Much ado surrounds the myths of T.E. Lawrence and David Galula. So much so that academics fawn, foreign policy is derived, and military manuals preach their stories as holy works. From the practice, beautiful theory was born that enlightened western interventionists can deploy into the hinterlands, win hearts, minds, and souls, and unilaterally transform societies through the spread of democracy and capitalism.
After the traumatic events of 9/11, our stubborn refusal to study and learn from the Vietnam War, and our slow start in Iraq and Afghanistan, these are the stories that we wanted to hear; we needed to hear. As with every myth from George Washington's apple tree to Greg Mortenson's schools, the truth is often much messier and complicated. Essentially, it's a human story filled with emotion, exaggeration, pride, and greed.
In February, Bing West challenged that "the new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare."
Today, as the study ebbs and flows, a new wave of counter-counterinsurgent academics are beginning to deconstruct the myths. The research question is simply "what really happened?" Of significant note, Grégor Mathias's Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory begins to carefully scrutinize Galula's claims. From the website,
Galula in Algeria:Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory
by Grégor Mathias
Translated by Neal Durando
Foreword by David H. Ucko
This groundbreaking investigation uncovers serious mismatches between David Galula's counterinsurgency practice in Algeria and his counterinsurgency theory—the foundation of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan.
General David Petraeus and Lt. Col. John Nagl, coauthors of the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, credit David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Praeger 1964, 2006) as the single most influential source of the doctrine they set forth. What does an informed, objective study of the basis of Galula's work reveal?
Given the centrality of David Galula's theory to U.S. Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is striking that there has been no independent evaluation of Galula's recollection of his COIN operations in Algeria. Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory delivers just such an analysis, exploring the colonial French counter-insurrectionary theoretical milieu of which Galula's COIN theory was a part, the influence of Galula's theory on U.S. COIN doctrine, and the current views of Galula's theory in France and other NATO countries.
French defense researcher Gregor Mathias compares each of the eight steps of Galula's theory set out in Counterinsurgency Warfare with his practice of them as described in his writings and, now for the first time, in the SAS archives and those of Galula's infantry company and battalion. The study shows that Galula systematically inflated his operational successes to match his theoretical scheme, and that he left field problems unresolved, causing his work to unravel almost immediately when he left his command. Mathias concludes that, however heuristically fruitful Galula's theory might prove for U.S. COIN doctrine, it must be interpreted and implemented under the caveat that it was not successfully field-tested by its author.
Comments
Jason,
That was excellent post, and I know the SWJ community has discussed cognitive dissonance previously (it may have been quite a while ago) at a shallow level, but it is probably one of the more topics we need to delve into. We don't know ourselves as well as we should. The science of human behavior has a come a long ways, but I don't see us incorporating it in meaningful way. We all have these weaknesses that result in less than idea decisions, so at a minimum being aware of them would be helpful, but I think we can go beyond awareness to developing more effective thought processes if an effort was made to incorporate the latest from human behavior research into our planning and evaluation processes.
Mike
I am newcomer to this field and regularly hesitate to press send when making a contribution to SWJ. The great theorists and practitioners of modern and immediate times can intoxicate the newcomer's mind with a pop doctrine that on the face of it, appears inexorable.
The psychological investment in COIN is now so deep that the cognitive dissonance would be too great to change course or admit that how we interpreted Galula and transferred this interpretation into a new-age version of COIN. When you believe in a doctrine that has been resurrected by some of the most significant former and current military and civilian experts in the world, then it would take a great deal of courage to argue COIN may never work in Afghanistan. Not just because it is confronting to the imcumbents, but because it is confounding those who we have held tight in the depth of our minds and emotions. We are passionate about this stuff so that is understandable.
The anxiety that comes with the possibility of having made a bad decision can lead to rationalization, the tendency to create additional reasons or justifications to support one's choices. The most famous case in the early study of cognitive dissonance was described by Leon Festinger and others in the book When Prophecy Fails. The authors infiltrated a group that was expecting the imminent end of the world on a certain date. When that prediction failed, the movement did not disintegrate, but grew instead, as members vied to prove their orthodoxy by recruiting converts.
Yet when participating in the COIN courses the construct is immediately and sensibly obvious. In many theatres of conflict the basic tenets work at some levels. However, we forget that in the end we are dealing with one of the most complex beasts on the planet - humans. Hobbes based his theory of human nature upon the assumption that we are naturally competitive and violent. We also forget that Galula, like many of us here, operated in an arena so fraught with layers of complexity, emotions, physical exertion and post event recall clouded by how we saw it through our lense at that time. No wonder there are discrepancies between Galulas theory and practice.
Dont forget that the US is not the only nation involved in Afghanistan (the most current COIN theatre). Many of the Coalition partners do a very poor job of COIN (this is not reflection on the troops involved) or doing a range of versions that are unmeasured and remain unquestioned - as Bing said a franchised approach. Yet it is the US that must front the world to explain the consequences of the current interpretation and implementation of COIN in Afghanistan.
Either way whether it is science, military theory, economics, climate change or any other discipline that has such monumental consequences on society, then we do society a grave injustice to be wed so tight to any doctrine based on idolatry as much as reality, that frank and honest questioning is seen as an affront to the existing establishment.
Thanks for putting this post up.
This
"why must the people be the center of gravity, why cant it be something else." Now that is an interesting question!
May I ask a follow-up question of Gentile? That question would be as a commander in Iraq, what did you discover that might have been a different center of gravity (COG) for you?
Long ago I once also asked a similar question. . . that question was: could there not be two centers of gravity? The primary COG up north where the war was planned, and another secondary COG among the population of the coastal area.
Like Sir Robert Thompson (convincing SVN President Diem that resettlement would work in Vietnam--aka Strategic Hamlet Program--like it did in Malaya), David Galula was an opportunist selling coin snake oil.
Who are the Galulas and Thompsons of today?
I remember going through one of the first courses in the Coin Academy in Taji, Iraq in December 2005 and Galula dominated the thinking and structure of the course. There was one point where a slide went up that had the "people" as the "center of gravity" for a coin scenario in Baghdad. I raised my hand and asked why must the people be the center of gravity, why cant it be something else. I dont remember getting a satisfying answer beyond another reference to Galula.
gian
Mike, you hit another homerun with this post. Keep slaying the dragons brother, as long as they live we will continue to pursue faulty policy objectives, strategies, and drain our national resources based on urban legends. We had the Small Wars Handbook, COIN doctrine, SF doctrine long before Galula's book, and while they all have their shortcomings also, it is amazing how we tend to gravitate to the latest fad, instead of actually thinking critically.
Furthermore, American wine is as good as French wine, yet we'll pay more for French wine (not only due to the export fees) because the common perception (never challenged) is that French wine is better. French women, now maybe there is something to that legend :-).