A Far Cry From Failure by Michael O'Hanlon, Foreign Affairs.
Stephen Biddle and Karl Eikenberry are outstanding public servants and scholars, but their respective articles on Afghanistan (“Ending the War in Afghanistan” and “The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan,” September/October 2013) convey excessively negative assessments of how the war is going and of Afghanistan’s prospects. Their arguments could reinforce the current American malaise about the ongoing effort and thereby reduce the odds that the United States will continue to play a role in Afghanistan after the current NATO-led security mission there ends in December 2014. That would be regrettable; the United States should lock in and solidify its gains in Afghanistan, not cut its losses.
Biddle argues that the U.S. Congress and other donors are unlikely to keep funding the Afghan government after 2014. Based on this conclusion, he states that the only other viable options for Washington are to broker a power-sharing deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban or to end its mission immediately…
Comments
Should the potential for success or failure be judged along these lines, to wit:
-- To create a regional environment more conducive to stable democracies and open societies? --
If so, then in which of these ways is this objective most likely to be achieved:
a. As per Biddle and Eikenberry's suggestion regarding a power-sharing deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban?
b. Or via O'Hanlon's idea that we and our allies continue to build up the Afghan state such that it is at least resilient enough to fend off the Taliban in most population and economic centers?
(Herein, understanding that the mission of the Taliban et al would seem to be: To ensure that we ARE NOT able to create a regional environment more conducive to stable democracies and open societies.)
RantCorp:
That was extremely well stated. Unfortunately RCJ isn't the only one who refuses to recognize that Taliban & Co. is "the proxy UW force of the Pakistan Army." Our government also refuses to see or at least actually do anything about it and it has been THE primary cause of our cloud cuckooland performance in Afghanistan. That performance has resulted in the very curious phenomenon of the current Afghan Gov, in an attempt to defend itself against the Pak Army/ISI, working to co-operate with the Pakistani Taliban even though the Pakistani Taliban is suspected of helping an attempted strike terror strike against the US in the US. This is something our refusal to see the sun in the sky has driven them to do even though our original purpose in going over there was to keep people in the area who would hit us here from rising to the fore. Future historians are going to be hard pressed to believe our actions, unless they have advanced degrees in abnormal psychology with a concentration in self delusion.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/us-disrupts-afghans-tack-o…
RCJ wrote:
‘The Taliban were not our reason for going to Afghanistan, they were victims of mission creep and our desire to find someone and something we could actually target (kick)’
I am puzzled by the labeling of the Taliban as a Pathan ‘Revolutionary’ or ‘Resistance’ movement and not as the proxy UW force of the Pakistan Army. I have no doubt there are many Pathans who have a desire for revolution and resistance but why label them as a Pakistan UW force and not Pathan Revolutionary/Resistance fighters?
The original Taliban fighter was literally stood up with 6 to 7 year old boys in the refugee camps of Pakistan in the mid eighties. Unlike the Mujahedeen none fought the Soviet Army nor the Saurists owing to their age and the simple fact the political purpose for their existence was to fight UW in Afghanistan and India. Many of those children now have their own children in the ranks of the present-day Taliban and are fighting the ISAF and ASF.
Needless to say the possibility exists that in the ensuing 30 odd years the Taliban’s original purpose may have morphed into a Pushtoonistan revolutionary or resistance movement. However considering they remain trained, supplied, rotated, financed, disciplined, hospitalized, rehabilitated and pensioned by the Pakistan Army I would suggest such a major change to be unlikely. The proof in the pudding is the Pakistan Army’s attitude towards Pakistan’s home-grown Pathan secessionists. These Pathans are indeed revolutionary and resistance fighters but unlike the Taliban survive independently from any outside aid other than funding from Saudi/Wahhabi dissidents and the small-arms they beg, borrow and steal. These Pathan fighters are duly shot on sight by the Pak Army.
The Taliban only come to Afghanistan to kill or be killed at the behest of their Pakistani masters and rather than attacking the ISAF or GIRoA security personnel ( as one would expect of a genuine revolutionary/resistance movement) 90% of their victims are innocent civilians blown to pieces in mosques, bazaars and on public roadways. IMHO if the Talibs were inclined to pursue or merely express any secessionist intentions they would find themselves in one of the NWFP prisons of no return.
