Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:
Topics include:
1) The insurgency next door
2) What Sri Lanka really teaches us
The insurgency next door
While answering a question on Mexico this week at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, "We face an increasing threat from a well-organized network, drug-trafficking threat that is, in some cases, morphing into, or making common cause with, what we would consider an insurgency." Mexico's foreign minister Patricia Espinosa was quick to dispute this characterization, arguing that Mexico's drug cartels have no political agenda. But as I have previously discussed, the cartels, evidenced by their attacks on both the government and the media, are gradually becoming political insurgents as a means of defending their turf.
I note that Clinton used the phrase "We [the United States] face an increasing threat ...," not "they [Mexico]." The cartels are transnational shipping businesses, with consumers in the United States as their dominant market. The clashes over shipping routes and distribution power -- which over the past four years have killed 28,000 and thoroughly corrupted Mexico's police and judiciary -- could just as well occur inside the United States. Indeed, growing anxiety that southern Arizona is in danger of becoming a "no-go zone" controlled by drug and human traffickers contributed to the passage of Arizona's controversial immigration enforcement statute earlier this year.
Both Clinton and Mexican officials have discussed Colombia's struggle against extreme drug violence and corruption, revealing concerns about how dreadful the situation in Mexico might yet become and also as a model for how to recover from disaster. Colombia's long climb from the abyss, aided by the U.S. government's Plan Colombia assistance, should certainly give hope to Mexico's counterinsurgents. But if the United States and Mexico are to achieve similar success, both will have to resolve political dilemmas that would prevent effective action. Clinton herself acknowledged as much when she remarked that Plan Colombia was "controversial ... there were problems and there were mistakes. But it worked."
Isolating Mexico's cartel insurgents from their enormous American revenue base -- a crucial step in a counterinsurgency campaign -- may require a much more severe border crackdown, an action that would be highly controversial in both the United States and Mexico. Plan Colombia was a success partly because of the long-term presence of U.S. Special Forces advisers, intelligence experts, and other military specialists inside Colombia, a presence which would not please most Mexicans. And Colombia's long counterattack against its insurgents resulted in actions that boiled the blood of many human rights observers.
Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America's role in the rest of the world. An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the United States to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world.
Should the southern border become a U.S. president's primary national security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let's hope that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control.
What Sri Lanka really teaches us
In a recent Wall Street Journal interview, Gen. David Petraeus foresaw no let-up in Afghanistan's violence. With top Obama administration officials scheduled to meet in December for a major review of war strategy, Petraeus suggested that he needs a new set of measurements to show progress in time for those meetings.
With little to show from the war effort except frustration, some analysts are again questioning whether the U.S. military's favored counterinsurgency tactics, exemplified by former commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's restrictions on the use of firepower, have crippled the coalition's ability to bring the war to a conclusion.
Writing in Small Wars Journal, Lionel Beehner, a Ph.D. candidate at Yale University and formerly a senior writer at the Council on Foreign Relations, reminds us how the Sri Lankan government's unrestrained use of military power crushed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). "Winning hearts and minds" and protecting the Tamil population were apparently not part of the Sri Lankan government's military plan. Killing all of the LTTE's leadership and any foot soldiers who continued to resist, regardless of the secondary consequences, seemed to be the only guidance field commanders needed to remember. The remnants of the LTTE surrendered on May 17, 2009.
What lessons does Beehner apply from this experience to the struggle in Afghanistan?
The U.S. military, given the constraints it faces and wariness of the war back home, suffers from the Goldilocks paradox: It applies just enough force to upset the locals and kill civilians, yet not enough to actually dislodge the threat and win the war. The result is a worst-of-both-worlds scenario: An angry populace and an entrenched non-state actor.
Niel Smith, a major in the U.S. Army, also discussed the Sri Lankan insurgency in the latest edition of Joint Force Quarterly. Smith rejects the argument that newfound ruthlessness by the Sri Lankan government was the primary reason for its eventual success against the LTTE, noting that the long war had been particularly brutal from the beginning. According to Smith, what changed during the last years of the conflict were the actions the Sri Lankan government took to isolate the rebels from outside support and the war from outside political pressure.
Smith explains how the Sri Lankan government took advantage of the post-9/11 global crackdown on terror financing to cut off the LTTE from the Tamil diaspora that funded its operations. Just as crucial was the Sri Lankan navy's effective blockade of the LTTE's sanctuary in the northeast corner of the island. Finally, the government recruited China to be its new patron -- with protection at the Security Council, the government would no longer have to yield to international demands to cease fire just as its attacks on the LTTE began to inflict damage.
