That may also Mitigate IEDs
by Eric T. Furey
Download the Full Article: A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan
This paper intends to provoke thought on the connection between Stability Operations and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) reduction. Stability Operations emphasizes the need for a simultaneous bottom-up, top-down, and whole of government approach in order to "...outsmart the insurgents and wrest away the initiative." Ultimately, the end state is to link the informal (traditional) local sub-national consensus governance structures with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Afghan Central Government) at the district level. Therefore, one may reasonably ask whether an engagement program with local villagers might also diminish the IED threat.
Experience demonstrates it can. Interviews with US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (Special Forces Team{s}) conducting the Local Defense Initiative program from July 2009 until January 2010 provide evidence that a population-centric, bottom-up local engagement program within the rural areas of Afghanistan can reduce the number of IED incidents. What was further revealed was that indigenous reporting of IEDs and related information increased proportionately to the degree of trust, respect, and credibility developed between local village elders and United States Army Special Forces (Green Berets).
Accordingly, the IED more precisely should be viewed as a symptom and not the cause of the problems affecting Afghanistan. To discern this symptom requires opening the aperture to look over the horizon and effectively scope out the Operational Environment. The human terrain in Afghanistan, while very complex, helps drive the symptom, as does the ease and cost effectiveness of the IED. Currently there are three successful bottom-up local engagement programs from which to conduct further research and analysis: 1) the former Special Forces Local Defense Initiative program and the current Village Stability Operations program, along with the Afghan Local Police program; 2) the United States Marine Corps (USMC) Female Engagement Teams (FETs); and 3) the Non-Government Organization (NGO) Central Asia Institute's methodology.
In the fall of 2008, local engagement re-emerged as the critical pathway to initiate, build, and sustain enduring cross-cultural relationships with the indigenous population of Afghanistan to achieve an end-state. As a consequence, several bottom-up and top-down courses of action were considered to establish village security, mentor existing traditional local governance, build development and bring economic opportunity, while improving the quality of life. In January 2009, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) elected to go with a top-down approach to local engagement. Unfortunately, a top-down approach does not necessarily account for the complexity of the operational environment or the historical distrust Afghans have toward a central government. This is further complicated by the fact that over the past thirty years the people of Afghanistan have seen six different forms of central government. During this period of time, traditional local sub-national governance structures continued to exist in the rural villages of Afghanistan as they have for thousands of years. In July 2009, a bottom-up approach to local engagement was initiated; however, within a year the Local Defense Initiative program converted into another top-down approach, the Afghan Local Police program. Like its predecessor, the Afghan Public Protection Program, the Afghan Local Police program is controlled by the Afghan Government's Ministry of Interior.
In 2009, Special Forces Teams conducting local engagement in Regional Command -- West were able to utilize several of the highly successful FETs. After repetitive engagements between the same FET, village, and Afghan women, remarkable information was exchanged. The fact that 48.8% of the Afghan population is female and 44.6% of the population is under the age of 14 underscores the need to engage the women. Women are the caregivers and primary influencers of the next generation in their youth, prior to their attainment of fighting age. Going forward, serious consideration should be given to the creation of Joint Female Engagement Teams (JFETs) to augment the current Female Engagement Team program.
Since 1996, Central Asia Institute has been building schools, primarily for girls, in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As of 2009, the Central Asia Institute has helped build 131 schools, providing secular education to over 51,000 students as an alternative to the Madrassas, in some of the most Taliban infested and geographically inhospitable areas in the world plagued by war. The Central Asia Institute goes to areas where the Afghan Central Government cannot reach and other NGOs don't dare venture due to their desolate geographic locations. The key to their success is building relationships through trust over time.
