Event summary follows: The United States must develop a comprehensive strategy toward Yemen beyond counterterrorism, panelists concluded Tuesday at the American Enterprise Institute. Katherine Zimmerman, an analyst and the Gulf of Aden Team Lead for AEI's Critical Threats Project, outlined the six most likely and dangerous crisis scenarios in Yemen that could result from the current political stalemate, including the collapse of Yemen's economy or a mass-casualty attack on the United States by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Frederick W. Kagan, the director of AEI's Critical Threats Project, argued that the United States, in addition to its regional and international partners, has a vested interest in preventing Yemen from complete state collapse. Christopher Boucek of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that while current American strategy is focused almost exclusively on counterterrorism, the greatest threat facing Yemenis daily is the looming meltdown of their economy--not al Qaeda.
Ambassador Edmund J. Hull described the challenges of on-the-ground implementation of a comprehensive strategy, given the limited ability of US officials to operate beyond the capital, San'a, due to security concerns. The panelists advocated drawing on the lessons from the American experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to fine-tune an appropriate approach to Yemen that links development gains and security gains.
Comments
I know it verges on being un-American, but it's at least worth considering that AQ is not necessarily a reactive phenomenon.... that they aren't responding to some conditions imposed by the west, but rather proactively initiating a change that suits their interest.
RC:
It's all very well to speak of "addressing root causes", but if the root cause is somebody else's governance, how is the US supposed to go about addressing them? Our capacity to initiate changes in the governance patterns of other nations is very limited indeed. How exactly do you propose to generate fundamental change in the way Yemen or Saudi Arabia is governed?
I believe that we must consider an alternative "root cause" theory:
Such things as the crisis in Yemen, the rise of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and U.S. National Security are possibly best understood from the following perspective: as relating to a conservative backlash against the most blatent Westernizing and secularizing effort attempted by the West in nearly a century (the West's winning of the Cold War causing us to be so rash and so bold and to saddle up and move out accordingly).
This explanation, I believe, may provide us with a better understanding of why and how bin Laden, and his likely successors, have found and will continue to find many of the best and brightest to draw from.
With this alternative explanation and understanding of "root causes" in mind, how then should we proceed to addresses these matters?
Ken,
I prefer to think of it as "fundamental" and "focused on roots of causation."
Traditional approaches are more "reactive" and "focused on overt symptoms."
These governments can pay Eric Prince half a billion dollars to come in and suppress their populaces, and bin Laden's successors will always have a rich pool of the best and brightest to draw from; and ultimately the people will prevail, the governments will fall, and Prince will be up on charges.
Or, they can try some fundamental changes designed to address the root causes, and it costs virtually nothing to try.
Bob
<b>Robert C. Jones:</b>
I agree with your Step one (with a minor caveat, cited below). I further agree with the statements in your second paragraph in the above response to me.
However, we part company on this:<blockquote>"I would recommend we conduct a regional summit meeting to address the commonalities of the problem and to take the following positions:..."</blockquote>I see no rationale for us, the US, to conduct or even be involved in such a meeting and I can see many reasons why we should not do so, not least that the failure to achieve our 'desired' results would be seen as yet another US failure...
If we were trusted, it might be considered; given that we have as you often note destroyed our trustworthiness in the area, our credibility is, while not zilch, certainly not high enough to achieve any success in such a meeting. Folks would come, they're polite and we're rich but they would not be driven by us to be logical or forget the past or to do anything perceived not to be in the interest of their political class.
Your Point 1 position is logical and might work in a western venue. I strongly doubt it would be really accepted in most of the ME though they would certainly say they agreed. Your Point 2 is where the biggest problem erupts, we can't even get agreement between you and I and I suggest that getting those from the ME to produce an "honest assessment" is asking a group of persons to whom haggling and Taarof are National Sports to actually agree -- as opposed to seeming to do so if some possible benefit is seen -- is unlikely. Your Point 3 is generally valid, western or ME but the answers will vary widely depending on who is asked what.
I agree with your things that should not be done however I do not agree that we should talk about the principles we hold dear -- that primarily due to the fact that we talk one thing and do another and always have. That's called hypocrisy and people all over the world can spot it in a second. It would be far better if we left aside those 'principles' in international forums and instead talked hard headed national interests. The rest of the world understands that even if we seem to refuse to do so. That hypocrisy factor is the one thing I have heard as a complaint about the US in every nation I've visited and it is the most often mentioned of all complaints.
Along that line, I wrote above that I had a minor caveat with your Step one. It is that while we should not 'blame' ideology we should be very careful to not discount its effect. As an example in this scenario, the ideology of the Persian versus Arab disconnect (and it is an ideology as much as a bias and historical fact) is far more pervasive than most in the west understand and our lack of understanding blinds us to certain advantages that provides. Don't blame ideology but do not continue to fail to consider its effects. Not least on negotiating techniques...
