America's Secret Weapon to Stop Russia by Robert Spalding III, The National Interest
… Many have already said that there are no military options in the Ukraine crisis. While Western Europe and the United States do not desire conflict with Russia, the lack of action supporting Ukraine is actually a provocative gesture that invites escalation by the Russians. Fritz Kraemer, a little-known but highly influential strategist in the Pentagon best known for his many years as advisor to numerous secretaries of defense, believed that there were two ways to be provocative. One way was to be threatening, and in so doing provoke an enemy to action. The other way was to appear weak, and thus to provoke an adversary into a similar risky misadventure.
Before the United States Air Force began pounding Saddam’s forces in what would be a prelude to a one-hundred-hour ground campaign, it provided a much more subtle service to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. When considering the first Iraq war, most people think about the offensive campaign that pushed Saddam’s forces out of Kuwait. Few remember the deterrence provided by airpower before allied aircraft began the offensive that would be known as “Desert Storm.” …
Comments
Is Robert Spalding a Military Fellow at Council on Foreign Affairs? There is confusion in this piece, IMO, between offense and defense and in using correct examples.
NATO was about Western Europe. Ukraine is not Germany. And nuclear weapons change things so that the other examples seem a bit odd to me.
But what I really wanted to say is that the Council on Foreign Affairs seems to have this long time confusion between NATO as a defensive military alliance and the EU as a long term project to create a zone of peaceful activity and a collective or community.
The Ukraine as part of a US defense security perimeter within NATO confuses the various missions and mixes up defense with offense and democratization and markets with the nature of security perimeters and where the lines are drawn. Too close, and it is permanently unstable.
An example is a 1950's book from Ben Tillman Moore, I believe, on the future of NATO. He speaks of a creating a community and this mixed-up nature of thought continues to the conversation today. I believe some of the California universities have this book on file in an open source format that can be accessed via internet.
JPWREL:
The question is actually about the fate of the Ukrainians, not about the Ukrainian regime. I think there are perhaps a rather large number of Ukrainians who are willing to fight Russians. They will need money and weapons though.
The question after that has to do with the fate of the Poles, the Czechs and others.
Every airplane can be destroyed on the ground. Nothing new there. You just have to plan to minimize that possibility and hope for the best.
I think you mean 30 man hours of maintenance per flying hour. That is the way those figures have always been presented to my knowledge. The more mechanics and parts then, the shorter the turnaround time. Mechanics are very important.
How many of you brave souls are ready to die for a massively corrupt and incompetent regime in Kiev? And as far as F-22's are concerned with such a forward basing as many of you suggest the Russians have the means to be able to destroy them on the ground. And on the ground most of them would be since the F-22 has approximately 30 hours of maintenance for every hour in the sky.
Outlaw-09,
Thanks for interesting thoughts. I had been thinking about tapping the S.P.R. to supply oil directly to Ukraine or Europe, should Russia get really nasty. The approach you discuss is more effective. I have to chuckle at the D.o.E.'s response as routine test sales for the recent release of the S.P.R.(like the routine military exercises along the Ukraine border...hah!).
The lingering concern I do have, however, is that the day-by-day timeline of the current 'hot-stage' of the confrontation precludes a waiting period for these longer-term economic levers to kick in. A push-back with aircraft and patrols in international waters with a focus on Ukraine would buy the time required for the economic levers to exert their far more pervasive effects.
Ned.
While this article talks about military power as the secret weapon---how about one that is even more potent, does not require military confrontation and has probably been tested in the recent sell of 5M barrels and the WH knows it's true strength to bring Putin in line on the Crimea. By the way the crude sold was sour---the same type as sold by Russia out of the Urals.
The only question is---is the WH willing to use it as part of their "soft power" approach as it is truly the nail in the coffin.
The world's most powerful weapon: Oil
For several years, the United States' Strategic Petroleum Reserve, or SPR, has rarely garnered any attention, mostly because it is used so sparingly. Since 1977, when it was implemented, there have been only a handful of times that it has tapped, the last being in 2011, when President Obama authorized the release of 60 million barrels in response to the crisis in Libya.
