Obama’s Syria Plan Teams Up American and Russian Forces

Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09 View Post
Pardon my French...BUT WHAT in the hell is Kerry doing???????

The Associated Press Verifizierter Account 
‏@AP
BREAKING: Kerry: US, Russia could approve strikes by Syrian government against al-Qaida-linked group despite new cease-fire.

So, how is that a cease-fire?

Great. So now the United States is working with Assad... Has the world gone mad?!?

So Assad and Putin are continuing as usual and humoring Kerry/US. Yes, that is par for the course these days.

Charles Lister ‏@Charles_Lister · 13 Min.Vor 13 Minuten

Wow.

The U.S. could end up “approving” #Assad regime airstrikes?

Quite extraordinary...

Comment coming out of Syrian opposition tonight with this news......
Kerry and #Obama, the most retarded duo of this century.

Breaking
Russian air strikes on northern Aleppo, Assad air strikes on rural Damascus as both criminal forces ignore the #SyriaCeasefire.

The Assad regime offensive in #Latakia is in full swing.

WONDER IF Kerry and Obnama care to explain this development...???????

Russia and #USA had a deal recently for a ceasefire in #Syria, and to then fight only against #JFS (ex-#AQ group) and #ISIS.

Now, heavy Russian+Regime airstrikes on #FSA positions in #Handarat in #Aleppo city, as well as barrel bombs on Taybat al-Imam in #Hama.

NOW fully a few hours into the so called Russian/US ceasefire

All the ongoing Russian+Regime airstrikes are on #FSA only, not #JFS or #ISIS. Russia is doing the opposite of what the ceasefire deal says.

I remember a US President stating before the press in 2014.....

"we will judge Putin by his ACTIONS not his WORDS".......

Appears Kerry was tone deaf during that press conference......

Kerry now seriously needs to explain to the West what he meant by not having an enforcement element in his farce of a ceasefire......and it has not even gotten to the next day of this so called seven day ceasefire.....

Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09 View Post
NOW post Eid ceasefire begins.......

Syria #Russia'n soldiers now deployed along Castello (supply-) road in north

20 minutes after the fake ceasefire, airstrikes are hitting Handrat camps and Al Shaqeeq area in Aleppo....

Michael Weiss ‏@michaeldweiss · 2 Min.vor 2 Minuten
So far since the "ceasefire" Assad has shelled Deraa and barrel bombed Aleppo.

Syria Airstrikes after "#Ceasefire" on east parts of Castello road.
Seems #Russia bomb way into eastern #Aleppo

Hama: #Assad barrel bomb attack in Northern #Hama minutes ago. #Ceasefire
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yp9OaC-k-4o …

Daraa: #Pro-#Assad forces shelling #Al_Hara town with artillery now. #Ceasefire

Aleppo: #Assad helicopter has dropped a barrel bomb on Eastern #Aleppo. #Ceasefire

BREAKING: Syrian ceasefire brokered by the US and Russia begins now across the country except jihadist-held territory - via @AFP

Do you know when we'll hear where the jihadist-held territory is referring to?

NO that is in the five secret agreements that Lavrov and Kerry do not want published.......

BUT WAIT more Russian and Assad ceasefire violations.....

Airstikes on al Harra town in southern #Syria after #Ceasefire

Syria #Hama Airstrikes on Taybat al-Imam town after "#Ceasefire"

Airstrikes now on Beit Jann /#Damascus
So #Assad regime & #Russia still busy for #CeasefireViolations
Bombing as usual- good night

Syria Airstrikes now also on Mansoura in western outskirts of #Aleppo
(held by Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki)
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=de&lat=36...56112&z=14&m=b …

More #Putin/#Assad "you cease we fire" airstrikes taking place outskirts of #Aleppo

الشام @ahlalshami
Russian and Syrian airforce bombing all of Syria. Deraa, Homs, Idlib and Aleppo all bombed.
The usual regime "ceasefire"

Now, heavy Russian+Regime airstrikes on #FSA positions in #Handarat in #Aleppo city, as well as barrel bombs on Taybat al-Imam in #Hama.

Regime bombing Douma with artillery and mortars now.

Opposition forces are now firing back as the Russian/US Eid ceasefire allows for self defense......

Regime NDF gathering and headquarters in Salhab (Tal Salhab), East of Mhardeh, Hama bombed with GRADs by rebels now.

WELL so much for the great Kerry negotiation skills he claims to have....he gets taken every time when dealing with the Russians......

NOW the Eid ceasefire from the proAssad commenters....WHAT a different world they are in......

Damascus, Homs, Hama are calm, SAA have paused operations in Latakia province

1st violations recorded; Opp attacking SAA in Quneitra countryside & Gov shelling al-Harra (Daraa) & Handarat/Castello (Aleppo)

Russian MoD says unmanned drones will be used to observe the ceasefire

AND THIS is the best one YET.......
Russia announces start of delivery of humanitarian aid to Aleppo city through Castello road

Moscow: Washington refused to list Ahrar Sham as a terrorist group & has not provided coordinates of Nusra (to differentiate from rebels)

BUT WAIT...this process was to start IF a ceasefire held for a solid SEVEN DAYS NOT SEVEN MINUTES....HELD meant not a single bomb being dropped by either Assad and or Putin...WHICH now a few hours into the ceasefire IS CLEARLY NOT happening......

!!! Ceasefire now in Syria !!!
Happy counting the violations against it
(followed by non existing consequences)

A ceasefire inside of an existing ceasefire especailly with Russia has never ever worked...just look at Minsk 2

This is a typical Russian agreement compliance example...
...just right before the ceasefire went into effect

Syria #Russia bombing Ma'arrat Misrin town north of #Idlib city now
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ear3NMXUQCs …

WELL so much for the Lavrov statment that Assad will adhere to the agreement.......NOT.....

Syria Seems #Russia stopped bombing on #Aleppo today,
but #Assad regime continues with barrel bombing (~a dozen)

Since Kerry conveniently "forgot" to talk to the HNC and armed opposition before he caved for the Lavrov/Kerry Eid ceasefire AND then basically threatened the armed opposition to "fall in line" with it......

Armed opposition demands are actually well thought through and are calling out both Kerry and Larvor's hyprocrisy towards the Iranian IRGC, QUDs Force, Hezbollah, Shia militias.....which both seem to totally have forgotten are on the US terrorist listings.....AND the clear lack of any enforcement mechanism if Assad violates the ceasefire which everyone knows he will.....and if not then Russia will violate it as both did within hours of announcing the CoH......

The lack of a clear ceasefire enforcement mechanism has always been blocked by Russia both in eastern Ukraine with Minsk 1 and 2 and now with the Syrian CoH and this Eid ceasefire which really is just a ceasefire inside a ceasefire....

Charles Lister ‏@Charles_Lister · 1h1 hour ago

NEW - #Syria’s armed opposition have issued a series of demands & clarifications to the US, before the #Syria deal can be formally accepted.

Armed groups have given US & #Turkey 48hrs to respond. For now, they demand a cessation of regime air attacks from 12pm #Syria time.

While awaiting a US response to their demands, armed groups based in #Aleppo will allow unrestricted aid deliveries from 12pm (now).

In their letter to US Envoy Ratney, #Syria armed groups welcomed aid provision, but insist access is given to *all* besieged areas.

Syria armed groups also demanded clarity on whether any mechanisms for punishing truce violations had been included in the deal.

Syria armed groups also confirmed that they acknowledge they are “obliged” to “deal positively with the idea of a truce” in #Syria.

#Syria armed groups also reaffirmed the fight vs. terrorism, but said targeting of JFS/Nusra reveals hypocrisy re. Shia militancy.

BTW....Shia militancy is killing Syrians as much as is Putin and Assad....

WILL be extremely interesting to see if the Russians, Assad and or the Shia militias/Hezbollah stop the 33 truck aid convoy coming from Turkey when it gets near Aleppo.....

BUT WAIT....there are supposedly five separate agreements inside this ceasefire that both the US and Russians wanted to be kept secret...WHAT are they and WHY are they secret??????

WHY is not the western MSM demanding that they be released??????

After the following Russia/US ceasefires;
1. Minsk 1
2. Minsk 2
3. two Russian so called ceasefires inside Minsk 2
4. Syrian CoH
5. Four Russian regimes of silence
6. one promised Russian 48 hour ceasefire for humanitarian aid
7. Russian three so called aid corridors and a four hour ceasefire every 24 hours

AND NOW the Lavrov/Kerry Eid ceasefire inside the existing Syrian CoH ceasefire.....

