by Colonel Gian P. Gentile
Download the full article: The Death of the Armor Corps
The Armor Corps in the American Army is gone, it is no more.
The Army has become decidedly infantry centric. This wouldn't be so bad if it was a fighting kind of infantry centered army. But instead it is an infantry centric Army grounded in the principles of population centric counterinsurgency and Rupert Smith's view of war in the future as "wars amongst the people."
To be sure the American Army will be told to do lots of things from winning hearts and minds in the Hindu Kush, to passing out humanitarian relief in the troubled spots around the world, to nation building in Iraq. But first and foremost it must be an Army grounded in combined arms competencies. This must come first, and not second or third after fuzzy concepts as "whole of government approach" and building emotional relationships with local populations. The latter may of course be important, depending on the mission, but those kinds of competencies must be premised on combined arms and not the other way around.
Download the full article: The Death of the Armor Corps
The author is a serving Army Colonel. The views in this article are his own and not those of the Department of Defense.
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I'm certainly no expert on Armor, growing up in artillery and now in EOD, but it's always struck me how otherwise thoughtful and brilliant men confuse Armor with Cavalry. I don't mean you've done this, Col Gentile, but I always notice it and to avoid it I think any discussion of armor needs to proceed with an awareness of the difference between the two. Armor still has a place but we've moved past the point when it was our only option to use the instrument of cavalry. I've incidentally heard anecdotal tales that some forward thinkers in Armor, even way back when, saw this change coming and tried to claim Aviation as a sub-branch of armor.
Patmc has been in a battalion that finally pulled together a battalion training plan and trained as an artillery battalion.
Well and good. The technical delivery of fires is actually a pretty easy skillset to maintain (says the retired third generation artilleryman) as was evidenced by the many fine technical delivery-of-fires battalions of the Guard and Reserve (yes, Virginia, the USAR once was a combat formation other than the 100th Infantry).
The issue for the artillery isn't maintaining technical gunnery skills. It's maintaining full-spectrum fire support skills.
How many DIVARTY (excuse me, Fires Brigade) staffs have planned and conducted large scale maneuver support including air, other than single tactical engagments?
How many Division and higher staffs have even considered an org for combat and fire planning (anyone remember Corps-level JAATs?) for division and higher ops?
That's the skill-set that's atrophying. It's a skillset that has to be practiced to be maintained.
No, we're not going to be planning 3 day rolling barrages with thousands of guns (but I could plan that if you need it). But we do need to know how to do more than snipe.
The odd thing - if my small group students of the early 90's took a tactics exam today and provided the answers that were correct then - they would fail the test.
Don't get me wrong, I lurves me some PGWs. I like long-ranged artillery missiles that can take out targets with a singleton strike. I'm not necessarily a big fan of creating a mass of low-density minefields by shooting DPICM everywhere I look. But I also know that mass has a quality all it's own when you need it - and you need to be organized and trained in how to provide it when it's needed.
We have a tough row to hoe, as many here have pointed out - my problem with it all is that historically, we have trouble finding a balance - we tend to go all one way or another. And then pay in blood when we guess wrong.
Mike:
Good to hear from you!
Fair points. To be sure there are still combined arms battalions in heavy brigades that have their tanks and bradleys and have done some good combined arms training. Not to mention the fact that armor and cavalry soldiers have performed (and continue to do so) superbly and bravely over the last 9 years in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But what is extinct is an armor "state of mind" that we had once before but it is now gone. That state of mind was premised on an identity of an armor corps made up of soldiers, ncos, and officers. And that state of mind was an essential component to the other critical parts of our balanced army like the infantry and artillery. But as I seen things, Mike, that balance is no longer there and the armor state of mind is gone. Perhaps we can retrieve it, I certainly hope so, and any good infantryman out there should want it back too.