That is what makes the recent "test sale" of 5 million barrels of oil so intriguing. This is the first time since 1990 that there has been a test sale from the SPR, which just happens so coincide with the time there was concern that Iraq could invade Saudi Arabia. While correlation does not always mean causation, the release of those 5 million barrels coincided with a 2.7% drop in crude oil prices.
Hit 'em where it hurts -- their wallet
It's no secret that Russia is one of the world's leading exporters of oil and gas. It exports about 8.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and refined petroleum products, as well as 19.3% of the worlds natural gas exports. What is less known is Russia's nearly crippling dependence on oil and gas revenues to pay the bills. The $662.3 billion petroleum industry in Russia represents 26.5% of GDP, and over 50% of the federal government's revenue comes from royalties. Unfortunately for Russia, its oil doesn't come cheap. Even with oil at $100 per barrel and current production levels, the country projects only 1.8% GDP growth, and if oil were to fall any lower it would force massive federal budget cuts.
So what exactly would releasing oil from there do? Let's say U.S. production and imports from Canada and Mexico were to hold place. The U.S. would need to release about 950,000 barrels per day to meet all of the United States' current demand. Based on the SPR's 727 million barrels in storage, we could do this for well over two years and drive down global prices significantly. Surprisingly, though, we don't even need to go to that extreme. According to economist Phillip Verleger in a recent Quartz article, if the U.S. were to release only 500,000 barrels per day from the SPR, it would lead to a $10 drop in oil prices and would cost Russia $40 billion in sales. At this pace, we could maintain this pace for more than four years and could potentially cause Russia's GDP to drop by 4%.
We've done it before, but it will be harder this time
There are two ways to describe the collapse of the Soviet Union: The storybook version is about the arms race that eventually bankrupted the USSR and led to its evenutal collapse. The one that doesn't get told as much, though, is the other half of what caused the bankruptcy: cheap oil. In a coordinated effort with Saudi Arabia to increase global crude production, inflation-adjusted oil prices fell 69% between 1981 and 1988. This resulted in massive revenue shortfalls for the USSR and became a critical piece that eventually led to its downfall.
Taken from the Quartz article:
The idea has history behind it. In 1985, Saudi Arabia decided to pump a lot more oil and increase its share of global oil sales. As a result, oil prices plunged by more than half, at one point in 1986 reaching $13 a barrel. The primary, unintended victim was the Soviet Union. “The Soviet Union lost approximately $20 billion per year, money without which the country simply could not survive,” wrote former Russian prime minister Yegor Gaidar. The economy went into a tailspin, as then did the politics, and in 1991, the Soviet Union was no more.
NOTE: Info concerning the 5M barrel crude sale
SPR oil put up for sale on the day Ukraine’s new chief is in town
By John Kingston | March 12, 2014 04:27 PM
One trader speaking to a Platts reporter had this to say about the decision by the Department of Energy today to sell 5 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
“The Gulf Coast market has plenty of barrels,” he said. “They should have done it a few weeks ago when the Gulf Coast was tight due to all the weather delays.”
A few weeks ago, however, Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk wasn’t in Washington. He’s the interim President of Ukraine, and he’s in DC today.
It almost defies logic to think there isn’t a link. (And White House press secretary Jay Carney said there isn’t one, when asked about it at the daily White House press briefing.)
But there is no reason to sell oil now. The reason given by the Department of Energy — a test sale to evaluate its ability to distribute oil in the event of an emergency — sounds very formal and entirely believable. But such a test hasn’t been done since 1990. Why now?
The “energy weapon” that has been discussed so vehemently since the Ukraine crisis began — using US LNG and crude oil exports to weaken world prices and steal Russia’s energy customers — always had a few flaws in it. First of all, even for the terminals where LNG exports have been approved, they aren’t ready to go. Second, US crude exports are still banned, despite lots of talk of changing that.
But selling oil out of the SPR, and specifying that it’s sour crude that’s for sale — the same type as Urals, Russia’s crude grade — can be done now. Next month, in fact, 5 million barrels of oil over 30 days, for an average of just over 165,000 b/d.