"The definition of insanity is repeatedly doing the same thing and expecting different results."
- A. Einstein

Al Jazeera News ‏@AJENews
UPDATE: Ahrar al-Sham rebel group rejects US-Russia truce deal, hours before it is set to begin...second largest rebel group supported by KSA

SO now we know where KSA stands on the Lavrov/Kerry ceasefire deal.....

People swear revenge after #Russian bombs killed their relatives in #Aleppo.
https://www.facebook.com/qasioun.new...type=2&theater …

These are (mostly) unarmed civilians who now turn possible fighters or even suicide bombers due to #AssadPutin violence and intl. ignorance.

The optics of Nusra now JFS organizing to help lift sieges on major Syrian cities while US goes to partner with Russia is not good.

The direct actions of the Obama/Rhodes/Kerry WH are literally driving Syrian Sunni's into the arms of JFS.....

Abu Saeed Al-Halabi ‏@Saeed__Saeed01

In 2011, Assad threatened to bomb us if we continued our revolution. Today, it's America who threatens to bomb us if we continue.

Comments on the Kerry/Larvor "peace deal"....from a leading Iranian US named "terrorist".....

Iran|ian General & terrorist Qasem Soleimani dreaming about the capture of #Aleppo City & nearby towns "in the coming months".

Ever notice that the Obama/Rhodes/Kerry WH never seems to ask the opinions of three top Syrian/ME SMEs who have no DC/think tank ties....

Kyle W. Orton
✔ @KyleWOrton Options for US-Russia plan in Syria
1. Never takes effect
2. Regime abuses
3. Works perfectly
Unclear which is worse
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/...n-syria-again/

Moscow Rules in Syria, Again

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on September 11, 2016

Moscow Rules in Syria, Again

In Geneva on 9 September 2016, the United States and Russia announced an agreement to implement a ceasefire—formally a “cessation of hostilities” (CoH)—in Syria, which is intended to allow humanitarian access and restart the political process to end of the war, and then to begin jointly targeting the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, recently rebranded Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS).

There is reason to wonder if the deal will ever take effect and the lack of an enforcement mechanism against Bashar al-Assad’s regime leaves open the possibility that the pro-regime coalition will, as it did after the February ceasefire, abuse this process to their advantage.

Most dauntingly, if this process worked to the letter it will legitimate the gains of the regime’s aggression, carried out under the cover of the last ceasefire, and has the potential to weaken the insurgency and embolden the regime, strengthening radicalism on all sides, pushing a political settlement further away, and thus protracting the war.

The Terms of the Agreement

The details—which will determine the feasibility of this agreement—are being kept secret. But Secretary of State John Kerry laid out the broad terms, which he “hope[s] will reduce violence, ease suffering, and resume movement towards a negotiated peace and a political transition in Syria,” this way:
•The regime “will not fly combat missions anywhere where the opposition is present in an area that we have agreed on with very real specificity.” This is a “bedrock” component of the agreement, according to Kerry, who acknowledged that this instrument has been the primary cause of civilian deaths and displacement in Syria. Russia would also refrain from attacks on mutually-agreed, opposition-held zones. But, Kerry added, “not all flights” by the Assad regime would be halted, and the regime would be allowed to continue attacks on al-Qaeda and IS.
•The CoH will go into effect at “sundown” on Monday, 12 September. Neither side will be permitted to take territory held by the other and the CoH will be accompanied (in theory) by the granting of humanitarian aid to all besieged areas, including Aleppo. All parties are to withdraw from Castello Road, creating a demilitarized zone that allows free access to eastern Aleppo City, and both the regime and the opposition are to allow unhindered access through the Ramussa gap.
•There will be “seven days of adherence to the cessation of hostilities in order to convince the people of Syria and the opposition that the actions of the regime … will be consistent with the words that we put on paper.” After this “sustained period of reduced violence” and access for humanitarian supplies, the U.S. and Russia will “work together to develop military strikes against Nusra” through a Joint Implementation Centre (JIC), essentially a U.S.-Russian intelligence cell, to be based in Jordan, that will map out which actor holds which territory.

The immediate questions are over the enforcement mechanisms.

How will JFS, which in Idlib especially is deeply tangled into the rebellion, be isolated?

Kerry explained:

If groups within the legitimate opposition want to retain their legitimacy, they need to distance themselves in every way possible from Nusra … The warning we give to opposition groups who have up until now found it convenient to sort of work with [JFS] is: it would not be wise to do so in the future; it’s wise to separate oneself.

In other words, move or get bombed.

On the other side, the question is: How will the regime be prevented from continuing its aerial bombardment of civilians and the mainstream opposition?

Kerry says that Moscow has conveyed the terms of the agreement to Damascus and Assad has agreed. “There is … deterrence in Russia holding Assad accountable for his promise,” Kerry says.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed with this, though naturally put the emphasis on “de-marbling”—geographically separating JFS and the rebels—over restraining the regime’s indiscriminate bombardment of civilians. Lavrov also made a point of saying that this proposal was available a year ago but the Americans would only do “deconfliction”; now they have come around.

Problems

The rebels are reluctant to “de-marble” because they know what comes next: areas ceded solely to JFS become fair game, JFS will be defeated, and the regime will then move in. Moreover, solely excising JFS, without doing anything else to alter the current balance of power, would cripple the rebellion.

Still, the enforcement mechanism for opposition violations is effective and can be implemented over the reluctance—even defiance—of actors on the ground and/or their external backers. As Kerry put it, “There is a deterrence in that.”

The enforcement mechanism on the other side—Russia’s influence over the regime—does not work that way. Indeed, if past is any indication of the future—and it usually is—it does not work at all.

Putting aside the raft of war crimes Russia has racked up on its own terms since its intervention began in service of keeping the Assad regime in power, Moscow has shown no willingness to stop the Assad regime committing aerial massacres and using siege-and-starve tactics to eliminate rebel pockets.

Kerry says that “no one is building this based on trust,” but his explanation of what it is based on—”a way of providing oversight and compliance through mutual interest and other things” and “managed in a different way” from last time—sounds an awful lot like trust. The U.S. seems, once again in Syria, to be playing by Moscow’s rules.

From the phrasing Kerry used it seems Assad’s air force will be free to launch attacks into IS-held areas and will also be allowed to attack al-Qaeda in areas where the target packages are not developed by the JIC. Even at face value this would make Assad—whose ouster is formal U.S. policy—and his most murderous weapon into a counter-terrorism partner. In reality, there is no reason, whatsoever, to believe the regime intends only to strike at jihadist terrorists, and the process of delineating areas that will be considered legitimate targets provides a manipulable loophole by which the regime and/or Russia can target the mainstream armed opposition.

The Washington Post reports:

In technical discussions over the last several weeks, U.S. and Russian military and intelligence officials have mapped out “boxes” in Syria, designating areas with a preponderance of [JFS] forces, those regions where the terrorists overlap with opposition groups, and areas that are primarily opposition and civilians.

How a final call is made on labelling areas as JFS-dominated, JFS-present, and JFS-free is distinctly opaque.

Russia still retains the position that Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam are terrorist organizations, too. How Russia would be prevented from, or punished for, striking at these or other, non-mutually-agreed groups is likewise unclear.

Additionally, the JIC is itself somewhat troubling. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, is on record expressing his “reservations about … sharing intelligence with [the Russians] … which they desperately want, I think, to exploit—to learn what they can about our sources and methods and tactics and techniques and procedures.” Clapper pointed out the Russians’ heretofore perfect record of deception and cynicism, asking, “What is it they’ve done that gives you confidence that if we do more with them or share more intel … they’re going to improve?” This is not a new problem.

Jose Rodriguez, the chief of staff of the Counterterrorism Centre at the CIA after 9/11, noted that even at that time—when relations were considerably better than now—the Russians “were always in the ‘receive mode,’ happy to take whatever information we were willing to share with them on terrorist threats but generally reluctant to offer much in return.” And that’s before considering the incompetence and corruption of Russian forces—bribable border-guards have been a significant jihadist asset in the Caucasus—let alone Moscow’s dubious practices that often strengthen and manipulate terrorist groups for political ends.

Options Going Forward

Three options now present themselves: (1) the CoH is never implemented; (2) the CoH is partially implemented with persistent cheating by the pro-regime coalition, reducing violence overall for a time but breaking down eventually with the Assad regime better situated; (3) the agreement works with minimal violations.

After the experience in the spring, when the opposition held-fire for months and the pro-regime coalition did not, the opposition’s response to this proposal has been distinctly cold, and Ahrar al-Sham this morning allegedly rejected the proposal outright. Given Ahrar’s size and role in northern Syria, it is difficult to conceive of this working if Ahrar chooses to play spoiler.

