An Interview with Colonel Alexander Alderson
by Octavian Manea
Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach
Can you point out the purpose of the military and of the use of military force in countering an insurgency? After all, the classic counterinsurgency (COIN) arithmetic suggested by David Galula is now the conventional wisdom: 80% political action and only 20% military.
The principal role of the military is to provide security but it is often from ideal to use soldiers to provide civil security. In many countries, this is the role of the police force. Unfortunately, in many cases when an insurgency emerges, it often does so at a point beyond which the police force can contain the situation. If it could, presumably the problem would not have developed in the way it did. But let's say that the government has not been able to stop the insurgency from developing and the insurgency goes on to challenge law and order and governance. Let's say that the insurgents have got to the stage where they control an area where they actively challenge the rule of law if not overturn it. In such a case the government needs to act. At this point extraordinary measures are needed and this includes using soldiers to support the police to re-establish the rule of law, to protect the population, and to confront the insurgent.
Of course, this is not ideal. A soldiers' principal role is to defend the state from external threats so their equipment, training and skills tend to be optimized for general war. That said, good professional armies should be able to rise to the complex challenges of a 'war among the people' by a process of adaptation and adjustment. Specialist training and some adjustment to organizations, equipment and tactics are generally required. The faster an army can do this, the more effective it can be. The initial advantage the insurgent has is that armies tend to be large and often conservative organizations. They can take too long to respond the general environmental challenges of COIN and the specifics of insurgent tactics and equipment. So unless the institutional mindset is attuned to adaptation, the insurgent will have the advantage. It is not for nothing that both US and British COIN doctrine emphasizes the need for adaptation, in fact 'Learn and Adapt' was made one of the British principles to highlight the importance of not getting stuck in one's ways.
Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach
Colonel Alexander Alderson set up the British Army Land Forces Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency Center in 2009 and is now its director. He was the lead author for the British Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine (November 2009) and his operational experience includes Iraq, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and the 1991 Gulf War. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern History and is a senior visiting research fellow with the University of Oxford and at King's College London.
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Stated another way:
In very conservative and very different states and societies such as Afghanistan, do counterinsurgency approaches which are founded upon and depend on achieving rapid and complete correction of "root causes" (improper/outdated political and economic models); do such approaches make any sense, in that they seem to require relatively sudden, dramatic and comprehensive changes from entities (these very conservative, very backward and/or very different states and societies) that cannot reasonably be expected to implement, much less adapt to or tolerate, such dramatic changes?
Accordingly, should such a "root causes" counterinsurgency approach be considered as illogical, counterproductive and self-defeating in it requires, for its success, something that the state and society cannot provide?
Thus, when confronted with such an impossible task, should we not expect that the state and society will rebel even further; in that such approaches are more likely to scare, anger, alienate, confuse and frustrate the subject populations and governments -- rather than win them over -- and, thereby, fuel/strengthen rather than strangle the insurgency?
Bill C.
Is it possible that what is written in FM 3-24 is.....wrong? I worked at the Special Warfare Center writing doctrine where I retired from the Army. I was one of many who had to review that FM. I can tell you that there was a significant amount of disagreement on thei contemporary philosophy. Since the FM was being drafted by CAC at Leavenworth, we could only make comments and recommendations, many of which were not included in the final draft. That is the way it goes when drafting FMs, so no sour grapes. It is doctrine (for the Army), but it doesn't mean that what is written in the manual is gospel.
Also, your statement from the National Security Strategy:
1-53: "The most effective long term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development."
Key word "promotion" (furtherance or encouragement). How do you interpret this as "exploiting" and "intervening"? you are making my case for me.
Chet, et. al.
Consider this from FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency:
"COIN is a combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations."
And then this from FM 3-07: Stability Operations:
Conflict Transformation:
1-23: "Conflict transformation focuses on converting the dynamics of conflict into processes for constructive, positive change." Conflict transformation is the process of reducing the means and motivations for violent conflict while developing more viable, peaceful, alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and socioeconomic aspirations."
1-26: "It (conflict transformation) exploits the opportunity within a conflict to achieve positive change ... conflict transformation develops more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the competitive pursuit of political and economic goals."
National Security Strategy:
1-53: "The most effective long term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development."
Thus, it would appear that we are in the business of:
a. Exploiting the opportunities presented when states/societies are placed in weaker, more vulnerable positions; occasioned by such things as foreign invasions, natural disasters, insurgencies, etc.
b. Our job, during these times, is to use these opporunities to justify intervening in these states and societies -- for the purpose of ridding them of their old political and socioeconomic models (which we feel are the source of all their problems and many of ours) -- and replacing these outdated foundational underpinnings with a political and economic order that is more to our liking.
