News & commentary by Dave Maxwell. Edited and published by Daniel Riggs.
1. Chinese ambassador tells U.S., North Korea not to make tensions with each other worse
2. Commander General LaCamera nominated for next USFK commander
3. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis receives Paik Sun-yup award
4. N. Korea continues to build up chemical, biological weapons: US official
5. N. Korea may give up nukes, but will test U.S. commitment to diplomacy: U.S. experts
6. The rollout of the Biden administration’s North Korea policy review leaves unanswered questions
7. They Were Promised a Socialist Paradise, and Ended Up in ‘Hell’
8. (2nd LD) Top diplomats of S. Korea, Japan agree on 'future-oriented' ties, differ on historical issues
9. Inside the real North Korea: Wife of British diplomat reveals human side of life under Kim Jong-un
10. North Korea may mount military provocations over South Korea-US summit: Korea Herald
11. Japan, S.Korea meet with Blinken despite rifts
12. Biden’s tentative steps towards North Korea’s Kim greeted with scepticism
13. South Korea’s diplomatic balancing act with Russia
14. Trump may have cleared Biden's path to check NKorea
15. North Korea faces economic ruin amid food and medicine shortages
1. Chinese ambassador tells U.S., North Korea not to make tensions with each other worse
Newsweek · by Lauren Giella · May 4, 2021
The US and north Korea get a dressing down from the Chinese ambassador. Of course the Chinese prescription for reducing tensions is for the US to lift sanctions.
2. Commander General LaCamera nominated for next USFK commander
koreanjoongangdaily · by Michael Lee
I still have not seen an official announcement from the US side but our Korean counterparts keep a close watch on issues like this.
Close here but as usual the press misses an opportunity to more accurately explain the command relationships.
A bilateral agreement signed between South Korea and the United States in 1978 also gives the USFK commander operational control of allied forces on the peninsula in wartime — a combined force that includes South Korea’s approximately 600,000 active duty troops as well as the 28,500-strong USFK.
What the reporter should have added is that the ROK/US Combined Forces Command is a bilateral command , NOT a US command, that serves the security interests of both the ROK and US and answers equally to the national command and military authorities of both countries through the Military Committee. By agreement and tradition, the commander of the ROK/US CFC has always been a US general officer but that will change when the OPCON transition process is complete.
The ROK press also makes a big deal out of USFK and often incorrectly describes USFK as controlling ROK forces in the Combined Forces COmmand (the Joongang Ilbo did not do that here). But it is interesting the ROK focuses on the command that is the least important when it comes to deterrence and defense. USFK is a subunified command under the combatant command of USINDOPACOM. It is not a warfighting command and is a forces provider to the ROK/US Combined Forces Command which has warfighting responsibility for both the ROK and US. It answers to the Military Committee which consists of representatives of both country's national command and military authorities. And then there is the UN Command which is an international command that will provide coalition forces to the ROK/US CFC in wartime and will retain responsibility for managing the Armistice to prevent a resumption of hostilities. The UNC answers to the US CJCS because the UN Security Council Resolutions that established the command in 1950 designated the US as the executive agent for the command.
3. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis receives Paik Sun-yup award
koreanjoongangdaily · by Park Hyun-Young and Sarah Kim
A great honor for General Mattis.
4. N. Korea continues to build up chemical, biological weapons: US official
koreaherald.com · by The Korea Herald · May 5, 2021
No surprise but it is important that US officials state this.
Excerpts: “Jennifer Walsh, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and global security, also said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may actually use such weapons in case of a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
"North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons jeopardizes international stability and weakens the global nonproliferation regime. These capabilities pose a threat to US forces, allies," said Walsh in a statement submitted to the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations.
"Given the risk that Kim Jong Un could seek to employ WMD in the course of or to stave off a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the Joint Force must be ready for any number of WMD-related contingencies that require operating in a CBRN contaminated environment," she added.
5. N. Korea may give up nukes, but will test U.S. commitment to diplomacy: U.S. experts
en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · May 5, 2021
The $64,000 question is what are the real security guarantees that would allow Kim to give up his weapons? What are their terms?