Though Assad has supposedly agreed to this, how he, the localized militias under the banner of “the regime,” and, perhaps above all, Iran behave in practice is an open question. Despite Tehran and its Lebanese proxy Hizballah publicly accepting this deal, they have the potential to be spoilers. The possibility that fighting simply never stops or reduces cannot be ruled out—as Kerry himself recognized.

The U.S. and Russia could “encourage” the rebellion and the regime, respectively, Kerry said, but he did not push it beyond that. “If—and I again want to emphasize the ‘if’—if the plan is implemented in good faith … this can be a moment where … the negotiations could take hold,” the Secretary of State said.

A direct re-run of the last ceasefire is certainly plausible, where the rebellion more-or-less abides by the CoH and the pro-Assad forces reduce the scale of their offensive operations, which at least spared some civilian lives, but use the rebel quiet on some fronts to concentrate their forces and attacks in the most strategic zones. Indications from pro-regime media hint at this possibility, with the regime allegedly planning an escalation in Aleppo; the question is how the opposition responds.

There were no penalties for the regime last time, and the gains it made under the CoH have been recognized by the “international community,” which now uses them as the baseline for this proposal. Assuming this CoH is enacted, whenever it was next admitted to have collapsed, the pro-regime coalition would have further attrited the rebellion and be in an even better position to negotiate a settlement on its own maximalist terms.

The third option—that the process on paper works to the letter—is actually difficult to distinguish in important ways from option two. The regime’s advances in violation of the last ceasefire are frozen in place and, as explained by Faysal Itani,

[The U.S.-Russia plan] would likely weaken or eliminate a strong component of the insurgency without compensating for the lost capacity, further tilting the military balance in the regime’s favor. Unless the United States can prevent that, the [JIC] would make a lasting negotiated settlement in Syria more difficult than it already is, setting the stage for open-ended civil war and further radicalization.

The deal will “save innocents from regime aerial bombardment—a worthy goal in itself,” as Itani notes. The mere reduction in violence six months ago saw a flourishing of the nationalist discourse and the peaceful street demonstrations that began this uprising, causing serious tensions between opposition communities and al-Qaeda that remain to this day. But such an agreement has to be “judged by the extent that it serves key U.S. policy goals in Syria: fighting extremism and enabling a negotiated settlement,” and on both counts it fails.

Western Missteps, Al-Qaeda’s Gains

When Russia intervened on 30 September 2015 it had three aims: rescue a tottering Assad regime, eliminate all possible workable oppositionists, and thereby rehabilitate Assad, converting military success into political achievement by subverting the political process that was supposed to transition Assad out into one that set the terms of his remaining. It has proceeded more or less to script.

The gains of Jaysh al-Fatah were quarantined; the crucial rebel pocket east of Damascus had its leader, Zahran Alloush, murdered and its viability mortally threatened; the mainstream opposition in the north was battered and al-Qaeda has filled the void; IS was scarcely touched outside of three small areas and the propaganda show in Palmyra.

The overarching trend for the last year is the regime mopping up. The insurgency has been divided into besieged cantons that are then being shrunk down and starved into submission, either permitting regime control to return or seeing the population expelled entirely, as happened in Daraya recently and seems likely to occur in Maadamiya soon.

With no decisive Western assistance forthcoming, these were the ideal conditions for JFS to expand its reach. Insurgent unity was clearly necessary, and JFS was able to dominate the coalitions formed.

Long before the last year, one of the key factors enabling JFS to embed itself in opposition dynamics so thoroughly was presenting itself as better-serving opposition interests and security than the West, which it portrays as conspiring against the revolution. Both perceptions are widespread among anti-regime Syrians, and not without reason.

Before this deal, the West had compiled a “spotless record of having protected not one single Syrian inside Syria from the mass homicide campaign conducted by Assad and facilitated by Iran and Russia,” as Fred Hof put it. Concurrently, the U.S.’s pro-Iran tilt had made the line between jihadi conspiracy theory and U.S. policy an increasingly hazy one, since the U.S. had all-but ceded Syria to Tehran, whose ground forces now lead the pro-regime coalition, as a sphere of influence.

The latest data point was the airstrike on 8 September that killed JFS’s military commander, Usama Nammourah (Abu Umar al-Saraqib), a man who was planning to break the siege of Aleppo. Meanwhile, not a single shot has been fired against those imposing the siege, namely what remains of Assad’s forces or the thousands of Iranian-controlled foreign Shi’a jihadists, many of them members of registered terrorist organizations, from whom the regime’s army will not have to “de-marble” under threat of airstrikes.

Operation INHERENT RESOLVE’s unwillingness to deal with the pro-regime terrorist groups has compromised its legitimacy among the opposition from the start. The impression that the Coalition became the regime’s air force was one shared by the Pentagon, which was well-aware of, and displeased by, the fact that its intervention allowed Assad to “perform an economy of force,” leaving IS in the east to the Allies and trying to finish the nationalist opposition once and for all in the west. But that was the policy decision.

Now comes this deal with Russia, a state that has provided close-air and other support for Lebanese Hizballah and the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Syria.

If the deal succeeds as planned—changing the status quo only by removing JFS—it would deliver an existential blow to the rebellion, which will thereafter be neutralized as a strategic threat to the Assad regime. Enabling regime advances in this way will not pacify the country but condemn Syria—a la Algeria—to perpetual war, leaving U.S. interests in a political settlement that stabilizes the country and closes down the favourable environment for terrorist groups unattainable.

The threat to rebels from the eradication of JFS without any replacement of its capacity is not just to their cause, bitter as that would be; it is to their personal security and that of their families, a very powerful motivator. The Assad regime’s systematic atrocities against the Syrian population were assessed by the United Nations to rise to the level of crimes against humanity, including enforced disappearance, rape, and extermination, and Amnesty International recently reported on the nearly-indescribable inhumanity of the conditions in Assad’s prisons, where up to 200,000 people languish. That is what falling back under regime rule means to people in opposition-held territory.

This is why, despite Syrian oppositionists understanding the primacy of Western counter-terrorism priorities in approaching Syria and the lethal consequences, physically and spiritually, of JFS co-opting their rebellion, they will fiercely resist any proposal they believe enables regime advances and why extruding JFS from their midst under these conditions is impossible. The rebels never acceded to JFS’s assiduous efforts to foster interdependence by choice or ideological affinity; it was a tactical and military necessity.

An Alternative

Destroying JFS is necessary, no matter the imminence of the threat of its terrorism, which is in many ways the least important aspect of the strategic danger it—and al-Qaeda more generally—pose. There are ways of doing this without so narrowly focusing on counter-terrorism that it further tilts the balance in Syria toward Russia and the pro-regime coalition.

The more effective means of isolating and defeating JFS to bring about an outcome consistent with Western interests is to finally give the mainstream armed opposition a meaningful alternative, while complicating the regime’s ability to commit mass-homicide, which provides the desperate circumstances under which extremists are tolerated as a necessary-evil for protection.

Enforcing the second condition would necessitate direct military action against the Assad regime. This is militarily possible, and extremely unlikely during this administration. Nonetheless, it is difficult to conceive of a solution to the Syrian crisis that meets Western interests without such action.

If the U.S. accompanied the anti-JFS airstrikes with increased support to the mainstream rebellion and demonstrated a preparedness to punish regime violations of the CoH, such as the mass-slaughter at the Idlib City market yesterday, with force, it would signal both fairness and seriousness, raising the strategy’s chances of success. It would make rebel buy-in more likely and might convince the regime to negotiate in a manner approaching good faith, something its present position gives it no incentive to do.

NOTICE the Obama/Rhode/Kerry WH has us chasing after their version of the truth ..we must destroy AQ/IS/JFS.....THEY totally tend to forget that there is another set of Shia jihadists right around the corner THAT they totally for some strange reason "ignore".....

GREAT POINT BTW.....
Kyle W. Orton ‏@KyleWOrton
Interestingly, tho the Quds Force, Hizballah, and Kataib Hizballah are on the terrorism list, #SAA doesn't have to "de-marble" from them.

WHY is that??

Russian Geneva ceasefire greetings dropped last night and this morning by the Russian AF....WONDER what Kerry has to say about his "joint partners actions"....give Larvor and Putin a single inch in negotiations and they will take your entire arm.....

Another 5 #Russian air strikes targeted the towns of #Lataminah and #KafrZita in #Hama prov.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fGYnCWcb5o …

BREAKING
THE MOMENT A #RUSSIAN AIR FORCE SU-34 BOMBS A @SyriaCivilDef HOSPITAL IN SARAQIB.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-i314vyaEig …

Assad and #Putin let their forces kill 164 people across #Syria on Saturday
57 in #Idlib prov.
56 in #Aleppo prov.
-LCC

JisrAlShughur last night.
The #AssadPutin #genocide continues.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TIGgQeA3UYs …

What looks like a parachute retarded ODAB-500 thermobaric bomb used by Russian/Assad jets on Maysar in #Aleppo today

EVEN after those great words from Kerry and Lavrov the killing of civilians just keeps on keeping on.....well so much for the next Russian "offered ceasefire that was not"......