Those who object to the coldblooded "Sri Lankan Way" remind us that the Soviet Union's brutal campaign in Afghanistan did not result in victory. But the real lesson of the Sri Lankan campaign is not the level of brutality employed by the counterinsurgents, but rather the ability of the counterinsurgents to isolate the battlefield from all outside support and influence.
The Soviets were not able to achieve this condition in Afghanistan and U.S. chances don't look much better. Do the insurgents have sanctuaries and external support? Those factors, and not the level of brutality, seem to best explain victory or defeat. Not good news for Petraeus and his staff.
Comments
Carl,
I think the move to a single police force is very positive.
We have to professionalize our police forces but our Federal model, where our municipalities are poor, does not work at all and has created social and security problems.
President Calderon started this war on drugs and the states are now joining the battle against the cartels, some to a certain degree, but the municipal authorities find themselves between a rock and hard place here. The Federal Government understands that if they join the fight many municipal mayors will die; two or three have already been killed by the cartels precisely because they tried to fight them.
The Federal Government and the Governors are talking about a single police force for each state supervised closely by the Federal Police and the Army, at least for some time, and working also under a national security system that will share intelligence and coordinate security efforts. They are also talking about better salaries, certifications and trainings for the new police forces, etc. Some states have already begun a process of integration of their police forces, Nuevo Leon, Sinaloa. Guerrero started a new Police Academy to professionalize their police force and they graduated their first one hundred or so policemen who studied four years at the academy. The Distrito Federal is also making efforts to improve their police forces.
While many of us in Mexico are deeply discouraged and saddened by all that is happening we are noticing that our society is changing dramatically and I am confident that many of these changes will yield good results in the long run.
I sincerely don ´t believe the Calderon Administration is picking or favoring a particular cartel in this war on drugs. The largest cartel in Mexico, the Cartel de Sinaloa has been the hardest hit by this war on drugs.
I believe that President Calderon drew a line on the sand obligating many state governors and municipal presidents, and police forces across Mexico to choose sides either on the side of the state or against it.
Calderon ´s Administration has killed many criminals, if you read the news about the war on drug in Mexico, you will see how the Army and Federal Forces are killing criminals everyday, and arresting many of them. Some criminals like the Barbie and El Grande, turned themselves in after seen what happened to Beltran Leyva, Nacho Coronel and other drug lords who were killed by the Armed forces and their bodies exposed indignantly to the world.
It is true that some cartels appear to represent a greater evil to Mexico at this point. Traditionally the Cartel de Sinaloa and Cartel de Juarez only dealt with drugs and didn ´t bother anyone. These traditional cartels controlled different territories for many years with some level of peace and stability and had many businesses among themselves, they even developed a culture, their children went to school, etc.
This is no longer the case, the eruption of highly organized proto-facist and paramilitary gangs such as Zetas, La Familia or La Linea, all of them representing a social security problem for entire cities, has changed all that and has brought to Mexico a higher and more intense level of violence. The Zetas, in their quarrel against the Cartel de Sinaloa, killed the children of some of their cartel leaders, the Sinaloa responded in kind, Cd. Juarez is the scenario of this all out war among cartels that is happening every day. They are killing each other everyday. Sometimes I think this is also positive. I have mixed feelings about it. But it has been extensively documented that although there have been many innocent victims in this war on drugs, the great majority of those killed have been criminals, gangs, drug dealers themselves as they try to eliminate each other. Of course it is not the kind of republic we wish to have, but do we have a choice when they are killing each other?
El Cartel de Sinaloa deals only with drugs, at least traditionally, but Zetas and La Familia represent greater social problems as they terrorize populations by kidnapping, demanding money for "protection" to small business and killing migrants too. So I personally believe the state should focus on them first. But I don ´t think that is case and I also think that the government cannot do that either because as the US border authorities get better at securing the border some cartels will morph into organizations more like the zetas, and will start kidnapping and extortion. The Cartel del Golfo has already morphed into another zeta-like gang.
Also, as the US gets better at controlling and sealing the border, hundreds of thousands of central and south American migrants will get stranded more and more in Mexican border towns, it is already happening because it is increasingly more and more difficult to pass illegally through the border today.
Already some people in Mexico are demanding the Calderon Administration to seal our southern border with Guatemala, to build a wall to prevent a humanitarian crisis at the border, some half a million central and south Americans cross our territories each year, Mexico deported near to 200 thousand central Americans last year who had entered Mexico illegally and were trying to make it to the US border. The MS13 and other maras gangs depend entirely on the porosity of our northern and southern borders for their traditional drug and illegal alien smuggling businesses. All of this adds a lot to an already explosive cocktail we have at our border towns.
