“Why We Lost,” A General’s Account of Two Wars, by Daniel Bolger

Outlaw,

One of the purported reasons why the KSA funded the Pak nuclear program was to acquire an insurance/deterrence for the scenario you are alluding to. If an Iranian (re Shia) Army threatens the KSA the Ayatollahs will find themselves fighting off a nuclear armed Pak Army along their 800 km eastern border.

They wouldn't stand a chance - unless of course they have their own nukes!

I can't for the life of me understand why so many of our political leaders keep saying the war is over. Leaving Plato out of it, from what I can see the real war is yet to start and we should be doubling our efforts to keep it that way!

RC

RantCorp: I'm with Bill M. (if I remember correctly) on this one. I think that the fixation on "centers of gravity" is overly formulaic and not very productive in discussing these issues. Do I acknowledge that decades upon decades of Saudi proliferation of Wahhabism contributes to regional instability, to include inspiring some terrorists? Perhaps. However, I acknowledge that they do so in an effort to safeguard their own best interest against their hostile neighbor across the Gulf, which is an adamantly non-Wahhabist regime that happens to be the world's most prolific sponsor of international terrorism. Realizing that "centers of gravity" are a Clausewitzian tool for understanding warfare, DoD doctrine has divorced them from the wider context to the point that they're not particularly useful for discussing the issues at hand.

Sorry, I was out of town when you wrote your response. Like everything you write, a lot makes sense, and we agree on many things. I'm also hesitant to question you on an area of history you obviously know so much about. But here are a few areas where your comparison fails in <strong>scale</strong>.
<blockquote>While I didn't include the discussion in the materials you've seen, I've done some research and comparisons with respect to the populations in Dhofar and Anbar/Helmand and how that correlates to force strength (I mentioned commensurate force strength as one of my principles in an earlier comment). I think you overstate how widespread the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq were - both were fairly localized at the outset, and there have been areas of both countries that have been largely immune from violence (e.g. Balkh Province in Afghanistan and Kurdistan in Iraq). <strong>I believe that part of the reason why our results in Afghanistan and Iraq have been so mixed is that the troop-to-local ratio outlined in FM 3-24 wasn't adhered to</strong> - the British contingent in Helmand being a good example of this,</blockquote>
I noted your comments about the relative sizes in area and population elsewhere, but you did not really address that issue in your response. If Helmand province had 1.4 million people in over 1000 villages that is an entirely different <strong>scale</strong> than an equal area Dhofar with 50,000 folks in far fewer towns. It was easier to cover far fewer urban areas with the Sultan's 10,000 forces, 1,800 irregulars, 4000 Iranian troops, and 500 British SAS. With smaller forces, 12 helicopters may have sufficed for attack, transport, MEDEVAC, and logistical support. Twelve helos wouldn't have been close to enough in Helmand or Anbar.

Likewise, Anbar had between 1.2 and 2 million people dependent on the source and supposedly 95% of those lived close to the Euphrates river. Obviously, that is an entirely different scale of challenge in terms of urban combat.

In the quote above I bolded your mention of the "troop-to-local ratio" in manpower in the previous FM 3-24. That ratio no longer exists in the current revised version. Perhaps one reason for that is that Helmand province would have required 70,000 troops to meet the cited ratio of 1 per 20. The most it ever had was 27,000 in July 2010 plus 8,000 ANA which totals just 35,000 troops or half the earlier FM 3-24 cited quantity. Anbar likewise would have needed 60,000-100,000 troops alone which it actually came close to in 2008 (including Iraqi Army and Awakening forces). We do agree that quantity has a quality all its own in terms of boots on the ground. Look at how few troops we are trying to use to quell current ISIS problems. If 95% of ISIS fighters in Iraq are near towns along the Euphrates (and Tigris) to mirror the population, you can see where limited air attacks now could have problems in terms of civilian casualties and lack of effectiveness.

You mention the Hornbeam line which was apparently only 53 kms in length and had concertina, mines, and outposts. Contrast that with the mountainous AfPak border which is far larger and a constant source of Taliban and al Qaeda infiltration. The Syrian border was equally pourous and large along Anbar province. Obviously, the U.S. was not going to use mines like the Brits did back then. The elevated nature of many passes would have required enormously costly and difficult helicopter resupply of COPs to duplicate the "Hornbeam line" in Afghanistan.

Much of your discussion cites differences between the Oman of today, 1984 when the Marine Major wrote his study and the 60s-70s of the Dhofar rebellion. But that simply reinforces my contention that historical analogies are inherently flawed because things change over time. The Afghanistan of the 60s in Helmand province called "Little America" obviously was a different Afghanistan than the Soviets faced, and once again a different Afghanistan over time while we have been there.