Syria Headquarter of #WhiteHelmets in #Saraqib /#Idlib destroyed after #Russia'n airstrikes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKBlHa0aIa8 …
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgwLoscox9o …
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-i314vyaEig …

THIS time it was the Russian AF...so much for the Geneva talks yesterday and those great words from Kerry and the Russian FM....

REMEMBER....the Russian FM Lavrov stated just after they entered Syria that he and Putin define anyone as a "terrorist" that carries a gun and resists Assad....clearly and concisely spoken during a public carried interview...

Syria body part/ child's arm after #Russia'n airstrike on Kafr Naha in western #Aleppo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89jcVJV00sI …

OVER 100 killed civilians just yesterday by combined Russian and Assad deliberate air strikes on civilians...20 plus were children...

THIS is the direct result of a "do nothing stupid FP" since 2012......

Until someone explains what the consequences are if Russia and Assad don't hold up their end, the Syria ceasefire deal isn't serious.

Clarissa Ward ‏@clarissaward
1) some thoughts on the US-Russia #Syria deal after talking to a wide ranging group of Syrians both inside and outside the country

2) Those I have spoken to, who are anti- regime, are extremely disappointed with the deal.

3) Syrian opposition leaders say they were not consulted on the details by the US whereas the Russians said that they consulted w/ regime

4) There is no indication of what the consequences of Syrian army breaking the deal would be. Syrians are being asked to trust + no one does

5) As one Syrian told me "you can go ahead and trust the Russians but please don't ask us to."

6) People on the ground feel they quite clearly can't trust the Americans. They believe the US is working w/ Russians to assure Assad wins.

7) They see a clear hypocrisy in claim to fight terror when a designated terrorist group like Hizbollah is allowed to fight with impunity

8) People in rebel held Aleppo see Syrian army as terrorists, not JFS who led the battle to lift the siege.

9) Syrian opp supporters who have no love for Islamists understand that punishing JFS means weakening whole opposition + strengthening Assad

10) One Syrian opposition supporter in West "this isn't a diplomatic solution. This is the US siding with Russia to destroy the opposition."

Really really really worth reading this as I personally have not seen a similar article since the single Soviet AFG Spetsnaz team that openly stated it is time to go home...which was broadcast on Soviet military TV.....several days before the SU announced they were leaving AFG....I was the only open source collector that had caught a video of this particular SU Spetsnaz and many in the intel community had no idea of what it meant....

This is an English translation of the Russian article I posted this morning....by a very good Russian social media open source analysis team.....

https://citeam.org/here-s-why-assad-...-war-in-syria/

Quote:

The following is a translation of a scathing article on the state of the Syrian Arab Army that appeared in an online outlet Gazeta.ru, which is Kremlin-controlled but sometimes critical of the Russian authorities online. The author is a retired Russian officer with 8 years of experience working in the General Staff and 5 years as an editor of an established military magazine. The article, originally titled "It would be easier to disband the Syrian army and recruit a new one", mirrors the emerging Syria fatigue sentiments in the Russian military circles and reportedly was confirmed by a serving Russian colonel, who added "Everything is like it’s written but worse". The expert notably omits mentioning regime war crimes even when describing the use of barrel bombs. Throughout the text, he calls Syrian rebels "militants" and "illegal armed groups" — terms widely used by Russian military and media to describe Chechen fighters during the wars. This anti-rebel stance perhaps lends even more credibility to the author’s assessment of their capabilities versus those of the SAA.

While militias, Iranian volunteers, Hezbollah and PMCs fight in lieu of the Syrian army, Bashar Assad’s soldier busy themselves with collecting bribes at checkpoints. This view becomes more and more widespread among military experts aware of the actual situation in Syria. The country’s air force is worn down and uses home-made bombs, the soldiers dig moats to protect from terrorists’ tunnels, while the militants enjoy tactical and moral superiority, says Mikhail Khodarenok, Gazeta.ru’s military observer.

The pro-government forces are likely to capture the city of Aleppo soon. However, it remains doubtful if this will bring the end of the Syrian war closer. In Middle Eastern wars, there is no single building to plant a flag on that would make the enemy surrender unconditionally.

Indeed, it is quite hard to say which side is currently winning the military conflict. Bashar al-Assad, the president of the Syrian Arab Republic, still does not control about half the country’s territory and a majority of towns and villages.

The results of the fighting in Syria so far have been disastrous. The total number of Syrians killed has grown to 250-300 thousand (giving a more precise number is impossible), while about a million people have been wounded. Syrians of all ethnic and religious denominations have grown weary of the civil war that has dragged on for over five years.

Always defeated

The actual fighting against opposition groups is mostly done by Syrian militias, the Lebanese Hezbollah Shia units, Iranian and Iraqi volunteers and Private Military Companies (PMCs).

The main military actions Assad’s army engages in is extorting a tribute from the locals. The Syrian armed forces have not conducted a single successful offensive during the past year.

Apparently Syria’s General Staff has no coherent short-term or mid-term strategic plans. Assad’s generals do not believe their troops can bring the country to order without military aid from foreign states. They do not plan large-scale operations, giving the reasoning of ostensibly high combat capabilities of the illegal armed groups, lack of ammunition and modern equipment, a fear of heavy losses and a negative outcome of the fighting.

The Syrian army’s junior officers, NCOs and privates have little enthusiasm to charge and fight for their motherland. The general morale deterioration is exacerbated by the fact that the history of the modern Syrian army has known no military victories.

Assad’s army bears the brand of constant defeats and humiliations since the first Arab-Israeli wars of 1947-1948.

The Syrian army fighters see no close end to the crisis. There are no set dates of ending military service. The achievements of soldiers and officers are not encouraged or awarded. The materiel and food supplies are inadequate. There are no benefits for soldiers or their families.

Most importantly, even if the Syrian leadership wished to solve these problems, they couldn’t raise the funds to do so. Assad’s government currently has no stable income sources. Years of fighting have severely disrupted the country’s economy. Industrial production has fallen by 70%, agriculture — by 60%, oil production — by 95% and natural production — by 70%. The Syrian treasury has no money even for immediate defense expenditures.

This situation is further exacerbated by the Syrian army being severely understaffed and underequipped. Currently, the staffing and equipment levels stand a bit over 50% of the required figures. The yearly draft does not satisfy even the minimal needs of the army. Due to this, since 2011 sergeants and privates who have served their terms have not been discharged.

The draft fails due to a number of reasons. Some potential conscripts support the anti-government forces and actively dodge the draft. Others have joined the illegal armed groups. Still others have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, preferring not to fight for any of the sides. Many potential recruits have become refugees outside Syria, some of them in Europe. A large part of the population lives on territories outside the government troops’ control. Finally, recruits and their families fear reprisals from the militants.

The majority of Syrian army units are based at fortified checkpoints. There are in total about 2 thousand such checkpoints throughout Syria. Thus, over a half of the army operates with no connection to their units.

Sitting inside those fortified checkpoints, the Syrian regulars are mostly doing defensive duties and extorting money from the locals. They do not conduct any major operations to liberate population or administration centers.

Such pillars of any military as "A superior’s order is the law for his subordinate" and "An order is to be performed at all costs, precisely, timely and with no objections", are at best limitedly enforced in the Syrian army.

"Barrel" bombs

It is hard to find anything worthy of studying or imitation from the Syrian army’s military practice.

The only worthy examples are of the "How not to wage war" variety.

The Air Force deserves a special mention. The Syrian Arab Air Force conducts a significant number of sorties daily (reaching 100 in certain days in 2015), over 85% of which are bombing runs. The Air Force’s contribution to the overall fire damage is about 70%. The airstrikes are conducted by several dozen fighter/bomber jets and around 40 army aviation helicopters.

The SyAAF’s main modus operandi is solitary sorties. Flights in pairs and larger units are not done in order to save resources. In order to decrease losses, the bombing runs are done at heights of 3 thousand meters and above. In extreme cases, dive bombing is used.

Due to the lack of air ordnance, the Syrian army has until recently used even sea mines, torpedoes and depth charges for ground attacks. The so-called "barrel bombs" are also widely used. Over 10,000 of the latter have been dropped on the enemy.

A "barrel bomb" is a type of home-made air ordnance weighting 200 to 1000 kg. It is a section of a wide oil pipeline welded shut with metal plates from both sides and stuffed with a high amount of explosives. A "barrel bomb" is highly explosive and is used to destroy buildings and attack large gatherings of the militants.

