When Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates announced Monday that he was dismissing Gen. David McKiernan as the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan and replacing him with Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, he signaled his support for an intellectual movement that in a few short years has come to dominate military thinking in Washington. Both McChrystal and his new No. 2, Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, Gates emphasized, have a "unique skill set in counterinsurgency."
Counterinsurgency is king. Once the province of graduate students and historians of the conflicts in Vietnam and Algeria, this resurgent doctrine of how to wage a type of unconventional war has become the lens through which the American defense establishment analyzes what happened in Iraq, what to do now in Afghanistan, and the very future of warfare.
Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command and the former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, is the inspiration and leading light of this movement. In 2006, he coauthored the Army field manual on how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, stressing the need to provide security for the local population and support the host government, among other imperatives. A vocal cohort of students and adherents of counterinsurgency -- now given the inevitable military acronym "COIN" -- has emerged to advance the cause. New think tanks and blogs propagate and debate counterinsurgency research, and tomes exploring insurgencies past, present and future are on every cognoscente's reading list. Even the State Department has embraced the concept, composing its own counterinsurgency manual for U.S. civilian agencies...
Much more at The Washington Post.
Comments
I saw this article in the Washington Post yesterday and was immediately drawn to read it. While Ms Ward provides some critical insight into COIN and its potential success and failure, I think the opinion that it has become the unquestioned "mantra" or "orthodoxy" is a stretch. In todays complicated world there are several factors that play to success or failure of US policy. Rarely is there simply a military solution to a problem, and I would argue that COIN is only a method of military engagement where the diplomatic, informational, and economic factors are considered alongside the military considerations. While COIN may be the vernacular that has come out of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the policy defined in DoD Directive 3000.07 (Irregular Warfare) dated 01DEC08 does more to define the "latest mantra," to use Ms Wards own words. Ms Ward explains how COIN operations stress the need to "provide security for the local population and support the host government, amount other imperatives," and goes on to describe the militarys propensity apply the same model to all situations ("the discovery of a Hammer [COIN] makes everything look like a nail [active insurgency]"). Given an active insurgency, the COIN doctrine has been proven effective, but does not account for all considerations. In contrast, the DoD Directive on IW accounts for multiple objectives, ranging from the ID and defeat of threats, extending US reach into denied areas, ensure the security of sovereign territory, and create a safe and secure environment in fragile states, and synchronize the efforts of DoD with other government agencies. This is accomplished through a variety of doctrinal methods of engagement (COIN, UW, FID, CT, and SO). Thus while COIN has become a major part of our current conflicts it is in essence only one tool in the DoDs Irregular Warfare kit bag.
People forget sometimes what the military is used for. If foreign policy is a toolbox, the military is the hammer. The hammer can be used to build or destroy, depending on what is asked of it. Because the U.S. military is well disciplined, it does not outward question what is asked of to do, like a good hammer, it just does it. Using the hammer is not painless. If done carelessly, it can hurt, damage, and maim. Remember though, that the hammer is 19 and 20 year old sons and daughters, who are willing to hit hard and give it all. Use it wisely. COIN principles dictate a long presence in hostile areas. Its a different way to use the hammer, that the citizens may not be accustom to, and may not tolerate the length of time needed to accomplish it. People are impatient. So I would ask the powers using the hammer, remember the people will want it to be put back in the box, even though sitting in a tool box is not the job of the hammer.