Contrast Soviet casualties of 14,000 dead in Afghanistan to ours that are a fraction of that quantity. Then look at casualties of the Dhofar rebellion which were in the teens for British forces, low hundreds for Oman's SAF, and surprisingly high for Iranian forces. You probably have the more accurate numbers than Wikipedia but no doubt will agree that the scale is not comparable to either Helmand or Anbar coalition casualties. And given the far larger coalition and insurgent size in both provinces you would have expected even greater casualties than we experienced so apparently something our troops did was successful.

And even if you cite better port facilities in Iraq (and Kuwait) you are not adequately addressing the far larger road march distance to reach our troops in both conflicts. IEDs killed over half our troops and securing those convoys was not about getting luxuries to our troops. It was about necessities like food, water, fuel, and ammunition. That challenge passing through dangerous territory to reach far larger troop numbers was not the same scale as Dhofar.

Finally, as in Vietnam, if we had fought in Dhofar today, our carriers and other ships and bases could have pummeled insurgents to a far greater extent than was possible from sea-basing alone against Iraq or Afghanistan. The distance inland from the Oman's shore was not far. USAF airlift of MRAPs, troops, supply airdrops, and the aerial refueling challenge would have been simplified with less overland distance once crossing Oman's shore.

I think your assessment that the insurgency was limited initially in both Iraq and Afghanistan also is flawed. Lots of Sunnis were involved in many areas, and many were urban nightmares. Sure the Kurd areas were less involved but that still leaves many millions of angry Sunnis and Shiites elsewhere compared to the 50,000 population of Dhofar. Afghanistan similarly was not a pleasant place anywhere where the Taliban had previously been in largely Pashtun areas. Those overall areas and populations where insurgencies were occurring were far larger in scale than Dhofar or all of Oman whose population at the time was only one million overall.

Move Forward: Thanks for your response and challenge.

I want to clarify that I don't disagree that the Saudi proclivity for proliferating Wahhabism has had some obvious unintended consequences in the long-term, but beyond your observations about basing facilities and oil, I think it's also important to once again point out that the Saudi government (roughly synonymous with the House of Saud, though there's some gray area) didn't sponsor 9/11, so punishing them with a punitive raid or an attempted palace coup would have been hitting the wrong target. Doing a root cause analysis and applying diplomatic pressure to get them to alter their methods of promoting Wahhabism would have been (and I think <I>are</I>, as I believe this has happened) a better approach. Let us not forget that since 9/11, the Saudis have implemented programs that have been fairly effective at re-indoctrinating former malcontents and pulling them away from terrorism. I also think you're off base on your accusations about the Saudis and U.S. frackers - I'm not saying that that's not part of their overall goal, but there's a lot more going on strategically than that, particularly targeting Iran, Russia, and ISIS/DAESH. I wrote a lengthy article on that topic last month and would be glad to give you the link if you'd like.

With respect to your comments on Dhofar:

- While I didn't include the discussion in the materials you've seen, I've done some research and comparisons with respect to the populations in Dhofar and Anbar/Helmand and how that correlates to force strength (I mentioned commensurate force strength as one of my principles in an earlier comment). I think you overstate how widespread the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq were - both were fairly localized at the outset, and there have been areas of both countries that have been largely immune from violence (e.g. Balkh Province in Afghanistan and Kurdistan in Iraq). I believe that part of the reason why our results in Afghanistan and Iraq have been so mixed is that the troop-to-local ratio outlined in FM 3-24 wasn't adhered to - the British contingent in Helmand being a good example of this, and <A HREF="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gQFLsfS4BGc
">this interview by the KCL Department of War Studies</A> with retired British Lieutenant General Jonathon Riley features a good discussion of that. I would also counter with your observation about the localization of the insurgency to Dhofar by pointing out that that wasn't an accident, the insurgency remained localized because the COIN force in Dhofar did a far better job of restricting insurgent maneuver and logistics through the use of several <I>cordons sanitaires</I> than ISAF or MNF-I have done. Most notable of these were the Hornbeam and Damavand lines, which made it virtually impossible for the PFLO(AG) to move freely through the jebel; the comparison between this and the porous Afghan and Iraqi borders should be obvious. So, I maintain that the comparison is only made invalid by years of poor operational planning and execution on the parts of ISAF and MNF-I.