Further research and analysis is needed to define the connection between these local engagement programs and the frequency of IED incidents to determine if a correlation exists. An oft-quoted Afghan phrase regarding outsiders is "you have the watches, but we have the time," alluding to the fact that while foreign invaders, colonialists, and visitors have occupied parts of Afghanistan over the centuries, often with superior technology, it is ultimately only the Afghans that prevail, living much as they did before. A lack in understanding this concept has frustrated many US and coalition military leaders at every level since 2001, who cannot grasp why millions of dollars in aid and assistance have failed to secure the loyalty and cooperation of the Afghan populace. This happens because time necessary to build trusting and respectful relationships with the village elders was not taken. Furthermore, the perception is that the US and coalition forces will eventually depart, leaving them to deal with the Taliban, thus asking themselves why they should risk retribution now or later.
The challenge continues to be the ability of the Afghan Central Government to bring good governance to the rural villages of Afghanistan. To date, they have been unable to establish security, provide justice, offer economic opportunity or bring basic government services to the rural areas of Afghanistan where most of the population resides. Further complicating matters, by picking his Provincial Governors who in-turn hand pick the district sub-governors, President Karzai in effect drives the anger of a disaffected populace. The insurgent capitalizes on this by assuming shadow government functions within the rural villages. Thus, the relationships developed through a bottom-up local engagement program between US and coalition forces and the villagers may determine their willingness to report on insurgent activities, including IED related information. As a consequence, the battle is over influencing the villagers sitting on the fence trying to decide whether to risk their future and place their trust with the Afghan Central Government or accept what may be the better of two untenable positions by remaining with the proverbial devil they know, the Taliban.
Regrettably, to date bottom-up local engagement programs suffer from top officious interference that disrupts and eventually destroys the program's intent. A top-down approach makes it more difficult for US and coalition forces to develop relationships; in particular, with the Pashtun, who have a fiercely independent nature and do not self-identify with the central government of Afghanistan. Ideally, local engagement should be conducted, at least initially, free from the Afghan Central Government's interference in order to allow the necessary time for US and coalition forces to effectively reverse bridge the village with the district government. The Afghan Central Government should concentrate its efforts to clean up corruption while effectively extending essential public services, law and order, development, economic reform, and possibly even electricity down to the districts and out to the villages. This is where a top-down program can be the most effective provided it is nested with a bottom-up local engagement program.
Overall, experience suggests that Stability Operations can reduce the number of IED incidents. However, for any local engagement program to succeed, the US and coalition forces must separate the Taliban from the local populace, eventually compelling the Taliban to negotiate, air their grievances constructively, and be —to become part of the legitimate representative political process. In the interim, the biggest obstacle in achieving our objectives is the perceived illegitimacy of the Afghan Central Government, resulting from systemic corruption that creates an endless cycle of instability. An independent bottom-up local engagement program that can make the best use of FETs, applies Central Asia Institute methodologies, and the successful tactics, techniques and procedures from the Local Defense Initiative program may be the best approach to buy time and space until the Afghan Central Government has the capacity to establish security and deliver basic public services to the districts. Upon further research and analysis, a bottom-up, top-down, and whole of government approach may prove to successfully link the village to the district, improve security, bring development and economic opportunity while significantly reducing the number of IED incidents as Afghan National Security Forces and Special Forces gain the respect, trust, and support from the indigenous population of Afghanistan.
Ultimately a successful bottom-up, top-down, and whole of government strategy will require the full integration and support of the United States and coalition partner military and civilian agencies to forge a unity of effort from the strategic down to the tactical level. This strategy could enhance the operational effects and speed the process of creating a non-permissive IED environment for the insurgents through Stability Operations.
Download the Full Article: A Comprehensive Approach to Local Engagement in Afghanistan
Eric Furey is a retired US Army Special Forces Lieutenant Colonel. He served as a Red Team Leader and as part of the first Red Team (Alternative Perspective) to deploy with the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan from July 2008 to January 2009. He along with his fellow Red Teamers wrote the initial concept and plan for Tribal Engagement. In addition, they created a Tribal Engagement Fusion Cell. Their efforts became the genesis for subsequent local engagement activities in Afghanistan.