There is no pilot training to replenish the combat losses (training in Russia has been discontinued). The aircraft are not being repaired (the only aircraft repair plant is inside the Aleppo warzone).

Various estimates put the air force’s losses since the start of the conflict (April 2011) at about 200 planes and over 150 pilots.

The tunnel war

Tunnel and anti-tunnel tactics have seen widespread use during the Syria war. Tunnels are used to blow up multi-storey buildings used as command posts or ammunition and materiel depots. Drilling machines can dig tunnels at a speed of 3-4m/day while improvised machinery can do 1-2m/day.

Underground tunnels and passages have been gun in Syria since the times of the Roman Empire and the founding of the first cities, such as Palmyra (Tadmor), Damascus, Raqqa and Homs. The local soil encourages this. Being rather soft and clayey, the soil does not slough, which is why both sides of the conflict toil endlessly to dig underground passages of all kinds and purposes.

Militants dig tunnels or use a wide network of old ones to achieve surprise during attacks on military facilities and government troops. Despite a severe underground threat, the Syrian army has a rather negligent attitude to this. There is almost no information on caves or underground communications in towns or militant-controlled territories adjacent to them.

However, various anti-tunnel techniques are used to protect government troops and important facilities, such as using georadars (anomaly detectors), building counter-tunnels, digging shafts and building anti-tunnel moats.

The main technique government troops employs against enemy tunnels is drilling shafts.

Continued.....

Militants’ morale and tactical advantage

Continued.....

Time to go home

Continue.....

For those SWJ readers/commenters who really do think that Kerry means it when he talks about the suffering of the Syrians and the need for humanitarian aid....he is only interested in achieving something for the Obama/Rhodes WH legacy if the following thread is correct and I believe it is correct NOTICE for some strange reason US MSM is not following this at all....

Kerry has made repeatedly promises to the Iranians and Russian that have never seen the light of day publicly nor publicly been discussed....that is why a number of European senior diplomats/FMs basically mistrust Kerry.....

Charles Lister ‏@Charles_Lister
BIG - JFS military chief Abu Omar al-Homsi (Abu Omar al-Saraqeb) killed in alleged US drone strike along w. senior leader Abo Omar al-Shami.

Abu Omar al-Homsi is a former JN emir or #Idlib, who led the founding of Jaish al-Fateh in '15. He's seen widely as an Islamist unifier

The timing of the strike is telling, in midst of last min talks w. #Russia, who accuses US of inability/refusal to target AQ in #Syria.

The strike targeted a meeting that had been called to plan a new opposition counter-offensive to break the re-besieging of #Aleppo.

Bear in mind the consistent US position through talks with #Russia has been that JN/JFS is the spoiler-in-chief of attempts at "calm."

If agreed, the US proposal to #Russia aims to create a new ceasefire around #Aleppo.

A JFS-led offensive now would have crippled deal.

Make no mistake, JFS will present this as an attack on those intending to "save" #Aleppo, in an attempt to further "win" the opposition

The implication of this (see the thread) is clear: the WH sees a Russian siege of Aleppo as integral to the deal

The WH sees offensive ops to break the Aleppo siege as detrimental to its deal with Russia

Ratney told the oppo in no uncertain terms that they were not happy about JFS being at the forefront of the ops to break the siege

Under the smokescreen of talks, WH gave Russia/Iran full cover to reestablish siege. Now involved militarily, too

KyleWOrton
.@Charles_Lister: "Many Syrians living in opposition areas of Syria perceive JFS as a more…effective protector of their lives…than the US".

Kyle W. Orton ‏@KyleWOrton
Wrote about this a year ago:

Iran’s Partnership with al-Qaeda and Unanswered Questions

[url]https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/09/19/irans-partnership-with-a…]

The Islamic Republic of Iran released five senior al-Qaeda terrorists in March, ostensibly as part of a prisoner exchange for an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Yemen by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). But the murky circumstances in which al-Qaeda’s leaders were “held” in Iran and other inconsistencies cast some doubt on this version of events, and draw attention to some old questions about Iran’s support for al-Qaeda and its affiliates and offshoots.

According to a September 14 report by Sky News, the five al-Qaeda leaders were freed—and will soon be allowed to leave Iran—in exchange for Nour Ahmad Nikbakht, an Iranian diplomat kidnapped by AQAP in July 2013 who landed in Tehran on March 5. Even on this version of events it means that the Iranian State media reports at the time, that Nikbakht was freed as the result of “intelligence operation,” were false.

Who Has Been Released?

The most important al-Qaeda leader freed by Iran is Sayf al-Adel. Regarded as al-Qaeda’s number three, al-Adel is one of al-Qaeda’s most capable military leaders. Beginning his career in the Egyptian military, before moving into Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), then led by Ayman az-Zawahiri, al-Adel was one of the masterminds behind the conspiracy that assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981. By 1988, al-Adel was in Afghanistan and remained after the Soviets left.

Iran has long had friendly relations with Egypt’s Sunni Islamists and the alliance with EIJ was further strengthened via Hassan al-Turabi in the early 1990s, after which Zawahiri was the poster-boy for Iran’s policy of ecumenical support for anti-American Islamic radicalism. Al-Adel was among those trained by Iran through the Hizballah in Lebanon in the early 1990s, going on to serve on al-Qaeda’s Shura Council and as al-Qaeda’s security chief. Al-Adel is believed to have been involved in the 1998 Embassy bombings and the butchery of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, though, interestingly, al-Adel seems to have opposed to the 9/11 massacre.

Al-Adel was key in convincing Osama bin Laden to maintain relations with Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, despite Zarqawi and Bin Laden having a stormy initial meeting and retaining deep difference over the “far enemy” question. Zarqawi had extensive contacts in the Levant, al-Adel argued, and this “rolodex pragmatism” would carry the day—and quickly: al-Qaeda put Zarqawi’s contacts to use for the Jordanian end of the Millennium Plot in December 1999.

EIJ had operated quite freely in Iran in the 1990s and after the NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 al-Qaeda members and associates, al-Adel and Zarqawi among them, took shelter in Tehran and Mashhad, where Zarqawi was even reportedly trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC).

Zarqawi moved from Iran to an area of Iraq controlled by Ansar al-Islam, which was led by Zarqawi loyalists and received assistance from both al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in April 2002. The next month, Zarqawi moved to Baghdad with two-dozen senior al-Qaeda associates, including his successor Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Hammam as-Suri, the head of the military for Jabhat an-Nusra (al-Qaeda in Syria), at least until he was supposedly killed in March. Zarqawi was allowed free movement in and out of Baghdad, and he conducted a tour of the Levant to set up the “ratlines” that brought foreign holy warriors into Iraq during the American regency. By November 2002, Zarqawi had taken direct charge of Ansar in northern Iraq.

Zarqawi and three-hundred jihadists were allowed to move back into Iran during the Iraq invasion, before being permitted to cross the border again later in 2003 to make war against constitutional government in Iraq. Once back in Iraq, Ansar would reassert its autonomy from Zarqawi, albeit remaining in coordination with him, and Zarqawi and his associates from the Herat camp in Afghanistan rebranded their group from Jund a-Sham to at-Tawhid wal-Jihad, which later became al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and eventually the Islamic State (ISIS). An al-Qaeda network maintained on Iranian soil, of which al-Adel was a senior member, was an important logistics and supply base for AQI.

From Iran, in collusion with Zarqawi, al-Adel organized the bombing of Riyadh in May 2003, after which the Iranian theocracy ostensibly placed al-Adel under some form of arrest, the terms of which were never made clear. Al-Adel was reported to have been released in a previous prisoner swap in 2010. After Bin Laden was struck down, it is said that al-Adel was the interim leader of al-Qaeda—which couldn’t have happened if al-Adel was truly detained. Several reports in the summer of 2011 said Tehran had allowed al-Adel to travel between Iran and Pakistan.