Because the primary objective of our efforts is not so much to defeat the insurgency -- as it is to establish a new political and economic order within these states and societies (COIN, as pursued today, would seem simply to be a tool used in this process) -- then the manner in which COIN can be pursued, within this framework, would seem to be limited, restricted and potentially compromised.
This begs the question:
Should these two efforts [1] to establish a new political and economic order within these weakened/vulnerable states/societies and [2] to defeat the insurgency) be so torturously and restrictively commingled? Or should these tasks be made separate and distinct -- so that they might both be successfully pursued more effectively?
Uh, sorry Bill C., but I think the point is that we have not "determined that the proper way to fix insurgencies is to establish within these states and socities-a new societal, political and economic order."
I'm sorry, and I don't mean any disrespect (here it comes), but that is a bunch of intellectual mumbo-jumbo. I mean, forgive me for saying so (here it comes again), but that statement puts on display the arrogance that gets us into these messes to begin with.
Continuing in the vein of my 12:04 comment above (the strategic goal is not to -- straight up -- defeat the insurgency, but rather to use the opening presented by insurgency -- or other state/societal difficulty -- as an excuse/a reason/a justification for intervening in the affairs of other states, so as to establish a new political and economic therein), consider this from page 2, last paragraph, of Colonel Alderson's interview above:
"Dealing with the insurgent alone is not going to solve the problem of why the insurgency emerged in the first place. The list of possible causes is large, but some critical underlying societal, political, or economic conditions are likely to be at the bottom of it all and the governments's inability or (lack of) intent to deal with the root cause is the catalyst."
Thus, we have determined that:
a. The root cause of insurgencies generally is that certain states/societies have a flawed social, political and/or economic model that underpins their society and that, accordingly,
b. The proper way to fix insurgencies generally (and other problems) is to establish -- within these states and societies -- a new societal, political and economic order.
Herein, might we be able to view what could be a problem:
If the methods used are designed -- not to quickly, effectively and efficiently defeat the insurgency -- but, rather, to cause the subject state/society to become re-wired so as to be a better "fit" for the modern world (the better peace theory?), then might such a roundabout approach have the potential to provide that neither goal is achieved?
Dayahun,
I just ran the numbers straight through a spread sheet. I didn't delve any deeper.
Chet,
I never said Afghanistan was in hte bag, rather that we are entering a point in time where we are statistically more likely than the Taliban to win. This fact should provide some sober optimism rather than generate complacency. The other guy still has a greater than 40% chance of winning.
The source of the data is page 10, table 2.1 of the One Thousand Fathers report.
The point is that a very common piece of convetional wisdom on COIN is wrong and that we should always check our assumptions.
Chet,
Reference hero talk... sarcasm or earnest man-love :-)
... actually... you are pretty smart...
#1 - There is indeed nothing new under the sun, even nano-technology was stolen from mother nature...
#2 - Not sure if human nature is flawed... it is what it is... can't have smart people without idiots and good people without nasty ones... I think extremes are a law of nature..
#3 - Not that there is anything wrong with the power over people thing... some people need to be controlled... while others need to be killed.
#4 - You can try to fix things.. but remember all of todays fixes are based on yesterdays failures... also a law of nature I think... evolution maybe?
r/
MAC
Okay, MAC, you are my hero now, too. I may not be the smartest guy around, but I have been involved in counterinsurgencies for over 20 years. People make this WAY more complex than it really is. A few tried and true anecdotes:
1. There is nothing new under the sun.
2. Human nature is flawed and people can, and often will, do very evil things
3. People seek power over other people (see number 2)
4. Most things are not fixable. The best you can do is police yourself and hope that your example does not go unnoticed.
Brother Zen...
I personally am not searching for the philosopher stone of generalized COIN principles, best practices or a universally applicable recipe for action everywhere and anytime... I embrace specifics and subtle explanations...
There are some that would argue... and have argued that insurgencies are not unique... I am not one of those... COIN is an art... not a science or technical blueprint/checklist. By now you will have noticed that I am a liberal arts type... and mathematical magic frightens me...
Sun Tzu: There are no more than five tones in music, yet their combinations give rise to countless melodies. There are no more than five primary colors, yet in combination, they produce innumerable hues. There are no more than five flavors, yet their blend produces endless varieties. In military tactics, there are only two types of operations, orthodox and unorthodox, yet their varieties are limitless.