Excerpt: "I do believe North Korea is committed to complete, verifiable denuclearization, assuming they get the security assurances they want and certainly they need because they're concerned about regime change, and they realize nuclear weapons, indeed, are a deterrent," Joseph DeTrani said in a webinar hosted by the Washington Times Foundation."
My fear is the regime will use "security guarantees" to end the ROK/US alliance and get US forces off the peninsula so that it can achieve its objectives to dominate the peninsula and ensure regime survival. The regime is conducting political warfare, executing a long con, and using blackmail diplomacy tactics to achieve its strategic aims.
Sasha Mansourov thinks we are going to see a provocation: “Alexandre Mansourov, professor of security studies at Georgetown University, argued Pyongyang will likely stick to its traditional way of dealing with a new U.S. administration -- first by provoking to see how serious the new U.S. government is.
"North Koreans are likely to test how seriously the United States is really committed to diplomacy because they've seen this game many times before. They played this game with us many times before," he said in the virtual seminar.
"And so in my opinion they may actually launch ... maybe a satellite, will conduct a submarine based ICBM test sometime around May 21 Biden-Moon Summit, just to see whether the Biden administration will abandon diplomacy," he added, referring to Biden's upcoming summit in Washington with his South Korean counterpart, Moon Jae-in.
6. The rollout of the Biden administration’s North Korea policy review leaves unanswered questions
The Brookings Institution · by Robert Einhorn · May 4, 2021
We still do not have the details of the new policy (and I hope we do not see the classified policy and strategy because we need to be executing a superior form of political warfare to effectively deal with north Korea and this must be classified).
But Robert Einhorn identifies some key points: “The Biden administration seems prepared to associate itself with some elements of its predecessors’ North Korea policies, including the joint statement adopted by President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at their Singapore summit meeting in June 2018. The Washington Post quoted a second U.S. official as saying the administration would build on the Singapore agreement and other previous agreements.
...
Other than maintaining that it will avoid the mistakes of its predecessors, issuing some expected reaffirmations (the goal of denuclearization), and providing some interesting tidbits (support for the Singapore framework), the Biden administration has so far relied mainly on generalities in publicly outlining the results of its review of North Korea policy, using language like “calibrated, practical, measured approach” and similar formulations intended to be reassuring and unassailable.
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So, much is still publicly unknown about the Biden administration’s North Korea policy. Indeed, much is still probably undecided within the administration. The following critical questions remain unaddressed so far by the public rollout of the Biden policy.”
7. They Were Promised a Socialist Paradise, and Ended Up in ‘Hell’
The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · May 5, 2021
The cruelest bait and switch.
Excerpts: “Mr. Lee was born in Japan in 1952. The family ran a charcoal-grill restaurant in Shimonoseki, the port closest to Korea — a reminder that they would return home.
As the Korean War came to an end, the Japanese government was eager to get rid of the throngs of Koreans living in slums. For its part, hoping to use them to help rebuild its war-torn economy, North Korea launched a propaganda blitz, touting itself as a “paradise” with jobs for everyone, free education and medical services.
Mr. Lee's primary school in Japan, he said, screened propaganda newsreels from North Korea showing bumper crops and workers building “a house every 10 minutes.” Marches were organized calling for repatriation. A pro-North Korea group in Japan even encouraged students to be recruited as “birthday gifts” for Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder, according to a recent report from the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights.
Japan approved of the migration despite the fact that most Koreans in the country were from the South, which was mired in political unrest. While Japanese authorities said ethnic Koreans chose to relocate to North Korea, human rights groups have accused the country of aiding and abetting the deception by ignoring the circumstances the migrants would face in the communist country.
“By leaving for North Korea, ethnic Koreans were forced to sign an exit-only document that prohibited them from returning to Japan,” the Citizens’ Alliance report said. The authors likened the migration to a “slave trade” and “forced displacement.”
8. (2nd LD) Top diplomats of S. Korea, Japan agree on 'future-oriented' ties, differ on historical issues
en.yna.co.kr · by 송상호 · May 5, 2021
Please focus on national security and national prosperity as the priority while managing the difficult historical issues.
9. Inside the real North Korea: Wife of British diplomat reveals human side of life under Kim Jong-un
The Telegraph · by Nicola Smith
Will this be a "coffee table book" that I will purchase? The hard cover is $25.95 at Amazon and is due out in June.