From the article behind the link: "Crimea is most likely permanently lost until there is a change in government in Russia. To buy time for Ukraine and to allow time for diplomatic measures to be effective, a military solution is called for. A purely defensive deployment of F-22 fighters (along with supporting aircraft) is just one possible solution. To be diplomatically effective these forces would have to come with an American promise to defend Ukrainian skies from attack."
Carl, like the article, your reasoning makes sense to me; place those F-22s in Western Ukraine and send Special Forces to start training up the Ukrainian military gutted by President Yanukovich, a latter-day Seyss-Inquart -- this time, duly deposed. While I grew up during the Viet Nam era and lost faith in military power (before I realized that it was a mis-applied analogy that led to the tragedy for American troops and Vietnamese), let's think of the 20th century without an America in it.
It makes me shudder. American exceptionalism (a/k/a why us?) is duly questioned these days. In a letter to my family, I argue that such exceptionalism exists but has been abused and misused to over-extend power or to shrink from confrontation. That essay basically argues that America can 'take exception' to the prevailing wisdom (in this case, accepting aggression as acceptable, if not ideal, in a sphere of influence) by following the ideal on which our Republic was established against all odds and that we can do better (not better than others but better than ourselves). Besides, if we do nothing now, we may very well need a whole lot of boots on the ground later on.
http://nedmcdletters.blogspot.com/2014/03/letter-96-is-american-excepti…
Here is the principal argument articulated in Congress supportive of Russia Following the link is a critique of this three minute speech, unfortunately shut-down rather arbitrarily, placed to friends in F.B.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?c4488507/reasoned-case-sympathetic-russia
Making available the basic pro-Russian argument among a few brave Congressmen willing to buck the consensus. You all know my views on the Crimea -- views that very few people admittedly hold; my stubbornness persists in the face of an uncomplicated, perhaps compelling, argument emerging as a bottom-up dissent against the political leadership. The basic concerns I have with this argument by Representative Rohrbacher (R-CA) are three-fold:
1. Russia is not going to stop with Crimea. Right now, the Putinista has gained very little geopolitically because the Crimea is largely cut off from Russia by Eastern Ukraine. Russia already has Sevastopol for her navy; taking Crimea may change the status of that base from leasing to a disturbing ownership. The costs for grabbing Crimea alone are too high. But as a first step, not so high, if Russia achieves a more rational aim of taking Eastern Ukraine.
2. Even if Moldova permits Transnistria to secede and join Russia (as that spindly region had tried to do under the auspices of the crumbling U.S.S.R.) the micro-region of half a million people would remain completely alienated from the mother country by a large chunk of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. Annexing the rest of Eastern Ukraine will consolidate Russia's territorial hold over Transnistria.
3. There is the question raised against comparing the current response to Russia as similar to the appeasement of Germany in the 1930s: President Putin is not Hitler; he is not bent on world conquest. Well, neither was Hitler.
Outside of rubbing the face of the grimacing Gauls in the dirt in 1940, Hitler basically wanted western Russia and Ukraine as in-continent colonies to relieve over-crowding in Germany and to grab Europe's bread-basket. Ukraine exports a large part of its yearly crop. The U.S.S.R. had to import massive amounts of U.S.-cultivated wheat in the 1970s. One can infer that the domestic production within the U.S.S.R. of foodstuffs outside of Ukraine was insufficient.
Hitler got 'blitzed' from his early wins over weaker states and over-played his hand confusing his Generals' brilliance and moral cowardice with his delusions of demi-godliness. Had he not been a blood-drunk bully, Hitler may well have retained his core objectives. So might Putin, if given a green light afforded by a severe calcium deficiency in the lower back.
<blockquote>I did indeed mean GPS jamming</blockquote>Then read this, in particular the 5th paragraph...but also about the spoofing.
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_04_03_2014…
Again, I don't know lots about GPS but unlike many I have faith that the scientists/engineers can figure out how to make it function securely. And as mentioned earlier, there are and will be alternatives.