Here are a couple of questions I have asked myself and which have helped me develop my basic assumptions about pop-centric COIN in Iraq and Astan. What is the nature of the social system? What is the relationship between government, administration/local governance and governed/local population(s)? What are the prospects for government reform? What is the nature of leverage and its utility (behaviorant conditioning)? ... and what can we do to influence any of the above?
The varieties are endless... but I also accept the fact that we must dumb it down so that big military can execute appropriately... or as appropriately as possible under the circumstances.
Man-hugs,
MAC
Could the main problem with our approach to counterinsurgency be that our tactics, technics and procedures are not designed so much around the idea of defeating the insurgency as they are around the idea of (1) using the opportunity/opening presented by the insurgency (or some other form of state/societal difficulty) as a means of (2) breaching state sovereignty/intervening in the affairs of other states so as to (3) achieve our strategic objective of (4) establishing a new political and economic order therein?
In a test along these lines, could such things as WOG and pop-centric COIN score well when being measured against the strategic objective of establishing a new political and economic order within a state/society, but score poorly when measured strictly along the lines of whether they might quickly and decisively defeat an insurgency?
hi Mac
"Before we discuss/argue the merits of this or that yardstick for measuring effort, effectiveness or success, maybe we should spend more time identifying and discussing the base assumptions upon which our pop-centric COIN edifice is built"
That would be useful. What effective principles that might be generalized to...well...the whole world, would have to be a)very limited in number b) simple and c) starting points for an approach designed for local circumstances.
"I submit that there is a large disconnect between American assumptions about how things work or "ought" to work and Iraq or Afghan (world) realities...'
Agreed.
That's where measurement is useful - it highlights gaps
Brother Chet... we have no disagreements...
... you are absolutely correct... the underlying thesis in FM 3-24, and the contemporary conventional COIN wisdom, is indeed that the US can somehow get involved in another nations insurgency and "push them" into resolving it. Pop-centric COIN was developed in the halls of academia versus historical experience...
... but then... Iraq and Afghanistan are actually insurgencies of our own making... are they not? Saddam Hussein had his own way of dealing with his insurgency... anyone remember why Saddam drained the marshes? It wasn't to create more beach front property or to build more housing for the poor. The Taliban government in Astan remained firmly in power, even after years of harsh rule... how did the Taliban deal with potential challenges to their rule?
Before we discuss/argue the merits of this or that yardstick for measuring effort, effectiveness or success, maybe we should spend more time identifying and discussing the base assumptions upon which our pop-centric COIN edifice is built. I submit that there is a large disconnect between American assumptions about how things work or "ought" to work and Iraq or Afghan (world) realities... no matter how well structured the thought experiment.
What makes me an intellectual is that I make shit up... Like most of us, I study human behavior and dabble in the dark arts of psychology and the social sciences... What makes me a realist is the study of history and it is the study of history and its lessons (subjective learning) that keeps me within the lines of the reasonably possible... I actually spend more time studying Amir Abdur Rahman Khan's approach to governance or the Taliban's approach to coalition building and coalition management to get a feel for the normative order shared by the Karzai administration, government officials, Taliban, and local strongmen and their respective clientele...
r/
MAC
Hi Doc Madhu,
you asked:
"I'm not trying to be a smartass, zen, but what is the reasonable yardstick and how are we to know it is reasonable?"
That is an excellent question.
While "reasonableness" is in the eye of the beholder, here's what I mean:
Have we defined our terms with precision?
Have we clarified and made explicit the question we are asking?
(Starting with the above helps minimize the likelihood of shifting goalposts and analytical confusion)
Are we picking a metric that measures a variable that is central in terms of cause and effect? - i.e. a statistical analysis of race cars might note that the fastest race cars are red in color but the red paint is a correlation with, not a causation of, automotive speediness.
Are we mistakenly ascribing the effects of multiple-causation to the one cause we are measuring with our yardstick or are we disaggregating effects of multiple variables?
If we are looking to measure across multiple examples, are we comparing apples with apples?
That's a start, but you get the idea.
<em>As Kitson said "the aim of the government when trying to counter such a campaign is to regain and retain the allegiance of its people".</em> - from the above article.
In a previous thread, commenter and blogger "Pundita" wrote:
<em>I also think it's playing ostrich at this to argue the questions of whether the U.S. can achieve victory in Afghanistan and what victory might look like. That's because it's obvious by now that until the Pakistan military's modus operandi in Afghanistan is halted NATO is trying to empty the ocean with a sieve and making it impossible for Afghan self-governance.
Just to review: the MO is to use proxies to assassinate or intimidate every Afghan they neutralize who shows intelligence and skill as an administrator, and who's not corrupt.