RCJ wrote:
‘Anytime a government is dedicated to the exclusion of some significant segment of the population from full and unbiased participation in economic, social and political participation in the future of that place, one may call it "democracy" but it is in fact a form of tyranny; and revolutionary insurgency is the typical, and natural response from that excluded population.’
IMHO this Jeffersonian argument in support of the Talban and the subsequent characterization of the ISAF/GIRoA effort as a tyranny warrants a close examination of the political will of the Afghan population so as to establish who in fact is the freedom fighter and who is the tyrant.
I think all would agree none of the Tajiks, Hazaris, Uzbecks, Nuristanis etc want the Taliban back so that’s 52% (16 million people) native opponents straight off the bat. The 300,000 Pathan members of the ASFs (150K military/150K police/VSO) would be the first to be ‘rescued’ by a Taliban bullet so I would hazard a guess that they are not for the Taliban. Include the ten direct family members of each of these 300K Pathan security personnel ( who probably represent the family’s major/sole bread-winner) and the anti-Taliban bloc side has another 3 million supporters. Add another 3 million or so more distant cousins/in-laws/neighbors and you are talking 6 million ethnic Pathans with a direct financial linkage to GIRoA and ISAF rule. So the so-called ‘tyranny’ has 21 million supporters or 70% of the Afghan population.
Any Pathan revolution/resistance mandate must now draw its democratic legitimacy from 30% of a total population of 30 million. Impacting their legitimacy credentials is the simple fact that most live near the Pak border.
Half of these remaining 10 million people are female. Does anyone seriously suggest any female living in Afghanistan would wish to see the return of the Taliban if given a choice? I very much doubt it. So those 5 million females make it 83% with very little interest in the Taliban’s return.
RCJ wrote :
‘Our continued efforts against "the Taliban" were largely at the encouraging of a Northern Alliance-based government that was happy to have us enforce their tyrannical monopoly on governance.’
It is possible that all of the remaining 5 million want the Taliban back but I have my doubts. Which dominant Pathan tribal group might represent the core of the Taliban’s legitimacy? It would help if they actually lived in Afghanistan and or at the very least were born there. The Popalzai are the dominant Pathan tribe and they are centered around Kandahar. Importantly in a country where the sentiment for political leadership is ultra conservative the Popalzai of Kandahar boast seven Shahs of the Durrani dynasty that ruled all of Afghanistan and as far as Kashnmir for nearly a century and are considered the founders of the ‘modern’ Afghan State.
Some other prominent Pathans - Mullah Omar is a landless peasant from Urozgun and is a Hotak, Jellaudden Haqqani has lived in Pakistan since 1975 and is from Paktia on the Pak border. Gulbuddin Hekmatyr is from the far northern town of Kunduz and was a pro-Soviet student who came to prominence at the University of Kabul by throwing acid on female under-graduates and subsequently fled to Pakistan and lived there for nearly 40 years.
However there is one Pathan dude who was born in Kandahar, is a member of the Popalazi tribe, currently resides in Afghanistan and so happens to be the President of Afghanistan. IMHO any suggestion the current President has a weaker political mandate than any other possible Pathan candidate from the Pathan heartland strikes me as doubtful.
Certainly Karzai is far from ideal but his lousy performance in no way explains the lack of political support the Taliban possess in their heartland and the complete absence mandate in the rest of Afghanistan.
IMO the suggestion that any organization that less than 5% of the population is in some way denied nation-wide representation as a result of tyranny flies in the face of reason.
Pakistan has existential reasons for waging UW against its westerly neighbor and like all sovereign states it will do anything to ensure its national security. Unless her strategic insecurities are dealt with Afghanistan will never know peace. The notion that Pakistan’s national security will somehow be strengthened by an ethnic Persian resurgence along the Durrand Line is insane.
Only Israel fears the expansion of Persia more than Pakistan. Our strategic blunder in Iraq and the subsequent empowering of Iran has completely freaked them out.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has the measure of any nuclear threat posed by India. A MAD balance is maintained by the simple fact that Pakistan missiles can reach enough major Indian cities to render an existential threat from India highly unlikely. Unfortunately these same missiles located in the Pakistani Punjab wouldn’t get halfway to Tehran.