<blockquote>You keep missing the point with the F-22. Its utility has nothing at all to do with dropping bombs big or little on peoples head. It wasn't designed to do that. It was designed to kill other airplanes, flocks of 'em. We have had so much our own way since 1943 that people forget what the primary purpose of a fighter is, it is to kill other airplanes. We've been calling light bombers 'fighters' for so long we get them mixed up.</blockquote>Au contraire. You keep superimposing past threat aircraft numbers into future fights that will be dominated by ballistic and cruise missiles. The threat from China is not lots of modern fighters, it is lots of hidden short to medium range missiles and pretty numerous and effective air defenses. Same for Iran and Russia. The number of F-22s we have is perfectly adequate given that no other nation has a single fielded stealth aircraft let alone 200+ plus of them with thousands of F-35s on the way. Whether you believe it or not, the F-22 definitely has a ground attack mission. However, that mission is not against ground armor.
The F-22 already can respond to address any threat rapidly. What cannot respond rapidly is the sole kind of BCT that actually can stop Russian armor. The Army armored BCT. It needs to be manned in theater or prepositioned or some mix of the two. Otherwise we and NATO can make all the threatening noises we want without a true deterrent.
Prince Ned:
We have a problem, a big one for all the reasons you articulated. We have three more years of this administration and I fear what may come. Your reference to what Buchanan handed Lincoln is very apt and very scary. These guys just don't get it. They can't get it maybe. The people at the top are all superzips (thank you Charles Murray) and their lives have been nothing but exclusive schools and gated communities. They have no chance against a killer like Putin. They can't even see him. That wouldn't be so bad except their baby like views are not going to get then killed; those views and inaction may get a lot of flyover people killed, not to mention Ukrainians and Poles, people who don't have to die.
I like your comment about time being needed, not perfection. So often it seems like the genii inside the beltway figure if they only puzzle it out long enough and think 'strategically', perfection can be achieved...and then they look up and the time is all gone.
Appeasement is indeed how it looks.
Sir Carlos,
Of course, I agree with you. Two niggling concerns remain:
> my flagging confidence in President Obama to follow through if the going gets "to Russia with rough"; as well as, secondarily,
> the possible insufficiency of a pure air deterrent if Russia seeks to unlock Transnistria and Crimea from their geographical isolation from mama-bear (as, I believe Putineers are likely to do).
Answering the junior concern first: why not bring in the Caliporno National Guard (sister guard to Ukraine) 'for (six months of) ROUTINE military exercises' (until the soft power hardens)? Poking the bear can go both ways. Arrrrr.
The first concern is my primary one because of its potential consequences. If the Administration backed away, as per its track record (i.e., if you can't beat 'em at ZERO cost, run like hell), that would lead to a much bigger shooting war down the road as Russia would see nothing but green and red ahead (and of that I remain convinced).
It is one thing, not pleasant, to bail out on a pax-max mission (e.g., Lebanon in 1983 or Somalia a decade later), but it is another problem altogether to cut and run before a cross-border, sovereign aggressor. MoveForward's concerns are well articulated; the one difference I have is we need presence, not perfection, to buy the time for longer-term 'soft-power' to kick in.
Many critics of the President see him as another Chamberlain; at least that P.M. ramped up re-armament in the U.K. after Munich. My sense is that President Obama resembles not the chief executive whose train route he took to D.C. in 2009 en route to his first inauguration (i.e., President Lincoln) but his predecessor. President Buchanan had ruled out the use hard power and depleted what soft power had been available to leave a festering carnage to his successor.
Of course, I am not being fair to judge a man subjected to the daily pressures of a President, particularly this President with the gratuitous bullying he has endured from the G.0.P., but that prism (prison) of appeasement is how this situation looks to me.
Move Forward:
I did indeed mean GPS jamming. You fight Ivan or the Red Chinese you had better find something else to guide those bombs because GPS won't work. It isn't another issue, it is the issue.
You keep missing the point with the F-22. Its utility has nothing at all to do with dropping bombs big or little on peoples head. It wasn't designed to do that. It was designed to kill other airplanes, flocks of 'em. We have had so much our own way since 1943 that people forget what the primary purpose of a fighter is, it is to kill other airplanes. We've been calling light bombers 'fighters' for so long we get them mixed up.
That big myth about the USAF (and USN and USMC) keeping our ground forces from being attacked from the isn't. That is what fighters have been doing so effectively for the last 70 years ground guys forget that isn't the natural order of things. Besides you contradict yourself in the sentence immediately following when you say Russian and Red Chinese aircraft won't survive long against our aircraft.
