... Yet how can the US military, so overstretched in strategically crucial wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, spare any troops for this type of primarily humanitarian venture? The dilemma is similar to that faced in recent years in Darfur, where we wanted to do something but did not have the forces.
Admittedly, there may not be a solution tomorrow. But by tapping into President Obama's call for a new spirit of volunteerism and national service, there may be a way to make a difference sometime in 2010. The idea involves a new type of military unit that the Pentagon should propose during its ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review.
For crises like those in Congo and Darfur, the United States should consider a radical innovation in recruiting policy. We should create a peace operations division in the Army with individuals enlisting specifically for this purpose. There would be risks in such a venture, to be sure. But they are manageable and tolerable risks, especially since most such deployments would be legitimated by the United Nations, carried out with partners such as key allies, and backstopped by the US armed forces in worst-case scenarios...
More at The Washington Post.
Comments
M-A lagrange:
Agree with all you say and especially like the comparison of the situation to the Middle Ages. The elimination of the LRA and FDLR would at least remove obvious excuses for Uganda and Rwanda to mess around in the Congo. It wouldn't remove the temptation but there would very much less legitimate cause. So I think it would be very helpful, certainly to the people who have the misfortune to live near them.
That of course would still leave the FARDC. Another reason those rappel seat wearing "warriors" won't ever be up to the task of taking on the LRA and FDLR is if they ever got close to the point of being able to do so, they would be perceived as being a threat to the Kinshasa gov and the ground would be cut from beneath them. But in the event those two foreign bodies were somehow removed from the country perhaps there would be more chance for increasing the discipline of the FARDC, perhaps. At least they could no longer say they are confronting foreign forces.
This is a problem that there seems to be no solution for. If an Executive Outcomes type organization still existed, maybe that might work, maybe. But it doesn't so I have no good idea of what can be done.
MONUC, as most of UN military intervention, even placed under chapter 7, is not capable and does not have the will to do something. Part because most of its contingents are sent to DRC for vacations. And therefore, what ever TOE and ROE their governments signed, national commands have given strict orders to not participate directly or indirectly to any combats.
But the main remaining problem in DRC is (and not would) the FARDC themselves. Training high skilled commandos to solve LRA and FDLR question is an option. This was already thought about. But after? What do you do with those guys?
DRC political/military context and links are not abnormal but very much middle age type. The FARDC are not the army of a nation but the aggregate of several gangs (and I use that term on purpose).
1) Those gangs do not obey to central command but to their chief. If the chief is in business with someone from central command that is part of the presidential gang: they will act "accordingly to orders". If not... They will respond to the best business offer. If it comes from FDLR or LRA, they will do what FDLR or LRA request.
2) If they have no business offer, they will create or found one and harass population.
3) When power will turn (its a democracy), what will you do with the highly trained guys? Has they will only obey to their gang chief; they will be in the best case counter productive. In a normal case, they will use their skills for banditry.
So the idea to train FADRC is a good one but with 2 faces. One of the FADRC problems is that military engagement is seen as a way to make money through access to violences power. The second is that FARDC see officer rank as the normal and basic rank in an army. And finally and not the last neither the least, DRC government is not capable to pay FADRC and is not willing to pay FARDC.
You can create a trained army from ground. But you need first to give population protection from that army first. Main threat in DRC is not FDLR or LRA, even if they are the enemy, main threat is the FARDC.
The two things that would most further peace in the eastern Congo would be the destruction of the LRA and the FDLR, destruction as in hunting them down and killing them, dead, all of them. A peace operations brigade probably wouldn't be able to do that, especially if it worked under MONUC. MONUC can't or won't do anything decisive. Anybody who doesn't believe that things will improve without the actual destruction of those two entities hasn't a clue, in my opinion, and any suggestion that doesn't recognize that hard reality is silly.
However, if you modified Mr. O'Hanlon's idea into the creation of a volunteer unit raised for a specific purpose, that might work. It worked in the past in the Philippines. People would be recruited for 3 years to be deployed in this or that area for the duration of their term with experienced officers and non-coms coming from the regular Army. It would be a throwback to the 19th century but it would be an outlet for people to exercise their patriotism and impulse to serve without making them go into the big green machine. An idea anyway.
We need to utilize our personnel more effectively. For example, I encounter numerous Spanish speaking Marines that could transfer that capability to Pashto,Iraqi,Tagalog then train for small unit warfare. Learn the language, culture,terrain,mission, and embedd with the masses. The ethnic makeup of Afghanistan would allow them a certain amount of cover in certain provinces.
