A Combined Arms Response to "Death of the Armor Corps"

<b>Jimmy Smith:</b>

I knew where you were coming from and what you meant -- but I disagree with the premise that his words were not well received and wanted to highlight that what we say and how we say it colors what others think. And do. So I took advantage of your minor lapse but in good faith...<blockquote>"I would suggest that Lind's ideas on Maneuver Warfare were probably not well received when synchronization ruled the day. Airland Battle was a big change from Active Defense, but clearly the emphasis still lay on the big gunfight."</blockquote>Not as I recall; all the announced 'believers' in the Active Defense <u>and</u> Airland Battle were Colonels and above -- most everyone else knew better in both cases. In private conversations, many 'believers' were somewhat agnostic to say the least. The US Army has never been nearly as monolithic as even many people who've served in it a few (sometimes many...) years think it is.<br><br>
This is another minor quibble:<blockquote>"...a period of MAD and highly synchronized, top-down, conventionally focused warfare."</blockquote>In part. In part also because the USSR was the nominal (note that word) BIG threat and in part because the Army needed new hardware and one way to get it was to amplify the threat and need. We may not be quite as devious as the Afghans or Arabs but we're close. Many things are not as they seem or are recorded (though Gian has trouble accepting that... :D).

I also disagree on DuPuy -- he was forceful enough that he became the squeaking wheel that got what it wanted. He was wrong on many counts but I will acknowledge he got more right than he got wrong. I think that's true for most of us, so he was exceptional only as a result of being forceful and rising to a position with clout in a very competitive but not completely meritocratic system. So all things considered, good for him even if he was occasionally wrong. ;)

I would say their results were acceptable, no more (and only barely so IMO). Perhaps that's because vividly recalling the era, I remember a number of sometimes fairly senior voices in opposition that were silenced by the system. Lind was far from the only such voice and many were in uniform until invited to don civilian attire. The pressure to speak with one voice is, umm, quite strong in the carpeted offices. Quite strong...

The problem is at that level, minor mistakes can have catastrophic consequences. They can also be unduly costly to correct. Committees are a very inefficient way of making decisions and with a better personnel system promoting only the best people instead of the most competitive, no committees would be needed. Until such a system arrives, we have committees: GOSCs, Councils of Colonels, PBACs and such to minimize the types of mistakes that resulted from single player decisions made in the 70s. Shy Meyer tried to fix it and unnamed others stalled him...

Which is why I totally agree with your last line:<blockquote"Naysayers, give em' a chance. You might be shocked and amazed with what they can do..."</blockquote>

Hopefully, all the senior folks about today will have enough sense to do that. Many -- not all -- of their predecessors did not.

Mark, thanks for inclusion of flexibility. I would suggest that the conditions you set in your unit might have had something to do with their success.

It is amazing what Soldiers can accomplish when they are granted the initiative to solve this dilemma of flexibility.

Naysayers, give em' a chance. You might be shocked and amazed with what they can do...

Ahhh, alright, alright! Now looking back, I see what you two mean though. My apologies. You two were supposed to automatically know where I was coming from, i.e. read my mind for my intent. I intended to pull that out from the rest of the reading. Very true...the idea has been used tons of times before as you both have kindly highlighted. Although, I intended on using that quote for two reasons. 1) Relate to the dangers of strictly using history as basis for our future. 2) To pull out an example of this thought-process during a period of warfare that was intently focused on Soviet hordes. I would suggest that Lind's ideas on Maneuver Warfare were probably not well received when synchronization ruled the day. Airland Battle was a big change from Active Defense, but clearly the emphasis still lay on the big gunfight. Lind's example was merely a catalyst to demonstrate some maverick ideas not necessarily accepted during a period of MAD and highly synchronized, top-down, conventionally focused warfare.
On another note, I do not mean to de-constructively criticize DePuy in any way. I would hate to have been in his shoes in 1976. Post Vietnam, disheveled force, lack of leadership or foresight, etc. I could go on and on. However, he stepped up and had to make some serious decisions during a period when the Army was arguably at its nadir. It is easy for me to look back and play armchair QB. Truthfully, it appears he was a great focal point to the professionalizing our force. I would also submit that Active Defense Doctrine was a watershed. So many positive changes came from our Army as a result of AD.
Thus Ken, I guess perception is reality. Starry and DePuy might appear to be egocentric, but I would suggest their results were better than the unforeseen alternative at the time.

Jimmy,

Academia is a series of endless conversations with no resolution. That's great in some ways. It challenges me to question my beliefs, expand my world view, and learn more, but at the end of the day there is no resolution. No resolution means neither accountability nor responsibility. We both know differently. I try to take and give from it as best as I can in hopes of applying it in my life.

Passion, intensity, and purpose are required to motivate men to patrol day in and day out on roads that continue to blow up.

Humor and making fun of one's self is required to make sure that you do not fall victim to your own hype. If you recall, the Greeks initially correlated comedy to tragedy.

"Never do the same thing twice Even if something works well for you once, by the second time the enemy will have adapted. So you have to think of something new." I bet this was a rather fascinating and dissident point of view at the time of publication in 1985."

Ken caught it before I did. You dropped the ball on that one. Ugh, Ugh. Cough, cough. Roger's Rangers?

Keep writing brother.

Mike

Great discussion.

Mike - thanks for your comments. We did indeed do very good, hard training from which we learned a lot of lessons. I know that those training days out on the range were a large key to our success during the surge, and certainly it was a key to the BCT's success, dispersed across such a wide variety of terrain and confronting an array of different threats.

To Carl and several of the other commentators concerned about the death of Armor I add these observations from a true blue Infantry officer about tanks, their protection, firepower, and the men that use them:

They are indispensible. We saw regularly their value in Iraq throughout all 3 of my tours (2003, 2005, 2007-08). We saw how the combination of firepower and protection can provide enormous value and tremendous support during all phases of COIN operations. Furthermore, as we analyze the Israeli campaign against Hizbullah in Lebanon in 2006 we can again see clearly the need to have a well trained Armor force to confront hybrid threats.