The other four al-Qaeda leaders set free by Iran are:
1.Abu Khayr al-Masri: An Egyptian member of al-Qaeda’s Shura Council, Abu Khayr was as a member of the Black Guard, the elite bodyguard unit, connected directly to Bin Laden and Zawahiri. Abu Khayr was al-Qaeda’s chief of foreign relations and the principal conduit to the Taliban. Abu Khayr is one of the most-wanted men in his native Saudi Arabia. Reported to have travelled from Iran to Pakistan in 2010 with Saad bin Laden, Osama’s son, it is not clear how or why Abu Khayr ended up back in Iran and what exactly were the arrangements of his captivity.
2.Abu Muhammad al-Masri: One of the most important operational planners in al-Qaeda, Abu Muhammad is another Egyptian member of the Shura Council, and a close associate of al-Adel’s. Abu Muhammad is under U.S. indictment for the African Embassy bombings.
3.Khaled al-Aruri (a.k.a. Abu al-Qassam): A Jordanian national of Palestinian descent, al-Aruri was with Zarqawi in his formative period: they travelled together to Afghanistan in the late 1980s, were imprisoned together in Jordan in 1994 with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and went back to Taliban Afghanistan together in 1999. Al-Aruri then moved with Zarqawi to Iran to Iraq back to Iran and then into Iraq again. Al-Aruri remained a deputy commander of AQI and one of Zarqawi’s closest companions until Zarqawi was killed in 2006.
4.Sari Shibab: A Jordanian al-Qaeda member of whom little is publicly known.

A History of Duplicity

Perhaps Iran really has been strong-armed into releasing these men—when al-Adel was last reported released in 2010, it is said that al-Qaeda had kidnapped an IRGC officer disguised as a diplomat in Pakistan to hasten a release process that was already in motion. But without clarity on whether al-Adel was released in 2010—or if he was, whether, when, how, and why he was rearrested—this raises more questions than it answers. And whatever the case might be, none of the confusion conceals the fact that Iran’s holding senior al-Qaeda leaders under “house arrest” is a sham.

Continued....

Christiane Amanpour Verified account 
‏@camanpour
US SecDef Ash Carter tells me it's up to Russia to influence Assad to stop using chlorine bombs and go for a transition. More soon.

Because Russia is the leader of the free world?

All the Obama/Rhodes/Kerry WH talks about are Sunni jihadists...FORGETTING they recently did a deal with Iran that actually supports Shia jihadists.....

Well worth reading......
Iran marshals an army of Shia jihadists to crush the Syrian population—excuse me, Takfiris—in Aleppo.
http://bit.ly/2bTTV1Z

Obama/Rhodes/Kerry WH FP hard at work......BUT before...an interesting question....why is it this Administration with over 80 clear and concise events they could leverage in their talks with Russia BUT ABSOLUTELY ignores????

Taking a bet that no SWJ reader/commenter can in fact answer that question....

Assad Regime to Besieged #Aleppo: Surrender or Starve
https://yallasouriya.wordpress.com/2...nder-or-starve …

Quote:

Istanbul— Aleppo is under siege again. Once again, some 300,000 civilians in the rebel-held eastern part of the city must eke out their survival with no fresh produce and a dwindling food supply, in addition to the other perils of life for those in the Assad regime’s political opposition.

That means barrel bombs that destroy houses and bury their children, and missiles that destroy their schools, mosques, and hospitals.

The siege crept up almost without notice over the past 10 days, as the regime closed the Alramousa road, the sole supply route into the old town, first by intense bombing and then by targeted missile attacks just weeks after a surprise rebel offensive had opened it.

State television on August 27 showed a missile attack against vehicles traversing the road that it said were carrying “mercenaries and armed elements.” Two days later, rebel media activists reached the scene, where they found the body of driver Abdo Rawas splayed out on the road, alongside his destroyed truck and its cargo of fruits and vegetables. The activists couldn’t find the body of Adnan, Rawas’s 12-year-old son, who was driving with him. They fear he was incinerated in the attack, leaving no remains.

The siege of Aleppo, like any siege, will come to an end at some point, but the question is on what terms. If the other sieges against other rebel-held towns in Syria are any guide, the terms will be take it or leave it: Surrender or starve.

Take Darayya, a Damascus suburb where a four-year regime siege ended just one week ago. Regime forces had destroyed or damaged practically every building in the town, seized the inhabitants’ farmland, burned their crops, and bombed their sole hospital.

In Darayya, townspeople were out of food, water, ammunition, and medical care when they agreed to leave their homes with no expectation of returning. More than 5,000 were deported to Idlib province, which is under rebel control, or to camps for the internally displaced in regime-held territory near the Syrian capital.

In Moadamiya, which abuts Darayya, a regime military officer, accompanied by Russian officials, told town representatives on Wednesday that defenders would have to give up their weapons and be sent to Idlib, but anyone who was willing to submit to regime control could stay.

Col. Ghassan Bilal said now that the regime had separated Moadamiya from Darayya, “There will be no more meetings.” If locals did not accept the deal, the opposition Smart news agency reported, he threatened to set the city on fire. A town spokesman said 45,000 are trapped there, along with possibly 2,800 rebel fighters.

The evacuation began Friday, with hundreds of civilians piling into buses to be evacuated to regime shelters. The monitoring group Physicians for Human Rights called the evacuation a war crime. “Nothing about this evacuation is voluntary, and nothing about this evacuation is legal,” said Widney Brown, the PHR programs director. “Under international law, both forced evacuations and besiegement, in which Moadamiya’s thousands of civilians are being deprived of vital food and medicine, are war crimes and crimes against humanity.”

In Al Waer, the regime fired napalm-like incendiaries, which produce orange flumes that intensify when doused with water.

Al Waer, a neighborhood in Homs where there are 80,000 civilians according to the Syrian opposition, has been under heavy attack since March, first from snipers, then mortars, artillery, missiles and air assault, local medical personnel reported. The regime tried out a new weapon on public locations as well as private dwellings, dubbed a cylinder missile, which consists of 300–400 kilograms of TNT. Launched from nearby areas, it can destroy a four-story building.

What the Assad regime chalks up as a morale-boosting success is simultaneously a signal failure for the US-led Friends of Syria Group, the international coalition that has provided pro-Western rebels with just enough arms and support to survive; as well as for the United Nations, which has been ordered by the Security Council to deliver food and medical supplies to the people under siege.

The UN, which has managed to deliver food and medicine only once in four years, “failed the people of Darayya, we all failed the people of Darayya,” Jan Egeland, a senior UN official, said in Geneva on Thursday. “I failed them, and it is really sad to think of what they went through over these years.”

A siege, he told reporters, “is not broken by the population giving up after starvation and after bombing. A siege is lifted by humanitarian access and freedom of movement, in and out, by the civilian population.”

The evacuation of Darayya was also an abject setback for the world’s governments, which are party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other instruments of international humanitarian law. A fundamental principle of the convention is that civilians are not to be made the object of attack in war, a lesson incorporated from the Holocaust and World War II.

Aleppo first came under siege around July 10, when the Assad regime, with Russian air support along with Iranian-led Hezbollah and other militias, cut the Castello road. At the time, it was the only secure route into eastern Aleppo, and they stopped the traffic by destroying at least 20 vehicles and their occupants as they tried to enter or leave the city. Amid Syrian-regime barrel bombing of civilian districts, along with Russian aircraft targeting at least six health facilities, Russia proposed setting up evacuation corridors so that residents could flee the city safely, a move that other UN Security Council members rejected.

On August 6, 27 days into the siege, rebel forces attacking from southern Aleppo linked with rebels based south of the city and freed the Alramousa road, which leads to eastern Aleppo. After several days of fighting, commercial traffic, ambulances, and private cars began to traverse the narrow road, marking a temporary end to the siege.

Within 10 days, regime aircraft began targeting the Alramousa road, and doctors based in eastern Aleppo reported that Russian jets were “hunting” the cars of civilians trying to flee the city.

By August 20, the road was impassable, rebel media activists said, and by August 27, regime forces, trying to regain lost territory, set up mortar positions on the hills above the road, giving them complete control over it.

“The regime and its allies were destroying everything on the road, even though they knew they were carrying civilians…”

It is now “a death road, like the Castello road,” Dr. Abdo Mohammadain told The Nation in a WhatsApp message Thursday from inside Aleppo. He said he had tried to drive the road twice, around August 24, first by ambulance and then by private car. “It was raining mortars, some landing just 20 meters from us, and we had to turn back because the driver didn’t think we would make it,” he said of the first attempt that morning.

On the second attempt, he said, aircraft were attacking cars, which were crashing and burning, causing accidents and blocking passage. “The regime and its allies were destroying everything on the road, even though they knew they were carrying civilians or transporting food or fuel for electric generators,” he said.

Stunning as these setbacks are, they receive little notice from the Obama administration, which is still hoping to convince Russia to observe a cease-fire and impose one on its Syrian ally. Not only has the president failed to comment, but US efforts to end the fighting, with a diplomatic drive that features carrots but no sticks, seem to be going nowhere.

Even as Russian aircraft destroyed a half-dozen medical facilities in Aleppo and other parts of northern Syria last month, the administration refused to pin responsibility on its negotiating partner. Human Rights Watch produced careful documentation in late July of Russia’s use of cluster bombs against Syrian civilians earlier that month, but the US government refused to confirm the data.

