Winning Battles, Losing Wars

A couple of thoughts.

First: a lot's said about Vietnam, and some of it's relevant, but a lot of it's blather. It's become popular to look at Vietnam as a loss, and there were certainly a long list of mistakes that would allow a casual observer to reach that conclusion. However, this falls apart when one considers the wider strategic context. With respect to the Southeast Asian theater itself, after years of mis-micromanagment by the Johnson White House, the Nixon-Kissinger team seems to have done an adequate job of bringing the war to the point where Kissinger could simultaneously orchestrate the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the normalization of relations with China. Congress' 1974 defunding of military aid to Vietnam also merits mention. (There are rumors that the current administration more closely resembles that of the President Johnson, but that's probably another discussion entirely.) The Vietnam conflict's purpose was to counteract the communist "Domino Effect" phenomenon in Southeast Asia, and it was partly effective at achieving that goal. In the wider context, engagement with China to end American involvement in Vietnam contributed to rapprochement with China, which widened the Sino-Soviet split, which accelerated the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Vietnam was a campaign in the wider Cold War, and although it wasn't an outright victory at the operational level in 1973/'75, it contributed to an unadulterated success in 1991. Good discussions of this can be found <A HREF="http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/a-new-nixon-doctrine-strategy-for-a-po…; and <A HREF="http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/09/rethinking-nixon-forty-yea…;, and in the latter chapters of John J. Weltman's excellent 1995 offering, <A HREF="http://books.google.com/books?id=YOOz2SldOzAC&pg=PP11&source=gbs_select… Politics and the Evolution of War</A>. Are Russia and China still significant strategic competitors? Of course; but, as Sir Laurence Martin noted in 1981: "[S]ecurity is a game in which the final goal is never quite in reach... Security, like electricity, must be on hand when you need it. But, also like electricity, it is almost impossible to store, and every generation must make its own."

Second: As far as I'm concerned, there's ample evidence that both elected officials and, unfortunately, flag/general officers harbor a growing ignorance of and/or disinterest in grand strategy. In the aforementioned Vietnamese example, President Nixon may not have been a grand strategist himself, but he trusted the advice of Henry Kissinger, who was. Kissinger rightly identified an opportunity to trade an operational stalemate (Vietnam) for a major step toward an eventual grand strategic victory (rapprochement with China and marginalization of the Soviet Union). By contrast, American officers' capacity to advise civilian officials on how to link the available ways and means in order to achieve those officials' political ends on the one hand, and to oversee the operationalization of that process on the other, seems to have atrophied significantly since the end of the Cold War. I suspect that if the war colleges refocused on grand strategy - as opposed to the campaigning they currently teach, which might generously be dubbed "operational strategy" - they might be better prepared to advise civilian leaders on the one hand, and guide subordinates in the execution of that process on the other. Will this be hard? Yes, but if it revitalizes America's ability the achieve its strategic ends, then it's worth it; and to quote von Clausewitz: "Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult."

As a caveat, I suspect that this institutional misunderstanding of what strategy is and how it works contributes significantly to the false narrative that America's warfighters have performed flawlessly, and that blame for America's mixed record in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere falls squarely on the shoulders of civilian officials. It is undeniable that the majority of American troops have executed their missions honorably and admirably; however, it is equally obvious that tactical and operational mistakes which were attributable solely to military personnel have impacted the strategic landscape, sometimes disproportionately. This false narrative does serving and future personnel a disservice by undermining efforts to incorporate lessons purchased at great cost in blood and treasure. America can scarcely afford to re-learn these lessons - most notably the obvious need for both conventional and irregular proficiencies - again in the future.

To me, everything here is pretty easy to understand:

a. We have a long-standing foreign policy goal/political objective of transforming outlying states and societies more along modern western political, economic and social lines.

b. We also have (or had) a long-standing belief that foreign populations, liberated from their oppressive regimes, would -- due to the "universal appeal" of our way of life, our way of governance, etc. -- quickly, easily and mostly on their own (1) throw off their old ways of life and governance and, in the place of these, (2) adopt our such ways.

c. Our "war goals," being consistent with Clausewitz's theory, are, thus, exactly the same as our foreign policy goal/political objective noted above. These to be achieved, if necessary and/or when an opportunity arises, via "other ways and other means," to wit: via war.

d. But, for a period of time, we do not have a legal means/excuse to pursue this foreign policy goal/political objective -- via force of arms -- this, due to the then-peaceful setting.

e. All this changes with 9/11. Now we had a "license" to pursue our foreign policy goal/political objective -- of outlying state and societal liberation/transformation -- via force of arms.

f. Thus, we embark on war with item "a" above -- but more importantly item "b" -- in our ruck sack; herein thinking that, with these, we are good to go. (The wars, per item "b" thinking above, will be short, quick and easy.)

g. Right out of the gate, however, we learn that our national leaders (and our military leaders?) did not know crap about the very different ambitions -- and the very different wants, needs and desires -- of the populations within the states and societies that we had been sent to (1) liberate and (2) transform.

h. These guys and gals, it soon becomes apparent, have no great interest in organizing, ordering, orienting their ways of life and ways of governance so as to better meet the needs of foreign states and their societies (to wit: those of the West.) These folks have other ideas, goals and ambitions as to how to order, organize and orient themselves and their lives.

i. So now we're screwed. In order to achieve our foreign policy goal/political objective, we now understand that we must either:

(1) Ramp up our effort considerably, attack and subdue the population generally, employ the "heavy hand" to this effect and stay for 50 or more years. (We may not have the "license" -- from our domestic nor our allies/international audience -- to do this). Or we must:

(2) Find a way to "get out of Dodge." This, so as to pursue our foreign policy goal/political objective -- of transforming these states and societies more along modern western lines -- via more intelligent ways and means. (To wit: via ways and means less likely to produce counterproductive results.)

Thus, the wars are lost even before they begin -- regardless of the number of "battles" that may be won in the interim. This, because our national leaders (and our military leaders if the shoe fits):

a. Did not know or understand the battlefield (the hearts, minds, thinking and ambitions of the subject populations) and, thus:

b. Did not know the enemy or the fight they were getting into.

This, shall we say, due to what might be called "ethnocentric hubris."

Q.E.D. ?