We also recognize that the current fight is not necessarily the future fight and that a return to combined arms warfare that combines infantry, armor, artillery, CAS/CCA, engineers, et al. is an absolute necessity as we begin to drawdown forces committed to OIF/OEF. The key will be to re-establish training that emphasizes these fundamentals and creates a base on which other training - for operations in Haiti or a COIN campaign - can be conducted. The CSA's vision for a unit with 24+ months of dwell is to focus on the tasks of the Full Spectrum METL that have not been trained as much in recent years due to short dwell time.

I also have to support the authors' description of the Armor corps, and its officers, NCOs, and Soldiers, as inherently flexible. My attached tank platoon made the transition between platforms (tanks, wheeled vehicles, foot patrols) several times and each time did so masterfully. They did not encounter an armored threat when they returned to their tanks, but they used the advantages of their platform to confront the threats they encountered in the best way possible. That is what we seek from our officer and NCOs of any branch.

<b>Jimmy Smith:</b><blockquote>"<i>"Never do the same thing twice Even if something works well for you once, by the second time the enemy will have adapted. So you have to think of something new."</i>
I bet this was a rather fascinating and dissident point of view at the time of publication in 1985."</blockquote>You're kidding, right?

No it was not. Lind merely repeats common wisdom. First time I heard it was from a Marine Corporal in 1944 when I was a Navy dependent. First time it got dispensed to me as <i>guidance</i> was at P.I in 1949 from another Marine Corporal who happened to by my D.I. I heard it -- and repeated it myself -- hundred of times over the next 45 years. Not least trying to pound it into the heads of about five years worth of AOBC (and AOAC and BNCOC and ANCOC) students at Ft. Knox in the early 80s. And more a bunch field grades and a few random GOs later on...

One of the last times I saw it in print was when a news report quoted a Somali militia officer as saying that Delta and the Rangers had done the same thing six times in a row before the battle of Mogadishu; he was amazed because they were supposed to be the super duper pros and even he "knew that tactically, you never do the same thing twice..."

All of us were saying something that had been handed down by generations of soldiers for centuries. Pay little attention to civilian strategists; most will mess up your mind and have little new to offer. Colin Gray is one exception, Frank Hoffman another but the majority provide little of substance.

The real question is why too many senior people in the US Army do not abide by that common sense rule?

I think the answer to that is our terribly flawed training system...

All those folks above AOB level I mentioned above -- they had all been taught that, probably practiced it, many for real -- but they got lazy and wanted to not apply it or let it be applied, mostly due to excess time sensitivity and lack of patience. Folks have to be constantly reminded that war is a thinking mans effort -- and it requires patience.

As an aside, DuPuy was a smart guy and he did some good things -- he also did and said some exceedingly dumb things -- and the marginally effective for the nominal job Bradley is one result of that. That was due to his misunderstanding the voluminous data he had from the Yom Kippur war and the fixation of he, Donn Starry and Building 4 on NW Europe and open plains as a battle site. :(

Moral of that is do not do your war planning on your desired or even the common wisdom expected scenario -- you better be prepared to go anywhere and do anything and if you go too light (specifically, think the limited number of dismounts from the Brads among several other things that appear in this thread...) or with a scenario in mind you'll pay one way or another.

He and Starry are classic examples of egos overruling common sense. Thus I'm not nearly as sanguine as you regarding those future leaders getting it right. Their predecessors surely did not -- and who taught the current and thus the future crew...

Touche Carl. I appreciate your comments. Although I would say again that it is acceptable to agree to disagree. Hopefully through discussion and discourse this can ultimately result in a nation protected and prepared for the next challenge. I am sure that the mounted maneuver branch will play a fitting role because those future leaders will ensure that it occurs, regardless of what DePuy personally thought the role of leadership played on the battlefield in the past.
The whole idea of combined arms in integrating all facets of the force directed towards the threat that we presently pose, not the one our Hobbesian perspective thinks it should be. Were in good hands. Plenty of units are scanning their CITVs in training as we speak. I can promise you that you will not have to translate your blogs to Chinese, Farsi, Spanish, Russian or Korean etc, anytime soon because of these leaders. Although I don't think the branch can take all the credit. A few other branches, services and non-mil elements might be on the table too!

Mike, you continue to have such a wonderful spirit for the profession. I would be a lucky guy if I was able to balance humor and academia as you have. Great to see that you have stayed the course and are encouraging others to share their thoughts here.

I would like to reiterate what Mike said-thanks to all who have shared and debated. With all the organizations to support, this is definitely the one to consider.

Carl, on another note, I wanted to thank you for your professional stance regarding the importance of examining historical data with application towards the future. Again, I don't completely agree with this stance. I think it is an important one, but not the only element to consider when wrestling with the subject of what Armor's future role is. Actually, I think your approach (unless I am misinterpreting) is rather dangerous. I believe that if you want to really intellectually prepare yourself (and your unit) for conflict then you need to take a much more holistic approach. One that must necessarily include history, but other facets as well.
Apparently, I have an affinity for the Marine Corps. (Yet another point of self-discovery I owe to this blog). Now that we have taken to quoting others, then I would like to recognize Bill Lind and his perspective on Maneuver Warfare and how it relates to this debate:

"Therefore one of the first principles [to Maneuver Warfare] has to be: There can be no fixed schemes. Every scheme, every pattern is wrong. No two situations are identical. THAT IS WHY THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY CAN BE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. Another principle that follows from this is: Never do the same thing twice Even if something works well for you once, by the second time the enemy will have adapted. So you have to think of something new."
I bet this was a rather fascinating and dissident point of view at the time of publication in 1985.
Carl, if past history was all to this game then historians and librarians would be millionaires. It is imperative to understand the present as well.

Cole-

We all spend time on SWJ in the hopes that our experience may help influence the real decision makers and those that would come after us. No one is right; some are wrong, but the hope is that our stories and statistics prove that one plus one can be greater than two. SWJ provides one such venue. Your voice is important.

Today, my youngest brother and I were paddle boarding in the Intercoastal Waterway along the NC coast. Paddle boarding is a relatively new sport, standing upright on a surfboard with a paddle rowing like you're in a kayak. He had some issues with turning. On our last run, I headed towards the dock shouting, "here's how you do it" expecting to do a sharp turn at the edge of the dock. Ego trumped ability. I missed the turn and slammed into the dock. I put a major dent in my new board, and it will now be in the shop for four days to get fixed. Shows you about what I know at times :).

