Afghanistan and civil-military relations
General Stanley McChrystal's report on the situation in Afghanistan is likely to strain relations between the Obama administration and the uniformed military. The arrival of McChrystal's report in Washington in likely to spark its own low-level war of finger-pointing and blame-shifting between civilian policymakers in the White House and McChrystal's staff and defenders in the Pentagon. This strain in civil-military relations could last through the duration of the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan and beyond.
McChrystal's report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely don't trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive.
The first task for McChrystal's report (and its leaking defenders) was to show how President Barack Obama's supposedly limited war aims actually result in broad, expensive, and open-ended goals for Afghanistan:
Although the assessment, which runs more than 20 pages, has not been released, officials familiar with the report have said it represents a hard look at the challenges involved in implementing Obama's strategy for Afghanistan. The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary, but that in turn requires a sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy.
McChrystal's report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims.
Next, according to the Washington Post, McChrystal's report lists numerous obstacles that could prevent success, barriers that are outside of the U.S. military's control:
For instance, McChrystal thinks a greater push by civilian officials is vital to shore up local Afghan governments and to combat corruption, officials said. He is emphatic that the results of the recent Afghan presidential election be viewed as legitimate, but is also realistic in acknowledging that the goals of the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai and the coalition are not always as closely aligned as they could be, they said.Separately, officials said, McChrystal's assessment finds that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths.
In others words, McChrystal is saying, don't hold me responsible for success if Karzai's election is a fraud, civilian officials don't show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol.
The report illustrates the basic struggle between civilian policymakers and military commanders. Each side looks to the other to solve its problems. The White House staff is hoping that McChrystal will deliver a clear, high-probability war-winning strategy, a strategy that would reduce Afghanistan as an issue of concern. McChrystal, like all field commanders, wants his political masters to give him a realistic and measurable objective, with the resources needed to accomplish it.
McChrystal's report implies a pessimistic outlook for U.S. success in Afghanistan. If he and his staff had an optimistic view about the Afghan challenge, there would have been no need to be so diligent about clarifying responsibility for what comes next. In the case of success, all would share the glory. McChrystal's report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations.
Communication breakdown
In the latest issue of Joint Forces Quarterly, Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen shouts down the concept of "strategic communications." Mullen implies that the concept of strategic communications is condescending. What really matters, he believes, are U.S. policies and how they are executed. Communicating the results of those policies is not the problem. Mullen says:
Our messages lack credibility because we haven't invested enough in building trust and relationships, and we haven't always delivered on promises ... That's the essence of good communication: having the right intent up front and letting our actions speak for themselves. We shouldn't care if people don't like us; that isn't the goal. The goal is credibility. And we earn that over time ... To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate.
In his essay, Mullen mentioned happy moments for the United States's public image: the voyage of the Great White Fleet, the Marshall Plan, and disaster relief missions. If that was the only type of interaction the U.S. government had with the outside world, then Mullen makes a good, but trivial point -- the State Department would not need an Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
Unfortunately, the U.S. government has not found a way to limit its interactions in the world to just economic reconstruction, disaster relief, and harmless publicity tours. Long before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States found it had to defend its interests, protect its citizens abroad, oppose revisionist powers, supports its friends, and occasionally attempt to prevent human suffering. Taking a side in a conflict means making an enemy out of someone. Mullen apparently believes that clever communications cannot compensate for "what our actions communicate." He is probably correct. But he never explains how the United States, a great power with global responsibilities, can avoid taking consequential actions in the first place, actions that will anger somebody somewhere.
Writing in FP, James Glassman, the last Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, agrees with Mullen on one thing -- the U.S. should stop bothering with whether various aggrieved people like the U.S. Instead, Glassman suggests, U.S. public diplomacy efforts should encourage the citizens of countries to focus on their own bad guys instead of the U.S. For Glassman, it's okay if most Pakistanis hate the U.S. as long as even more hate the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Having experienced the harsh reality of being the U.S. government's public diplomat, Glassman's minimalist strategy may be the best he could salvage. Its success depends on having an enemy who is politically incompetent, out of touch with the populace, and incapable of adaptation. That is a good description of al Qaeda. But counting on such an adversary is not a formula for success.
The U.S. government continues to have trouble with strategic communications. Mullen and Glassman's essays show more ideas are needed.
Comments
Robert:
Thanks for the response. I agree we aren't in much disagreement and my comments were and are aimed at form, not function.
Having once upon a time toiled within the Beltway, I can understand how one would look for ulterior -- and underhanded -- motives in every action. Now that I am thankfully removed from that corrosive environment, I can and do object to that approach. Not that it'll do much good...