Jose Angel:
Very informative. Keep up the good work. I knew there was a move afoot to reform the police but I didn't know anything else about it. How do you think the move toward a single state police force will work out? I remember that in the past some of the state judicial police forces (I think that is what they were) were quite bad.
Also do you think the fed gov may be picking sides in the fights between the cartels in order that the least of evils might prevail?
The first thing I noticed in the article is that it characterizes all Mexican drug cartels at the same level of capacity for "insurgency" and that, in my opinion, is not accurate.
For example, the Cartel de Sinaloa operates under a very old and traditional organizational structure that dates back to the 60s and it lacks the capacity to operate under a structure of independent and highly coordinated cells that can cover larger territories more effectively and challenge the state directly, as the Zetas can do. The Zetas are a more modern and superior organization, they tend to be more tech wise and resort to more modern techniques than the Cartel de Sinaloa, they have also developed connections in other countries. Their higher organizational advantages have enabled them to take away territories long controlled by the Cartel de Sinaloa and other cartels and that is why the zetas are under attack from so many fronts at the same time, from the Cartel de Sinaloa and the Cartel del Golfo and La Familia and others who are trying to destroy the zetas.
This capacity of the Zetas to operate any number of almost independent cells across wide territories also makes that organization more capable of operating and mutating into different illegal activities, such as kidnapping and extortion when drug dealing does not work or does not provide sufficient funds.
They are known for their aggressiveness towards any other criminal organization. The MS13 (from Los Angeles and El Salvador) had developed a decades old corridor across Mexico bribing corrupted police and buying protection from the Cartel del Golfo and other cartels that normally allowed them to cross through Mexico and smuggle their drugs and people to the US. The Zetas tried to take control of the MS13 crossings in Mexico and also of their operations Central America. The recent Tamaulipas massacre seems to be a direct result of the MS13 struggle against the Zetas. Some people want to characterize that as the killing of 72 innocent migrants, but there were only a few migrants, the rest were MS13 maras who smuggled drugs and people through Mexico and refused to be controlled by the Zetas. It wasn ´t a tipically diverse group of central American migrants, with old and young and women and children travelling together, they were all young men in their twenties.
What can the US government do? In my opinion: Nothing more than what it is already doing for Mexico: just continue to support Mexico in secret with intelligence and access to surveillance and defense technologies to have the upper hand against the drug cartels and then the US Administration must continue maintaining a low profile about the whole drug war in Mexico as it has done for the last few years and give the impression that Mexico is handling this whole problem by ourselves. And of course, America has to do its homework at home and fight the cartels in US cities too.
The second thing I notice in the discussion is the comparison between the Plan Colombia and the Merida initiative.
You have to really understand why the Mexico-US anti-drug cooperation agreement was named "Merida Initiative" and not "Plan Mexico".
I personally believe that the Plan Colombia was successful and that Colombia ´s people has to be greatly thankful for American support in their struggle against these terrible criminal organizations.
But the Plan Colombia had a single major blunder: The involvement of US troops and military personnel and aircrafts actively and visibly participating in Colombia ´s territories (read sovereignty).
Whether you like it or not, any "help" or "assistance" plan that involves US military presence will always remind latinamericans about their common history of invasions, colonialism,imperialism and interventionism suffered at the hands of european powers and northamerica.
This single fact, the presence of actively participating US military personnel killing criminals (read: Colombian nationals) alienated entire sectors of Colombia and isolated Colombia from its leftists radical and populists neighbors, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil and others who resented more American presence and involvement in internal problems in the region. The lack of cooperation of Ecuador, Venezuela, Brazil and Bolivia with the war on drugs in Colombia was a problem and it is a continuing problem to these days that curtail any US and Colombia ´s efforts to end the problem.
That is why nobody in Mexico wanted a "Plan Mexico" similar to Plan Colombia in the first place, and that is why nobody sees, at least visibly, any US involvement in the war Mexico is waging against the drug cartels. President Calderon read correctly the risks of accepting US cooperation and assistance and knew that it had to limit its exposure and visibility to minimum levels.
But that does not mean that many of us in Mexico also understand that the United States is fully cooperating with Mexican forces and that also explains to a large degree the many successes our armed forces have against the cartels lately and of course we appreciate it and it encourages us because we know that the US has picked up a lot of experience fighting drug cartels in Colombia and insurgency in other countries. Many of us think that US help is especially significant or strongly cooperating with the Mexican Marina, the most highly prepared army in Mexico, although this cooperation is carried out discretely and silently with the Mexican authorities prohibiting the American officials to speak out about their "help" in catching drug lords.