If you relook my initial comments to Jimmy Smith, the same truth holds. Jimmy and I joke harshly b/c we push and force each other towards higher goals. We demand more from each other. That's the Armor Officer Corps that I grew up in. We're self-confident, at times abrasive, and cool under pressure. We're the break the glass in times of war breed. And Lord help the fool that attacks Jimmy.

This mentality is still alive and well.

If you step back from it all, then platform and technology become irrelevent within the fog and friction of war. Case in point is trying to conduct unilateral surveillance vertically from a UAV. Palm groves, triple canopy, and restricted terrain provide concealment for the guerilla in the same manner that a tank would find concealment using camaflauge. Patton proved this during Operation Fortitude, the Allied deception campaign to thwart the Nazi's defense on D-day.

Just another way to look at it.

For the rest of y'all that have learned something from this blog, pay up. Donate some dinars. Ok, scrath that. No dinars. Donate some Dollars to help out Dave D. et all. Particularly those of you that have made money from book, newspaper, and magazines sells from the free work here on SWJ.

I'm dropping 500 bones tommorow, and I contribute for free. If I ever have a best selling memoire, then the first check will be $10,000 towards SWJ. What say you? Please don't make me envoke the shame.

Mike

<b>Cole:</b>

2) They pretty much stopped by late 69. Only took five years to learn the <u>excess</u> costs. Most later and nowadays are successful because that painful lesson was learned. The occasional 'must do' or poorly planned will only serve to emphasize that hot LZs are to be avoided if possible.

3) One can't assure much of anything in combat. One can do ones best to avoid being stupid.

4) The issue is not CAs, it's where they're placed.

5) METT-TC. sometimes high casualties are unavoidable -- usually, they are not.

6) Re reading my post, I came across as saying something I did not mean to imply. My point on the civilian job was that, just like a Troop who's never used a military rifle other than an M4 will say it's great and Gian Gentile will fight to the death for tanks, we all do what we know best. My apologies. What I should've said was along the line of -- don't let familiarity with one facet obscure the benefits of others. We -- including moi -- all fall prey to our own experience. :(

7) Good, then we both are trying to stay current.

8) I'm unsure how we'd keep all the tanks in the south and I did not mean to imply we would or should, merely to point out that North Korea would not be a walkover ala DS/DS and 2003. My personal belief is that the equal mix, two companies of Inf and two of Tanks is the best way to go given current technology.

<b>Cole:</b><blockquote>Not sure how to respond about the Air Assaults. We still seem to be doing them pretty effectively witnessing the 82nd CAB UH-60/CH-47F insertion of Marines into Marjah. 101st just took over northeast Afghanistan so guess we will see. They had one of the larger air assaults in history in OIF during the march to Baghdad.</blockquote>We learned to avoid hot LZs...<blockquote>
Guess you are referring to the 2005 RPG downing of the H-47 with SEALS coming to the rescue of other SEALS in Korengal valley. We lost lots of troops in that valley who were not in aircraft, just as we lost many more troops in Viet Nam separate from air assaults. You don't stop driving because you have an accident. You learn from that accident.</blockquote>That's one, there have been others with SEALs disproportionately involved. Those losses, Afghanistan and Viet Nam, were <b><i>not</i></b> accidents, they were a result of tactically stupid actions and misuse of a technology.<br><br>

Yes, there are bound to be losses in any forcible entry -- those can be minimized by astute planning and competent execution. Ability to do those things come from education and training, technology cannot do it.

Hot LZs were never a good idea and I mentioned the Howze Board because that FACT was proven in the blank wars of the air mobility test in 1963-64; it was immediately forgotten and excessive -- not just casualties, <u>excessive</u> casualties in Viet Nam resulted. In Marjah as in Iraq during DS/DS, hot LZs were avoided -- that's why I said we were getting smarter.<blockquote>Guess offering new ideas and "a" solution could be construed as being a know-it-all. Perhaps we share that in common ;). </blockquote>No we do not. I'm not proffering <b><i>a</i></b> solution based on my civilian employment. I do provide hints and facts based on experience. Some seem to miss many of the hints...<blockquote>While it helps to hear lessons from Korea and Viet Nam (which is why I asked) the Army has changed and will change more.</blockquote>Really? Who knew? All that time from my green suit retirement until my far more recent final retirement as a DAC sort of kept me abreast. A lot of serving friends and a son who's off on his fourth deployment soon help me not to get too stale even in my dotage...<blockquote>Old solutions and status quo thinking must be continuously assessed and may need adjustment rather than relying exclusively on the tried and true or historical precedent that no longer applies...Guess I agree with the two Majors that we aren't in trouble yet given the threats faced.</blockquote>Agree on both counts. Though I would suggest your two examples of failures are telling. Both were the result of hubris -- the US can do this -- compounded by poor planning and execution. That's a result of poor education and training. Neither was saved by technology available as opposed to authorized or desired.<blockquote>Sorry if you misunderstood that I was talking about why there were not more U.S. tanks in South Korea, not allied or threat tanks. But sounds like 4000 T-62-and-similar-or-older vintage North Korean tanks and lots of turrets in known locations are not a significant threat since I'm not sure any could penetrate an M1A1 or Korean smaller copy...</blockquote>I didn't misunderstand, you did. My initial point was that the number of M1s deployed in Korea given the need would likely not be overwhelming. In the add on, I cited the numbers, pointed out that quantity has a quality all its own and that North Korea deliberately opted for 'lesser' tanks to suit local conditions; conditions for which the M1 is significantly unsuited -- which I also pointed out and you seem to elide.

Recall also that one need not penetrate for a mobility kill and immobilized tanks are easy targets for hunter killer teams -- that's why I mentioned and even underlined the North Korean anti-Armor force. Inattention kills.

Carl/Ken-

Thanks for the info on 1CAV and airmobile. I've never read about it from that perspective only as tactical successes. Guess it shows that there are always many sides to every story.