The worst terror in Syria is not from the Islamic State but from state-sponsored attacks on civilians, backed by Russia.

Far from taking the lead in organizing protection for civilians in Syria or allowing defenders to acquire arms so they can protect themselves, the administration strategy appears to be focused on reaching a deal with Russia on jointly bombing terrorist targets in Syria, a deal that would be accompanied by a national cease-fire. The problem with the strategy is in the different definitions of terrorists used by Moscow and Washington. It’s hard to see how they can reach an accord.

Continued.....

The US government, once the world’s leading champion of humanitarian law, is not completely silent but has been reduced to pro forma statements. “The United States deplores the regime’s attempt to besiege Aleppo city and demands that full access to the city be maintained,” said Michael Ratney, the US Special Envoy for Syria.

Continued.....

Lets' see.....and especially if we reread the 2014 Obama public statement..."we will judge Putin on his actions NOT his words".......

1. constant Russian cyber attacks
2. constant violation of both agreed to air and sea protocols to avoid an accidental war
3. a serious set of INF violations that has not even been sent to Congress as required
4. Russian deliberate targeting of civilians using cluster and incendiary munitions
5. Russian deliberate targeting of hospitals and critical civilian infrastructure ie food centers, marketplaces, water...etc.....
6. continued use by Assad of chlorine CWs and being protected by Russia at UNSC
6. deliberate use of napalm against civilian targets
7. use of starvation supported by Russia
8. war crimes being committed by both Assad and Russia

Let's not even get into the Russian continued violations of Minsk 2......

SO again just why is the Obama Administration so silent when it comes to calling out Putin's actions.....??

Unconfirmed.....if true then this is either the Russian 14th and or 15th Russian Peacekeeping Brigade as Russia has only two UN peacekeeping brigades......

Does not make sense though as the Assad opposition would not accept them as "peacekeepers" After being bombed cluster munitions and incendiary munitions and napalm and starved for over nine months by Putin...they would simply view Russian troops as aggressors....AS one says..."this would go over like a lead balloon"....AND it would allow Putin to now place Russian combat units into Syria which he cannot easily do right now....

Internal #Italy Army assessment: #Putin to dispatch a #Russia Army brigade as "#UN"-peacekeeping force to #Syria's #Aleppo with US blessing.

ALSO interesting as Ukraine has repeatedly asked for UN peacekeepers for eastern Ukraine and or OSCE forces as peacekeepers BUT Russia refuses....

IF true then is Obama hurting so much for some kind of "legacy deal by Christmas" that he throws overboard all US FP?????

OR is this an attempt to block any Turkish military moves to get to Aleppo....

Ever notice the intense silence out of the Obama WH on the increased use by Assad of CWs......weapons that Russia stated to the UNSC and the world that Assad was free from........but again it was all Russian lies......

Remember Obama's "Red Line"? Assad has used chemical weapons almost 200 times since his so called "Red Line".........was evidently just a PR joke with no real intent behind it.......

From today
Reports of a new Assad chlorine gas attack an hour ago in Ein Tarma, eastern Ghouta, #Damascus. Multiple suffocation cases, 1 fatality.

From yesterday
Aleppo 71 suffocation cases inc. 37 children & 10 women admitted to hospital following Assad chlorine gas atk today

As Assad was bombing civilians w/ chlorine gas in #Aleppo yesterday Russia was bombing mosques. Anadan al-Kabir mosque destroyed AND it was supposedly the core reason for Shia mercenary and IRGC troops to be in Syria in "order to defend Shia shrines" BUT instead they are attacking FSA...

WHAT the heck has the Russian FM/MoD been both smoking and drinking lately......definitely ends any proposed joint efforts and points to the fact that Russia never intended to do a joint op anyway.....ANOTHER Obama WH failure to see this coming right a them????

Bizarre assertion from Russia: 'Only Syrian air force operates in #Aleppo, US must coordinate w/ them there, not us'
http://izvestia.ru/news/629674

So the RuAF has never dropped a single bomb or cluster munitions on Aleppo whatsoever......if you believe this Russian statement I truly have a bridge to sell you in the Sahara...

BUT WAIT...was it not several weeks ago that the Russian Syrian Ambassador publicly stated....."Assad was not going to attack Aleppo".....appears he was also lying.....

A really great timely article..........read it and then reread it again and again.....

Kyle W. Orton ‏@KyleWOrton

The End of the Islamic State by Christmas?
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/...e-by-christmas …

Core comment by Kyle........
Quote:

The Coalition’s Troubled War-Making

In speech in May, Falaha mocked the U.S. strategy of killing its leaders and expelling it from cities:

Do you think, O America, that victory is by killing one leader or another? … Or do you … consider defeat to be … the loss of land? … True defeat is the loss of willpower and desire to fight.

This might sound like self-consolation but it is actually the heart of revolutionary warfare: IS started with a cadre of ideological purists and expanded its network from there, concentrating on proselytization among recruits. When IS was defeated in 2008 and driven into the deserts its core held because they believed in the cause. The group simply reverted to an earlier stage of Maoist revolutionary war—namely insurgency and terrorism.

Unquote:

Kyle confirms something I have written here at SWJ over and over and over.....and got virtually no real response on......

When the US military arrived in Baghdad in 2003 they did not know they had walked right into the middle of a Salafist ongoing Phase Two Guerrilla War as based on Mao....which had been ongoing since 1991 against Saddam ...when we arrived they just shifted gears and moved against the "near enemy" the US......

Final recognition that the Obama/Rhodes/Kerry WH "do nothing stupid" FP Syria and eastern Ukraine is really all about talking and that is about it...and if talking does not work then talk some more......

Obama's Syria strategy is now negotiating with (not pressuring) Russia as it kills civilians
http://bit.ly/2bQMlev

.@JohnKerry manages to give comments on #Syria and #Aleppo without mentioning #Syria and #Aleppo ...
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remar.../09/261576.htm …

Quote:
SECRETARY KERRY: Well, good afternoon, all, and thank you for your patience. I gather you’ve been waiting for a little bit. When our teams met – (inaudible) – when our teams met in Geneva, we left Geneva with documents that went back to both capitals to review. And Minister Lavrov and I scheduled time to meet today, which we did; we just met for a couple of hours and to review the review. And I think it’s fair to say that everybody knows from the President’s comments earlier today, which I thought were very much on point, how complicated this issue is because of how many different forces there are – different players, stakeholders, entities, and so forth.

And so we’ve been working very hard over these past months to see, if we can get something, that we get it right and that what we get is sufficiently pinned down that we both understand where we’re going. It’s fair to say that out of the review I think there are a couple of tough issues that we talked about today that he will go back and review, I will go back and review, and we’ve agreed to meet tomorrow morning and see whether or not it is possible to bridge the gap, come to conclusion on those couple of issues. And if not, we’re determined to do what I’ve said all along, which is take the time to make sure that we’re doing this in a way that gives it the best chance of success.

So we will meet in the morning. We’re going to review some ideas tonight, a couple things on these couple of tough issues, and come back together and see where we are. And I think that’s a wise and important thing to do. I’ve said all along we’re not going to rush and we’re not going to do something that we think has less than what we believe is a legitimate opportunity to be able to try to get the job done.

So my thanks to you for following it today, for being interested in it. We will meet tomorrow morning and we’ll give you a sense of where we are at that point in time. An awful lot of technical things have been worked out, a lot of things are clear, but there still remain, as I say, a couple of tough issues. We’ve got to figure out how to make certain both of us can be comfortable with the resolution to those issues, so that’s what we’re working on. Thank you all very much.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary --

QUESTION: Secretary, can you say what some of those tough issues are?

SECRETARY KERRY: I can’t. No, I want to keep faith with what I’ve said all along, which is not – because everything’s interconnected, and so we’ll let – we’ll give you a sense. Let’s see where we are tomorrow.

QUESTION: Do you think that (inaudible) this deal?

STAFF: Thanks, everybody. Sir, we’ve got to go meet the President. Thanks, everybody.

QUESTION: Is there any resistance to --

SECRETARY KERRY: Everybody’s signed off on what we talking about just now. We’re just trying to figure out how to solve a couple of problems. Thanks.
Unquote

A five year old could have provided a more coherent answer than the DoS did.....

Ethnic_cleansing on an unprecedented scale’: Rebels, UN criticize Assad tactics
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/et...tics-954614280 …

YET Obama and Kerry say not a single word......

So who in the Obama WH and CENTCOM knew this?????...further continuance of the Assad and IS "business" relationship since 2006.....

