Prepare for major war or stability ops? The Navy faces the same question

Debates over how to prepare for both major combat operations and stabilizations missions are not just for the Army. The Navy also faces the same questions, but with even more severe troubles with its future acquisition budgets, its contractors, a rapidly rising Chinese peer competitor, and expectations policymakers have for the Navy. A recent analysis showed that a muddling-through strategy that attempted to retain the Navy's capacity for full spectrum operations would result in a second-rate Navy that would no longer be a global player. The report concluded that the Navy will have to either give up some missions or its presence in some regions.

The latest issue of Proceedings summarizes the controversial analysis produced by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) for the Admiral Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations. The problem is the gap between the Navy's annual shipbuilding budget and what it costs the Navy's contractors to deliver the ships the Navy orders. In recent years, the Navy's shipbuilding budget has averaged about $13 billion per year. However, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Navy's shipbuilding plan, which hopes to increase the Navy from about 285 to 313 ships, will cost $19-21 billion per year. Ship retirements are outrunning new additions, causing the fleet to shrink by 20% over the past decade. The CNA analysis predicts a further 20% decline in ship numbers over the next 10-15 years under these conditions.

While the Navy has struggled with its shipbuilding budget, it has increased the tempo of its "stability operations" such as counter-piracy patrols, counter-drug patrols, humanitarian assistance, and cooperative engagement operations with foreign partners around the world. These operations have been a method of coping with declining U.S. ship numbers by attempting to create a "1,000 ship navy" composed of partner navies that have experience operating with the U.S. Navy.

The CNA report (also summarized in the Proceedings article) discusses five future paths for the Navy as it faces a constrained budget and shrinking numbers:

1. 2-Hub Navy: The Navy focuses on high-end combat capability emphasizing forward presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection in the Western Pacific and Persian Gulf. The Navy would sharply reduce its cooperative engagement operations with foreign partners and other "stability" missions.

2. 1+ Hub Navy: High-end combat capability in the Western Pacific plus low-end stability and cooperative engagement operations in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean area.

3. Shaping Navy: Focus on global stability operations and cooperative engagement with sharply reduced high-end combat capability.

4. Surge Navy: A powerful high-end Navy that could defeat any adversary but would operate close to home. Such a Navy would support an "offshore balancing" foreign policy and would end the Navy's global forward presence.

The worst choice of all according to CNA would be a Navy that attempts to retain "full spectrum" capability. Without making hard choices about missions and geography, such a Navy would eventually be unable to accomplish any of its missions or maintain a credible global presence.

Just like the Army, the Navy faces the same tradeoffs preparing for both high-end and stability operations. In the Navy's case, the full spectrum of demands on it are current, not hypothetical. Much of world has become accustomed to the Navy patrolling the maritime commons while also backstopping security alliances, especially in the Pacific. And in a decade or so the Navy will face at least one high-end peer competitor. But the Navy is also called on to do its part to address various sources of instability, from Latin American to all sides of Africa. According to CNA, there is a big gap between what policymakers want the Navy to do and what muddling through will bring.