"The role of any commander would be to put him at greater risk or, culturally, to invoke shame in anyone who allows him to explode his munitions."

Concur. Also agree on IEDs as minefields. Let it be known that Carl Prine came up with the funniest acronym for TBI that I've heard- Too Bad Infantryman.

Cole-

You're suggested task org is very similar to an immediate response package run by the XVIII Corps to deploy anywhere within 24 hours. I would add some more fuelers and mechanics to your mix to get it good. I'd also add in ATV's, rubber boats, and motorcycles for the scouts depending on the terrain.

As far as tech goes, not many of us are anti-tech; it is just that many commanders get lazy with technology. When used properly, tech can help and be value added. Otherwise, they hurt our efforts. Here's two anecdotes.

1. The reality behind the tv screen. In 2006, I was having a hard time conveying to command the limitations of UAVs. While we were conducting covert recon in palm groves to better learn our AO, we'd notice the enemies react to UAV drill. When UAV's approached (yes, you can hear them miles away), guerillas would hide and wait for them to pass before continuing guerillaing. So, back in the FOB, the area appeared clear even though it was not. I had a BN and BCT S2 discounting my intelligence reports. Finally, after much consternation, I sent out video cameras into our patrols so that we could record the reaction and convey it to our bosses. It helped show what was really going on versus what was perceived.

2. Layers of approval authority. First issue that I dealt with was procuring my own Rover. This action allowed me to see what everyone else could see (pilots, UAVs, and C2)and not have to rely solely on someone else's interpretation. Second, after we developed the trust of our higher command, we were able to delegate and minimize the bureaucracy of who is talking to whom. Instead of working through four layers of C2, my E5 FSO's talked directly to the Army Aviators and my PL's talked directly to the CAS pilots. The JTAC (remotely) and I monitored and held final approval authority for any fires, and my Squadron Commander monitored my actions particularly when I got too aggressive, but this change allowed us to effectively use our technology.

Mike

<b>Cole:</b><blockquote>"Direct fire + movement = maneuver. Attack and scout aviation does both, as do UH/CH during air assaults, as do armed UAS controlled from the ground or cockpits of manned aircraft."</blockquote>Umm. Uh, Cole -- one of the things we learned in Viet Nam was that 'air assaults' are not a good idea. That got reemphasized early on in Afghanistan (If I was a SEAL, you wouldn't get me near a Chinook...). Carl Prine has it right below on the errors and lessons of whirlybirds in Viet Nam. As one who participated in the Early Howze Board tests at Ft. Stewart and in North and South Carolina, who was in a unit that made more Air assaults then the First Cav in 1966 and while OpCon to the 101st in 68, I'll just repeat what I said earlier, "the birds were significantly misused and suffered significant casualties and horrendous losses partly due to that misuse." They also built bad tactical habits, some of which are still with us.<blockquote>...Aviation and UAS go over all of the above at considerably higher speed.</blockquote>Crew rest, OR, Wx and density altitude permitting...<blockquote>...a decision to make everyone an 11B, versus mech, airborne, etc. Perhaps it was meant to lighten the burden for Army light infantrymen going to Afghanistan. </blockquote>Inattention got you; I also pointed out that was done before 9/11 and was to lighten the burden of the Infantry School and PersCom / HRC.<blockquote>That's also why Armor and FA Soldiers, not to mention Navy and USAF personnel get diverted to non-traditional jobs in Afghanistan and Iraq.</blockquote>Uh, no not really. Those things happen because we do not have adequate troop strength for the jobs we undertook. That is not a "Hooray for flexibility" effort, it's a "we screwed up" coverup. That said, I'll give a hooray for the folks from all services who had to do it to cover their leadership's failures.<blockquote>...Normandy and the Phillipines...two Army amphibious landing that did not involve self-propelled landing craft-turned-vehicles.</blockquote>Wrong again. The Leyte landings saw the largest use of LVTs in WW II, eleven Bns worth of 'em -- mostly Army. There were no US LVTs at Normandy but the Brits had some we provided and they later used them in the Scheldt Estuary. The US and the British did use them in several river crossing operations in Europe after they arrived in theater for the US -- Macarthur had dibs on Army AmTracs early on to return to the Philippines...<blockquote>Do I detect that the former Marine in you appears forgiving of EFV and probably MV-22 technology, while simultaneously critical of Army aviation and other tech.</blockquote>No, you do not detect that a former four year Marine and 23 year Soldier who was later a moderately senior DAC and is a big Army Aviation supporter is telling you that he believes you significantly skew things to make your points and you tend to misquote or 'misunderstand' others. Nor do you apparently detect that he is / I am highly ANTI-parochial and very leery of anyone who has <b><i>the</i></b> solution to the problems of mankind...

As I said to you earlier, I'm not anti-tech, far from it-- I'll take all I can get and ask for more. I just know from harsh experience that it is not nirvana. Techno goodies are tools, that's all they are and our training must be adjusted to cope with an enemy's almost certain efforts to shut down as much of our acknowledged and beneficial technological edge as he possibly can.

Later you said:<blockquote>Why are there relatively few tanks in Korea, as Ken points out? </blockquote>That's not what Ken pointed out -- it also is far from true; Korea is absolutely crawling with tanks, just not many US tanks. The over 4K ('quantity has a quality all its own...') North Korean tanks are optimized for local conditions and the very heavy M1A2 will <u>not</u> be able to go a lot of places due to purposely narrowed passes and low MLC bridges. Korea poses a problem of some magnitude. Compared to other recent and potential enemies, they are also brave, competent and tenacious fighters who know their terrain intimately and will not be easily beaten.

Oh and that 4K doesn't count the 2K or so turrets bunkered into the ground here and there...

The South has almost 3K tanks, most fairly new and better fit for Korean conditions than the larger M1 which they imitate in a smaller package.

<b>Carl Prine:</b>

Good points all. BTW, Harry W. O. Kinnard was one of the good guys, really. Unfortunately, he came of age fighting in NW Europe and those guys, even the good ones, were way, way too far into Mass and Firepower. For the COIN efforts of the 50s and 60s, the guys who fought in the Pacific always did far better than the European veterans -- mostly because they believed in Speed and Flexibility rather than Firepower and preferred Surprise to Mass.

