Embedding with the Afghan National Army in Zabul

CAAT in Support of Transition: Embedding with the Afghan National Army in Zabul by the Counterinsurgency Advisory & Assistance Team, International Security Assistance Force, is a March 2011 report that is highly recommended reading for those in country (or out of) and able to access it through official channels. Our apologies here at SWJ for removing it as the copy we received, while marked unclassified and with no distribution caveats / restrictions, had not yet been approved for public release.

Comments

email me on NIPR

[email protected]

i would prefer not to give his info over these means. The CAAT POC has NIPR/CENTRIX and SIPR access

thanks for your understanding

Chris,

Do you have a POC (email) at CAAT?

Im currently working in ANSF dev at 10 Mtn. I just had an OPT with all the stakeholders from the branches and the commander of the CAAT as well as the BSO. Once you get a copy of it, please be aware that we have resolved all the issues either immediately or a staff lead has been identified. Some other issues can be solved at the MoD level, specifically with Tashkils and I was on the phone all day with NTM-A/CSTC-A trying to tackle those issues as well.

CAAT is an excellent resource.

Please post the document when you can.

Not sure where to go in order to find the parent document. Searched on AKO, but found nothing. Looks like it would be interesting.

Congratulations to CAAT on doing what I thought US advisors/ TTs were supposed to be doing for the last decade.

The key take-aways for me are:

- "be unobtrusive and low maintenance" - To me this means "don't be the "ugly American" and walk in demanding information or acceptance of USF TTPs from the ANA leaders. Listen to what they want VS telling them what we want.

- "From day one, look out for talented ANSF personnel that you can recruit to CAAT" - kind of like an Afghan version of the KATUSA program. We learn from them, and they learn from/ about us. Spot-on. My team tried this in Kandahar....no-go.

- "LOOK like you work for the Afghan commander, not ISAF. Facial hair, Afghan uniforms, language" - building trust & gaining acceptance requires moving away from 670-1. HNSF won't listen to our advice if they don't trust us. How we look impacts how we are perceived.

- "Pre-brief Afghan Corps Commander...you are HIS agents, and without his support you may be ignored" - USF advisors work for the US but must be seen as supporting the HNSF leader

- "sleep in their billeting, eat with them every meal, have 50 cups of chai, go on patrols with them" - weren't we supposed to be doing this from the beginning?

- "Riding in ANSF vehicles at the same force protection posture as the Afghans builds instant credibility; coalition units typically seen as afraid, hiding behind technology" - see above comment as well as previous postings on SWJ.

Many on here have recommended such ideas, especially thosee that have worked with the ANA/ ANP. The risk to USF is higher but the payoff is higher too. If we're going to fight this war by/ with/ through ANSF and train ANSF to take over, then accepting higher levels of risk is going to be necessary if we really want to get the Afghans to listen to us, accept us as allies, utilize our advice, and become a professional military force. Are any SFABs reading this? Probably not. Would they do this if they did read this? Probably not.

If this is what APH are doing, sign me up.