Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) has been subject to more than their fair-share of Monday-morning quarterbacking by retired generals and colonels; active duty officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted; Representatives, Senators, reporters, pundits, bloggers and think-tankers without throwing yet another so-called "expert" opinion into the hopper.
Moreover, the release of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and General Accounting Office report combined with the partisan bickering in Congress only add to the fog of war as these documents, as well as other reports, have been interpreted by both sides of the aisle as either an encouraging sign of progress or confirmation of a bad war heading south.
The need for restraint in second-guessing and adding to the noise level is especially true leading into General David Petraeus' and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's much awaited progress report to Congress.
What I offer here are "the basics" - background on the "new" counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and a quick-look guide on what to look for in reports and commentary concerning the dynamic and complex operating environment in Iraq -- all against assumptions that "we don't know what we don't know" and everything we hold as ground-truth is nothing more than a snapshot in time of a long campaign that is subject to rapid and dramatic change for good or for bad on a recurring basis.
Background
Nothing new here -- Its all been documented before is a common criticism concerning Counterinsurgency -- US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5 published in December of 2006. To a certain extent this is true and (prior to the publication of FM 3-24) if one was so inclined to gather up the combined works (books, studies, articles, speeches, and interviews) of T.E. Lawrence, Galula, Thompson, Fall, Trinquier, Kitson, Liddell-Hart, Kilcullen, Hammes, Manwaring, Cordesman, F. Hoffman, B. Hoffman, Metz, Millen, Robb, Boot, Nagl, Petraeus, Mattis, Chiarelli, McMaster, Yingling, Strickland, Record, Cassidy, Murray, Sepp, Tomes, Krepinevich, Grau, Thomas, Mao, Guevara, Giap along with many others and then read, sort and analyze -- I think you see where I am going with this...
The authors (experienced operators and COIN scholars - oftentimes both) of FM 3-24 did the research, analysis, and writing for us -- whittling down that vast database into an easily digestible and, more importantly, a relevant and useable guide. What was to serve as the "new doctrine" in Iraq took the historical principles, molded those into contemporary imperatives and then offered up the unique paradoxes inherent to COIN in comparison to conventional force-on-force operations.
If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride -- Yes, from the offset, if we had a real Phase IV Plan (post-"major" combat operations) and had implemented that plan with full participation of interagency assets things could very well be different now. Had we efficiently occupied the vacuum that existed immediately following regime change one could credibly argue that the counterinsurgency that developed and face today would have never matured.
Well, we didn't have a coherent Phase IV plan, we didn't have all instruments of national power (interagency minus the military) available and we fueled the development of an insurgency by alienating large segments of the Iraqi population. Water under the bridge and best left to the historians to sort out -- it is time to move on. What is important is that we now have a "theater-wide" doctrine (best and brightest tactical commanders implemented sound COIN practices on a local level from the offset -- but their efforts were fleeting as units moved on and there existed a denial in many quarters that we were even facing an insurgency) and short of calling it quits, that doctrine is our best, and possibly last, chance on getting this thing right.
But we need a strategy; doctrine is all about tactics -- Right, history is chock-full of examples of COIN military forces winning every tactical battle only to lose the war. That said, strategic goals are many times (if not most) vaguely defined and tend to shift with the prevailing political wind over time. Sound and stable tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) (COIN best practices) provide a common and time-tested baseline for military and other agency organizations to operate from in the absence of a well-defined strategic end-state. While the advantages of a "bottom-up" approach to COIN is arguable; solid tactics, executed correctly and uniformly, provide a solid base while the "top" (host nation or otherwise) sorts itself out.
Our National Strategy for Iraq:
- Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
- Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
- Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.
When one only has a hammer every problem looks like a nail - To meet these goals we require the right tools in the toolbox -- FM 3-24 provides tactical tools that, given time, are the best practices to meet the strategic goals listed above. Are those tools foolproof and a guarantee for success? Absolutely not, but again -- they are our last best chance.