Obviously Pakistan should not get a pass for what it is doing in Afghanistan but think October 1962, Cuba, missile flight times and what the US was prepared to risk to ‘fix’ the problem and ask yourself why are we abandoning our ally and giving up our strategic foothold in the epic-center of this unfolding catastrophe.
We all have one.
RC
"But Madhu, Brookings thought the constant military aid was bad."
"Yes, but their non-proliferation advice and their civilian aid advice was equally bad, just in a different way. Remember, it's the consensus, the hawks and doves combined, a sometimes Anglo-American way, a sometimes Brussels way of approaching a region, <em>that</em> is the issue."
"But none of my books at Georgetown covered this. I mean, I've read everything okay? I am SAMS. I am Georgetown. I am Princeton. I've traveled. I have languages. How can you say I missed something?"
"Well, that is the key question, isn't it? How a person develops not so much blind spots, as the place which "I will not go...." "
"But what if you are wrong?"
"Well, I might be. That's why you need to go beyond reading your books and REALLY READ YOUR BOOKS."
"Where did you start if there is so much wrong with so much written?"
"Well, I read for information, not to copy someone else's analysis. And the place to begin is this:
We say we want to block terrorism and proliferation but we contribute to it greatly. We are Warriors, not warriors. Traditional enemies such as Russia and Iran remained our preoccupation so when push came to shove, we outsourced through regimes that were the problem to begin with."
"So, you looked at the inconsistencies?"
"I started with the thinking of the thinkers. And I looked to see if what they predicted ever came true. It almost never did."
"Prediction is impossible."
"True. But it wasn't so much the prediction, I guess, as the delusions that went with them. This includes, sadly, those that we partnered with, even those on the side of the angels. If we deemed someone good, we assumed their analysis must be too."
Ah, Brookings and South Asia and Afghanistan analysis!
Good old Brookings: Michael O'Hanlon! The Shaffers! Strobe Talbott! William Dalrymple! Vali Nasr! Stephen P. Cohen! Write, write, write. Conference, conference, conference. Lecture, lecture, lecture! Oh, Washington Consensus, how may I worship you <em>even more</em>?
<em>And it goes on and on and on....And on and on and on:</em>
From a comment I left at zenpundit:
<blockquote>You all should take a meander through Zakheim’s <em>A Vulcan’s Tale: How the Bush Administration Mismanaged the Reconstruction in Afghanistan.</em>
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It’s hilarious in the way it broadcasts Zakheim’s own contributions to the mess without ‘fessing up. Well, I don’t think there was any real ‘fessing up but I might be wrong because gales of laughter caused me to stop reading.
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There are many hilarious passages on Musharraf. Rumsfeld and the Neocons and the old Nixon-wallah’s got played, and good. They knew nothing. Less than nothing.
.
Wait, hang on. I’m getting some complaints here. “Nothing” is on the Twitter and Tweets: “Please. Even Nothing Knew Better Than That. Tweet!”
.
Seriously, read a bit of it. The laughter will do you good. Money man actually has a passage where he’s all, “we have to figure out how to shovel as much money to the military and Musharraf as we can without lousy Congressionals messing it like they always do! We’ve got to block the Soviets and keep the Iranians….what? Oh, what decade is it again?”
.
LOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOLOL!!!! </blockquote>
Young people reading and lurking, my only hope. You are starting to "get" it aren't you? No conspiracy. Sometimes, analysis is terribly weak and the reasons are complicated and varied, including the fact that many good people are driven by emotion and personal friendships and habits and passions and messy <em>humanness</em> as much as anything else.
Don't despair. Yes, this board's negative Nelly is trying to change ways.
There is no reason for despair. The thing of it is, you are better educated about the world than you once were about many things, including the passions that your elders developed during the Cold War and the twenty year cycle after. The passions that run the Washington Consensus. From this, you will build. I see it starting already. Good luck to you. I mean that sincerely. Be nicer than I am.
You too will develop your own passions and struggle to overcome them and in the future your own children will say, "hey, what were you thinking?" And the answer will be that we are human which means being fallible. Which ought to mean humility. A thing I struggle with so I should shut my trap, really.