Carl- "This is something else we often don't discuss: An armored element that screws up at COIN resets and tries again, towing away the MBT or replacing the track of the Brad while sullen villagers stare at them."

Carl, are you familiar with the Explosively Formed Projectile (EFP), or a dual headed RPG (apologize for not using the correct RPG nomenclature), and the damage that they can inflict on a heavy armored vehicle? Pretty amazing stuff, especially when it can be procured and employed with relative ease and ubiquity.

A wise old Battalion Commander told me once, "All the stupid insurgents are dead." Their supporting regions are not.

"Intelligence drives Maneuver." - Another simple adage that I try to live by that I think strikes to the heart of this particular disagreement.

Mike, thanks for the hands-on perspective that you bring to the discussion. You are able to convey what I have been trying to say. Didn't know you took down the BN of BTRs in the motorpool though. Now I know where "Generation Kill" got their ideas! Lol. And great point about movement vs. maneuver.

Ken, great point. I think the emphasis on "Hold" could be linked to why we are having this discussion in the first place which debating on how much we are willing to have particular branches digress from their primary roles. Your point brings back images of GEN(R) Shinseki testifying to Congress.
As for OBTE, I have had the opportunity to receive a number of weeks of training from AWG. Their pragmatic pedagogical techniques to training continue to amaze me. I have felt like I have had blinders on my whole life. And the silly thing is that it is not rocket science. It simply begins with asking the right questions. I don't want to diverge from the initial debate so I will stop.
I do appreciate your input regarding troop levels especially when GPFs become the main effort vs. a Special Operations oriented mission (i.e. AFG circa 2002).

That said, I have some catching up to do. Especially with my comrade, Carl. But many of my opined points can be found seconding Cole regarding the evolution of warfare and its impact on the future of massed WWII-like armored engagements. I firmly believe there is something to be said about the correlation with MAD and heavy armored formations. First, I need to confirm if WWII can be considered a peer engagement. Carl, any thoughts?

I would be interested if anyone has any empirical data comparing peer armored engagements before the bombing of Nagasaki and Tokyo (the use of MAD weapons) and after...just to see if one could draw a correlation between the two. I would only draw evidence from US campaigns though. Hmm, maybe a CGSC research question...

More to follow, but need to catch up on the discussion points. Love it!

- the other "smith"

"The Taliban consistantly express great fear of Apaches, and we see the decapitation successes of UAS in Pakistan and elsewhere."

Meet

"First Divison's record of battlefield success was evident by Viet Cong avoidance of the unit wherever possible."

Shelby L. Stanton

It doesn't matter now. It didn't matter then.

And it's painful to say that.

It also might be mentioned that the ground component of the US Army has increased, I believe, about 8 percent during OEF, including in the ranks of the infantry.

It has not helped to "win" the war in Afghanistan, nor has it even seized initiative back from insurgents that make the Viet Cong look like the Third Army.

One wonders about the causative forces of rebellion and why air mobility, armor, infantry and everything else in our arsenal haven't addressed them.

Hmmmm.

<b>Cole:</b>

Your always impassioned defense of technology while totally ignoring its shortcomings is invariably awesome. Good job.<blockquote>You guys can go on thinking warfare was not transformed by helicopters in Vietnam...or currently in Iraq/Afghanistan. History will show differently as did the most recent QDR.</blockquote>Warfare was modified by Hoptiflopters -- it was not <i>transformed</i> by any stretch. In Viet Nam, in particular, the birds were significantly misused and suffered significant casualties and horrendous losses partly due to that misuse. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we've gotten a bit smarter and have better birds but the aerial trucks have not transformed warfare nor have the weather, speed and range limited aerial gun, missile and rocket platforms transformed fire support.<blockquote>Thanks for the information, and nobody is seriously talking about the death of any branch.</blockquote>No one here, now -- but it has happened before and will again. So has and will the even more silly tech-substitute for troops bit...<blockquote> Although I'm sure Cavalry troopers never thought tanks would replace horses, or battleship sailors would no longer dominate.</blockquote>Actually, the Cavalry folks, officer and enlisted, were at the forefront of Army modernization and mechanizationfforts between the world wars -- and a lot of Battleship guys became Aviators. A common thread is that the people actually doing the job realized the limitations of their platforms...<blockquote> Were you at Inchon and how many tanks were aboard each LST...note to EFV, they did not get to shore under their own power.</blockquote>None on LSTs except IIRC Dog Company a couple of days later. To my knowledge, the entire Bn (-) in the assault waves went to the beach in LCTs (now LCUs), three per craft, from the LSDs.

The EFVs predecessor, the LVTs, did go ashore under their own power and did so while at least Baker Company's tanks were helplessly stuck on LCTs in the mud flats offshore (a direct result of an education and training shortfall, negating available technology...).

As a minor point, North Korea does not have an Armor force that can fight and succeed against a mobilized and fully committed US Armor force. However, they do have an Armor <u>and anti-Armor</u> force that can give the amount of US armor <i>likely to be available and committed</i> to an operation on the Peninsula a really, really, hard time if they do not in fact defeat it...

<b>Carl:</b><blockquote>"Really want to hear what Ken White did in Korea with his M-26 Pershings! Suspect it was infantry support rather than tank-on-tank. Wonder what he thinks about getting past lots of large concrete blocks dropped onto roads at todays chokepoints?"</blockquote>Actually, you'd be incorrect. It was mostly tank on tank with a little infantry support until after Seoul, then it flipped until the trench war started in May '51 when it became totally infantry support.

That sequence is likely to be repeated in any forced entry operation. I disagree with some of your other points as well but you and I have already had that discussion.

One point however, is too important to bypass -- I seriously advocate we'd have been far better off in Viet Nam with <u>fewer</u> helicopters. Quite seriously. They encouraged poor training, poor tactics and general laziness as well as micro-management and I say that with a dozen CAs into hot LZs and more into cold ones plus a slew of hours just boring holes in the air and having eaten a lot of chow delivered by air freight. ;)

Technology is no substitute for good training and it can all too often blind otherwise good Commanders to dangers in that regard.