The Russians are often jerks but often they ain't. I wouldn't bet lives on them not being able to straighten things out well enough make good air strikes if their airplanes aren't contested by fighters.
The point of having F-22s isn't to avoid losing them. The point of having them is to kill the others guys airplanes or make them so afraid that that will happen that the other guy doesn't fly his airplanes. In order to do that they have to be in range. Being closer means more time on station and quicker reaction and more weapons carried. If that entails danger, that's war ain't it?
Of course Russia can seize east Ukraine even if F-22s are threatening. The Iraqi Army could have seized much of Saudi Arabia in 1991 despite the F-15s. But in doing so they would pay a price, smoking holes in the ground and dead Russians. If F-22s are around, they'll have to pay to play. If they aren't, they won't. Besides, let's say they take east Ukraine, then what? They got to hold it. If F-22s maintain a no fly zone over that area and unconventional warfare gets started with Ukrainian irregulars shooting off ATGMs and MANPADS, Russians are going to die. Vlad and the cheerleaders might not be so enthusiastic about conquest if that happens.
<blockquote>I think if you think GPS guided bombs are going to do any good at all against Russian or Red Chinese forces or any forces other than Talibanis or AQIs, you should think again.</blockquote>Carl, you're right. I don't think small GPS-guided bombs will do much good against moving Russian armor. But that is all the F-22 can drop and the F-22 is the sole NATO fixed wing aircraft guaranteed to survive in an environment of Ukrainian and Russian radar air defenses. Fratricide will run amuck if you read about Georgia in 2008. Any non-stealthy aircraft, to include NATO's, zooming around is at risk. You are probably talking about GPS jamming but that is another issue. Read the Wikipedia for small diameter bomb II and think F-35. It's not hard to get the facts exclusively in open source material.
<blockquote>The function of the Raptors would be to keep enemy air off friendly backs. That is its most important function. Dropping bombs and shooting missiles and guns at ground soldiers is nice to have but not something that precludes effective fighting. Most armies in the last hundred years have not had the benefit of that. We can do a lot to keep Russian air off Ukrainian heads and that is a lot. It is also a lot for the Russians to think about hence its deterrent effect.</blockquote>It's a big myth about the USAF keeping our ground forces from being attacked from the air. Nobody except China and Russia has large air forces anymore and they won't survive long against our aircraft and air defenses. The Russian aircraft won't hurt the Ukrainian ground forces either because they will be too busy dodging Ukrainian and Russia air defenses. Then think about how the Russian aircraft will distinguish between Ukrainian and Russian vehicles that look largely the same. Read about how many Russian Su-25s were lost in Georgia. If an A-10 can't survive in that environment, neither can an Su-25.
Don't you think the Russians already are thinking about the F-22? Of course they are a factor even if parked in Germany or elsewhere. The only ones that we will lose is if we are dumb enough to park them in range of tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in Ukraine, Poland, or other nearby NATO countries. However, F-22 air supremacy will not stop Russia from seizing east Ukraine in 3-5 days according to NATO public pronouncements.
Move Forward:
I read Mr. Farley's article and it is a mess. He sets out to demolish an argument that Mr. Spalding never made, that "fielding the fielding of F-22s could decisively tip the military balance in favor of the Ukrainian military." Mr. Farley does effectively demolish that argument, the problem is Mr. Spalding never made it. He said that those planes could "would immediately change Putin's invasion calculus." which it would and even Mr. Farley acknowledges that when he concedes that he figures no Russian aircraft would rise to directly challenge the Raptors.
The rest of Mr. Farley's article is filled with so many breathless expressions of wonderment that the Russians have...artillery. Wow! The Russians have...SAMs. Wow! There is a chance the Russians may actually shoot at us. Wow! And if so we may lose some airplanes. Wow! And so on. The one thing he does contribute is that Mr. Spalding carries things a bit too far thinking that Ukrainian ground attack aircraft could freely operate under the protection of the F-22s. They almost certainly couldn't as Russian tactical air defenses would prevent them from doing that.
