How does one execute a population-centric approach to COIN in an area where you cannot go except by a three day hike? About six weeks ago, the PRT and both US and Afghan supporting forces pushed north along a mountainous dirt track in order to reach Doab, one of the bigger villages about 30km north of FOB Kala Gush. The idea was to conduct an extended engagement with village leaders to discuss reconstruction projects, establish some rapport, and to contest any anti-Afghan forces in the area. There was dispute among US officers about whether MRAPs or Humvees could navigate these rough mountain tracks. The drive was slow and precarious, the US vehicles clinging to the edge of dirt mountain but they did reach Doab and engage the elders. So far so good. Not long after they began the drive home, an estimated 100-150 insurgents attacked the US convoy, engaging in an extended 8 hour firefight along the entire route back to FOB Kala Gush. If one can imagine walking a balance beam while getting shot at for 8 hours, one can get a feel for the engagement. To the credit of US forces, they returned to base largely intact, have suffered two non-critical wounds and losing one HUMVEE. However, one wonders the secondary effects of pushing into the Doab valley and the ensuing violence.
In the words of Paul Newman's harried and hunted Butch Cassidy, "who are those guys?" Is the Taliban and al Queda actually using the dirt tracks of Nuristan as meaningful transit routes? Or are these tribal warriors defending their valley from foreigners as they have any other force that ventured into their mountains? The answer to that question informs how important Nuristan is to the COIN fight in northeast Afghanistan. Mountains with xenophobic locals should be left alone. Significant Taliban transit routes may need interdiction. It is hard for to believe that the Taliban can move significant men and supplies across the mountains of Nuristan -- or why the independent minded Nuristanis would help them. But mountain men of Afghanistan can hike for days and days and perhaps the Taliban have found some acceptance among the Nuristans.
Meanwhile the PRT and maneuver forces at FOB Kala Gush will try to remain positively engaged with the locals at Doab and others in the Afghan frontier -- with aid if not military force. Yet this quandary underscores one of the weaknesses of the current US reconstruction approach -- the very military nature of PRTs. When military presence is in itself an incitement to resistance and anti-US/anti-government sentiment, would a more traditional civilian/NGO assistance approach make more sense in many areas? A team of Afghan locals working on behalf of a USAID-funded NGO could likely have gotten in and out of Doab without violence and more positive effect.
Nick Dowling is a small wars policy wonk with experience in OSD, the NSC Staff, NDU, and the contracting sector. He has worked on stability operations for 16 years, most prominently on Bosnia and Kosovo as a Clinton Administration appointee and Iraq and Afghanistan as a DoD contractor. He is currently President of IDS International, a leader in interagency and soft power" types of support to the US military. He is a graduate of Harvard, got his masters at Georgetown, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Although a veteran of print and television media interviews and publications, this is his first foray into SWJ.