Since as my friend Niel Smith often makes the point that armor forces are not only essential to fighting at the higher end of the conflict spectrum but have actually done quite well and have done important things in irregular warfare. I mean shoot what two army brigades are most often mentioned for their superb and brilliant performances in Iraq? 1/1AD and 3ACR.
I just think that the army and its armor soldiers should recognize that we have lost the armor state of mind, and that we at least need to try to get it back. Not for us in some anachronistic way but for the good of the army and our role in support of the common defense.
As an Armor officer I agree with COL Gentile to an extent.
I had not heard that 3d ACR was losing their tanks. If thats true it is a big mistake. As outlined in an article by MAJ Chris Mahaffey in Armor Magazine July 09 the 3d ACR is the only remaining heavy cavalry unit in our Army. Many of our early problems in 2003 with reconnaissance and with controlling lines of communication were because of the lack of a corps level cavalry force. Tanks are necessary for armored cav to complete its mission of defeating the enemys security zone. This is further supported by LTC Jeffrey Broadwater in his article on the anemic brigade level recon squadrons https://www.knox.army.mil/center/oco...adwater07c.pdf, in that piece he calls for the addition of tanks to add more offensive power.
Another cause for concern is the move of the Armor Center from Fort Knox to Fort Benning. Maneuvering vehicles is not the same as maneuvering infantry and Armor should remain a distinct and separate institution. I have yet to read a convincing argument for the move which seems to me an opportunity for the Infantry branch to take a greater role in Strykers, mounted reconnaissance and the Bradley
As far as the horror stories of unqualified staff sergeants and units untrained in gunnery. I think its too early to say the armor corps is extinct. As a counter example, my unit went as far as firing a modified table 8 in Iraq during the deployment. At NTC, we consistently executed a deliberate battalion level attack with a breach under fire.
We have had some deterioration of our combined arms capability but the sky isnt falling and the goal remains a full spectrum force.
It is not about the M1 tank or dreaming of better past days of fulda or the VOD at NTC. It is about an armor state of mind that has left the American Army. To be sure the Army needs to undergo transformation: but that transormation should be premised on combined arms and not of O'Hanlon like Peace Brigades.
My simple point is that the Army must be able to do combined arms first if it expects to be able to do anything else.
The armor corps was a critical component of combined arms competencies. To be sure a modern army needs specialization in terms of light infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, special forces, etc.
My worry is that we have lost one key component of that balanced force--the armor corps--and we should not sweep the problem away with notions of a future filled mostly of irregular warfare and on the notion that learning and adapting leaders can solve any problem. To be sure they can, but their ability to learn and adapt is premised on combined arms competencies and not more fuzzy notions of cultural awareness, whole of government, or whatever other flavor of the day term is currently en vogue.
gian
That there are Armor (19K) Non Commissioned Officers as high as the rank of Staff Sergeant who have never qualified on a M1 Tank sounds distressing to M1 tankers, but there are other chariots, and so long as the commanders of <i>those</i> platforms meet the standards established for technical and tactical proficiency, we don't have a problem, unless those established standards are unrealistic or too hard/expensive/time consuming to train to meet.
<i>Amongst lnjuns... ...a tribe's greatness is figured on how mighty its enemies be.</i> Armor Branch's enemies nowadays ain't nothing compared to the 1st Guards Tank Army.
In the conventional sense of the pre-9/11 military the Armor branch is dead or dying on the branch. However, as MikeF points out: 1. The insertion platform doesn't matter. Be it a jinga truck, your boots or a fast rope insertion you're just getting to the actions on the objective. 2. Whether you're a Infantry PL, a Cav Scout Section leader or a Mech company commander you have to fire and maneuver and CFF satisfactory IOT win the fight.
What is key is defining and preparing for the next war. There is something to be said for the Dessert Storm era of Armor forces although to a lesser extent than previously needed. The same could be said of Airborne Infantry but they may have a greater utility in the run up to the next war because of financial considerations in our generation of warfare. Retaining and continuing to develop the next generation of leaders is of the utmost importance. Their branch should be irrelevant.