In this regard, President Calderon has learned from the lessons of Uribe and has been more careful and has walked a fine line by not provoking and awakening the anti-American fever of the many leftist movements and political parties and public universities in Mexico that will see the presence of American agents as a loss of sovereignty and a threat to our independence and that would have jeopardize our efforts against the cartels.
Being discrete about any American presence or involvement in Mexicos war on drugs is also important because there are leftists and socialist radical movements across Latin America that also deeply impact Mexico ´s internal politics as we share a cultural and common heritage corridor with Latin America. Most leftists latin American governments, political parties and organizations have transnational alliances and cooperate and help each other to get to power in their respective countries, remember the briefcase with millions of dollars Hugo Chavez sent to Cristina Fernandez de Kirchrner to help here in Argentinas presidential elections, or Hugo Chavez/Castro ´s involvement in Honduras with Mel Zelaya or with Evo in Bolivia or with Ollanta Omalla in Peru ´s 2006 presidential elections.
President Calderon has managed to maintain warm relations with most countries in latin American and no country criticizes the Merida Initiative as they did with Plan Colombia.
Also, when comparing Mexico with Colombia, there are huge differences. For example, when analysts say that Cartels control regions in Mexico, they mean "soft control" not physical violent control, they are not talking about physical control as the FARC did in Colombia with huge entire territories and states, Mexico ´s cartels "control" softly, they bribe officials, police, so that they are able to operate in those cities unmolested by local, only local, police forces. In Mexico, our federal police forces and our armed forces can enter and take possession and control of any locality, municipality in the country. There is no comparison.
Our cartels may sometimes mutate or take the form of an insurgency, but they will never become a genuine insurgency with popular support. Their end-game is to make money, but they lack the capacity, mobilization and support to overthrow governments.
I would like to stress another important fact about this report, it seems to characterize all Mexican police forces as corrupt. Many people seem to have a picture of Mexico of ten or twenty years ago, with rampant corrupted police all over the place, that picture is changing dramatically. If you read about our police forces and our security systems here in Mexico you will learn that there are many different kinds of police forces in Mexico, the Federal Police forces are highly certified, have higher salaries and benefit plans and there are a lot of tests and controls today to prevent corruption or infiltration into federal police forces. Also many police officers have died in these years and that has also been a catalyst force to unite federal policemen against the cartels too. This is not to say that there is no corruption in our federal police, but can you say there is absolutely no corruption in New Yorks Police Department?
Municipal police are very corrupted, this is a problem of Mexico ´s federative system where our Federal and State governments are rich and enjoy huge budgets but our municipalities are poor and dependent on help from State and Federal governments. Consequently, municipal policemen are very poor, underpaid, unprepared and uncertified and are easily corrupted. There is a bill in congress this month to eliminate all municipal police forces in the country and create a single centralized police force for each state, following international standards, with higher salaries and certifications. I know this sounds very nice, and I have never underestimated the negligence of our policy makers in Mexico. But I also know our federal government and many state governors are death serious about this matter. The centralization of police forces into a one single police force has already started in some states; in Nuevo Leon where I live we are expected to have this new system in place within a few months.
Finally, I find the Sri Lanka comparison to Mexico as highly unlikely too. With all due respect for Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka is not the 11th Economy in the world, Mexico is, Sri Lanka is not the US second trading partner, Mexico is, Sri Lanka does not have all the industry Mexico has and does not export more manufactured goods than Brazil and Argentina together, Mexico does, Sri Lanka does not have universal health care, universal educational systems, and social security nets like Mexico has and they are highly efficient too. Sri Lanka ´s army was not capable to patrol all of Sri Lanka ´s territory, Mexico ´s army patrols all territories, town and cities in Mexico and there is no single little town where they cannot enter.
The arguement for or against the word insurgency being used to define what is going on in Mexico is interesting. This is not a classic insurgency aimed at taking over the national government for whatever reason. As Bard O'Niell points out, insurgents have many different motivations for engaging in insurgency. Insurgency is, afterall, a way instead of an end.
Another way to look at this is to consider the the behavior of the two parties. By what framework should we evaluate their activities? What are the adversaries of the government doing? How are they operating? And how is the Mexican Government responding? The answers to these questions define current conditions in Mexico, not the assumed end.
It seems the government is behaving like a counter insurgent. It seems the cartels are behaving as insurgents, even adopting the tactics of terror. It also seems there is an active sanctuary - the United States - that the cartels rely upon for weapons and financial means.
The cartels are even operating inside the US, and the conflicts in Mexico are linked to transportation corridors, for example the fighting that broke out in 2005 between the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel in Nuevo Laredo is all about control of the plaza in the lucrative I35 corridor.