Your statement:<blockquote>"Such a structuring of the problem might be honest and unavoidable but it also sets up the conditions for future blame-shifting and finger-pointing."</blockquote> while possibly accurate is a very sad commentary on our government and its operational methodologies as generated by the Political and chattering classes and our mostly ineffectual and venal elected politicians. It may be accurate but that mindset should not IMO be encouraged...
Still, in my time in Washington, I learned that the "blame shifting and finger pointing" that occurs is almost never as it first appears. You see military or other DoD / McChrystal 'allies' using Tyson to educate everyone. Perhaps true but lacking more information than you or Tyson have presented or that I have seen elsewhere it is equally possible that someone else is trying to set the stage to point out precisely what you have stated -- that the military side is trying to preemptively shift blame -- in an effort to be covered later by saying "We told you they would try to do this..." A gullible press -- and we certainly have that -- will fall for anything.
There are numerous other possibilities, State not wanting to undertake the big commitment required or one 'intelligence' organization or another has leaked things to draw attention to other things as an early step in a long term effort to distract attention from something removed. It's also possible that one of the Think Tanks (fascinating term; I always try to put a 'septic' in there somewhere) leaked or what little they'd heard about it for purposes of promulgating their 'solution' to the problem that is the 'Stan. Cato for example could be trying to force a drawdown ;).
Many more possibilities -- yet you stated with some certitude that it was "Plan A." My initial comment was a clumsy attempt to say you just might be leaping to suggest a possibly erroneous conclusion based on the evidence presented...
As I said, you may be correct. I'm just a rather cynical old guy who learned the hard way to distrust much of anything that emanates from D.C. where there are usually wheels inside of wheels and many things -- even things purely military and absolutely including civil-military relations -- are driven solely by domestic politics even if there is no readily apparent connection. I also believe that early news is always pretty much incorrect, thus to draw many inferences from first reports is almost certain to be an invitation to err...
While I also agree with your comment:<blockquote>"Were their actions proper or improper? That is one corner of the debate."</blockquote>to the extent that there may be such debate, I suggest that if the report was classified and if it was leaked, then the actions of <i>whoever</i> did it were improper, period. Further, the debate issue thus raised is in fact not civil-military at all but purely political and will largely be of interest only to policy mavens and the many, many would be mavens. The large majority of Americans will simply want a decent solution and don't much care for the sausage works inner operations details.
As to the apparent report, we do very much need to shed a lot of the vests, vehicles and the base camp mentality to do either the Gentile approach (with which I'm in agreement) <b><i>or</b></i> the Nagl & Kilcullen approach -- which we cannot afford on several levels and which, even if we could, is not likely to succeed as its rationale is based on previous experience with other ethnic groups in quite different circumstances. Experience which has in fact rarely been very successful.
Low key, early commitment of civilian and limited well trained specialty military assets has been and can be successful -- once you commit major forces, particularly if those forces are third parties, the track record is really poor.
We, the US, Civil and Military, really need to bear that in mind for the future...
Gian:
My conclusion is that the officials who briefed Tyson agree completely with your concerns - there is a mismatch between the "narrow" war aims of defeating al Qaeda in Afghanistan and a strategy that results in open-ended nation-building as the end-state supposedly necessary to achieve those war aims.
Your comment thoroughly discussed this mismatch. My essay pointed out that the officials who briefed Tyson also see this mismatch. I believe they are concerned about it.
This confusion prompted me to write "supposedly narrow."
What would be true limited war aims? That is the question of the hour. Kilcullen and now Gates believe that you cannot have an effective CT operation in Afghanistan without 1) a broad presence on the ground for HUMINT purposes, which leads to 2) the requirement for a large-scale stability operation.
Once again, the question of the hour is whether the Kilcullen/Gates assumptions are correct. Let the debate (finally) begin.
Ken:
Let me try to answer some of your questions.
<blockquote>Does this mean he should not have mentioned those things at all? If so, would that not be an incomplete report? How would you, in his position, have handled the problem?</blockquote>
Answer: If I was McChrystal, I would have discussed the patroling problem you discussed, plus every other possible barrier to success, risk, shortfall, etc. Most important, I would have urged/demanded the President to clearly state the desired end-state, in measurable terms. In other words, pretty much what McChrystal seems to have done, according to Ms. Tyson.
McChrystal is doing his duty when he puts the responsibility for war aims on the President. And when he informs the President of the obstacles and risks to success and the resources he needs to overcome these obstacles and risks. I am pretty sure you and I agree on this.