What happens when we are no longer in the ME? Do we bury our heads in the sands of NTC or swamps of JRTC and fight the next 'enemy', which undoubtedly will take the form of the current enemy lest we take a leap of faith and attempt to visualize our next enemy. Which may be something between a conventional military with terrorist tactics and forces. The west has exposed our weakness and there is no reason to think our enemies don't see it like Hamas did in 2006.
A branch immaterial approach would seem best so that we ensure we are keeping those who understand how to fire and maneuver while remaining thoughtful enough to know how to relate across cultural boundaries, stay in the military. We should adopt other militaries approach to developing and maintaining these softer skills while immersing our leaders in foreign cultures. There are only limited opportunities for this in grad school programs or externships that are often viewed as derailing a leader off the prescribed career path.
As the Aussie points out there are not enough U.S. soldiers who truly understand COIN. There are many Armor, Engineer, Artillery, and Chemical CPTs and MAJs that do and they should stay in the service regardless of whom are next enemy is because they are adaptive and agile leaders who understand both likely facets of future warfare.
This generation of LTs, CPTs and MAJs will be tomorrows COLs and general officers. Keeping the proper personnel will mean they can put together past GWOT experiences, visualize the next enemy and train the future competencies necessary.
A few years ago, Field Artillery branch was hurting. Its officers, NCOs, and Soldiers were training for and conducting non-standard missions, such as convoy or base security. My own FA Brigade deployed in OIF IV to perform convoys, then almost deployed again to conduct a security force mission. The unit went almost three years without full FA training. When the unit received an order to deploy to A-stan and actually shoot, we put together a tough FA training plan and got back to standard. It was painful, but we did it.
If Armor branch is not training to its standard, that is the fault of Armor leaders. COL Gentile writes that he had officers, NCOs, and Soldiers that could not do table gunnery. If these were essential skill sets, why didn't he train his men on them? FA units deployed without guns. Most Armor or Mech units still deploy with/or fall in on their vehicles and fire in combat. There are larger picture issues, such as BDE or above level operations, but BN and below is still in the hands of its leaders.
The Army has shifted some BCTs away from heavy. These forces are needed in a light role right now. Blame higher for not growing the Army to meet its actual needs. He laments that 3rd ACR lost its tanks. From my understanding, 3rd ACR has been formatted as a regular BCT the last few years, and the ACR was more esprit de corps than actual role. RSTAs were supposed to serve as mini-cav, but because of need for boots, they're usually used as regular maneuver.
It is good for COL Gentile to point out that Armor is at a crossroads, just as "The King and I" a few years ago brought attention to issues within FA, but I think he is overstating the problem. We worked with Abrams and Bradleys on one mission during my time in Iraq. We were riding around in Mad Max gun trucks, so having real armor around was a nice morale boost. The Army should not abandon Armor, and I don't think it has. The priority and resources are shifting where needed for the current fight. The Armor schoolhouse and Armor leaders need to ensure their troops still know their skills. In the end, it is their responsibility.
<i>What if a heavy Brigade Combat Team in Iraq was told to pick up and head east and do a movement to contact into a threatening country?</i>
They would run into a defense based upon the Mosaic doctrine, incorporating (but not limited to) the lessons learned during the Iraq War (~35,000+ US casualties) and the 33 Day War.
I have great respect for COL Gentile, but alas, there will be no "Battle of Prokhorovka," "Chinese Farm," or "Valley of the Tears" in the near to foreseeable future.
.... alas, there will be no "Battle of Prokhorovka," "Chinese Farm," or "Valley of the Tears" in the near to foreseeable future.
Are you sure? What about "Wadi Salukis" and "Fallujahs". Good combined arms is not a pick up game. It requires the highest form of skill in Land Warfare. Once lost it may never be recovered, except at great expense.