- I simply disagree with your assessment of the logistical differences between Dhofar, Afghanistan, and Iraq - if anything, the logistical challenges in Dhofar were <I>worse</I> on balance than its modern corollaries. In 1970, Salalah basically had one pier and one British guy supervising some locals to operate it; Iraq's port facilities in 2003 were far better developed. There are obviously some logistical challenges for land-locked Afghanistan, but its transit links with its neighbors are much better than anything that was in place anywhere in Oman in 1970. Many troops in Afghanistan (and Iraq before) have access to post exchanges, fast food, and MWR provisions that even the troops at RAF Salalah would never have dreamed of - to the degree that one of the few things General McChrystal did correctly was to enforce a short-lived moratorium on fast food purveyors on the grounds that "<A HREF="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703610604576158610111737164… is a war zone, not an amusement park</A>". The SAF <A HREF="http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3749.pdf">never operated more than twelve helicopters at a time</A>, roughly equivalent to a single Marine medium helicopter squadron (although this was later supplemented by the Imperial Iranian Air Force), which were used for both combat operations and for resupplying positions that were roughly analagous to positions such as COP Keating or OP Restrepo, though possibly more austere. These were supplemented with pack animal trains, which are also used in Afghanistan. (<A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/In-Service-Sultan-Account-Insurgency/dp/184415467… the Service of the Sultan</A> by Ian Gardiner describes some of these logistics operations; his descriptions actually seem very similar to what I've read about Afghanistan). The COIN force in Dhofar lived consistently with FM 3-24 paragraph 8-13, which warns against "logistic postures that project an image of unduly luxurious living". I think one would be hard pressed to argue that the logistical footprint in Afghanistan or Iraq reflects FM 3-24. ISAF and MNF-I have also enjoyed better provisions for fixed and rotary wing heavy airlift than was ever available in Dhofar, as well as a much bigger budget than Oman's modest and nascent energy income or Britain's withdrawal from "<A HREF="https://www.rusi.org/publications/other/ref:N517AA8D59D1B3/">East of Suez</A>" would have ever allowed.

- Major Cheney's study was one of my sources, and while valuable, some of his observations that you cite reflect the state of Oman nearly a decade after the Dhofar War's end, not the conditions on the ground when it began. In 1970, Oman had just begun pumping oil, and its energy resources are modest compared to those of its neighbors. Major Cheney's study also cites the Saudi support for the insurgents, but doesn't reflect that the Saudis <A HREF="http://countrystudies.us/persian-gulf-states/62.htm">reversed sides</A> as a counter to Iranian participation in the campaign in support of the Omani government. There are several good books on the campaign, but the best I've read is the aforementioned one by Ian Gardiner.

- The Ibadhis are moderate <I>now</I>. In Wilfred Thesiger's classic <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/Arabian-Penguin-Classics-Wilfred-Thesiger/dp/0141… Sands</A>, he discusses having to claim to be a Syrian owing to threats against "The Christian" by the Ibadhi Imam, who had repeatedly clashed the Sultan. Ibadhis and Sunnis have fought one another in the past over religious differences. There are also some ethnic, cultural, and political faults between the residents of what were once known as Dhofar, Oman proper (the interior), and Muscat (the coastline) that aren't reflected by Major Cheney's paper, and which were occasionally violent. Your understanding of the Omani-Iranian relationship is also lacking, as the countries remain close and conduct military drills together. I wouldn't rule out Iranian support in Oman post-1979, though I doubt that the need will arise. Oman has traditionally been the "Switzerland" of the GCC, for lack of a better term, and has repeatedly served as a diplomatic middle-man between the West and Iran. While the sectarian divide is real, both pre- and post-Revolutionary Iran have been willing to collaborate with traditional rivals when doing so serves their own interest.

- Your assessment of Oman, re: urban areas, desert terrain, et cetera is accurate for 1984 or 2015, but out of context for 1970. Oman has been utterly transformed since 1970, so Major Cheney's assessment and some of the other statistics you cited do not accurately reflect the state of affairs during the Dhofar War. To read some of the descriptions of Thesiger, or Gardiner, or also <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/SAS-Other-Animals-Experiences-During-ebook/dp/B00… Higgins</A> (and potentially <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/Warlords-Oman-P-S-Allfree-ebook/dp/B00JZB8W9G/">P…. Allfree</A>, though I'm only partly into his book), one would be forgiven for assuming that they were, in fact, referring to Helmand. And again, the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq were initially localized, as was the one in Dhofar, but I maintain that the former cases spread because of poor operational planning and execution by ISAF and MNF-I.