<blockquote> In view that latter, could I ask what causes you to believe that relationship may suddenly become more contentious? Further, could I ask what this added debate might entail, what are the specifics in the scenario you mention that impact on civil military relations?</blockquote>
Answer: In her WaPo piece, Tyson said McChrystal's report had not been released to the public. But she received a well-organized briefing on it from unnamed officials who read the report.
Why did these officials do that? If they trusted everyone in the civil-miltary process to live up to their respective responsibilities, they could have simply waited for the process to function as the textbooks say it should.
My conclusion is that these officials did not trust that everyone would fulfill his assigned civil-military responsibilities. Specifically, that the U.S. military command in Afghanistan might be held responsible for matters outside of its control.
These officials used Tyson to help educate everyone what their specific civil-military duties are. Specifically, they are trying to get the White House staff and the President to take responsibility for the things they are supposed to take responsibility for. This may have happened in any case without the briefing to Tyson. But my conclusion is that these officials were not so trusting.
Were their actions proper or improper? That is one corner of the debate.
The next episode to the story will involve the response to McChrystal's troops request. The latest leak is that McChrystal will present high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk options. Such a structuring of the problem might be honest and unavoidable but it also sets up the conditions for future blame-shifting and finger-pointing.
The first half of this Post by Robert Haddick on General McChrystal and strategy and policy in Afghanistan has me baffled.
Tyson in the WaPost piece asserts that the President's war aims are narrow:
"The administration has narrowly defined its goal as defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary..."
But then Robert Haddick qualifies Tysons restatement of the war aims by saying in his words that the war aims are "supposedly narrow." What do you mean by this qualification, Robert? Are you saying that the President's current war aims are not narrow at all but quite broad? If that is what you are implying then what in your mind would be limited war aims?
But the further confusion that I have which ultimately leads to what I think is our dysfunctional strategy is this follow-on statement by Tyson paraphrasing Administration thinking on the military means to achieve the policy goal. In order to achieve these "narrow" war aims of "defeating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups and denying them sanctuary...", it requires a
"...sweeping counterinsurgency campaign aimed at protecting the Afghan population, establishing good governance and rebuilding the economy;" or in American military parlance population centric counterinsurgency, and more literally and clearly, nation building.
To which I continue to ask WHY? Why do these politically established war aims require a campaign of population centric counterinsurgency (aka Nation building) to accomplish them. I do believe the President's war aims are narrow, and reasonably so based on our interests in Afghanistan, a broader set of war aims would call for as the ultimate political aim a newly built nation in Afghanistan as the overall political goal.
I dont know why certain folks--military, politicos, journos, experts etc,--- seem to move automatically to the default position that the only way to accomplish policy goals in Afghanistan is nation building. This is why tactics have eclipsed strategy. I am not sure if this is strategic incompetence on our part or if there are deeper and more troubling wheels turning that intentionally accept this strategic dysfunction.
Is what is really happening here a desire to adjust policy aims to make them in fact closer to the totality of nation building as political objective and therefore bring back some semblance of strategic rationality? If a newly built Afghanistan Nation was established as the policy goal (with the resulting effect of the defeat of AQI), then strategy would demand a population centric counterinsurgency approach to doing it and hence strategy, as long as it could be resourced properly, in this formulation would make sense.
My interpretation is that I do not know who leaked what to Tyson or for what reason. Obviously, your information is far superior to mine as you can determine intent and ascribe motives.
Refer to the quote that U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths. I interpret that as an accurate statement and possibly aimed at reversing several US military cultural trends -- a proposition I believe long overdue. However, silly me just looked at the military aspects on the rationale that the political aspects obvious, common knowledge and are ALWAYS in flux. Though I believe they too are accurate...
Does this mean he should not have mentioned those things at all? If so, would that not be an incomplete report? How would you, in his position, have handled the problem?
Your interpretation is apparently:<blockquote>"In others words, McChrystal is saying, dont hold me responsible for success if Karzais election is a fraud, civilian officials dont show up, or European soldiers are not allowed to patrol."</blockquote>Obviously your prerogative and I certainly understand why you might couch it that way to post in a Column at Foreign Policy.
Different strokes, as they say...
An interesting debate on civil-military relations? In what sense. You contend:<blockquote>"Now, were others doing their duty when they discussed these items in the report with Ann Scott Tyson? Some will say yes, some will say no. That in my view makes for an interesting debate on civil-military relations."</blockquote>What I do not know is if that report is in fact classified, who discussed its contents with whom and for what reason and thus I cannot say whether anyone was "doing their duty" but my suspicion is that no one was doing anything dutiful at all and there may be a violation of 18 USC 793. However, that seems to be a constant phenomenon in DC these days...
