Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor

Dayuhan:

If we were to broaden the definition of "intervention" beyond warfare generally and reactive warfare specifically, could we then say that there is a great deal of -- un-opposed -- great power intervention going on in the world today (much of this being in the form of aid, development assistance, military assistance, etc.)?

The purpose of these un-opposed great power interventions being:

To achieve, minus the significant use of great power military force, the transformation of various states and societies such that they might better fit in, benefit from and service/support the needs of today's more integrated world?

If we accept this new definition of intervention and view it as a proactive -- rather than reactive -- means to achieving the ends identified immediately above, then might we say that this meets at least some of the criteria of a "grand strategy?"

With these additional considerations, then would it be proper to consider both (1) the "apples and oranges" periods of history I have identified above and (2) the distinctly different insurgencies that might develop therein (which often do not have and can not count on rival great power support); this distiction causing all sides to consider different strategies/tactics, etc., and view obsticles and chances of success differently?

If we were, in the 20th Century, living in an "apples" insurgency world; one in which the great powers were often at each others throats (WWI, WWII, Cold War) -- this period often being characterized by great power rivalry and effective great power assistance to insurgencies (Great Britain's [Lawrence] assistance to the Arabs helps defeat the Turks; Chinese & Soviet assistance to the N. Viets/Vietcong helps defeat the USA; USA assistance to the Afghans et al. helps defeat the Soviets),

And if today we are living in a much different "oranges" insurgency world -- one more reminiscent of the post-1815 19th Century -- wherein, the great powers were often seen as being "in business" and "in bed" with each other -- and where these great powers might view insurgencies/terrorism as being contrary to their common interests (ex: joint action against the Chinese rebels in the Boxer Rebellion),

Then could understanding this distinction be important -- in various ways -- such as:

a. In helping to explain why great powers today might choose to intervene in less-powerful foreign lands/regions (the calculation of success being different than when one believes that a great power might oppose you)?

b. And in helping to explain why difficulties like support/sanctuary to an insurgency from a less powerful entity might be seen as something that the great power feels that it can, in this instance (no rival great power standing in one's way) overcome?

Likewise: If the "little guys" (the weaker states and/or the insurgency force therein) who are the subject of such great power interventions; if these lesser entities believe that there is little hope of a "knight in shinning armor" and/or "the calvary" coming to their rescue (no great power coming to their aid), then might these lesser entities, also, calculate their chances of success differently today?

If the above assessment is even partially correct, then could understanding this distinction re: "apples" and "oranges" insurgencies (and periods of history) help us is some meaningful way?

"Thus, could it be that this rather unique and crucial factor (no great power[s] standing in our way; all great powers seeming to view terrorism and insurgencies as contrary to their interets).

Could this be the reason why the United States today (1) feels bold enough to try to do state-building/societal transformation and (2) is not deterred by such (less-critical?) difficulties as "sanctuaries?" by BillC

I don't know the answer but that is a really good question, you might just be right to.

Bill C.: Aha. I see your point (finally, I think slow).

If that is what our powers that be believe, I think they are greatly mistaken and underestimate the advantages a sanctuary gives and how much trouble an entity like the Pak Army/ISI can give, is giving.

slapout9:

By great powers I refer to powerful nations or states such as the United States, Russia, and China.

The point I am trying to make being:

Unlike during the Cold War, and other periods when insurgencies might receive active support from rival great powers, today this major obsticle would not seem to be present.

Thus, could it be that this rather unique and crucial factor (no great power[s] standing in our way; all great powers seeming to view terrorism and insurgencies as contrary to their interets).

Could this be the reason why the United States today (1) feels bold enough to try to do state-building/societal transformation and (2) is not deterred by such (less-critical?) difficulties as "sanctuaries?"

Bill C,when you say great powers do you mean States or other Great Power entities or both?

If my assessment immediately above is correct, to wit:

a. That today there are no great powers actively involved in helping service, support and/or sustain the current insurgencies and

b. That all great powers, at present, view such activities (as insurgencies) as contrary to their interests.

Then could these factors -- possibly more than any other items that we discuss -- be viewed as the dominant reason why the United States has acted, and continues to act, as it does in the early 21st Century?

Correction:

Third to last paragraph:

"sanctuary" not "sanctionary."

Sorry.

Problem is, the United States:

Flush with success in having convinced such formidable entities as China and Russia to transform their societies more to our liking.

Now firmly believes that it must transform the rest of the less-integrated world; this, so as to be able to provide for and sustain the new world order that it (the United States) has, thus, created.