We can continue to argue about the ends and whether that matters in defining an insurgent, but ultimately it is how the beligenrants behave which is defining what is going on in my view. Food for thought.
Duck:
Regarding this comment
"Those that advocate drugs have probably never seen what meth, crack, and heroin do on a daily basis in our country on a first hand basis."
Both Slap and I have seen that on first hand basis, often; Slap far more than I. What I saw convinced me that prohibition will never ever work. You are attempting to stop somebody from doing something dead easy that he is convinced will make his like better in the short run. That something is cheap by the hit and if he does it in the corner, he doesn't hurt anybody, not even himself in the short run. So nobody else cares, and if nobody cares, nobody will call the cops. If nobody calls the cops, you have the delightful situation we have now.
People hurt themselves with drugs. They hurt themselves because they are weak characters. They go for the quick and easy. The thing people won't say is that many of the people the prohibitionists want to save, aren't worth saving. Many are weak jerks, people who, when they are found od'd dead, cause their neighbors and the cops to say "Good. We're all better off that idiot killed himself." That ain't a very Oprah like sentiment but that is the way it is.
If you want to look at it from an economic standpoint, the country is spending 3x trying to preserve the economic contributions of people who at best can only contribute 1x.
Another thing you should think about is all the money spent on chasing drugs is money that is not spent on crimes that have victims who do call the cops. Make a request for funds with the words "combating drug trafficing" and the skies open up and money rains down. Make a request for funding to combat burglary and nothing. Look at the stats for cold case murders in the country. All those cases have victims. How much money is spent on cold case murder investigations vs. the drug war?
Slap is right. The whole drug war thing is a quasi-religious effort to proclaim the moral superiority of those who advocate it; not to mention a way to finance the adventures of the drug warriors who would have to go back to regular police work if we stopped this foolishness.
Bob,
Your narrow view of insurgency is largely in accord with the military's view, which probably means it is outdated by 30 or so years. The type of insurgency you're talking about where the majority of the populace mobilizes against an unjust government was fairly common after WWII when populations were overthrowing their colonial rulers or puppet governments. That probably still exists, but is far less common. Mexico is one example of criminal insurgency that intentionally or unintentionally fractures a country into areas controlled by the State and those areas controlled by criminal organizations. Afghanistan isn't that much different. You have criminal organizations, you have tribal warlords, and you have the Taliban which is hardly a consolidated "mass movement" raising up to fight an unjust government. It is simply another "unjust" group fighting for power, not to correct the perceived ills of the current government. I find it entertaining that you think every insurgency is due to a failed government. What exactly did the government fail to do?
If you want to watch a movie about drugs and Mexico and crime then watch "No Country For Old Men" and after you watch it tatoo this quote from the movie on the inside of your forehead. "IF THE RULE YOU FOLLOWED BROUGHT YOU TO THIS ....OF WHAT USE IS THE RULE?"
We have been following the rule of prohibition for over 50 years and each year it has done nothing but get worse....time to re-think the rule.
jj. We are far too eager to call every form of populace-based violence "Insurgency", which makes the term cover such a broad arena of activities so as to render it virtually meaningless.
Mexico is standing up to challenge the Cartels, they are enforcing the rule of law, not against a populace who believes the law to be unjust, but rather against professional, organized criminal business enterprises who are out solely for profit. This is not insurgency any more than the organized crime that grew out of prohibition was insurgency.
The best thing the US could do for Mexico is to target the demand on the US side of the border. I would recommend doing that in ways that focus on users rather than sellers, and that focuses on programs that do not punish the taxpayers like the current systems that fill our jails and drives the construction of new ones. The other critical component is the fact that these are ILLEGAL drugs. That forces the entire industry into the criminal arena. If the US could balance punishment and treatment, controlled legalization and tailored illegalities, we could take the pressure off of Mexico. We would also create new legal industry at the same time.
This is one more case where US policies and unwillingness to make hard decisions at home are making things very difficult for our allies. Any aid we lend to Mexico in terms of capacity building, ISR, Intel support, etc should also be very carefully designed so as not to undermine the legitimacy of their government. THEN we would likely turn this into an insurgency, and it would be more our fault than the Cartels, but it would be the Cartels that likely step up to exploit the situation.
Those that advocate drugs have probably never seen what meth, crack, and heroin do on a daily basis in our country on a first hand basis. I mean watch an episode of Addiction sometime. Do you really want to give those people easier access to drugs? I suppose you could make an argument for weed, but it's got to stop there. Crack cocaine etc. aren't a "victimless" crime.