In view that latter, could I ask what causes you to believe that relationship may suddenly become more contentious? Further, could I ask what this added debate might entail, what are the specifics in the scenario you mention that impact on civil military relations?
Ken:
Thank you for your comment.
My discussion of McChrystal's report and the implications for civil-military relations was my interpretation of the Ann Scott Tyson article in the Washington Post I cited. Your interpretation may differ but I will stand by mine.
It was not my intent to "excoriate" McChrystal, his staff, or his defenders. My intent was to describe the tug and pull of civil-military relations, using the current Afghanistan circumstance as an example. I am merely observing and discussing the process.
In my opinion, McChrystal was clearly doing his duty when he discussed in his report the implications of the open-ended war aims assigned to him and the obstacles outside his control that could prevent success. I am pretty sure you agree with that.
Now, were others doing their duty when they discussed these items in the report with Ann Scott Tyson? Some will say yes, some will say no. That in my view makes for an interesting debate on civil-military relations.
Concerning Afghanistan, I don't think it will be the last such debate.
-Robert Haddick
A comment on civil military relations. Not only am I a very long time observer of that relationship, I have watched and even participated on both sides over the years. The relationship has basically remained stable for the over 60 years I have been a nominal adult.
There have been occasional forays up and down the scale but the net relationship has changed little if at all. A good many Academics and many of a left leaning ideological persuasion do not like military forces and wish they did not exist but most realize the essential worth and necessity. There are those who are very pro-military, some excessively so. That's fine, both groups are entitled to their opinions.
However, the majority of Americans neither like nor dislike the Armed Forces, they accept the existence and the need for forces and are just glad they don't have to serve and would hope their kids do not. There are also a number who have served and relish the experience -- and a few who served who hated it. I have heard and read various predictions on the topic over the years and not a one has effectively altered the relationship in any lasting or meaningful way. Neither will anything much to do with Afghanistan -- other than with the policy wonks who fret about such foolishness.
As for the rest of the McChrystal report commentary; deal in innuendo much?
You flatly state:<blockquote>"McChrystals report is supposedly secret, but anonymous staffers have already revealed its themes to the Washington Post. The goal of these staffers is to protect McChrystal and the uniformed military against White House officials they likely dont trust. These staffers have evidently concluded that they need to leak first in order to establish their position and put White House staffers on the defensive."</blockquote>Well done, that's in the finest Beltway style. Brings back memories of my not terribly happy time there...
One presumes that as you make strong assertions you have some proof of their truth? Surely you wouldn't be that positive if you're just guessing?
Without commenting on the current or the previous White House's decidedly broad, expensive, open ended -- and ill defined -- goals for Afghanistan, you note<blockquote>"McChrystals report has thus shifted responsibility over to the White House to either the rally the country and the Congress around a big nation-building campaign or to explicitly scale back the desired war aims."</blockquote>Which is exactly where it belongs and exactly what he should be doing, giving an honest and accurate assessment.
It is the Armed Forces job to do the bidding of the Government, it is the Government's job to justify what they are doing and to be able to clearly state their goals. That is something the US Government has failed to do very well for the last 48 years and the fact that someone in uniform has finally called them on it-- and politely -- should be cheered, not criticized. I'm personally pleased also to find someone in uniform with the finesse to identify responsibilities and failures without whining.
You also say <blockquote>"McChrystals report is a preemptive defense against blame and recrimination. That does not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations."</blockquote>Really? Given that a quote you provide says <i>"McChrystal's assessment finds that <b>U.S. and other NATO forces must adopt a less risk-averse culture, leaving bases and armored vehicles</b> to pursue insurgents on foot in a way that minimizes Afghan civilian deaths."</i> (emphasis added / kw) It seems to me he is using a fairly astute political lever to push <u>the US Armed Forces</u> into being less risk averse and wedded to bases and cities -- a necessary change in my opinion and one that if not successful, will make anything done in Afghanistan that much harder. He is flatly saying that if <u>we</u> do not change, no reasonable success is likely -- an extremely accurate statement, I believe.
I see nothing in my readings that indicate this report will not bode well for either the U.S. mission in Afghanistan or for civil-military relations. Do you have any grounds for such an assertion? Or are you expressing a belief that the Armed Forces should do what they're told and never embarrass our elected royalty by telling them they have no clothes -- but that it <i><b>is</b></i> okay to embarrass the Politicans (who have no shame...) by failing to conclude military campaigns with a reasonable degree of success?
Instead of excoriation and accusations of preemptive defense, he deserves an Attaboy for telling it like it is instead of saying "Yes, Sir, Can Do" as too many in the Armed Forces have done for entirely too many years. In this case, very much so when the odds are against that open ended goal in Afghanistan.