The anecdote features in her new book, North Korea – Like Nowhere Else, a rare photo exploration of the reclusive state, which is due to be released on Thursday.
10. North Korea may mount military provocations over South Korea-US summit: Korea Herald
Of course they could. But will they? For what effects and objectives?
11. Japan, S.Korea meet with Blinken despite rifts
Excerpts: “The Biden administration conducted a North Korea policy review "in a deliberate way because we wanted to make sure that we were very actively consulting with all of the concerned countries, starting with our close allies South Korea and Japan, given their own very strong equities in this issue," Blinken said Monday.
The two Asian nations are both treaty-bound allies of the United States but have long had friction due to the legacy of Japan's harsh colonial rule over the Korean peninsula.
South Korea last month voiced "deep disappointment" after Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga sent an offering to the Yasukuni shrine, which venerates war dead including convicted war criminals, although leaders in Tokyo have in recent years refrained from the more explosive step of visiting.
Relations deteriorated sharply in 2019, with South Korea pulling back at the last minute from terminating an agreement on sharing intelligence with Japan on North Korea.
12. Biden’s tentative steps towards North Korea’s Kim greeted with scepticism
Financial Times · by Edward White · May 5, 2021
Excerpts: “Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst who briefed presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama on North Korea, believed Biden’s policy was being designed as a “holding action, not a breakthrough”.
“The administration is not hyping its proposal. It realises that it’s unlikely to ‘solve’ the North Korean problem; it likely seeks to keep North Korea quiet so it can concentrate on more pressing priorities elsewhere that are solvable,” she said.
...
Soo Kim, a former CIA North Korea analyst now at the think-tank Rand Corporation, expected the Kim regime to resume military provocations. “There is little holding Pyongyang back from brinkmanship,” she said.
...
Ramon Pacheco Pardo, a North Korea expert at King’s College London, noted several “positive signals”, including Kim’s adherence to a de facto moratorium on nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests since his summit with Trump in Singapore in 2018.Preparatory work was also under way for potential “track two” talks: back-channel discussions involving North Korean diplomats and foreign non-government experts, people familiar with the discussions said.
“They have certainly left the door open,” said Glyn Ford, a former member of the European parliament with close connections to high-ranking North Korean officials. “Quite how far open the door is, I’m unclear.”
13. South Korea’s diplomatic balancing act with Russia
eastasiaforum.org · by Anthony Rinna · May 5, 2021
Russia can be a spoiler in Northeast Asia.
Excerpts: “Given that Russia has a strong interest in pursuing collaborative economic projects involving both North and South Korea, particularly under South Korea’s New Northern Policy, the biggest challenge Seoul faces regarding Russia–US tensions will be responding to Russian diplomatic overtures that involve projects and initiatives that run counter to the current sanctions regime.
Senior Russian officials, for their part, express doubt that the United States would be favourable toward South Korea engaging in trilateral cooperation with North Korea and Russia. As South Korea gears up for presidential elections in 2022, it remains to be seen whether Moon Jae-in’s successor will maintain the New Northern Policy, launch a new analogous project, or abandon prospects of such trilateral cooperation altogether.
If Seoul maintains that Russia can play a helpful role in the Korean peace process through economic collaboration, then Russia’s opposition to sanctions — and the United States’ insistence on maintaining them — will elevate tensions within South Korea’s own foreign policy decision-making. This may not be nearly as pressing an issue as Seoul’s increasingly untenable ‘strategic ambiguity’ between China and the United States, but it is an issue that South Korea will likely be forced to contend with.
14. Trump may have cleared Biden's path to check NKorea
washingtontimes.com · by Ben Wolfgang
But we are likely to see neither a return to "strategic patience" nor the employment of "unconventional, experimental, top down, pen pal diplomacy." The question is how will the difference be split?
15. North Korea faces economic ruin amid food and medicine shortages
The Guardian · by Justin McCurry · May 5, 2021
It could be worse than the 1990'a Arduous March. But while there are external conditions, e.g., COVID, natural disasters, and sanctions, it is really the policy decisions of Kim Jong-un that are the problem and what will bring ruin to the north.
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