- Again, your comparison of the Omani, Afghan, and Iraqi economies once again reflect the Oman/Dhofar of 1984 or 2015, rather than that of 1970. One such example: the British advisors determined quickly that one of the five key lines of effort needed to be a veterinary program because the Dhofari economy was entirely contingent upon livestock. (Higgins' book, linked to above, describes this in detail; Major General Tony Jeapes <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/SAS-Secret-Operation-Storm-Middle/dp/1853675679/"…; also describes "Operation Taurus", a "Texan-style cattle drive" precipitated by the firqat militias' refusal to keep fighting until the SAF helped them to move their livestock to Salalah for sale. Afghanistan's long-term economic prospects might be more modest than those of Oman, but with Afghanistan's mineral resources and agricultural potential (<A HREF="www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30246121‎">pomegranates</A>, <A HREF="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13806062‎">saffron</A>, <A HREF="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/13/afghanistan">wheat</A&gt;, and even poppies cultivated for legitimate pharmaceutical use have all been suggested as cash crops), I would suggest that this is down to mismanagement, rather than representing a fundamental difference that undermines the Dhofar comparison.

- With respect to your observation about the Sultans, you overstate the role of the SAS (I say this because a retired Royal Marines Brigadier and Dhofar veteran read my dissertation, and his only correction was that <I>I</I> had overstated their role). You rightly identify that the nature of the insurgency shifted in 1970, and in fact this was one of the <I>catalysts</I> for the palace coup, rather than its result - if anything this is a long term, dare I say <I>strategic</I>, best practice that contrasts between Dhofar on the one hand, and Afghanistan or Iraq on the other. You also neglect to mention that the Dhofari insurgency gained steam in 1970 after the British withdrawal from Aden, the announced withdrawal from Bahrain and the rest of the region "East of Suez", and the ensuing establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, which sponsored the PFLO(AG) with Communist Bloc support. I would suggest that the policies of the British and other Western states to <A HREF="http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28896860">train and mentor royals like Sultan Qaboos</A> are part of why the Gulf monarchies have been relatively stable in recent decades. One of the reasons why Egypt has weathered the Arab Spring better than it could have is that the United States has maintained relationships with the ruling military government for decades, particularly since the Camp David Accords. As such, this is a contrast that we should be taking as a <I>lesson</I> from Dhofar, rather using it as an excuse to dismiss Dhofar as a relevant example.

- You're correct that there were no coups in Afghanistan or Iraq, and that the Dhofari rebels were communists, not radical Muslim extremists. You're absolutely right: all insurgencies are different. I would once again counter that about half of FM 3-24 consists of examples from Vietnam, and many leaders to include President Bush himself read about the Algerian War around 2004/'05. Differences in ideology between communists and Islamists matter, but that doesn't preclude them from employing the same methodologies. I think that if you were to read Mao or Guevara (though I don't know why you'd bother with Guevara), you'd find a lot of similarities between their writings and the writings and methods of a Zarqawi, or a Mullah Omar, or an al Baghdadi. And when you figure that the COIN campaign in Dhofar produced a favorable result and a lasting political solution, as opposed to the results we've seen in Iraq and are bracing for in Afghanistan, I'm not sure that there's so much room for derision. Rather, it would be nice to hear someone saying, "How can we scale this kind of regional success up to the national level?"

Any more specific than that, and I'm afraid you'll have to wait until at least late 2016, at which point I hope to have a book ready to publish. Of course, I say that partly in jest, as I'd be happy to continue discussing some of these individual points with you if you have further thoughts on the matter.

The theory or fact that:

a. The House of Saud,

b. Sponsors the extreme element of Wahhabi,

c. So as deflect the green eye of envy and appear pious;

d. This, so as to preclude/confuse/defuse rebellion and regime change,

e. Which would otherwise occur without such sponsorship.

This theory or fact would, indeed, seem to explain why the House of Saud might, under normal circumstances, have been the target of the United States' retribution after 9/11; much as was the case with the Taliban, in Afghanistan, who had housed bin Laden.

This theory, however, does not explain why the House of Saud -- in spite of this known relationship/sponsorship -- was not targeted.

To understand why the House of Saud was not targeted, one could look to a number of possibilities, for example:

a. To maintain a balance of power vis-a-vis Iran?

b. To prevent the KSA from falling into the hands of those who would not ally themselves, much as the House of Saud has, with the United States? And/or

c. To prevent economic problems re: oil?

I am sure there are other reasons.

In sum, however, none of these problems/circumstances were present in Afghanistan and re: the Taliban and, thus, nothing stood in the way of our going after the regime there.