Cartels Influence LOCAL Politics; National Politics Irrelevant
I think I would argue the cartels DO have a political agenda at the local levels where they require freedom of movement to conduct their business. I think too many people get caught up in the top-down perspective, when the real heart of the insurgency is really bottom-up. Should the MX government draw a map of what territory they unequivocally control, I bet the country would be fractured. What remains under govt control can still be called Mexico, the remaining areas are narco fiefdoms. Ive more comments that can be found on http://www.themexicopage.blogspot.com. Thanks for the post.
it most definitely is insurgency just because the political aims are for anarchy or cleptocracy etc etc doesnt mean that it is not working to delegitimize the govermernt. Whether the fight is for the corner, the block, the city, the county, the state, the region, the nation, the classification is based on success not intent
Slapout 9:
I'm sure you could use the Google to find this, but here it is:
http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/greenwald_whitepaper.pdf
Thanks
ADTS
Drugs, violence, and a hispanic heritage. Clearly Columbia and Mexico are very similar and a "Plan Columbia" could be tweaked into a "Plan Mexico," right?
Well, consider this: Columbia was a nationalist insurgency that got into the drug business. Mexico is a drug business that may be getting into the insurgency business.
Those who call events in Mexico "insurgency" are missing the essence of what insurgency is. It is violent, yes. It is challenging the government, yes. But it is not insurgency. I have to agree with the Sec State on this one. US demand is driving a massive illegal drug business that is threatening to drive Mexico into anarchy. Either or both aspects of that driver must be addressed as the main effort of any US action. Address the illegalitiy in the US. Address the Demand in the US. To merely attack the symptoms of Cartel violence in Mexico is irrational at best, and arguably insane.
Wiki page on the history of cocaine in Coca-Cola.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca-Cola#Use_of_stimulants_in_formula
ADTS
I was not aware of that one, but there are others, The Amsterdam method is interesting and more in line of what I had in mind.
Anonymous
You might want to do some research on when and how drugs became illegal in the USA. Before the 1930's until some religious government bureaucrat decided they should be illegal they were all legal and we managed to survive. Don't get me wrong your points are well taken and legalization is not some type of panacea but it should be seriously looked at.
Those advocating the legalization of what are now defined as illicit drugs should bare in mind: more loss of life, break-up of families, accidents and lost productivity in the workplace, can be attributed to one drug that is legal. . .alcohol. Adding cannabis, cocaine, and brown tar horse will only make matters worse.
The answer lies in changing peoples behavior through education, intervention, treatment, and follow-up, to include revamping the criminal laws, judiciary and penal system.
As Adm. Mullen mentioned, the greatest threat to our security may be our national debt. Thus far, the war on drugs has been a sunk cost contributing only to a growing law enforcement and penal system industry.
In lean times, our money must be spent where it can do the most good, not just a body count of periodic drug seizures shown for public consumption driving DEAs budget as an example.
Mike F:
An epistemological question:
"the true success of Plan Colombia" was due to State and legal advisors rather than military assistance."
I think we see this same problem in attributing causality when we talk about the Surge. If all three factors were present - just as several factors *may* have been present during or prior to the surge (eg, the Surge, the Awakening, the civil war burning itself out) - who's to say which, if any, factor takes causal primacy.
Similarly, I'm no expert on Colombia either - I've read Killing Pablo and should read From Pablo to Osama - but the same problem looks to me like it *might* be present here, too.
I'd be interested to get your take.
Best
ADTS
The summary above comparing the conflict in Sri Lanka to both the U.S. and USSR experience in Afghanistan misses a key point. The conflict in Sri Lanka was an internal conflict; there were no external invaders/occupiers (both the USSR and USA were/are invaders and occupiers in Afghanistan). The Gov of Sri Lanka, despite howls of protest from the West, had every right to take all necessary measures to protect itself from an internal threat. For an occupying power to apply the level of force required to defeat an insurgency (and force is required in the vast majority of cases) it will have to do so relatively quickly before world opinion can mobilize. I agree with the assessment that we're suffering from Goldilocks syndrome, and really can't see how anyone can disagree with that.
As for the conflict in Mexico, IMO it is an insurgency, but primarily at local district. Cartels are using violence (and bribes) to control (or attempt to control, which in a way is a form of overthrowing the current regime) the government at the local level to facilitate business. We have seen similiar criminal insurgencies in W. Africa and elsewhere.
If we have been successful with the Columbia model, which I know damn well is over-stated, it is only part and parcel due to the production of cocaine having been moved next-door to Peru and Bolivia, and exploiting gaps in law enforcement by using Venezeula as a transit hub as well.
