by Major David S. Clukey
Download the full article: A District Approach in Afghanistan?
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' one-year timeline to make progress in Afghanistan approaches, the U.S. and the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) still struggle to accomplish President Obama's goals in the region. I suggest that the current top down approach employed by U.S. and ISAF forces requires a corresponding and simultaneous application of a bottom-up approach to maximize operational effects.
Operational experience gained from four deployments and three combat tours to Afghanistan with the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) (2004-2008) and thesis research conducted on Afghanistan at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) inspired my hypothesis that the district level is the center of gravity for counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan. My recent attendance and participation in the Small Wars Foundation's Tribal Engagement Workshop (TEW) served to reinforce this hypothesis.
Download the full article: A District Approach in Afghanistan?
Major David S. Clukey, U.S. Army Special Forces, has been on four deployments and three combat tours to Afghanistan with the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) (2004-2008). His experience in theater and thesis research conducted on Afghanistan at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) inspired his hypothesis that the district level is the center of gravity for counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan.
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Good thoughts on alternative strategies.. However, there are more than a few problems with doing anything different on a short time line.
"Village/district" tactics may be at odds with nation building. Making deals with tribal leaders, bypassing the central government, paying tribes for LOC security, for example, may only be effective as long as the money holds out.
And assuming we might be able to stand up a district or national army/ national gendarmes in 12 months, or 12 years, is delusional. The tribal fissures and mistrust in Afghanistan is much tougher nut to crack than it was in Iraq. Sectarian divisions in Iraq may look like child's play compared to the Afghan tribal centrifuge. Iraq was a nation in fact; Afghanistan never was only so in theory.
And finally, democracy is a bottom up aspiration, not a top down graft. Its not clear that either Islamic society sees democracy as the answer. Indeed for radicals, democracy, or any foreign import, is the problem not the solution.
This is an interesting and much needed debate. If one has access to some of the information coming out of the classified realm, he will know that talk of reconciliation is a legitimate discussion being had by GIRoA, the Taliban, ISAF and perhaps even Alqaeda elements in Afghanistan. The general consensus seems to be heading towards a tacit abandonment of the top down approach and the prioritizing of a bottom up refinement process.
It is important to mention, at least generally, how the Marines in central Helmand have resorted to a derivative of the TST/SF/Maj Gant model. Without breaching security, the battalion nearest the provincial capital is essentially operating in a quasi-FID/SF type role at the tactical (even as squads) level, and having success. Elements develop their own neighborhood of sorts in surrounding villages and compounds and, partnered with ANSF, they are getting results and cooperation from locals. Only be securing the village and compound and bringing them to our side, can GIRoA ever take root at the local level. The TST model or some derivative is the antecedent to any GIRoA efforts from o-high.
This appears to be another take on the tribal approach advocated by MAJ Jim Gant. Not surprisingly, the author is an SF guy.
While I am not SF and have very limited experience working with them, it seems that they have the relevant experience we need for the fight in Afghanistan and we need to take advantage of it.
My question about the application of such an approach is: will our senior leaders support it? Are they willing to accept responsibility for sending out numerous small teams (likely from the GPF since many have already acknowledged the lack of adequate numbers of ODAs), operating fairly independently, and overly exposed to danger?
I doubt it. Our focus on "force protection" as part of our normal combat operations has become so over-powering that it no longer appears to be an important PART of the mission but the mission itself. We go to war to avoid getting hurt. Makes you go "hhmmm.....". Given that (and many on SWJ, including me, have provided examples of "force protection" taking precedence over mission accomplishment), I find it hard to believe that such an approach will ever be adopted, despite the fact that many (like me) are willing to execute it.
I could be wrong....I often am. We shall see.