As an aside, the benefit of being old is that I have been present for the demise of _<u>(insert branch/mission)</u>_ [and /or the announced need for fewer personnel as the technology will be a force multiplier] between three and ten times over the past 70 plus years...

Carl,

"The problem, however, is that I don't care about a brigade. MAJ Smith has suggested that we won't see any Clash of the Titans battles in the future, that the sweeping blitzkrieg campaigns the US perfected before 1991 for a different enemy aren't necessary. "

I never said that. I am smart enough never to say never, especially when the timeline is infinite.

I have suggested there will not be any SOON, because at the current time simply no other army we are likely to fight has more than a handful of modern MBTs to throw against us. I discount that we will go head to head conventionally with a nuclear power capable of MAD (China/Russia) for the same reasons we didn't do it in the Cold War - it's far too risky.

So that leaves a small set of foes, none of which are capable of Kursk v2. Not exactly rocket science to figure out. That doesn't mean Armor is irrelevant - it just means we may, as you say, need to reconsider our assumptions and how we train.

Niel

I'll add one more thought.

Carl Prine is correct in the stating the lack of tank on tank engagements that we faced during the initial attack. I think my only tank on tank was a platoon plus of T-55's the first night of the war. We engaged them at 2km's, and they could only see about 1km out. It was far from a fair fight. In another instance, I single handedly took down a battalion of BTR's in downtown Baghdad. They just happened to be abandoned and parked motor pool style in an Army base off of the Abu G highway :).

However, what Carl misses is the fact of the training we did the year prior for the perceived threat. We spent almost a year in Kuwait training in the desert for a huge tank on tank fight. Moreover, we honestly thought that we'd hit a chemical attack in the Karbala Gap. That year of unimpeded training made us ready for any engagement.

So, IMO, it's all about training and leadership. As I reread through the comments from COL(R) Cerami, B Brady, and all the 3 ID boys, I think of perseverence, adaptability, and resolve.

It is disingenious to argue that prior to 2003, we had a magical army trained to fight in any war. We didn't. NTC training focused on BDE and BN level commands learning how to do their jobs and many of the home station training areas are too small to adequately maneuver for tank company and platoons. We were more focused on not hurting endangered woodpeckers and turtles and conducting equal opportunity and consideration for others classes rather than warfighting.

Today, we have an Armor force that has grown up in war. We are finally starting to learn and institutionalize small wars to add to our kitbag of warfare. Good leaders will ensure that we maintain our HIC capabilities.

My only pet peeve is to get platoons to stop driving around on patrols. We don't drive; we maneuver. Maneuver, whether dismounted or mounted, requires bounding, overwatch, security, and communication.

Mike

First of all, thanks to everyone for the discussion. Our intent in writing this article was to generate debate, and so far the discussion has been fantastic. Also, thanks to my partner for carrying the load so far.

Jimmy has done an excellent job defending our work and furthering discussion, so I will just start by outlining them main points from my perspective.

1. COL Gentile is absolutely valuable. As the most prominent dissenting voice against COIN, he must not become frustrated. We (the Army) needs him to continue his well thought out defense of his position.

2. The authors do not agree with COL Gentile, particularly with his assertion that Armor has moved so far from its corps competencies that it is unprepared to respond to future threats from larger conventional enemies.

3. Contrary to that claim, Armor has become more relevant and better prepared to meet future threats as a result of realistic training and operational experiences at lower levels of leadership due to OIF/OEF. These leaders will be more mentally able to understand changing threats and adjust training and tactics accordingly than in the past. (I will address the USAF comparison in another post.)

4. Continued integration of Infantry and Armor branches is not bad. It is a recognition of common skills and experiences. It also takes advantage of unique skill sets of both branches. The closer integration makes both branches better.

Thanks again to everyone who has contributed. I look forward to getting deeper into the discussion. Carl, I will specifically address your Posen comment in a later post. It is a good point that needs a response on my part.

Allow me to start with Ken's wise words,

"I also agree with him that so-called COIN is not the graduate level of warfare. It in no way can be compared to major conventional operations. It's middle school -- lot of petty jealousies, behind the back deals and childishness overseen by policymakers who are clueless about what's really going on."

follow on with Todd Justice,

"We have Tankers that aren't really tankers, artillerymen that aren't really artillerymen, etc, etc. In other words WE ARE UNPREPARED."

My first postings were after drinking some whiskey in a post-Memorial Day Remembrance with and of some of my boys. I went directly with Jimmy and the ways that we were used to joking.

Now, I'm gonna finally say what I should have said initially...

Give us six months time and space and hand picked NCCo's,

I will bet 3 months of my major's paycheck that Mark Battjes, Jimmy Smith, Niel Smith, and I can train a heavy combined arms brigade
to be ready to face any threat.

Additionally, add six more months and a little leeway on certification, and I will double down on the bet promising to have that brigade capable of the tankers and mech infantry jumping and seizing an airfield with the tanks and brads following after the area is secure.

If you say we're broke, then please take up my bet.

v/r

Mike

Lot of talking past each other on this thread :D ...

I think most posting agree that an amalgam of force types is necessary, that neither all heavy / MCO or all light / COIN is desirable and that we have the ability with only slight degradation to cross level between branches and missions. Further, that we are gathering beneficial combat experience and that we are undergoing some systemic changes most of which appear beneficial.

I strongly agree that OBTE, brought to the Army by the Asymetric Warfare Group, is an order of magnitude improvement over the existing training process.

<b>Jimmy Smith </b> did say one thing that I believe deserves comment:<blockquote>"...I would only suggest that COIN does require a greater level of preparedness...Consider the primary of the three basic COIN Strategies: Clear-Hold-Build. This naturally requires the same basic core competencies of Shoot-Move-Communicate addressed earlier..."</blockquote>Clearing does require Shoot-Move-Communicate skills, however, just as "Task, Condition and Standard" fails as a training strategy because the conditions can vary so widely from action to action and place to place, shooting, moving and communicating in a COIN setting differs markedly from the same skills employed in major conventional operations. To say some low level skill transfer up is correct, to say that will be adeqaute is erroneous -- not that anyone said that...