Been there, done it -- This addresses the proliferation of first-person accounts of OIF operations -- because they can, at times, be confusing and even contradicting. The insights of vets with one or more tours in Iraq are most valuable in identifying the lessons -- hopefully learned -- that contribute to future success and updates of FM 3-24. There is one caution however and LTC Bob Bateman summed it up nicely in a recent post on the Small Wars Journal concerning a New York Times Op-Ed piece penned by members of the 82nd Airborne Division:
When I was writing from Iraq, I myself took care to speak only about what I personally saw, what I personally did, and (within the limits of operational security) things that happened around me. I was not in a position, even as a major with a top-secret security clearance working directly for one of the higher level headquarters in Iraq, to make as sweeping statements as their essay did.
That is not to say that many of their grander statements on topics such as political reconciliation within Iraq, or American strategy, are wrong. I leave that for all of you to evaluate on your own. It is only to say that their opinions on strategic issues are no more, or less, than any civilian living in, say, San Francisco or the Bowery. The fact that they, like me, wear uniforms should not convey some sort of magic pixie-dust validity to their opinions on events way beyond their personal experience, just as it does not for mine.
In a way, it is a shame that they wrote their essay in the way that they did. They could have been much more powerful, while conveying the same opinion, had they "stayed in their lane."
What follows are historical principles of COIN operations as outlined in the opening pages of FM 3-24. I've provided some abbreviated commentary on the things to look for and potential roadblocks in regards to recent and ongoing operations in Iraq. Again, not to judge, but to provide an insight on how FM 3-24 is playing out in Iraq.
Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency
1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective
This is a big, and elusive, COIN principle (with Principle 8 -- Long-term Commitment) in Iraq -- fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government.
Things to look for: Increased (or decreased) ability of the central government to provide security; selection of national leaders in a manner considered just and fair by a majority of citizens; high level of popular participation and support for political processes; culturally acceptable level of government corruption; culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; and a high level of acceptance by major social institutions. (1) In the near-term, movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform. (2)
Roadblocks: Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. (3)
2. Unity of Effort Is Essential
Essential at every echelon and by every organization -- military and civilian -- U.S., other Coalition and Iraqi. Well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other out and / or provide vulnerabilities suited to be exploited by adversaries. (4)
Things to look for: Continued close cooperation and coordination between Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus and their staffs, same with Coalition partners. Close coordination, cooperation and combined operations between Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and military units. Expansion of the PRT program to include access to previously denied areas in Iraq. Close coordination, cooperation and combined operations between U.S. military and PRTs and Iraqi security forces (local and national).
Roadblocks: If and when non-military capabilities significantly increase (PRTs -- non governmental organizations, international and regional organizations) the challenge of conducting coordinated and complementary operations by diverse organizations with inherently parochial objectives. The Iraqi national government's ability to meet the basic needs of the general population and its perceived legitimacy by a majority are the primary obstacles. Without the Iraqi government there can be no 'political' unity of effort.
3. Political Factors Are Primary
One "rule of thumb" is COIN is 80% political action and 20% military action. All military and non-military actions should contribute to strengthen the national government's legitimacy.
Things to look for: Any and all indicators of a true national government capable (or becoming capable) and —to take on those tasks associated with governance of a country. Solid steps towards national reconciliation is key. Again, movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform.
Roadblocks: The precarious state of the Iraqi Government due to criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the United Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Increase in divisions between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadrists and possible alternate coalitions between Shia factions aimed at constraining Maliki. (5)
4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment
This is much more than traditional enemy order of battle information. COIN requires a thorough understanding of Iraqi society and culture. Unfortunately, the insurgents hold a home-field advantage in regards to local knowledge. Therefore, to be effective, Coalition forces and other agencies require expertise in such skills as language and cultural understanding. (6)
Things to look for: Increasing and institutionalizing recent and ongoing efforts across the board in cultural understanding in formal military and non-military doctrine, education, and training. Increasing deployment and integrating with Coalition forces of subject matter experts to include Human Terrain Teams.