<blockquote>"(oh, and just because doing the right thing is hard, that is no reason not to try, right??)"</blockquote>Absolutely correct. I totally agree. The question though is 'What <i>is</i> the right thing?'
Our perceptions obviously differ. My right thing would be harder than your right thing because we'd have to acknowledge we are not, never have been and are unlikely to be that "Bright shining city on the hill" and we would have to get our own house in order before we start trying to manipulate others, we'd have to stop interfering in areas where we do more harm than good. Both our versions would be a difficult sell politically in the US due to the fractious nature of Americans however, my belief is that a moderate majority of our citizens and a slighter majority of our politicians would opt my version. We're unlikely to find out if either will fly, so that's probably moot...
Your version would seem to be more idealistic but I strongly doubt we can do what you apparently believe we can achieve by 'leading.' Not really our job and until we get our act together, we would really not be able to do that. Dayuhan keeps pointing out to you that our ability to truly affect what the Saudis do is slim, that's just as true for most other Nations to include the subject of this Thread, Yemen.
We get some leverage because of our wealth and the power that we possess (but use quite poorly, IMO) and we even get some respect for various reasons including the elements of the City /Hill bit in part but we still cannot -- and should not -- try to boss others around. That's what you suggest, you're being nice about it but in the end, it's telling others how to behave. Not our job and they do not like it -- won't do it, in fact. Thus, IMO, your suggestion <i>may</i> be politically feasible but it is, I fear, unrealistic insofar as ability to achieve change.
Jason,
That all sounds very practical and logical and should be part of the discussion. By looking at the problem within the context I describe, and also by getting all of the stakeholders together, I believe it helps fine tune and operationalize approaches like the ones you lay out.
Perhaps it would lead the Saudis to see how helping solve the Yemeni water problem helps them reduce their own challenges, as an example. Or by having a fresh perspective we avoid reaching into that diaspora and finding some guy who appeals to our Western eyes, ears and interests and acting to lift him into power.
Ultimately one must get to the details of what they specifically do in each unique case, but to skip step one (understanding the problem and mission analysis) and jumping straight to either attempting to force the current COA to work, or into COA development is not apt to produce the results everyone hopes for.
Bob
Robert
I'm going to stick to making an attempt with practical suggestions focused on Yemen.
1. Support the the organic revolution that is taking place in Yemen. One of the expressed frustrations from members of the Middle East community down here is that the US has been too slow to support this movement. A movement of highly mobile, socially networked young people ripe for support. A population base that could fuel future transnational terror or support future modernity.
The problem is some five or six years ago, US diplomats in Sanaa, concluded that Saleh had been "so successful at co-opting or eliminating his competition that few viable alternatives to his leadershp exist at the moment.
2. Water security
Yemen is running dry. It is the sort of vital resource constraint that could fuel future internal instability and war if it is not sorted.
3. Connect with the economy - free trade deals and bi-lateral commerce tend to have a stablising effect and build relationships beyond economics. Known in Roman times as Arabia Felix - meaning wealthy and fertile - Yemen is now the poorest country in the region.
4. Connecting the Yemeni Diaspora with Yemen
From my experience with the Sri Lankan civil war and the Tamil and Sinhalese Diaspora, they both had significant impact on what was happening back in Sri Lanka.
5. Education and English
If there is any aspect of social policy to support I would pick education and in that teaching English. An educated population who we can engage with directly and indirectly through conventional and new media will be more open to dialogue and interested in long term stability.
6. Eradicate Q'at
This is a massive problem in Yemen. It's like Bettle Nut in PNG. Not only does it use a drastic amount of water it eats away at families and communities. It is also a potential funding mechanism for AQAP.
No doubt there are plenty of other practical suggestions or reasons why what I have suggested may not work. However, surely they are in the interests of Yemen's stability and therefore of interest to SA and the US.
Cheers
Jason
Dayuhan,
I appreciate that you disagree with my assessment, we will continue to disagree. If you are asking which specific objective metric "proves" my position? You would make a good general.
As to your contention that regime change is our only option, you sell us, and others, short. The Saudis do not want to have insurgency or civil war and work diligently to suppress the problem. As Arab Spring begin to blossom they have also piled bribes on top of suppression. Neither of these "finger in the dike" techniques is apt to work for ever. There is simply too much energy behind this long suppressed movement. But there are simple changes in key areas that they can and should make on their terms. Not to become more American or more western, often they would actually make them "more Arab." This must indeed be their solution, but they must evolve from the royal "I am king, so I must not change" that so many royals have clung to all the way to the executioner's block.
As to Yemen? Yes it has its own problems. I do not mean to suggest that all of Yemen's problems are those of other states that have migrated there to take sanctuary; rather that until one addresses those other states issues and Yemen's issues at the governmental reform level in a comprehensive scheme of engagement, one is just sniping at the symptoms.
Yemen's government was too poor, too arrogant, and waited too long, and yes, the nature of their relationship with the US enabled that to happen.
