Attacks on Remote Posts Highlight Afghan Risks - Sabrina Tavernese and Sangar Rahimi, New York Times. Insurgents attacked a pair of remote American military bases in Afghanistan over the weekend in a deadly battle that underscored the vulnerability of the kind of isolated bases that the top American commander there wants to scale back. The commander, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, is pressing for a change in strategy that would shift troops to heavily populated centers to protect civilians and focus less on battling the insurgents in the hinterlands. As though to reinforce his point, insurgents carried out a bold daylight strike on two bases on the Pakistani border, killing eight Americans and four Afghan security officers in the deadliest attack for American soldiers in more than a year, Afghan and American officials said Sunday. The assault occurred less than 20 miles from the site of a similar attack that killed nine Americans last year, which had already become a cautionary tale at the Pentagon for how not to win the war in Afghanistan.
Worst Losses for a Year as Taleban Storm NATO Outpost - Martin Fletcher, The Times. It began before dawn - a devastating, well-planned attack. About 300 insurgents swarmed out of a village and mosque and attacked a pair of isolated American outposts in a remote mountainous area of eastern Afghanistan with machineguns, rockets and grenades. They first stormed the Afghan police post at the foot of the hill in the province of Nuristan, a Taleban and al-Qaeda stronghold on the lawless Pakistan border. They then swept up to the NATO post. The battle lasted all day. American and Afghan soldiers finally repelled them, with the help of US helicopters and warplanes - but at heavy cost. Eight American soldiers and two Afghan policemen were killed, with many injured. It was the worst attack on NATO forces in 14 months, and one of the deadliest battles of the eight-year war. The insurgents seized at least 20 Afghan policemen whose fate last night remained unclear. The attack came at a crucial juncture in the war, with President Obama soon to decide whether to accept a request by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the 100,000-strong US and NATO force in Afghanistan, for 40,000 extra troops, or to reduce the counter-insurgency operation against the Taleban and focus on al-Qaeda.
Afghanistan Assault Points Out US Vulnerabilities - Laura King, Los Angeles Times. In one of the most lethal battles for American troops in the Afghanistan war, a wave of insurgents attacked a pair of relatively lightly manned bases near the Pakistani border over the weekend, triggering a daylong clash that left eight Americans and as many as half a dozen Afghan troops dead. It was precisely the kind of attack the top US commander in Afghanistan is hoping to stave off by recently ordering troops to withdraw from such small outposts, concentrating instead on defending population centers. The outposts attacked Saturday had already been slated to be abandoned soon, the military said. The toll was the highest in a single incident for American forces in Afghanistan since nine US soldiers died in a strikingly similar insurgent assault 15 months ago on an outpost in the same northeastern province, Nuristan. Military officials describe the attack on the jointly run US-Afghan outposts in the Kamdesh district as a tightly coordinated onslaught by hundreds of insurgents.
McChrystal Planned to Move Soldiers Killed in Afghan Siege - Mark Sappenfield, Christian Science Monitor. One fundamental tenet of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's controversial Afghanistan strategy aims at avoiding precisely the kinds of attacks that killed eight American soldiers Sunday. In what is being described as one of the boldest attacks of the Afghan insurgency, an estimated 300 militants sustained a day-long siege against a coalition outpost in Nuristan Province - a place where the rule of law is so tenuous and the terrain so forbidding that it is seen as one of the likeliest hiding places for Osama bin Laden. It is also has fewer people than Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Beyond the request for more resources that has engrossed America, McChrystal's battlefield assessment proposes deploying American troops in a profoundly different way. Rather than sending them to the farthest-flung corners of a far-flung nation to hunt down scores of militants hiding in remote mountain caves, it intends to protect the Afghan population first, giving the most Afghans the greatest opportunity of establishing something approaching a safe and normal life. Fourth of McChrystal's "four fundamental pillars" for a new strategy is: "prioritize available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened." In fact, the very troops in Nuristan forced to fight off unseen attackers firing down from ridge lines cloaked in inclement weather Sunday are poised to be redeployed under McChrystal's new leadership, according to the Washington Post.