But seriously, young ones. Read up on Brookings and its history of analysis in the region. Go back and read what was written and what happened subsequently. Aid not gonna work, oldster Brookings. Hyphenating not gonna work, oldster Brookings. Wrong and wrong again.
LOL indeed. Laughter is the only sane response.
I think both of you have a point. We laid the groundwork against the Taliban (as we understood the group at the time) in the 90's. We stayed and incorporated a lot of different groups into that same label for a whole host of reasons, including inertia. But our entire system was geared toward working against the Taliban because of the way in which we understood the region in the 90's:
<blockquote>The Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee was established on 15 October 1999 by the Security Council with the adoption of resolution 1267 for the purpose of overseeing the implementation of sanctions measures imposed on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan for its support of Usama bin Laden. The sanctions regime has been modified and strengthened by subsequent resolutions, including resolutions 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006), 1822 (2008) and 1904 (2009) so that the sanctions measures now apply to designated individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida wherever located.</blockquote>
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/information.shtml
That we would punish the Taliban after 9-11 makes sense. Staying and working on building a state was also in the water in our civilian and military systems because of the fashionable ideas related to international "policing" and stability that were embedded in the NATO structure at the time of 9-11. Those ideas continue, if badly battered by experience, into the present.
The US and its attitudes toward West and South Asia have never been entirely rational. The entire thing is very sad for our youngest and bravest in the military and for many peoples in the region. It's just not rational, a lot of this "international strategery" stuff. All wishes and whims and scheming on paper....
Move Forward,
All of my positions seek to be as pragmatic as possible. But pragmatic does not mean tactical, or framed by the emotions and perspectives at the time of decision, or overly colored by superficial factors that cover the surface of every problem in unique ways.
Pragmatism for dealing with populace-based problems must be rooted in a fundamental understanding of human nature and the fundmaental dyanmics of the relationships between populations and the systems of governance that affect their lives. Also the understanding that any political solution forced by an outside party will be de facto illegitimate in the minds of many that it affects.
I don't like that we framed for failure. I know we can't go back and make smarter decisions then based upon that evolved understanding. But we can make smarter decisions now. To simply keep digging when we are already in a big hole of our own making, filling with Aligators of our own breeding, is foolish.
Revolutoin does not bring good governance, it can only remove governance perceived as bad. Everything else takes time. You want my pragmatic take on Egypt, Israel, Libya or the KSA? Just ask.
I stand by my assessment in my original post. I appreciate the passion of your arguments, and I feel that same passion and frustration. But I think you are focusing on the wrong factors, that while true, are largely moot toward getting to better results.
Move Forward,
All of my positions seek to be as pragmatic as possible. But pragmatic does not mean tactical, or framed by the emotions and perspectives at the time of decision, or overly colored by superficial factors that cover the surface of every problem in unique ways.
Pragmatism for dealing with populace-based problems must be rooted in a fundamental understanding of human nature and the fundmaental dyanmics of the relationships between populations and the systems of governance that affect their lives. Also the understanding that any political solution forced by an outside party will be de facto illegitimate in the minds of many that it affects.
I don't like that we framed for failure. I know we can't go back and make smarter decisions then based upon that evolved understanding. But we can make smarter decisions now. To simply keep digging when we are already in a big hole of our own making, filling with Aligators of our own breeding, is foolish.
Revolutoin does not bring good governance, it can only remove governance perceived as bad. Everything else takes time. You want my pragmatic take on Egypt, Israel, Libya or the KSA? Just ask.
I stand by my assessment in my original post. I appreciate the passion of your arguments, and I feel that same passion and frustration. But I think you are focusing on the wrong factors, that while true, are largely moot toward getting to better results.
<blockquote>No, we framed our operations in Afghanistan for failure from the very beginning in terms of the policies and politics we applied, and no amount of good COIN, CT, or any other military approach was apt to fix that in a reasonable time or at a reasonable cost. And THAT is exactly like Vietnam.</blockquote>
We were doomed to failure the moment diplomats met prematurely in Bonn, Germany to attempt to establish popularly elected governance and a constitution of a "nation-state" that should have been several to include ultimately negotiated lands in adjacent Pakistan and perhaps other "stans," and Baluch lands of Iran. Good COIN and counterterrorism in such a divided Afghanistan very likely would have worked far better using carrots where embraced and sticks where resistance continued. We could have better prioritized efforts.