Unique to the present challenge, however, is stark fact that -- unlike such cases as China and Russia noted above -- in what remains of the less-integrated world, there is often no viable state and/or no strong central government available to do our societal transformation bidding.

However, we do not see this distinction -- or the difficulty presented by sanctionary -- as today being insurmountable.

This, because in the present circumstance (and unlike the case of Vietnam and other instances of great power rivalry) today there would seem to be no great power(s) actively involved in helping service and sustain the present-day insurgency/ies(?).

All great powers presently seeming to view such difficulties (insurgencies) as being contrary to all great power interests(?).

Carl Prine:

I am not sure COL Mansoor was asked about an insurgency that has a contiguous sanctuary and is sponsored by the nation providing the sanctuary. It is very difficult to beat that setup. The sanctuary must be removed and the external support diminished. North Vietnam was never going to stopped from taking the South as long as the trail remained open and Laos and Cambodia were sanctuaries.

If we do not at least stop the Pak Army/ISI from supporting the Taliban and providing sanctuary, the small wars things COL Mansoor talks about can't ever work because, I think, you are talking about an invasion by proxy.

In any event, I read most of the small wars guys as saying you have to separate the insurgents from the population. That would hold if the population was either within or a diaspora without the area being contested. I think everybody ends up in the same place anyway. The population, internal or external, provides the various bits of supplies the various bits of support the insurgency needs. The population may only be important because it supplies vital inputs but without the population there are no supplies; unless the Pak Army/ISI steps in.

I assume from your comments that you believe the Taliban's primary support in Pakistan is from the Pathan (I like using that word because Kipling used it) resident there. I disagree strongly. I think the critical support comes from the Pak Army/ISI. Their actions are the key to this thing.

<b>Slapout9</b> has it right. We've tried nation building and / or elements of it dozens of places over the past 150 years or so -- it has NEVER worked at all well. It will work less well in the future as nations continue to fragment and the unsustainable economic models of so-called social democracy fray.

The principal problem has always been that we tired to build a government or society based on our idea and norms and most of the world rejects much of that. The idea that 'they' have to meet our requirements, standards or ideals is beyond arrogant, it is hubris bordering on idiocy.

There are better ways to achieve our aims.

A long time ago I was taught that a Guerrilla fighter is a person with an "Idea in his head and a Rifle in his hands" until you defeat the idea that he fights for nothing much will change. Nation building by our standards in other parts of the world is not going to work IMO.

If our overall strategic goal -- in Afghanistan and elsewhere -- is to transform the governmental and societal structure of these less-integrated states and societies; this so that these states and societies might become:

a. Less of a problem for our society/the modern world and

b. More of a conduit/vehicle by which our society/the modern world might better pursue and achieve its interests.

Then could this explanation -- in a roundabout way -- answer COL Gentile's question of:

"Why are insurgencies ALWAYS framed by folks like COL Mansoor as struggles for legitimacy, which then demands an operational approach to fighting them that is grounded in state building?"

Bottom line: We see "state building" as being the necessary prerequisite to transforming these societies such that they might better meet our society's needs.

Thus, in order to achieve our overall strategic objectives (noted above), we believe that we first must:

Install a strong central government; one which has the means (to include legitimacy) to effectively carry out our wishes, which are:

a. To replace critical elements of the old societal order (which cause us problems and have little utility for our society/the modern world world)

b. With critical elements of a new societal order (which are designed to better meet the needs of our society -- and those of the modern world -- today and going forward).

Thus, the critical problem with this theory/approach: How to have the local government be seen as legitimate -- as it carries out our requirements.

Carl (Prine)

You note that, for lack of a better word, "interdicting" (smacks of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, no?) insurgents may be a more effective strategy (or would it be a tactic? or something at the operational level?) than securing the nominal center of gravity, "the human terrain." I'm just curious about your reference to Charles Wolf and Nathan Leites. Through the Google, I know Leites was a Sovietologist, and Wolf an economist, and recently I checked out - and skimmed very briefly before returning - their book. It looked fairly theoretical as opposed to descriptive or evaluative. Did I just pick the wrong pages to look at, or could perhaps one look at it as a throwback to the days of RAND and systems analysis, so heavily criticized in the wake of one Robert Strange McNamara? *In sum, after that long-winded windup, do Leites and Wolf provide empirical support for the proposition, or have others?*

Thanks,
ADTS

Dayuhan: I will buy that given that I only used the first sentence from Gian's paragraph.