American Strategy of Winning Trust of Afghan People is High Risk - Tom Coghlan, The Times news analysis. Attacks such as that which killed eight Americans in Nuristan are a risk inherent in a US strategy that prioritises putting soldiers inside Afghan village communities. The American system, developed over the past three years, aims to separate the population from the insurgents and ultimately to win their trust. That means being among the people, rather than remote from them, and giving up the safety of large bases for small combat outposts of a few dozen troops alongside local security forces. These small outposts are built as satellites to larger forward operating bases which provide artillery support. It was a combat outpost and an Afghan police base close by that were attacked in Nuristan. The outposts are vulnerable if the insurgents can attack with surprise and in large numbers. In the mountains of eastern Afghanistan many of the advantages the Nato forces have in equipment are offset by the local conditions. Nuristan is at high altitude and air cover can be affected at this time of year by the onset of winter. The first snows usually fall at the end of October. The insurgents in the region tend to include highly competent foreign elements with al-Qaeda links as well as Pakistani militants, operating from groups originally trained by the Pakistani Army to fight India in Kashmir, such as Lashkar-e-Toiba. The insurgents operate from safe havens just across the border in Pakistan and enjoy short resupply lines. The steep, wooded valleys mean that they can often get close to US bases without detection, and can routinely overlook American positions from surrounding mountains.
Comments
Five years ago friendly forces closed a forward operating base (Bari Kowt / Arandu) just south of this location. Within a year videos published by AL Sahab, the AQ media outlet, were found all over the internet and in every Pakistani Market showing how the US was defeated at that location and was on their way to total defeat if more dedicated Jihads would come and join the fight. This "motivating footage" and the effect it has on young fundamentalists throughout the world is truly strategic IO. Mitigating the opportunities for enemy footage should be a primary concern.
Gentlemen,
1) "Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk resources." The cost to sustain forces in this region is prohibitive. It is simply not worth the effort given all of the Afghan population that is currently left uncovered by any security force. Rule of thumb for COIN: protect the population.
2) The locals do not want us there and have not wanted anyone else for the last 10,000 years. This is a region where foreigners are not tolerated. Foreigners consist of anyone not from your village (Kamdeshie Kazozie(sp) Conflict?)
3) The Tactical IO message falls on ears that do not care. Careful messaging throughout the rest of the AO can reinforce the reasons behind the movement: troopers moving to areas that actual have populations that can a) be influenced, and b) further the development of a population willing to support an Afghan government (an entirely different discussion). At a strategic level, a careful explanation of the reasons behind the movement can offset the already tragic event. Harping on the event and focusing on what really amounts to a desire to have revenge is an emotional response rather than a way forward; a way to improve this situation in Afghanistan.
MikeF:
good comments about Nuristan. We should have a new slogan "MAKE A STAND IN NURISTAN."
The press is now calling Wanat a "debacle" and I think this is mostly because of the withdrawal from that area afterwards-- a big IO defeat that could have been avoided.
The current battle at Kamdesh actually seems on the face of it to be a major victory for the friendly forces. The claims of enemy KIA have gone up from 40 to over 100. If 100 were in fact killed, that's a massive blow to the enemy in the district. The survivors may not have even been able to carry off the bodies. Unlike at Wanat, FF have followed up the repulse of the attacks with vigorous offensive actions throughout the area. The district is probably now the most secure it ever has been. A withdrawal no matter the reason would turn this victory into an IO defeat. The enemy is already claiming to have raised their flag over the district capital today although this cannot possible be true.
For a variety of reasons, many based on egotism and self-promotion, I have never been a fan of Bruce Clark. You may be mixing him up with someone else because he was not in Vietnam--he retired in 1962. He was, however, a corps commander in Korea.
If we we withdraw, they occupy. They win. It is that simple. The people will see this victory and respond accordingly. The shadow government will gain credence and will settle any old scores with those folks who might have either been helping and it will push the others off the fence.
If like Mike states, we go set up to draw them to our fight, with use our strengths. Make them come to us. We are the biggest tribe.
We win these fights, we can set the conditions for local COIN. We give up the territory, we lose.
I agree, the recent attack in Nuristan will provide the Insurgents with an IO victory, especially when the combat outpost is closed. I have not heard mention any efforts to minimize enemy IO victories in regards to the pending "troop withdraws." We must ensure that we sterilize any locations that are abandoned. We have seen in the past AQ media outlets filming abandoned combat outposts that showed signs of US presence. This footage is then incorporated into recruiting videos. If it is determined that a location is no longer functional for our strategy and it must be vacated then we must take steps to ensure that all signs of US presence are sterilized in order to ensure there are no signs left behind that will provide the insurgents with footage to use in their videos. MRE trash, ammo dun-age, and abandoned fighting positions will all provide the enemy with opportunity to create videos outlining US defeat at that location. If we have to pull out of locations lets make sure we do it right and bring in bulldozers to sterilize the area and limit filming opportunities for the Insurgent media machine. JB....ILE Student
MikeF:
While I agree with your ideas in the near term, I'd suggest being wary of using Bruce Clark as an example -- while he unquestionably did well at St. Vith, he also bequeathed the US Army the tag line "An organization does well only those things the Boss checks."