That's the same MO the Pak military used in East Pakistan and in Kashmir. It's the same MO they used in Baluchistan. It's the same MO they used in Afghanistan after the Russian pullout.
In fact it's the same MO they use against their 'own' people in the Punjab and Sindh who would seriously challenge the power of the country's largest landholders.
So I don't want to hear at this point about paths to victory in Afghanistan and nation building. First replace a sieve with a bucket.</em>
My question to the others is this:
1. What do you think of the assessment?
2. How do you counter the above?
In the "Defining Sucess" discussion at AEI linked here at Small Wars Journal, Gen. Keane and others stated, if my memory is correct, that we can focus on disrupting networks in Afghanistan and this will make the sanctuaries less of a problem. Is this the answer to the questions stated by Pundita?
I guess I get confused when the same theories are bandied about without grounding them in specific questions and specific data. Again, not referring to this author or the current article.
I guess what I mean is this: how am I to judge what happens in the Spring? The public is asked for strategic patience because all the elements are finally in place.
Okay. I respect those in charge and I haven't the background or education to really know what to think. But what if the violence doesn't go down in the Spring? Will I be cautioned for more strategic patience? Perhaps this is a problem with discussing yardsticks and metrics instead of clear cut goals that anyone may recognize.
Sorry, I'm highjacking threads and misunderstanding again, aren't I?
<em>...there has to be a reasonable yardstick.</em>
I'm not trying to be a smartass, zen, but what is the reasonable yardstick and how are we to know it is reasonable?
Sorry about the frustration I've been expressing here and elsewhere recently but sometimes it feels like theory matters more than the specific application of it with regard to Afghanistan.
I mean no disrespect and am not referring to the author of the current article. It's a general layman's lamentation :)
Mac,
You actually bolster my point with the Vietnam case. It was a winner....for the insurgency. Which was, and is, my point.
Anton,
Coul you give a source location for your "assessment". I would love to see where this "insurgents losing after after the ten year mark" comes from. I guess Afghanistan is in the bag now?
Here is something that gets lost on the chatter. Aside from the obvious, who is the counter insurgent, especially when America gets involved? The American soldier? The underlying thesis in FM 3-24, and the contemporary conventional COIN wisdom, is that the US can somehow get involved in another nations insurgency and "push them" into resolving it. I believe that to be nonsense and gave 11 examples of failure. Add Panama to the list and we make it an even dozen.
My question remains the same and no one, yet, has answered it. When has that worked and what would it look like if it did? Even if an insurgent movement goes away, if the nation is still racked by poverty, low GDP, high crime and corruption (look at Guatemala and El Salavador), what difference does it make if the insurgent movement is gone or not?
Anton,
Did you differentiate between insurgencies aimed primarily at a government and those aimed primarily at a foreign occupying power? I doubt that insurgents would be able to easily outlast their own government, which has nowhere to go but exile and is usually deriving benefits from its position. A foreign occupying power, which has to deal with home-front political will and is spending large amounts of money to maintain a position of often dubious advantage, is in a very difficult position.
Not saying your analysis isn't correct, but it may not be entirely applicable to, for example, the US position in Afghanistan.
I found the 1000 Fathers Report interesting. Conventional COIN wisdom is that the insurgent wins by avoiding defeat or basically outlasting the counterinsurgent. Therefore the insurgent should be more likely to win the longer the war lasts.
I tested this on the 1000 fathers report data. I grouped the data into wars of 0-2 years, 3-5 years, 6-10 years and greater than 10 years. In the 0-2 year group the insurgents won 100% of the time, in the 3-5 years group the insurgent won 87.5% of the time, in the 6-10 years group the insurgent won 80% of the time and in the greater than 10 years category the insurgent lost 55% of the time.
If I break up the data into four yearly groups the results are: 0-4 year group the insurgent wins 90.9% of the time, 5-8 year group the insurgent wins 100% of the time, 9-12 year group the insurgent wins 62.5% of the time, and 13 or more years the insurgent loses 57% of the time. The trend is the same - the longer the war the more likely the insurgent is to lose.
There are a number of possible explanations: an insurgent needs to raise substantial resources just to stay in the fight whereas the counterinsurgent has the resources of the state; the ability to recruit fighters to the insurgency might diminish over time; the counterinsurgent probably learns and becomes more effective over time; or the public might simply tire of war and resign itself to a government that keeps on surviving. There are plenty of other possibilities.
A linear trend line over the four yearly break up suggests that the odds of victory break towards the counterinsurgent in the 11th year.