Ken,
Step one is to stop blaming ideology, AQ and insurgents for everything bad that happens. Yes, all those things are problems at a certain level, but at the level where true solutions must be sought they are merely symptoms. We must learn to look past the symptoms and take an honest, holistic, and informed look at the root problems.
While each state has its own unique issues that are fueling the grievances within distinct and significant segments of their populace, and while those specifics are important, what should not be lost is the commonalities of human nature that drive the core perceptions and feelings that lead people to revolt.
I would recommend we conduct a regional summit meeting to address the commonalities of the problem and to take the following positions:
1. This is not all anyones fault. Many factors contribute and have grown over time to where we are today; but to look for scapegoats among the current symptoms (AQ, restless populaces, strained economics, ideology, etc) will not get us to an enduring success.
2. Identify the national interests of every state in the group, and also the interests of the primary non-state actors (both legal and illegal) that are involved and do an honest assessment of where they match and where they diverge.
3. Look at three primary LOOs to assess each governmental-populace relationship within:
Hope: Does each significant and distinct group within the populace perceive that it has legal, trusted and certain means to address grievances with the government? If no, what reasonable changes consistent with those respective cultures could they adopt that might serve to relieve the building pressure in their respective states?
Justice: Does each significant and distinct group within the populace perceive that the rule of law as applied to them is also just? If not, what reasonable changes consistent with those respective cultures could they adopt that might serve to relieve the building pressure in their respective states?
Respect: Does each significant and distinct group within the populace perceive that they are treated fairly as a matter of status (not equally, but fairly)? If not, what reasonable changes consistent with those respective cultures could they adopt that might serve to relieve the building pressure in their respective states?
Legitimacy: Does each significant and distinct group within the populace perceive that the government is in a form they recognize and draws its right to govern them from a source they recognize? If not, what reasonable changes consistent with those respective cultures could they adopt that might serve to relieve the building pressure in their respective states? Perhaps small adjustments are enough. As part of this we must assess how the nature of US relationship has contributed to any perceptions of lost legitimacy and publically acknowledge and adjust the nature of those relationships and how they are managed.
This is how I would start.
I would not simply ramp up CT, capacity building or development to engage the symptoms; nor would I consider any regime change operations other than as in extremis where all other efforts have failed and our national interests are extremely (and truly) large and threatened. I also would not preach any US/Western values, but I do think that it is ok to talk about the principles we hold dear and to operate consistently with those principles.
We should stand for the principle that "all men are created equal" but withstand the temptation to hold up any current foreign interpretation of what that means (value) as some model for what is right. Let people evolve. Some issues, be it slavery in the US, or Sunni-Shite friction in Bahrain are far too large to simply legislate away. But they do need to be addressed in some manner for the problems they are and efforts taken to slowly address. Our founding fathers made the big mistake of ignoring the elephant in the room. They knew they could not solve it, so their solution was to act as if it did not exist. That let the problem fester and explode.
Bob
(oh, and just because doing the right thing is hard, that is no reason not to try, right??)
RCJ:
Yemen will have problems no matter what happens in Saudi Arabia... and since the US has no capacity to change Saudi domestic policy, the Saudi problem, whatever it might be, is not something the US can do much about.
The US has no form of "engagement" at its disposal, short of regime change, that will change the way Saudi Arabia is governed, and your repeated assertion that US support allows the Saudis to "act with impunity" remains unsupported. They are not a US dependency and they aren't going to change because we want them to or because we think a political change in Saudi Arabia is in our interests.
What exactly would you have the US do about Saudi Arabia?
AQAP may be our problem in Yemen, but it's not Yemen's only problem, nor is it the most severe of Yemen's problems... it's just the reason we're concerned. Take away AQAP and Yemen is still a mess. We just wouldn't care. Yemen's problem is that oit's less a nation than an incoherent collection of regional, sectarian, tribal and clan dispute, and that will remain the case no matter what happens in Saudi Arabia.
The solution to Yemen lies in Saudi Arabia.
Yemen is the historic sanctuary on the AP, and nationalist insurgents from across the region migrate there to find safety from very effective security forces at home. AQ conducts UW to leverage and support these nationalist insurgents.
Given the well established despotism of the governments in question, to become a nationalist insurgent seeking illegal reforms where no legal venues exist is reasonable.
Given AQ's primary goal of taking down the Saudis, their presence to leverage this force is reasonable as well.
Given western interests in the stability of the region, our interest in events in Yemen is also reasonable.
The big question then becomes, do we cling to old models of supporting sitting governments (who support our interests) in the suppression of their own people, allowing these same governments to act with a growing impunity that fuels a rich source of foreign fighters and men willing to conduct suicide international terror operations for AQ to leverage? Or do we engage these governments in new ways to address these root causes short of violence, instability, regime change or insurgency?
I say it is time to evolve. The primary mission in Yemen is not CT, and the primary problems in Yemen cannot be solved in Yemen.
Cheers!
Bob