The larger point is F-22s would make Russian planning vastly harder since they could not let any of their airplanes come close to those things. And the benefit of that is it would keep a lot of Russian air off the backs of the Ukrainians. That is only the tactical benefit. The morale benefit, a strategic one I would argue, is that deployment of those airplanes would hugely encourage not only the Ukrainians but the Poles as well. And in turn that would give the Russians some pause.
Aside from Mr. Farley's article your comments seem to this civilian to be stuck in the mud of recent American military experience. The function of the Raptors would be to keep enemy air off friendly backs. That is its most important function. Dropping bombs and shooting missiles and guns at ground soldiers is nice to have but not something that precludes effective fighting. Most armies in the last hundred years have not had the benefit of that. We can do a lot to keep Russian air off Ukrainian heads and that is a lot. It is also a lot for the Russians to think about hence its deterrent effect.
Yeah we would be chancing losing some Raptors but the potential gain is big and worth it in my view. The last thing you want is to still have equipment left when you are in such a bad position that having it doesn't do you any good, like the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1944. If anything this situation might get us thinking again about having an active production line for airplanes that you really need so you can afford to lost some.
I think if you think GPS guided bombs are going to do any good at all against Russian or Red Chinese forces or any forces other than Talibanis or AQIs, you should think again.
Carl,
Perhaps start by reading this Robert Farley article in today's War is Boring:
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/216d502626b8
Then read in Wikipedia about the Iskander-M ballistic and K cruise missiles and decide how close you want to place our scarce F-22s. Why do they need to be close anyway? They fly very fast from wherever you put them. However, also consider that scarce F-22s have trouble flying high to fight Russian fighters and lower to drop bombs that are GPS-based and would have trouble against moving Russian armor. The future F-35 will be better at ground attack of moving targets.
It would be interesting to see how the Ukrainian T-64, T-72, and few T-80 tanks fared against more numerous and modern Russian tanks. If Wikipedia is correct, the Ukrainians also have lots of BMPs 1 and 2, plus many BTR-70s. Still the U.S. and NATO have only lawful obligations to protect NATO states. Having U.S. and other NATO forces prepositioned in countries bordering Ukraine, but far from the border, would be a non-threatening red line safer from Iskanders and other air attack. Putin would understand the significance of armor and Apaches.
Distant 4th gen fighters, such as A-10C, F-15E, F-16, and F/A-18, are very vulnerable to Russian radar air defenses, and not good at taking out armor in mass if they are busy ducking missiles even if jamming EA-18G are nearby. A low-flying A-10C would not survive long against Russian air defenses. Lower-flying Apache helicopters would survive if accompanied by Army heavy armor, MLRS rounds, and protected by Army air defenses...and your distant-based F-22s...but we are talking only protecting NATO countries. Ukraine hopefully will become a buffer zone not controlled by the Russians nor a NATO member.
Gentlemen,
Interesting dialogue. I am not equipped to speak to the applicability or versatility of diverse weapons systems. Nonetheless, the measures called for here are calculated to give Ukraine the time and space necessary to spice up her economy and spruce up her defensive posture from now until the longer-term responses (e.g., economic sanctions, releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, reduced asset flows and investments, N.A.T.O. & E.U. working agreements as well as reneging on the reneging of installing missile defenses in Poland, the Czechered center and the Baltics) can re-define the terrain.
As such, the use of F-22s or Apaches, etc. may not be the perfect response but their presence ought to be an adequate one. That is not to dismiss the importance of this discussion as my view blithely overlooks the very real risk of Russia calling our bluff. What would we in the face of a very determined Russian roll-in of an Anschluß? Or if the Russians shot down a plane? At that point, the usefulness of deployed weapons would become paramount. I suspect that the Putinista and his band of merry Putineers will back off but this contingency must be anticipated and planned for.
The rub for me is the fact -- and it is a fact -- that somewhere the President crossed the invisible line from accommodation into appeasement. That perception has to be changed or the possibility of a shooting war becomes much higher, especially since both Crimea and Transnistria are each land-locked from mother Russia. That makes the 'necessity' of protecting an even smaller minority of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine-sans-Crimea all the more 'compelling' for Russia.