Far more importantly, the central tenet, <b>Hold</b>, requires adequate troop strength for successful accomplishment. Such strength was not present in Iraq, is not and will not be in Afghansitan and is unlikely to be available for future such missions in any nation much larger than the NTC.

All the COIN devotees need to think past the nice theory to to harsh practicalities of entering campaigns where there is really no win or lose and what is an 'acceptable' outcome is defined down as time passes. There are better ways to do that than deploy the GPF in insufficient numbers to a job that requires some specific training for proper accomplishment.

We need to be multi spectrum, no question and we can do that; we did it before and successfully -- but the number of troops available will always be problematic in a democratic nation short of an existential war.

Rather than address the MCO / COIN argument, what's required is an assessment of what's likely to be available for likely future scenarios and if we run across one or some where the strengths are liable to be inadequate for the probable tasks, we probably need to go to Plan B. We need to have alternatives to GPF commitment to open ended campaigns which many prospective opponents will endeavor to lure us into.

The best education and training in the world -- and we are not there yet -- will not make up for insufficient strength. The best equipment in the world -- we aren't there, either -- will provide signifcant force multipliers but it will not provide enough humans for some missions. In short, we need an honest capability assessment to bounce against likely scenarios and then to adjust our operational plans from there. That's being done, it just won't dribble down to open source...

Thanks for the insight! Ideally, a subliminal thesis to the initial article has been achieved: Continued discussion and debate in an educational forum.

Carl- thanks very much for your candid input. I always enjoy a good debate. However, both your and my points continue to evolve around one disagreeable theme: you seem to believe that we need the enormous armored columns of yore, and I don't.

As for the FA branch, I guess we are polling a different group of FA folks. The guys I have spoke to regarding this topic recognize the differences, but seem to understand the need to support the overall mission in order to succeed presently while recognizing their role in HIC. By the way, they are not the only branch doing this.
Carl, I understand your fear that we will could lose our core competencies by "drinking tea." I don't think that is all we are doing. I would be shocked to hear of any units preparing their Soldiers for a mission in today's environment that focuses on "drinking tea" during rehearsals, and PCIs. Are we training and educating our Soldiers for Division and Corps level campaigns synchronized across miles of various terrain? No. Are Soldiers in training and preparing for potential conflicts that might occur on patrol? Yes. I think the core competencies at the company level (even Battalion) and below are in good hands. This leads me to my next point regarding the characterization of what "graduate level war" is. COIN or not? I would only suggest that COIN does require a greater level of preparedness. Why? Because it naturally crosses the spectrum. Case in point: Consider the primary of the three basic COIN Strategies: Clear-Hold-Build. This naturally requires the same basic core competencies of Shoot-Move-Communicate addressed earlier. In today's environment, we are required to do so much more than train just to Clear. We "cleared" in 2003. Unfortunately, the enemy today does not intend to sign anything like that of the WWII examples you address (stressing the fear of enormous enemy armored columns) of the past.
Carl, I see your point, and it is a valid one. Your are correct. Enormous armored and mechanized infantry forces standing at the ready to deter the rest of the world served as a terrific deterrent. I am sorry but I can't agree with your thesis that this is the formula for the future. I can't seem to get past the fact that there is a need to successfully accomplish the mission we are in, the fact that a globalized and relatively uni-polar world has transformed the way we prepare for conflict.
As you highlighted earlier, a democratic society has to support it military, it also has to pay for it too. And if you are unwilling to recognize the armor branches capability to adapt with the security environment, that same democratic society will gladly send us to the pasture. Why pay for something that is extremely expensive and unwilling to adapt to its surrounding environment? Any capitalist can understand this premise. I will caveat this by saying that armor is extremely important today as it was yesterday, but there is so much more the branch can do and should not put all its eggs in the 120mm basket. I would go as far as to suggest that the light cavalry squadron is one of the best task organizations to employ in Afghanistan. We have the ability to look beyond what we used to be recognized for our greatness in historical conflicts and add to it or even shift our emphasis to other important elements of the branch. These elements are relevant in present and future conflicts as well (light/heavy Cav, Stryker). Conflict is changing and this is an opportunity for the branch to change with it while still maintaining its heavy core competency.
Carl, even if there was another great armored campaign, armored forces are not the only thing on the battlefield. The whole idea of combined arms is linking all elements together. Can we still do this? Yes. I understand that you disagree with me and we have lost our capability to bring all elements together in a synchronized fashion for this major conventional campaign (although I would still like for you to tell me where this will come from). I would also posit that one of the reasons why you encountered empty enemy tanks during the initial invasion was due to the effective employment of combined arms. I would dare that that US forces did a pretty good job at successfully employing combined arms after nearly eight years of real-world non-conventional operations that preceded the invasion (including 3ID - the main thrust of this conventional case study). I know...your counter-point is because the Iraqi Army was not a peer force. Then Carl, if the initial invasion into Iraq is not a good enough example to defend the need to re-engergize the need to get away from dealing with these trivial conflicts of today, then what is? Where is the Chimera? From Jimmy's cupola, it's the one that flies a plane into US buildings ultimately resulting in greater US casualties than DEC 7, 1941.
Carl, unfortunately, we do not get to pick and choose our adversaries. I just pray that this democratic society can see through the current conflicts so that we are not faced with reacting to another one of these "trivial" insurgent forces. I believe the Armor/Cav community has plenty to contribute in today's conflict, even if it does not involve a 120mm gun tube. It's still important, but not the primary tool right now. I still maintain that the leadership in the Armor/Cav community understands this and is prepared for it.
I would submit that Strategic Interests probably drive what we need to prepare for. What conventional armored force is out there that requires to prepare more for than we already are? I would highlight that there is a correlation with the CAV and Stryker communities as there was with the armored forces in 2002/03. And I definitely don't want to take anything away from armored formations that were successfully employed in Iraq from 2004-present day.
As highlighted by others in this thread, the armored force is not dead. It is merely evolving to defeat current and future threats.

