The small US military mission in the Philippines attracts little attention, but Defense Department officials say it has been surprisingly effective at reducing the havens once used by militants here - and that could make the effort a model for other US partnerships with other nations, including Pakistan.
Pakistan has been reluctant to allow more than 70 American trainers into the country, worried about public reaction to a substantive US troop presence. But the low profile and public acceptance of the US military program in the Philippines suggest there could be lessons for American officers eager to step up their efforts with the Pakistan military...
More at The Los Angeles Times.
Comments
Westhawk:
Excellent points, especially this one that you make:
"...the challenge for IW thinkers in and out of active duty is to devise concepts, doctrine, and training programs that make small FID ops a more feasible substitute for big COIN ops for a greater variety of troublesome situations."
This has been the problem with FM 3-24 all along. It provides a one-way-only approach to counterinsurgency, which is population-centric-premised nation building. This approach might be the right one at times where vital interests are at stake and strategy has allowed for substantial commitments of blood and treasure, but it should not be the ONLY option available, as your post points out. One fears that it seems to be the only option available to us now in Afghanistan.
FM 3-24, therefore, and because of its permeating influence on the American Army, needs not to be just polished around the edges in its next (or ongoing?) rewrite, but deconstructed and put back together; in a way, like the Active Defense Doctrine of 76 was deconstructed and put back together in the form of the 82 version (and later refined in 86) of FM 3-0. Open, public debate as so often occurs on blogs like this one, The Captains Journal, Westhawk, Abu Muqawama, and many others needs to continue to advance the doctrine. A similar debate occurred between 1976 and 1982 in the pages of Military Review and other professional journals and magazines of the time.
Because on page 5-25 of FM 3-24 one finds a five line paragraph titled "Limited Support" that suggests the possibility of more limited options in coin, but buried in a manual for nation building of over 200 pages. This is why the manual needs deconstruction--and not polishing around the fringes--so that as a matter of doctrine as vehicle for change in the American Army we can move to a balanced, general purpose force and not one premised around the principles laid out in FM 3-24 which is really a mentality of nation building, ostensibly called counterinsurgency doctrine.
When it comes to doctrine the American Army since the end of World War II seems to have been afflicted by the disease of extremes, or stark pendulum shifts. Although many counterinsurgency experts appear to believe that they have figured out an appropriate middle point of the pendulum arc, I see things otherwise. I see the counterinsurgency movement and its effects on the American Army to be a symptom of the same disease of extremes that the American Army has so often suffered.
Dave, should the title of this post be "FID in PI"?
I bring up this nitpick because it puts a spotlight on what I think is the essential issue for our community in the period ahead.
In the last edition of "This Week at War" I wondered whether COIN, as the U.S. has practiced it in OIF and OEF, has a future. How likely is it that a U.S. President will send GP forces on another long-term population-protection and stabilization mission (i.e. COIN)?
On the other hand, FID, SFA, BPC, etc. seem to have a great future. Policy-makers will ask the JCS and COCOMs why in the future there can't be more ops like PI, Plan Colombia, CJTF-HOA, El Salvador, etc., and none at all like OIF and OEF.
This is an unoriginal and glaringly obvious point. But the challenge for IW thinkers in and out of active duty is to devise concepts, doctrine, and training programs that make small FID ops a more feasible substitute for big COIN ops for a greater variety of troublesome situations. This is the challenge and opportunity for the IW community.
Westhawk