Roadblocks: Time, time and more time to train, educate and deploy. Bureaucracy hurdles in formalizing cultural awareness education, training and doctrine. Availability of subject matter expert advisors in Iraq at the tactical level where the vast majority of diverse cultural interaction occur.
5. Intelligence Drives Operations
Without good intelligence counterinsurgents are blind, wasting energy and oftentimes causing unintentional harm while conducting COIN operations. With good intelligence they are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact. (7)
Things to look for: A concerted effort to push intelligence capabilities down to the lowest tactical level. This includes the capability to conduct intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. Human Intelligence capabilities are key. Formalized and properly resourced company-level intelligence cells are key. Increase in Iraqi civilian's willingness to provide intelligence / information to Coalition and Iraqi Security forces.
Roadblocks: Time and resources (trained personnel and intelligence-related equipment) necessary to provide tactical-level commanders more than the current ad-hoc capabilities. Standardized TTP to facilitate seamless sharing of intelligence between tactical commands and during hand-over to follow-on units / organizations. Policy issues that place barriers on intelligence sharing with non-U.S. Coalition partners and non-military organizations.
6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support
It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. While killing or capturing insurgents is often necessary, especially when based in religious or ideological extremism, killing or capturing every insurgent is impossible and can be counterproductive. Insurgents must be cut off from their sources of power -- and the key source is the civilian population. (8)
Things to look for: Continued local reconciliation building towards national reconciliation. As in Anbar, an increase in local Iraqi leaders coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. Government of Iraq support in integrating local volunteers into legitimate institutions to help improve local security. (9)
Roadblocks: Continued sectarian violence and the distrust it produces amongst the Iraqi civilian population. Continued attacks by Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists. Continued external support to insurgents - especially by Iran. (10)
7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential
The COIN cornerstone is security for the civilian population. Without that security no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. Transitioning security duties from COIN combat forces to law enforcement is key. Insurgents must be seen as criminals by the local population. In OIF Iraqi law enforcement organizations must be seen as legitimate and operating under the Rule of Law. (11)
Things to look for: Increased Iraqi security operations with minimal U.S. support. Increased Iraqi government capabilities to provide essential services. Increased presence of regional and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).
Roadblocks: Again, the ability of the national government to provide security under the Rule of Law and continued sectarian violence, continued attacks by Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists and continued external support to insurgents.
8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
Insurgencies are protracted by nature... Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome a common perception that U.S. COIN forces lack staying power. The perception that the national government has similar will and stamina is critical. At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted effort is also critical. (12)
Things to look for: This is huge, and a very dynamic and complex issue - Congressional actions that extend U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq or sets conditions and timelines for withdrawal. U.S. public opinion polls as Congress and candidates often utilize these polls to formulate legislation and platforms. Iraqi public opinion polls that reflect perception on U.S. commitment (staying power) and confidence in the Iraqi national government's future.
Roadblocks: The Washington Clock vs. the Baghdad Clock -- time allocated by the National Command Authority vs. the time needed to successfully conduct COIN operations in Iraq. Operational Tempo -- the ability for U.S. military forces to sustain security operations on a level necessary to allow for Iraqi national reconciliation. The ability of the Iraqi national government to achieve reconciliation.
Endnotes:
1. Counterinsurgency -- FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006.
2. MNF-I Commanding General letter dated 7 September 2007.
3. Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, August 2007.
4. FM 3-24.
5. Update to NIE.
6. FM 3-24.
7. FM 3-24.
8. FM 3-24.
9. MNF-I Commanding General letter.
10. MNF-I Commanding General letter.
11. FM 3-24.
12. FM 3-24.
Links:
Seeing the Counterinsurgency Forest from the Trees - Christian Lowe, Defense Tech
What to Make of the Petraeus Strategy - Dave Dilegge, Military.com