Dear Ken White
I would just make a little remarque on your description of OFDA, that I know well for its job on the ground in DRC and other places.
The definition you give is the one given in the manual (don't make me quote the page please, they're several from PKO to COIN).
It's role and effective action on the ground is quite different. Having it participating to stabilisation operations is not impossible and has been done. Myself I have implemented projects dedicated to stabilised militia controled villages through humanitarian aid in Ituri in 2004, in DRC.
I did it twice and had success and failure. This is described, unfortunatly in french, in Afrique Contemporaine nb 215 205/3.
This just to say that you're right about funds but you're trying to create a structure that will not be functioning before long time and USA is in hurry for a succes in DRC. FDLR hunt is happening now and not once all this administration will be in place and functional.
<b>marc:</b>
No wheels are being reinvented...<blockquote>"It makes 15 years US civilian agency is present on the ground, it is call OFDA and is part of USAID. Do not try to reinvent the weel.</blockquote>The OFDA you cite is the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. It is a part of USAID but it exists to provide suppport to and in other nations in the aftermath of a disaster, not in stability, foreign internal defense or similar operations. While it could be adapted to such a role it has not been at this time.
There is also the fact that USAID is grossly underfunded and that would need to be remedied.
The US government does not have an organization, predominately civilian, dedicated to such efforts. Other than that minor correction, I agree with the rest of your post.
Gentlemen, please
"An agency of the US government designed to do that does not exist though we could certainly develop one. It should be civilian because that make it less threatening -- not 'non' threatening, simply less so. It should also be civilian because many Americans who would be willing to join such an effort would NOT be willing to serve in the the armed forces."
It makes 15 years US civilian agency is present on the ground, it is call OFDA and is part of USAID. Do not try to reinvent the weel.
The idea to use civilian action by military personal to increase military perception by local population is an old trick. Let civilian do their job and soldiers do their's.
Because counterinsurgency theories have good publicity, which is deserved, it is no reason to fall in the pit of recreating existing stuff.
Almost all attemp to provide civilian services through military personal have failed. Take the time to look at what is going on on the ground. I'm not saying that FARDC (congo army) is capable neither MONUC (UN military forces) but, at least MONUC has idears.
What is missing is more than training for the FARDC. It is a real military tradition where doing war is not killing women and children.
And the guys in front, they're no small boys playing with water guns.
I support Stan and Rigs on that. FDLR (that them) have been hidden in the bush for 15 years, developing a FARC like command structure. They know how to use their toys. Sending green troops with a drop of military componant and mainly turn to social affaires will lead to US soldiers head on a stick and happy Hutu laughing at him.
DRC wars are not sophisticated but still are bloody, violent and vivious wars.
There are those who say that foreign internal development calls for, or that counterinsurgency efforts are, armed social work. Some truth in that. Entry in any of the ongoing problems in Africa with combat potential will certainly call for that. The armed part is a military function unquestionably.
We can apply force in Africa if required but I'm pretty sure that the Africans would rather no predominately white forces were involved on their continent so I think it would be ill advised for us to do so.
While the armed forces are certainly the people to do any combat effort -- and to provide security, they are not structured or equipped to provide long term internal development support. An agency of the US government designed to do that does not exist though we could certainly develop one. It should be civilian because that make it less threatening -- not 'non' threatening, simply less so. It should also be civilian because many Americans who would be willing to join such an effort would NOT be willing to serve in the the armed forces.
Social work is social work; force is force -- the two are highly inimical. Our previous attempts at combining the two have not gone well...
The 'expeditionary law enforcement' was aimed at the training of indigenous police in the event we had to intervene somewhere in the future. Note that 'had to' -- having to do something and doing it because you can are very different things. It may seem to be an idea with merit but the long term second and third order effects should be considered. We don't do that at all well, either.
Such a mission is so far removed from military missions that any attempt to place it under the DoD umbrella would doom it to mediocrity because most (by a large majority but not all) in the armed forces would want <i>nothing</i> to do with it. It also would give DoD another 'reason' to stay in the forefront on US diplomacy. That is a terrible idea.
Not least because, due to our political and budgeting system creation of such a tool would create a demand for its use -- even if there were no real reason to employ it. Indeed, even if there were good reasons NOT to employ it...
See Albright, M and Bosnia.
Yet another example of the fact that the Think Tanks (I use the phrase loosely) are glaringly out of touch with reality as often as not.
There's a reason we have not been militarily involved in Africa. We're too nice to survive.
<b>Rigs</b> said:<blockquote>"...Nobody would be able to cry about our lack of involvement in humanitarian crises because they could join up and help fix the world themselves.