If I attach the second sentence in the paragraph, "Why are insurgencies ALWAYS framed by folks like Colonel Mansoor as struggles for "legitimacy" which then demands and operational approach to fighting them that is grounded in state building?" which I should have done and as it was written, it seems to me that Gian is asking why the prize in insurgencies is the population.

So my question should be, if the population isn't the prize in an insurgency/counterinsurgency, what is?

Gian: Regarding your question "Which leads me to my second point, again I ask, as a matter of strategy why must the population be the prize, or the cog?", if not the people, what would the prize be?

SWJED: Would big Army and Marines go for something like a list of books from various conflicts to outline the basics? Sort of a "this is what worked for other people in other places" type thing. Then combine that with cultural specifics for each particular area to come up with Small War in country X as you suggest. It would be a kind of loosey-goosey setup but maybe that would be good in that it would get people to think about how to adapt to the local situation right from the start.

Do we need a broad-based COIN doctrine? I've heard Dave Kilcullen say that FM 3-24 was "Counterinsurgency in Iraq", that David Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice" was indeed "COIN for Algeria", he might add Robert Thompson and John Nagl most suited for Malaysia and Bernard Fall for SEA, I don't know. Moreover, they were probably most appropriate for the situation at the time they were written or were written about. While there may be some enduring truths, wouldn't it be better to have a "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan" publication or wherever we think we will be or are conducting COIN rather than "Counterinsurgency for the World"? If we do need such a broad-based publication what should it address? Beyond some basics, can one shoe fit all?

SWJ / SWJ taking something like this on intrigues me, even with all the headaches and heartburn that would go with such an effort...

Having spent a few years in TRADOC, I can tell you that re-writing a major FM such as FM 3-24 won't occur if senior officers (four star rank and influential three star rank) think it is unnecessary, even if the only rationale is, "I think it would serve no purpose at this time". To think that there is some objective, unbiased, "uber-doctrine" office that can override four star opinion is simply not true.

<blockquote>This was particularly grating: "But more important than the forces, than the numbers, was the changing in the strategic setting itself: the priority shifted from killing and capturing to securing the Iraqi people."

It gets old saying it, but US-led forces killed four times as many civilians by air strikes in 2007 as in 2006 and still twice as many in 2008 as in the non-Surge year of 2006. Overall civilian casualties at the hands of the "protecting" forces remained higher than during the apparently addled-brained 2006 lot.</blockquote>

Securing the population doesn't necessarily mean the security forces don't kill civilians. Securing the population means extending government control over populated areas, including areas previously untouched or abandoned by the government or security forces. This can be a bloody process, and I don't know any good COINdinistas who wouldn't acknowledge this.

There has been an update to 3-24 at the Tactical level FM 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN. And since FM 3-24 is for the BN level and above have we learned anything really new at that level in four years ?

Petreaus is at the top of the list. TRADOC already tried to initiate a rewrite but Petreaus pressured them not to.

Anon@1240 - Not true, none of the so-called "politically connected people" have direct influence on the doctrine process. If TRADOC and / or MCCDC decide there is a need to rewrite a doctrinal publication, they do it. It's that simple, there is no grand conspiracy here, at all.

The problem is there is too much "ownership" of COIN doctrine by a handful of politically connected people who have their current and futures careers riding on the COIN narrative. They have made names for themselves by writing the holy COIN Grail so to rewrite it would demonstrate that they are fallible and did not get it right the first time as they have claimed.

A couple of points building on Carl's post above.

Does anybody out there in the American Defense Community know when, if ever, FM 3-24 will see revision? I mean shoot, the German Army after only two years of trench warfare in World War I sought fit to revise their tactical doctrine. Too, the American Army in Vietnam revised their doctrine in about the same amount of time.

We have had 3-24 for almost four complete years now, have we not learned anything of significance and difference to warrant a revision of the thing, or is 3-24 simply perfection at Coin? Based on Colonel Mansoor's interview little has changed in how many folks view Coin.

Which leads me to my second point, again I ask, as a matter of strategy why must the population be the prize, or the cog? Why are insurgencies ALWAYS framed by folks like Colonel Mansoor as struggles for "legitimacy" which then demands and operational approach to fighting them that is grounded in state building?

Duck Dude, you poke at me for my phobia of the Coin Matrix, but interviews like this one from Colonel Mansoor suggest that it is in fact in place, dominant, and resistant to change.

Ironically with FM 3-24 and all of the talk of having military organizations that can "learn and adapt," it seems to me that now we actually have the opposite, or at least an Army who can ONLY adapt toward better methods of population centric coin.

Coin tactics have become the grammar and language of war.

gian