As an armor officer having maneuvered in both heavy and light combined arms operations, I can relate to some of COL Gentile's observations. I agree with his thesis in the short-term, i.e. if we had to attack into another country tomorrow, then we may have some issues; however, I disagree with his long-term assessment.
I think we should look at the problem as far as what are we doing right and what are we lacking at. Then, we can work to figure out how to mitigate our shortcomings.
What are we doing right? Well for starters, we have a generation of Armor officers brought up actually engaged in combat and not just practicing it at the CTC's.
1. Platform doesn't matter. Whether it is a HMMWV, Stryker, Chinook, or tank, platform is irrelevant. The fundamentals of fire and maneuver are the same. Section and squad bounding are the same whether it's a light infantry platoon or tank section. I employed the same techniques as a tank platoon leader during the Thunder Runs as I did as an Airborne Recon Commander taking down a AQ training camp.
2. Call for Fires. PL's and SL's are actually getting the opportunity to work indirect fires and employ CAS in a real world environment.
Those are two things we're doing right.
So, what do we need to improve upon? As COL Gentile rightly noted, we are lacking in our technical skills. Manning a .50 cal from a HMMWV is not the same as boresighting and firing a 120mm tank or learning how to recycle the ghost round of a Bradley.
So, IMO, the real questions we need to look at are what technical skills do we need to replinish, how long will it take to rebuild these skills, and how much will it cost.
v/r
Mike
In chronological order
<b>Sven Ortmann</b> is correct.
<b>Mark Pyruz</b> was ably and logically answered by William F. Owen. Predicting the end of war or of a type of warfare is even older than I am. Everyone including Omar Bradley was wrong...
<b>Patmc</b> is right on the money. Armor and Artillery both gain and suffer from being vaguely scientific in that many of their functions lend themselves to empirical data and fairly accurate quantification (gunnery and maintenance and gunnery...). That double edged sword leads them to perhaps over rely on those factors in judging performance as opposed to the more ethereal and subjective art of tactical employment. Still , he's correct -- if Armor is not up to its own snuff, then Armor should take a look in the mirror.
<b>William F. Owen</b>, as stated above, is correct -- attempts to predict the future of warfare are not only unlikely to be correct, they can lead to dangerous fallacies like the so-called Weinberger and Powell Doctrines -- two ideas that were doomed before they were uttered and a US Army that criminally eschewed so-called phase 4 and FID operations...
Lastly, <b>Mike F.</b> also quite correct. I have seen a number of American tanks killed or put out of action in combat. Virtually none of them were due to better gunnery on the part of opponents, poor US operational employment or strategic issues. Almost all were due to tactical mistakes at the platoon and company level. As Mike F said: <i>"The fundamentals of fire and maneuver are the same. Section and squad bounding are the same whether it's a light infantry platoon or tank section."</i>
Emphasizing gunnery and maintenance over tactical performance is perhaps natural in a culture that prizes 'objectivity' and is highly competitive. That it is natural does not mean that it is the correct thing to do.
His bottom line has it right:<blockquote>"...the real questions we need to look at are what technical skills do we need to replinish, how long will it take to rebuild these skills, and how much will it cost."</blockquote>That should not be problematic -- except for the parochialism and branch politics that have intruded in the past and are certain to do so this time...
As a Kiwi with great respect for the American Army, I am surprised to hear that the author hasn't quite got the lesson of the last years since Afghanistan:
The US Army has to do both combined arms and COIN/SASO/whatever. Both are equally important.
We will probably never need to head up to Smolensk from the Polish border, but China etc and other demand that combined arms competencies must be retained.
But yet, the Army will be involved in many Somalias, Bosnias, even maybe some Rwandas, and definitely more wars on the lines of Iraq and Afghanistan.
I had imagined that the American Army, now more competent than the British Army at COIN, realised that both spheres are critical. Both are important and neither can be allowed to wither. Neither can be subordinate to the other - or do we want to mess up the village war in Vietnam for an extended period all over again?