It's a good idea that could be made to work, and I don't think we should dismiss the idea outright. "</blockquote>To which my responses are in order; Let them cry -- they would continue to do so but would not join anything themselves. That is particularly so if the joined organization is remotely military.
It is <i>not</i> a good idea, His intent is good, no question -- but his solution will not work.
O'Hanlon showed his naivete by suggesting the recommended organization be <blockquote>"...a peace operations division in the Army with individuals enlisting specifically for this purpose."</blockquote>First point is that if it's an Army, it's purpose will be perceived as not being benign. Second is that such an organization may have some slight merit but if it is part of the Army that will deter some from joining it.
Lastly, it must not be part of DoD, an aggregation that is already too big with too many diverse missions outside it supposed core competencies. The armed forces can do development work but they are not good at it and never will be; if you want any success in this type of thing, you must use a purpose designed civilian agency.
Everyone needs to put a LOT more thought into this, As it stands, it would get a number of people killed unnecessarily for almost no benefit.
His theory as presented is heavily flawed - but I like the idea in general.
"Aside from the obvious blunder we are about to put inexperienced troops into, this paragraph makes me sick just considering it. If we think were fighting complex operations now and somehow conclude that the DRC will be a cakewalk, we are doomed to fail. Perhaps not sophisticated, but the Congolese are equally ruthless and could give a Sierra what uniform our folks are wearing."
I concur with Stan here - it is outrageous to suggest sending green forces to decades old conflict with only a vague notion of what they're going to encounter. It reminds me of the scene in "Hotel Rwanda" when the Hutu militia drove by with a cordless drill and a UN-blue helmet with a hole drilled in it. Such things would tend to strip the idealistic zeal from the greenhorns mighty quick. To suggest they do not need advanced infantry tactics because they can 'call for help' is absurd.
However, if they were to deploy a mixed unit of engineers, security forces, an intel shop as well as sufficient translators to get the job done, I'm very much for this type of volunteer force. Nobody would be able to cry about our lack of involvement in humanitarian crises because they could join up and help fix the world themselves.
It's a good idea that could be made to work, and I don't think we should dismiss the idea outright. With that said, I think Obama would be more open to creating a volunteer civil defense force than a paramilitary peace force.
Once again the guy is forgetting that DRC has a 15 years recurent conflicts history. With a nearly 100 years of poor military management, command and behaviour as tradition.
Rape as weapon is not just a posture in that place. As well as crazy child soldiers and military banditry.
Rather look at what s being done on the ground. They re lessons to be developed rather coming with new fallen from sky solutions.
<i>The dangers of deploying such units to missions such as the one in Congo, would be real, but the risks would be acceptable. First, those volunteering would understand the risks and accept them. Second, in most civil conflicts such as Congo's, possible adversarial forces are not sophisticated. Soldiers in the new division would not need to execute complex operations akin to those carried out during the invasion of Iraq or current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.</i>
Aside from the obvious blunder we are about to put inexperienced troops into, this paragraph makes me sick just considering it. If we think were fighting complex operations now and somehow conclude that the DRC will be a cakewalk, we are doomed to fail. Perhaps not sophisticated, but the Congolese are equally ruthless and could give a Sierra what uniform our folks are wearing.
I agree, we will not be performing anything complex... Perplexed comes to mind though.
The SECSTATE will follow in her husbands footsteps and abruptly call it quits once out of office or outta money.
This innovative idea takes me back to Operation Support Hope (less) but with far less qualified personnel being deployed into the Heart of Darkness.
I think it goes back to the discussion we had about a month ago about Army force structure. One school of thought states that we would need to have both a light force for counterinsurgency and small wars and another army for large, conventional war.
If we use this model, you would need a "small wars" unit which combines construction engineers, security forces, translators, etc. into a unit. It looks as if this is the type of force the author is advocating.
It's good in theory, although I doubt it would work in practice, particularly with the specialized translators and cultural advisors each region would need.
Ken, you make a persuasive argument about this and the counterproductive hit to legitimacy that a military deployment would cause. How could they include a security capability without it being military-based - unless some bureaucrat coins the term expeditionary law enforcement, ha ha. (after I wrote that I did a little google search, and apparently the term has <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/07/expeditionary-law-enforcement/… been coined</a> on this very site.)
In response to that article you suggested a shift in reserve training and recruitment to reflect the need for expeditionary law enforcement. While a solid idea, the point of the article we're commenting on here was tapping a new recruitment pool that is interested in stopping humanitarian atrocities and not getting involved in the more dirty work that the conventional military is called to do.