With America insatiable appetite for illicit narcotics the prime driver for the demand, were the Mexican cartels responsible for moving and distributing this fungible product neutralized, someone else, someplace else, would fill N. America's demand - the money is just too vast to ignore.
I have a different opinion in that we are misreading the entire situation. The situation in my opinion is that it is not an insurgency but it is more like Major gang warfare to control an economic resource. This happens because we have never had the mental courage to examine why people join gangs in the first place and what we need to do about it. Until we do that it dosen't really matter what we do.
The President took a big step back from Sec. Clinton's estimation today:
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/10/world/la-fg-obama-mexico-201009…
Agree with the President in that Mexico has no insurgency that seeks to topple the government - no FARC or ELN. Disagree in that the cartels do seek to coopt and hollow out the state from within where it threatens their organizations, and that they have no fear of using violence to do so. But given Mexican reaction, I can see how the thing to do would be to walk back such a statement.
As to the controversy about Plan Colombia, the Wikipedia gives a good summary. Basically people objected to PC in that it helped fund the Colombian armed forces which proceeded to use that money to go after the FARC but also to eliminate many peaceful civil society players in Colombia while not doing much to actually stem either narcotics trafficking or corruption, both of which continue to run rampant in Colombia. Remember the AUC paramilitaries - they killed thousands of civilians in their role as allies of the security forces and also as enthusiastic narcotraffickers themselves. People had legitimate objections to U.S. money funding a military with such allies, just as they did in the 1980s.
Generally I think PC can be viewed as a success in that it helped smash FARC as a threat to the government, thus reducing the paramilitaries' role as well. PC was a success in helping revitalize the Colombian state. It was a failure in stopping either drug trafficking or corruption in the Colombian government. See the current "para-politics" scandal.
Mike,
One the main controversies was the perception that US military support was provided to units that had alleged human rights violations.
Here is the outline of the plan when began in 2000 from the DOS web site:
United States Support For Colombia
Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
March 28, 2000
Plan Colombia
The Government of Colombia developed "Plan Colombia" as an integrated strategy to meet the most pressing challenges confronting Colombia today -- promoting the peace process, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian economy, and strengthening the democratic pillars of Colombian society. Plan Colombia is a $7.5 billion program. President Pastrana has pledged $4 billion of Colombian resources and has called on the international community to provide the remaining $3.5 billion to assist this effort.
U.S. Support
In response to Plan Colombia, and in consultation with the Colombian Government, President Clinton has proposed a $1.6 billion package of assistance to Colombia.
Adding to previously approved U.S. assistance to Colombia of over $330 million, the new initiative requests $954 million as an emergency supplemental for FY 2000 and $318 million in additional funding for FY 2001. The proposed U.S. assistance package will help Colombia address the breadth of the challenges it faces -- its efforts to fight the illicit drug trade, to increase the rule of law, to protect human rights, to expand economic development, to institute judicial reform, and to foster peace.
Five Components of Proposed U.S. Assistance
I. Improving Governing Capacity and Respect for Human Rights
The U.S. assistance package proposes $93 million over the next 2 years to fund programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of State and Justice to strengthen Colombia's human rights record and judicial institutions. Specific initiatives include protecting human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), supporting human rights NGOs' information and education programs, creating and training special units of prosecutors and judicial police to investigate human rights cases, and training Colombian public defenders and judges. The U.S. assistance package proposes $15 million to support the Colombian Government and NGOs that are specifically focused on protecting human rights. These funds will also be used to train and support Colombian law enforcement personnel in anti-corruption, anti-money laundering, and anti-kidnapping measures.
II. Expansion of Counter-Narcotics Operations Into Southern Colombia
The U.S. assistance package proposes $600 million over the next 2 years to help train and equip two additional Colombian counter-narcotics battalions, which will move into southern Colombia to protect the Colombian National Police as they carry out counter-drug missions. The program will provide 30 Blackhawk helicopters and 33 Huey helicopters to make the counter-narcotics battalions air mobile so they can access the remote areas of coca cultivation and cocaine processing in southern Colombia. This assistance will also enhance intelligence for counter-narcotics activities.
Funding for this element of Plan Colombia includes important humanitarian assistance and development components. It proposes $15 million to help persons displaced by conflict in the region. That funding is in addition to funds previously provided by the U.S. Government to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to assist internally displaced persons in Colombia. This funding component also proposes $16 million in developmental assistance, including technical and agricultural assistance to the farmers of southern Colombia.