Rant,

You focus on a small point. I don't think that Iraq or Afghanistan needed to be attacked at all. Like I said, these were conflicts of OUR choice. I agree with you, we needed to kick or punch someone, and they the two easy targets. The 9/11 attacks were planned in Florida, California, England, France and Germany equally to Afghanistan - but I don't recall us deciding it was necessary to change any of those regimes (though the case for California is an interesting one... )

My point on punitive expeditions is that sometimes a major power does need to make a point in a very physical way. We have bought so strongly into the idea that what we stand for is right, therefore any who hold opposing views are wrong; that are values are universal, so therefore anybody holding contrary values are wrong; etc - that we too quickly justify that we need to bring people to the light and way of American goodness and do them great favors when we replace their governments and systems of governance with ones designed and approved by us. I hope it is just an awkward phase we are going through, but it does seem to be lingering.

The "sins" of Afghanistan and Iraq were not all that great in regards to 9/11, so any punitive expedition should have been tailored accordingly. My primary points in bringing it up were two. First, because LTG Bolger suggested completely crushing two legs of the social trinity (Government and Army) and then leaving the People to sort it out. Crazy and unnecessary. And two, because it is a tool we have largely taken out of our tool kit. Now we prefer drive by shootings with drones or bombers. Not the same thing. More "the shores of Tripoli"- this sort of thing used to be the bread and butter for the Marines.

One of my most frustrated criticisms of American COIN "strategy" (e.g., campaign design) is this obstinate focus on Vietnam, and it appears to be one that LTG Bolger himself has latched onto. If LTG Bolger doesn't understand the wider strategic context behind OIF, then I question whether he understands the wider strategic context behind the result of the Vietnam War (which I've <A HREF="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/winning-battles-losing-wars">discussed elsewhere here at SWJ</A>), and he doesn't appear to be alone among his peers in that regard. David Johnson of RAND wrote an <A HREF="http://warontherocks.com/2014/01/failure-to-learn-reflections-on-a-care… for War on the Rocks</A> last year, which strikes me as being much better than anything I've seen/heard from LTG Bolger, that describes just how aggressively the Army worked to forget and/or de-contextualize the lessons of Vietnam after 1975, so LTG Bolger's observation about these "educated, experienced senior military men and women who had all studied Vietnam in their service schools" says more than he may have intended. His subsequent statement that "[a]bsent a realistic campaign concept in both countries, wars of attrition developed" seems to be more tactics/campaigning repackaged as "strategy" from a man who doesn't seem to understand the difference. The 2006 edition of FM 3-24 mentions Vietnam sixty times, despite the fact that the COIN campaign in Vietnam wasn't particularly successful; however, it mentions Algeria (in passing) only five or six times, the Philippines Insurrection (in passing) four times, Malaya two or three times, Oman once, and the Soviet-Afghan War not at all. While Bill M. may take me to task for citing "colonial era COIN", and while Vietnam certainly offers relevant lessons (some of which could and should have been applied to Afghanistan and Iraq), other campaigns (including colonial era ones) could have offered more relevant lessons to the conditions peculiar to Afghanistan and Iraq respectively. The fixation on Vietnam by LTG Bolger and his peers, to the detriment of understanding the conflicts at hand and seeking out the best practices from the corpus of literature on the recent history of insurgency, is inconsistent with the need for warrior-scholars, of which Generals Petraeus, Mattis, and McMaster are probably the best contemporary examples (seemingly in stark contrast to the quorum of their peers). Ultimately, the proposition that Afghanistan and Iraq were like-for-like repeats of Vietnam falls apart under closer scrutiny. As far as I'm concerned, LTG Bolger's statement that you cited further undermines his credibility.

Bill C.: I'll not address the bulk of your proposition, as we have discussed it ad nauseum elsewhere. Rather, I will make the observation that I suspect that you've applied more intellectual rigor to your oft-repeated hypothesis than LTG Bolger did to his book.

The previous comment was on another SWJ Blog thread, alongside another four comments: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-3-star-general-explains-why-we-lost-…

<BLOCKQUOTE>Every senior leader did something that stood out during their career to reach such a senior rank.</BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm not sure that's the accepted concensus. My impression is that many, perhaps most, senior leaders reach their positions more from hiding in plain sight than from going out of their way to distinguish themselves.

I enjoyed reading your comment. I do have one main quibble, though, and that's with the "if you break it, you buy it" argument. I really respect that position, at least in theory, but sometimes I don't think "buying" what's "broke" will actually fix anything. Its nice to think that we can do better, and make things right, but we shouldn't just keep breaking more and more things as we stay and feel good about staying.

Of course, this whole line of thought only gets us so far, because ultimately, some things have been broken long before we've gotten involved. Do we have to buy the Sunni/Shia divide, or maps that weren't drawn to fit the human terrain? I'd be happy if we could fix some of those issues, but we don't own them, and even if we did, ownership doesn't equal thd ability to make positive changes.