COL Cerami/Niel, I could not agree with you more. Coincidentally, it has been a common point of discussion amongst peers. We have primarily couched the discussion in terms of training vs. education. I would suggest that COL Casey Haskins attempts to introduce OBTE has been one of the best solutions I have seen to addressing this problem. The results have and beyond expected in commissioning sources and initial entry training over the past four years. Unfortunately, it seems your recommendations are the exception vice the norm and require a cultural vs. policy change. I think the good news is the recent push for officers to pursue additional education in the civilian sector would have long term benefit to this dilemma. I certainly hope this puts a small dent in changing the institutional and educational norms.

Todd- I see your point. Although, I don't know if I completely agree. Regardless of C or DMETL, core competencies are trained. Granted there are exceptions. For example, the heavy Brigade from 4ID that will deploy with out there equipment to Afghanistan. Will their competencies diminish? Yes, but I don't think to a degree that they will be incapable of retraining those competencies upon return. I still think that the intangibles that unit will gain from combat experience are invaluable when compared with the idea that they are left out of the conflict in lieu of training core competencies instead. i.e. training for that big armored army that could attack us at any minute, or the Krasnovians of course. Is it a trade off? Sure, but one that I would be willing to accept. If it is a matter of adjusting training management plan to ensure units are successfully prepared, then that might be another story. I will stop here.

Thanks again to all!

I'm emphatically not a Starry fan but he got a few things at least partly right on occasion -- and that was one:<blockquote>We ended up using the formations we had not because they were the best mix for the operational problems in Vietnam; we used what we had because that was the structure DoD inherited during the 1967 build-up and that guided implementation deeper into the war."</blockquote>What he got wrong in that is that the handwriting was on the wall long before 1967 and the US Government -- not just the Army -- failed to adapt. That going to war with the Army you've got applies to most all our wars -- as I have often said and not in jest, it's the American way. That has worked out for us, mostly, in the past. Not sure it will in the future.<br><br>

<b>Todd Justice</b> has it right -- unpreparedness is the issue. That is a constant in any democratic society for a host of reasons and that is unlikely to change in the future for all those same reasons. Justice also says:<blockquote>"Lets make sure we have leaders who can handle the stress and quick thinking required to fight against a powerful, unforgiving enemy. That way anything less will be a piece of cake. An old axiom that has served me well: Expect the worse and you will never be disappointed."</blockquote>Exactly. Are we there yet?

Interesting discussion, but like most in a forum such as this it kinda wanders back and forth across the issue and periodically drifts rather far from it.

In my earlier posts I was trying to make a succinct point and I want to reiterate it now.

In order to FIGHT you need people/crews/teams that can hit what they shoot at. MBTs, M4s, howitzers, whatever. It doesn't really matter if they are in a COIN fight, peace keeping, high intensity or simply serving as a deterrent.

Just as importantly you have to have junior leaders who can employ that combat power in an integrated, combined arms manner. Thats what makes you successful on any battlefield and thats what keeps your casualties down. Whether the anecdotes of TF Smith or Israel (2006) meet our current situation doesn't matter. What matters is that they both failed to accomplish their mission/goals. Why? It can most easily be boiled down to unpreparedness.

This very same issue was being dealt with in the 80's and 90's. The answer? Lets make sure we have competent squads/teams/crews that can fight in the harshest conditions. Lets make sure we have leaders who can handle the stress and quick thinking required to fight against a powerful, unforgiving enemy. That way anything less will be a piece of cake. An old axiom that has served me well: Expect the worse and you will never be disappointed.

For example, a JRTC rotation in 1998. I was a scout PL. My brigade executed a forced entry airfield seizure, expanded the airhead, conducted a COIN fight for a week to help stabilize the Cortinian govt. Krasnovia gets a case of the butt and invades. We switch to HIC and execute an anti armor defense, followed by a HIC MOUT attack. Two week exercise in which our Brigade was tested on every aspect of Full Spectrum Warfare. How do you prepare for such a diverse mission set? Train your squads and crews and leaders in their core competency with the understanding they will have to be adaptable. I think that is what COL Gentile was getting at and I think that is where we are remiss.

That's the first problem (low core competency today in our armor and artillery crews, etc.). I think the second problem is we have really only carried the modularity concept half way. We are hamstrung by our regimental affiliations and historical branch competencies. A more effective system might run like this: 2003, a HIC oriented force invades and secures Iraq. 2004 a need is seen for extensive long range COIN operations. A few MECH brigades are designated to remain as such with a focus on HIC and continue to be manned and trained as such. We retain the capability, they continue to serve as a deterrent, and they serve as a rest and refit for Soldiers coming off deployments. Meanwhile, the other brigades (across the Army) are converted to Bradley/Stryker/Light pure formations. "Vehicle Crewmen" transition from M1 to M2/3, Stryker, or HMMWV crew duties, therefore maintaining their core gunnery skills. Infantrymen in these formations are increased. Artillerymen are downgraded to mortarmen if they arent serving howitzers. A need for infantrymen goes up so incentives are offered for MOS changes and for recruitment. In a few short years you have one division in the Army configured as a MECH HIC organization and 6-7 COIN divisions. Russia invades Poland? Heavy division is deployed. Process begins for COIN divisions to bring their heavy armor out of mothballs and begin recerting on Gunnery. A process that shouldnt take too terribly long since those same gunners/TCs have been crewing 25mm and RWS systems. Same transition begins with Artillery crews. All those extra infantrymen? Fill light brigades or become track drivers, loaders, etc.

The benefits? You have ready trained PEOPLE who can adapt to any environment or situation. Rather than a bunch of Heavy Brigades that haven't conducted tank gunnery with real proficiency in years.

Now I am sure that is full of all kinds of holes but its what I came up with in the last 15 minutes and I am sure I am not the first to propose something similar. But it creatively gets to what I believe is the issue at hand. We have Tankers that aren't really tankers, artillerymen that aren't really artillerymen, etc, etc. In other words WE ARE UNPREPARED.

How we fix that problem as quickly as possible is the issue. How many tankers we have vs infantrymen is a decision for echelons above reality to wrestle with and one that would take years to implement. And that is the only time any speculating about threats, trends, etc should be happening. All Corps Commanders on down to Squad Leaders should be worried about is whether their gunners can hit what they shoot at and whether their junior leaders know how to FIGHT.