With the Afghan War in its tenth year it is worth pondering that by this time next year ISAF will probably have a statistically better chance of winning than the Taliban. It might be unwise to start leaving in the 11th year after having spent so much blood and treasure to get to this statistically advantageous position.
Chet... not sure if Vietnam is a basket case... but it is an example of a clear winner in an insurgency... Simply put... underground/auxiliaries and guerrilla action evolve into conventional warfare and ends with tanks of the Vietnamese Peoples Army pivot steering on the lawn of the presidential palace in Saigon.
Food for thought... David Galula is not the originator of the 80/20 rule. The 80/20 rule is a mathematical formula created by Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto in 1906... You can apply the 80/20 rule to almost anything, from the science of management to explanations of the physical/political worlds.
Here are some of its uses...
Insurgency: 80% political action/20% military action.
How about 20% of the fighting creates 80% of the political solutions or...
80% percent of political solutions create 20% of the fighting.
Unequal distribution of wealth in a given country: 20% of the people control 80% of the wealth.
Defects: 20% of defects cause 80% of the problems.
Time management: 20% of the work (first 10% and last 10%) consume 80% of total time. But we all know that there is always time to do it again... and if it wasn't for the last minute.. nothing would get done.
Productivity: 20% of the work force produce 80% of total output.
Problem children: 20% of population create 80% of the problems...
It is hard to disagree with conventional wisdom or the wisdom of crowds... but it is fun to spook the herd every now and then and watch it stampede...
r/
MAC
I'm not sure either gentleman has expressed the view, here or in official doctrine, that COIN= immediate turnaround of fiscal and monetary policy or a legacy of FDI going back decades. I am however, willing to be corrected.
It is not that pop-centric COIN cannot or should not be criticized, it can and should, but if you want to do quantitative analysis of the effects of COIN in country X, there has to be a reasonable yardstick.
Lets see if I can be evn more direct. With all due respect, Col Anderson and John Nagl, as expressed in our own FM 3-24, espouse a contemporary view that stresses a "resolve the problem" focus to COIN. Where has that ever worked? The Philippines? Iraq? Afghanistan? Somalia? The Balkans? Haiti? Colombia? El Salvador? Guatemala? Peru? Vietnam? I'm sorry, but those nations are all still basket cases.
"When you hear someone talk of COIN or unconventional warfare and how we should apply it, the first question you should ask yourself is "How much experience does this individual have, really, in COIN or guerrilla Warfare". A few deployments to Iraq, Aghanistan, or Bosnia with the conventional military does not an expert in COIN or Guerrilla Warfare make, nor does reading about it in a book."
Chet,
If you are going to challenge Col. Alderson's credentials to speak about COIN, you should do so directly, rather than by implication.
It would also help if you cited an example of someone who was, in your view, a COIN expert, so we can see what standard that you are using.
Thirdly, observations or arguments stand on their own merits, regardless if they are made my "experts" or "novices". A priori dismissal based on fast and lazy stereotyping is not a good intellectual habit to cultivate.
Undergraduates,for example, or even high school students, annually make scientific discoveries or run experiments with results that get published in peer review scientic journals, despite being very far from experts. A private after one tour of Iraq might have learned quite a bit about COIN, or at least how COIN can be conducted in Iraq, that is worth hearing here.
I for one, would be very hesitant to dismiss out of hand the opinion on COIN of a full colonel in the British Army who heads a counterinsurgency center and wrote the British Army's official COIN doctrine. That seems to smack of hubris.
I think by definition, Alderson is giving an "expert opinion" here.
While I respect Colonel Alderson's point of view, he makes some of the same mistakes that other contemporary COIN believers make. The general theme he makes is "Insurgents, bad; governments, good" and "we must fix the underlying problems that cause this insurgency". I am sorry to say that this isn't always the case. In fact, I would posit that, in all cases of an insurgent movement, they have come about due to some flaw in the government. Whether it be wealth disparity, lack of security, corruption, or a combination of all, these movements don't just spring from nothing and sometimes the government's they oppose are evil. Merriam-Webster defines the military as "of, or relating to, soldiers, arms or war." A military is designed to break things and kill people, plain and simple. Once you get off that track, it's over. When you hear someone talk of COIN or unconventional warfare and how we should apply it, the first question you should ask yourself is "How much experience does this individual have, really, in COIN or guerrilla Warfare". A few deployments to Iraq, Aghanistan, or Bosnia with the conventional military does not an expert in COIN or Guerrilla Warfare make, nor does reading about it in a book. Name one place in the last 100 years where the US has conducted COIN where it has been a clear success (nation that we are helping is no longer a third world basket case).