I suggest that idea is a large part of the problems the US Army faces today and that an organization that has to heed such advice needs to look at its hiring, personnel management and training policies to see what went wrong. Micromanagement has its own perils...
And, yes, that does very much apply to the current thread topic.
During the Ardennes Offensive (Battle of the Bulge), then COL Bruce Clark arrived at St. Vith, a key junction for track and motorized units, to find an American Army confused, panicking, and some retreating. He took charge, assembling infantrymen, tankers, cooks, and mechanics, establishing a hasty defense, he and held St. Vith for several days until Patton's 3rd Army showed up. His actions proved decisive in the overall battle.
I think his actions applly- here's why.
In one of the articles I read (Foust I think), shadow governments, training camps, and denied areas were suggested. Additionally, we know it's a gateway for fighters coming from Pakistan. (Nuristan could be more important than we think).
If we leave now, then we're likely to return to an area scorched by Taliban reprisals. In some areas, entire villages will be wiped out. The locals will never forgive us.
If we stay and reinforce for another two months, we achieve victory as we head into the winter months and large-scale offensives are minimized until spring. We can use that time to dismantle the local shadow gov't and training camps AND muster support from the locals.
Then, we can re-evaluate the situation and determine if the area requires more or less force. If we need to reposition, we can leave proclaiming the Taliban/AQ were too coward to fight.
v/r
Mike
Mike,
Ignoring the "big picture" (whether the US should be there in the first place and what victory may look like overall), you are perfectly correct in tactical terms. The single most effective response would indeed be to go in full force and stay, but I dont think that is going to happen.. Are there other options? Just pulling out would give them a big propaganda victory, but is it possible to pull out but still send the message that there will be payback and eventually THIS army will win? I am asking as an amateur with no knowledge of the local area. What would an alternative "second best" strategy look like? Drones? raids? blockade? what?
First, my heart goes out to the unit and the families of the Fallen in Nuristan. I have been in that situation before, and I understand the psychological and morale effects of everyone involved.
Second, we have the opportunity to effect the IO war with this battle. Back in 2007, my sister company experienced an attack on their patrol base in Sadah, Iraq. Nine paratroopers died and another 20 were wounded. I wrote about the events leading up to it in "Love and Hate." Seventy-two hours prior, I had lunch with the AQ leadership and offered an ultimatum: 1. Peace, 2. Destruction. They chose the latter and answered with that attack.
Sadah was unimportant in our scheme of maneuver. It was a mere foothold into the DRV so I could seize Zaganiyah, the military key terrain. C Troop was one week from leaving that patrol base in order to prepare for further clearance up the Diyala River. We were a shaping effort to a supporting effort, and our force ration was 300 paratroopers for a population of 100,000.
Immediately after the attack, COL David Sutherland, CDR 3/1 BCT, and LTC Andrew Poppas, CDR 5-73, rushed to the scene. I sent a platoon plus to secure the scene and dig through the ruble trying to recover anyone still alive. For twleve hours, we listened as battle rosters were called. Every once in a while, a medic would think that he had found a pulse or the hint of breathing. We would hold our breathe and pray until the casualty was finally pronounced dead.
Simultaneously, I took my remaining platoon and we tracked down the videographer killing him in a late night raid- My biggest fear was a video hitting the web of an American Patrol Base getting destroyed.
The command team made a decision. F*ck the plan, things changed, and we were staying. We rebuilt the patrol base, reinforced the area with two american platoons and an Iraqi battalion. Our actions were our IO message.
In the short term, attacks soared up to twelve a day on my troop. Sixty days later, we pacified the area and violence went to almost zero.
Sometimes, we have to allow the events on the ground to help shape our actions. This battle could be one of those moments. For a moment, we could forget the debate on A'stan strategy, COIN v/s CT, and make a stand in Nuranistan.
Send a battalion or brigade there. Let everyone in the province know you are staying the course. Taunt the enemy. Send broadcast proclaiming that AQ/Taliban are weak. Challenge them to come to Nuranistan to die.
Be the biggest Tribe.
v/r
Mike
I'm hoping to get ahead of the narrative with this comment.
I anticipate some declaring this to be an "IO victory" for the attackers. The guerrillas attack, inflict relatively heavy casualties, and then the Americans leave, creating the impression that they drove away the foreign infidels.
It's an IO victory at the tactical level (the general vicinity). In the larger picture, how great of an IO victory this is will depend upon how much we allow it to influence the "what do we do now" debate over Afghanistan.