Syrian foreign minister: 'Fighting IS not our prime concern', 'we have more important battles'
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/ne...-prime-concern …

Kyle W. Orton Verifizierter Account 
‏@KyleWOrton
Who saw that coming?

JUST check the date on his article......

Really worth reading the entire article.......

Provocation and the Islamic State: Why Assad Strengthened the Jihadists

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on September 3, 2014

Quote:
On August 25, Bashar al-Assad’s Foreign Minister, Walid al-Muallem, said: “Syria is ready for co-operation … to fight terrorism.” The week before Assad’s PR guru, Bouthaina Shaaban, told CNN that an “international coalition,” including Russia, China, America, and Europe, should intervene to defeat the “terrorists,” whom she says make up the rebellion in Syria.

Back in March I wrote a long post laying out the evidence that the Assad regime was deliberately empowering then-ISIS, now the Islamic State (IS), helping it destroy moderate rebels and even Salafist and Salafi-jihadist forces, with the intention of making-good on its propaganda line that the only opposition to the regime came from takfiris, which would frighten the population into taking shelter behind the State, seeing this madness as the only alternative, and would at the very least keep the West from intervening to support the uprising and might even draw the West in to help defeat the insurgency. These statements represent the culmination of that strategy.

At the time of that post, it was rather a minority view to say that Assad was bolstering IS but since then this view seems to have gone mainstream to the point where the French President called Assad “the de facto ally of jihadists.” People struggled to believe a regime could be that canny or cynical; to some it sounded too much like a conspiracy theory. But what Assad has done is not unique.

This tactic is called provocation (provokatsiya in Russian), and “simply means taking control of your enemies in secret and encouraging them to do things that discredit them and help you.” The KGB perfected this tactic, beginning with Operation TRUST, though Russia had invented it under the Tsar. The KGB’s successors have employed provocation in the last few months with the Ukrainian far-Right, which has done so much to discredit the new government in Kyiv; a sanguinary version of this policy was employed by the KGB-trained authorities in Algeria in the 1990s; and it has even been used in democratic countries, such as in America by the FBI against the Ku Klux Klan and the Black Panthers, and in Germany against the far-Right. (Germany is so good at this that the last time the effort to ban the neo-Nazi “National Democratic Party” got to court it was a fiasco because so many of the NDP’s leaders and members were German intelligence agents that it was impossible to say what the group’s true beliefs were.)

The best evidence that something of the kind has happened in Syria, a State where the security apparatus was schooled by the KGB, comes from Bassam Barabandi, a defector from Assad’s Foreign Ministry, who described the regime’s strategy in dealing with the uprising this way:

ISIS’s role in Syria fits into a plan that has worked for Assad on several occasions. When a crisis emerges, Assad pushes his opponents to spend as much time as possible in developing a response. … His favorite diversion is terrorism, because it establishes him as a necessary force to contain it. …

Assad renewed a version of this approach after non-violent protestors took to the streets demanding freedom and reform in 2011. … Assad needed to take steps that would pass time and prove himself as indispensable, both to the international community and to Syrians who fear retaliation from the Sunni majority. …

Assad first changed the narrative … to one of sectarianism, not reform. He then fostered an extremist presence in Syria … [and] facilitated the influx of foreign extremist fighters to threaten stability in the region. … The resulting international paralysis allowed Assad to present himself as an ally in the global war on terror, granting him license to crush civilians with impunity. …

Once the unrest shifted to an armed conflict, Assad’s choice of allies promoted sectarianism. … Today, the conflict has morphed into a sectarian regional proxy war. This is precisely how Assad envisioned it, and creates a dynamic that the internationals can dismiss as too complex or dissonant to Western interests.

The Assad plan also included allowing extremist Sunni groups to grow and travel freely in order to complicate any Western support for his opponents. The Assad regime and Iran have meticulously nurtured the rise of al-Qaeda, and then ISIS, in Syria. … Assad released battle-hardened extremists from the infamous Sednaya prison; extremists with no association to the uprisings. These fighters would go on to lead militant groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra.

In conjunction with the terrorist-release policy, Assad was sure to imprison diverse, non-violent, and pro-reform activists by the thousands … so that the influence of extremists would fill their absence. Assad was careful to never take any steps to attack ISIS as they grew in power and strength. …

Now that ISIS has fully matured, the Assad regime and Iran offer themselves as partners to the United States. For the first time, Assad is striking ISIS in Raqqa and locations inside Iraq, in a perverse harvest of the terrorist seeds he planted to quash the civilian-led reform movement. Assad will continue to make himself appear helpful by offering intermittent air strikes, details of fighters released from prison, and intelligence. …

The rise of ISIS in Iraq and events in Gaza and Ukraine have placed Assad’s war safely outside the headlines. Once again, the world is convinced it has higher priorities and may again conclude that Assad is a problematic, yet stabilizing dictator in a troubled region.

The Assad regime has perfected the role of being “at once an arsonist and a fireman,” as Fouad Ajami once put it; of creating problems and then exacting concessions from the West to solve them.

The simplest way of demonstrating that the Assad regime wanted to strengthen the Islamic State is to follow the money. IS has essentially five streams of revenue, which are:
1.Oil. IS controls the zones where Syria has oil—Raqqa and Deir Ezzor—and has added oil-producing regions of Iraq around Mosul to this. Estimates of daily intake vary between $1m, $1.8m, and $3m, but this is clearly one of IS’s most important revenue streams. It is also agreed by everybody, from our best journalists to the French Foreign Minister, that a not insignificant portion of this comes from the Assad regime buying the oil—handing over millions of dollars to IS that allow it to fund its fighters and military campaigns, and propagate its ideology to the captive population (estimated at between six and eight million people), while letting IS avoid the necessity of looting, a feature of the desperate FSA-branded rebels that has damaged their cause. IS also takes over other resources—notably grain silos in Syria and the wheat fields around Mosul—giving it total control of the population and allowing it to sell the excess.
2.Extortion (“Tax”). IS controls some non-Muslim minorities who pay the jizya, which is essentially a protection-racket. Other tribute is drawn as taxes from businesses (in the guise of zakat) and farmers. There are also charges for services like public transport. In total this is thought to bring in $5m per month or $60m per year. The Assad regime has avoided bombing IS-held areas as it does with rebel-held territory, allowing IS to exploit this revenue stream.
3.Kidnappings. The U.S. and Britain refuse to pay for the release of their citizens taken hostage but many European States do pay. Some estimates say IS has taken in $65m (£40m) from ransoms. This is plausible. (Al-Qaeda gained $165 over the last six years from European ransom payments.)
4.Antiquities. While IS has attracted attention for its obliteration of the region’s cultural heritage, it has a sideline in the sale of artefacts, specifically those looted from Nabuk in Qalamoun, which have given it at least $60m (£36m).

Continued.......

Kyle W. Orton ‏@KyleWOrton
In Syria, the U.S. has used anti-IS options other than the workable one—the PYD, Shia militias, decapitation strikes—to diminishing returns

Churchill: "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing after they have tried everything else."

This is exactly what CIA understood about Syria that CENTCOM, the Obama WH and it's 700 person NSC and the USA SF....DID NOT nor took the time to fully analyze....as they were far to busy "doing nothing stupid"....

Just a few suggestions by one of three solid ME/Syrian SMEs that were never approached by the Obama WH nor CENTCOM....

Charles Lister ‏@Charles_Lister
Pushing back against the grain:

- 10 ideas for those following/writing about #Syria's opposition & its allied jihadi factions.

1. Military unity & cooperation does *not* equal ideological affinity.

2. Short-term priorities (military) far outweigh long-term (political, ideological) considerations, most of the time.

3. Once a [... fill: faction/ideological current] does *not* mean always a [... fill: faction/ideological current].

4. You *cannot* understand underlying drivers & dynamics of insurgents & armed actors using Twitter & YouTube.

5. Ignoring complex nuance visible only to 1st-hand research & producing generalizations = dangerous/flawed self-fulfilling prophecy

6a. Our enemies (whether state or sub-state) are not supremely smart actors devoid of internal divisions or conflicting visions.

6b. Our allies and/or their civilian base are not supremely ignorant & incapable of discerning short/long-term and good/bad.

7a. Combating/isolating/undermining oppressive terrorist actors *can* be done utilizing a military-heavy approach.

7b. Combating/isolating/undermining socially-embedded terrorist actors *cannot* be done utilizing a military-heavy approach.

8. You *cannot* draw an inference from behavior of (a) 1 man out of 10,000 or (b) 1 faction out of 100 as representing the totality

9. Sometimes, people in #Syria don't see things like you do in #Washington DC/#London/#Paris etc.

10. A lot of complexity/difference of opinion happens behind the scenes & rarely is revealed in the open - so dig a little…