Slap:
I can never understand why people get preoccupied with our ground forces participating in this kind of thing. There are plenty of Poles and Ukrainians who can handle that. History has shown how well they can fight and boy would they be motivated, especially if we kept Ivan's airplanes off their backs.
You want to help me with something? I figure we invite Robert Gates out for some beers and we get him good and relaxed. Then we ask him what he now thinks of his decision to shut down the F-22 production at just over 180. That might be an interesting answer.
If the threat in the Cold War was the Soviet Union and not the ideology, why was the Cold War fought by proxy, in the developing world?
Poland and the Baltic States are members of NATO, and if they think they need help, they need to decide what they need and sit down with NATO.,, as they are in fact doing. The US should do its share, but the US also needs to insist that others do their share: this attitude that everything must always be all about US has got to change.
I was talking to Stan about all this, and it struck me that though he's in Estonia and you're in America, you seem a whole lot more worried over it than he does. Why do you suppose that is?
The sky is not falling. Hysteria is not called for.
Dayuhan:
Oh but it is. Round two remember, not round one.
Nonsense about the ideology being the primary enemy. The aggressive nuclear armed nation state that was the USSR was the primary enemy. Now, an aggressive nuclear armed nation state that used to be the USSR is itching to be the enemy. If it was just the ideology, we would still be after the Castro brothers Cuba. We are not because when the USSR fell, the communist ideology wasn't much of a threat anymore. So we get round 2.
Besides, there have been rather a lot of troublesome states that have managed to ruin things and kill millions without the benefit of a millenniumist ideology. Imperial Japan is a good example. So Putin's siloviki run Russia is a threat. I'll bet if you asked the man in the street in Warsaw, that is what he would say.
Interesting bit of sophistry you employ when your speak of "Europe". This isn't Europe we're talking primarily about here. It is Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic countries, the Czechs etc. They need us. They really do. I'll bet Biden got an earful about how much they do on his recent trip.
A component of leadership is loyalty, as is honor. Those states that have had millions of throats cut by Russians are looking for those things from us...now.
This is not US vs USSR 2.0. Not even close. The USSR was a threat to the US because it represented a global ideological movement with the capacity to take root around and even in the US and its allies. The threat was Communism, not the USSR per se. Of course that threat never became what it was intended to be, because at the end of the day Communism sucked and couldn't keep up... but the intention from the start was a global challenge to the West.
Putin has no equivalent to Communism. The closest thing he has to an ideology is Russian Nationalism, and that's self-limiting: it can only be sold to Russians. We do not have to worry about Russian nationalist movements sprouting and seeking to take control in Havana, Managua, and Berkeley.
Take a moment sometime and look up the figures on the relative size of the Russian and EU economies, of relative Russian and EU defense spending, and of defense spending as a % of GDP. Think about those numbers and tell me why the US taxpayer needs to come rushing to the defense of Europe.
If anyone is threatened here, it's Europe: it's certainly not the US. The Europeans are not children. They are quite capable of assessing the threat they face and determining what they need to counter it. If they feel they need US help, they can ask. If they ask politely, if the requests make sense, if they are willing to help shoulder the cost, and if they are willing to commit to a long term increase in defense spending, I think we should give them what they ask for. If not, that would have to be reconsidered.
Leadership doesn't mean telling people what they need and doing it for them. Sometimes it means letting those you lead define their needs, and sometimes it means encouraging or even forcing them to use their own capacities to meet those needs.
Curmudgeon:
No, that series of questions you asked had little to do with whether things were part of a comprehensive plane. Those questions were mostly logistical, nuts and bolts stuff that staffs should be able to take care of, or should be able to if they have time between equal opportunity sensitivity consciousness raising seminars. In this context and since you are I believe a professional military man, they come off as bureaucratic nitpicking the object of which is to make sure nothing much is done.
As I said before in another place, if you aren't going to do something until you have a perfect plan agreed upon by everybody, you are advocating not doing anything at all. And as I said elsewhere to, Putin has knocked a hole in the boat. We have to fix the hole and stop the flooding. There is no need to figure out precisely where we will steer and at what speed before we start damage control. F-22s and EF-18s are damage control.