III. Alternative Economic Development
The U.S. assistance package proposes $145 million over the next 2 years, including more than $45 million of new funds to provide economic alternatives for small farmers in Colombia who now grow coca and opium poppies plus another $30 million for regional efforts. As interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less profitable, these programs will assist communities in transition to legal economic activity. This component includes programs to build schools, roads, and clinics as well as $15 million to strengthen local governments. This component of U.S. assistance to Plan Colombia also includes funds to protect fragile lands and watersheds.
IV. Increased Interdiction in Colombia and the Region
The U.S. assistance package proposes $340 million for interdiction of narcotics. The program includes funding over the next 2 years for radar upgrades to give Colombia a greater capacity to intercept traffickers, and also to enhance intelligence to allow the Colombian police and military to respond quickly to narcotics activity. It will support the United States' forward operating locations in Manta, Ecuador, which will be used for narcotics-related missions. These funds will also provide $46 million to enhance interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador.
V. Assistance for the Colombian National Police
The U.S. assistance package proposes additional funding of $96 million over the next 2 years to enhance the ability of the Colombian National Police to eradicate coca and poppy fields. This additional assistance will upgrade existing aircraft, purchase additional spray aircraft, provide secure bases for increased operations in the coca-growing centers, and provide more intelligence on narcotics traffickers.
Related Issues
The Peace Process. The U.S. and Colombian Governments agree that ending the civil conflict is central to solving Colombia's problems. A peace agreement would stabilize the nation, would speed economic recovery, and would help assure the protection of human rights. A successful peace process would also restore the authority and control of the Colombian Government in the coca-growing region. The U.S. Government is hopeful that the peace negotiations now going on between the Colombian Government and the FARC guerrilla group and the Colombian Government and the ELN guerrilla group prove successful.
U.S. assistance in support of Plan Colombia is intended to counter the illicit trade in narcotics. All U.S. counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia will continue to be in the form of goods and services. The counter-narcotics components of Plan Colombia will be implemented by the Colombian police and the Colombian armed forces. U.S. assistance for Plan Colombia includes no plans for the use of U.S. armed forces to implement any aspect of Plan Colombia.
Human Rights. U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided under strict application of U.S. law designed to protect human rights -- the so-called "Leahy Amendment." No U.S. assistance is provided to any unit of the Colombian security forces for which there is credible evidence of gross human rights violations, unless the Secretary of State is able to certify that the Government of Colombia has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to justice. The U.S. Government has in place a rigorous process to screen those units being considered to receive assistance or training.
Displaced Persons. NGOs report that Colombia has the fourth-largest population of internally displaced persons in the world. The vicious conflict between paramilitaries and guerrillas is largely responsible for the forced displacement of Colombians. As many as 300,000 persons, mostly women and children, were driven from their homes in 1998 by rural violence. The U.S. Government provided, in 1999, $5.8 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross' Western Hemisphere Operations for assistance to internally displaced persons, with an additional $3 million earmarked for Colombia. The U.S. contributed another $4.7 million to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) general fund for the Western Hemisphere, a portion of which was used for institutional capacity building in Colombia. New U.S. Government assistance for Plan Colombia includes an additional $15 million to help those displaced by conflict in southern Colombia.
[end of document]
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.ht…
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A couple of questions/comments
1. Does anyone have a reference to what specific actions led Plan Colombia to be considered "controversial?"
2. Robert stated, "Plan Colombia was a success partly because of the long-term presence of U.S. Special Forces advisers, intelligence experts, and other military specialists inside Colombia." While the military effort was helpful, I thought that the true success of Plan Colombia was the political advisors from state to reform the executive branches of gov't and the legal advisors that assisted in reforming the judicial branch.
3. I wanted to take a moment to highlight that much of the overall analysis on Mexico in the past three years has come from friends of SWJ. John P. Sullivan, Adam Elkus, and Robert Haddick have been on the forefront of monitoring the situation.
-Mike
Well us Gringos are getting nervous about Mexico again and we are feeling the itch to "do something." But wars, revolution, rebellions and proclamations have happened in Mexico before, often, and the Mexicans have handled it. They will probably handle it this time. But if they do or if they don't, there isn't a darn thing we can do about it. We have to sit back and watch. I can't see anyway "that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control." The Mexicans can read what we've been up to just as well as we can and they can figure what might be useful to them better than us. Anything at all direct that we may try will just make things worse.
The only thing that we could do that would actually help is too radical for us and we won't do it: legalize drugs, at least some anyway. Other than that, which we won't do, we are spectators. We can do some feel good things like send helos and the latest and greatest tron movers but mostly we get to watch.
I get the impression that Mr. Haddick thinks American police and Mexican police are rather similar; that American police are as subject to temptation and as inept as Mexican police. I do not think that is so, not even close.