Vietnam was communist. The South Vietnamese had far fewer ethnic differences, but admittedly had the same ethnicities on both sides of their own "Durand Line." South Vietnam was far smaller and readily accessible to the ocean for ease of resupply and reinforcement. North Vietnam had no nukes that terrorists on both sides of the border might get their hands on. We spent far more of our GDP on Vietnam. We had a draft in Vietnam and few reservists had to deploy. We killed 58,000 brave Americans in Vietnam vs. just over 2,000 in Afghanistan.
But like Vietnam, we screwed up and refused to bomb the North in 1975 and threw away many of the sacrifices made by those 58,000. Let's hope we get it right this time to make the families of the 2,000+ and legless veterans feel better about what they accomplished for the world.
However, all was not lost. The millions that served in Vietnam proved to the Soviets and Chinese that the U.S. would take a stand depending on where the next domino was desired to fall. Both communist sponsors paid a heavy price as well. In that respect, many neighboring free nations could continue developing their economies and cultures, increasing trade with the U.S. and ultimately benefitting our own economy.
<blockquote>2. When one does seek to engage in a foreign country, one is best served by defining one's goals as narrowly as possible and one's interests as <strong>pragmatically</strong> as possible.</blockquote>
With this shockingly rare mention of pragmatism making its way into your world view, why does it not also apply in places like Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia? Do you not see the possible repercussions of a closed Suez or resumption of Egypt/Israel warfare? Do you not see the headlines of rejected Saudi UN council seats and closer relations with Russia due to our hands-off in Syria and recent embrace of Iran? Was Libya solved by raiding it and removing a cooperative dictator? Idealists should be careful what they wish for.
It's too bad that historians always get points for looking backwards, playing Monday morning quarterback, and making broad errant generalizations regarding dissimilar circumstances while claiming past is prologue. Meanwhile, no credit is given when others make reasonable inferences about future consequences be it national deficits and debt, entitlements, isolationism, squandered billions on "preventing" climate change that China/India continue creating, State Department over-optimism, the "Affordable" Care Act disrupting 1/6 of our economy, and a republic where the grossly uninformed and unproductive rule the ballot box.
<blockquote>2. The Taliban were not our reason for going to Afghanistan, they were victims of mission creep and our desire to find someone and something we could actually target (kick). Our mission for going to Afghanistan was to punish AQ for their acts of 9/11 and to evict them from their physical sanctuaries in that region. Our continued efforts against "the Taliban" were largely at the encouraging of a Northern Alliance-based government that was happy to have us enforce their tyrannical monopoly on governance.</blockquote>As a lawyer, you know that the willing accessory or driver in a murder is just as guilty as the trigger-puller. We lock up accessories both for reasons of justice and because we seek to preclude future action of a similar nature. In this case, we knew there would be future armed robberies resulting in murder if Taliban again was in the driver's seat.
The Pashtuns as Taliban embracers proved themselves unworthy of overall governance both due to past oppression of other ethnicities in the other 58% of the Afghan population, due to inability to win an election without the majority, and in a pragmatic sense of the U.S. knowing they would welcome back terrorists and extremists. If we had given the Pashtuns their own control of areas where Pashtuns dominated and swapped lands between Pashtuns and other ethnicities in other areas, that would have been a fair solution and could have given us bases in Northern Alliance territory to "influence" Pashtun provinces should they welcome al Qaeda again.
There is an easy solution here Bob now that we no longer can redraw Afghanistan. An election is coming in 2014. Let's see if the Pashtuns can elect their candidate.