I've heard that we can't be the world policeman anymore since I was a boy, and that was a very long time ago. The fact is if we don't step up, there is no one else who will, well no one else you would want your daughter to marry. Charles Krauthammer commented that we step up, or the Russians do, the Red Chines do or chaos does.
As far as I know the Ukrainians have been asking for weapons, not men and sure as hell not MREs. I suspect if we want to base F-22s there, consent may not be hard to get if Ivan moves west.
We do have some serious allies, Poland, the Czechs etc. I am quite confident they will very actively participate in us helping them keep Ivan away from the door. They still remember the Katyn Forest.
It is in many ways, USSR vs US round two, at least that is the way Vlad the would be Great seems to view it. He laments the passing of the USSR. The prime agent of that murdering empire's demise was us. It looks very much that he wants to restore something approaching the old USSR. WE are the most important obstacle in the way of that goal. That all makes it very much something like round two.
Carl, my comments are not intended to say “gee, that might be hard.” It is intended to say “maybe this should be part of a comprehensive plan, rather than a knee-jerk reaction … and while your at it, maybe the Ukrainians and the Europeans should be in on the plan.”
As for your second paragraph, then it is about time we start sharing that burden. As long as we do everything for everyone, no one is going to help. Reality is beating on our door. First, we need consent from the Ukrainians to do anything inside their borders. Second, we have some serious allies on the front line of this fight. They need to be an active participant in anything we do. That is how an alliance works. Finally, we cannot afford to be the world’s policemen anymore.
We need to realize that this is not the USSR versus the United States, Round Two. There is no plan to export communism as there was years ago. I have said it before, and will say it again – Russia cannot threaten the US with a conventional invasion force. They have nukes, but they would be a fool to use them. We would obliterate them (at least with the sub based nukes, not so sure about Air Force Missile Command). This is a regional matter with global implications. Therefore, we must first consult with regional allies and create a global strategic plan. Once the plan is in place we implement it. We should not be running amok like Team America World Police.
Curmudgeon:
Your first two paragraphs are, to paraphrase, saying "Gee. It might be hard." That is not likely to impress the Russians.
Your last paragraph is "Why us?" Us because we are the only ones with F-22s and EF-18s. Nobody else. And for better or for worse, us are tho one who formed the backbone of anti-totalitarianism in the last half of the 20th century. So they look to us. I don't mean the Germans and the increasingly feckless Brits (sorry David, but you can make a case about saying the same thing about us), I mean the front line NATO states and Ukraine, the ones who were murdered in their million by Germans then Russians. So we can decide whether we want to bleat, "Why us?" or we can get on with business and try to stop the killers.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJ9KkgGB4Kk
You want to stop killers like Putin? If you do you gotta try, not complain about how it won't be certain or easy.
This is not a new idea, and all of the meat has been left out. Where do you station them? In England, Germany, Poland? Any of those are NATO states that probably have the facilities already that could house them. Ukraine? Probably not since that would be seen as provocative and cause the Russians to react by say, cutting off Natural Gas to Europe.
How long does it take a Wing with all of the maintenance and ordinance to become operational in Europe? If it is going to take 30 days do we really want to advertise that and potentially ignite a "spoiling maneuver” by the Russians to take the Ukraine first. Would it not be smarter to position these assets and, only once they are operational, announce that we have agreed to protect Ukrainian sovereignty.
And finally, why the US? Don’t other NATO countries closer to the fight have similar weapons capabilities? Why must it be the US? To make us feel good? To pound our chest? What advantage is there to this rather than simply having the Ukraine agree to accept NATO protection? I am not saying we don’t have a strategic interest in limiting Russia’s regional ambitions. What I am saying is: are we really helping the situation or are we simply doing something to make us feel better about ourselves, or even worse, justify a large defense budget at the expense of the Ukrainians?
Very interesting idea, using F-22s as sort of a terrestrial equivalent to an aircraft carries deployment.
Eminently sensible. Very doable. There would be something tangible that we could point at and the front line NATO states and Ukraine could look at when we say we will back them. It would also make the Russians howl which is the best way to know that it has some meaning to them. It isn't laughable like our sending MREs.
EF-18s to go with F-22s would be good I think but I'm sure a guy like Mr. Spalding thought of that, just didn't say it.