<blockquote>1. Any government elevated into office by a foreign power, regardless of how pure the foreign power perceives its justification and goals to be, will be perceived as illegitimate by much of the population it affects and will provoke a resistance insurgency. (Much cited exceptions, such as post-WWII Germany and Japan often overlook how completely defeated and equally completely vulnerable to the revenge of their recent adversary neighbors those countries were. We were the lesser of two evils. They both needed our protection, and that is a very different thing than being a welcome guest)</blockquote>
In your first sentence, perhaps prolonged U.S. control of governance until boundaries were redrawn to redress past colonial screw-ups is the solution allowing each new smaller sub-state to elect their own popular leaders. Your second sentence is related because past WWII defeated nations with common ethnic and united nation-state backgrounds had no trouble with insurgency...in part because of continued U.S. governance and in part because of large occupation forces in much smaller territories.
As mentioned, we were the lesser of evils with East Germans trying to cross false borders not as insurgents but as seekers of freedom. Japan was surrounded by ocean so had neither the opportunity nor ethnic sympathetic kin or true believers to sail to Japan as insurgents. Contrast both with Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand Line and Sunnis on all sides of Iraq except Iran and Kurdish territories.
Also you downplay that we did not enter Afghanistan as colonial conquerors, but rather as revenge seekers...no doubt the same justification that next will result in boots on the ground sometime in the next decade(s). The Taliban had welcomed al Qaeda so we had no choice but to not only drive out al Qaeda but also the government that embraced both its terror and Islamic extremism. Simply leaving immediately would have resulted in a rapid Taliban return along with a re-welcoming of al Qaeda. There would have been no ANA to prevent it or overflight/overland rights to strike again. Bin Laden would still be alive to lead and finance al Qaeda with Taliban sanctuary instead of hiding in Pakistan.
I read this short piece with considerable interest. After all, I disagreed with the message contained in the title on its face, but Brookings is a highly respected think tank, and O'Hanlon is a brilliant and respected analyst. Clearly I must be missing something.
But upon reading, I found that I disagreed with the arguments supporting Dr. O'Hanlon's position every bit as much as I did with his overall assessment.
He faults Dr. Biddle for comparing the US relationship with Afghanistan to the one we had with Vietnam, but then he contrasts that by comparing it to the relationships we had with "...partners such as Egypt, Greece, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey." My memory (or access to CIA records) may have limits, but to my knowledge the US did not conduct regime change and prop up inherently illegitimate governments of our choosing in any of those partners cited by Dr. O'Hanlon. There are probably two primary strategic lessons we should take away from our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan:
1. Any government elevated into office by a foreign power, regardless of how pure the foreign power perceives its justification and goals to be, will be perceived as illegitimate by much of the population it affects and will provoke a resistance insurgency. (Much cited exceptions, such as post-WWII Germany and Japan often overlook how completely defeated and equally completely vulnerable to the revenge of their recent adversary neighbors those countries were. We were the lesser of two evils. They both needed our protection, and that is a very different thing than being a welcome guest)
2. When one does seek to engage in a foreign country, one is best served by defining one's goals as narrowly as possible and one's interests as pragmatically as possible. In Iraq and Afghanistan we did the opposite, and the resultant quagmires are the expected result of such ambition.
Dr. O'Hanlon then makes this rather odd statement: that we could "...still achieve its core strategic goals there by building up a state that is at least resilient enough to fend off the Taliban in most population and economic centers."
Ok, here are a couple of important thoughts on that comment:
1. Anytime a government is dedicated to the exclusion of some significant segment of the population from full and unbiased participation in economic, social and political participation in the future of that place, one may call it "democracy" but it is in fact a form of tyranny; and revolutionary insurgency is the typical, and natural response from that excluded population.
2. The Taliban were not our reason for going to Afghanistan, they were victims of mission creep and our desire to find someone and something we could actually target (kick). Our mission for going to Afghanistan was to punish AQ for their acts of 9/11 and to evict them from their physical sanctuaries in that region. Our continued efforts against "the Taliban" were largely at the encouraging of a Northern Alliance-based government that was happy to have us enforce their tyrannical monopoly on governance.
Some hard terms we don't like to use, but when we sugar coat our actions to soothe or conscience with inaccurate terms, the only ones we fool are ourselves. No, we framed our operations in Afghanistan for failure from the very beginning in terms of the policies and politics we applied, and no amount of good COIN, CT, or any other military approach was apt to fix that in a reasonable time or at a reasonable cost. And THAT is exactly like Vietnam.
Respectfully,
Bob