by Octavian Manea
Download the full article: Interview with Dr. John Nagl
"Counterinsurgencies are after all learning competitions."
What is the legacy of David Galula for US Counterinsurgency doctrine? Is he an intellectual father?
The most important thinker in the field is probably Mao whose doctrine of insurgency understood that insurgency is not a component or a precursor of conventional war but could by itself accomplish military objectives. The greatest thinker in my eyes in COIN remains David Galula who has the enormous advantage of having studied and seen the evolution of insurgency in France during WW2, then spending a great deal of time in Asia, and really having thought through the problem for more than a decade before he practiced COIN himself for a number of years. His book is probably the single biggest influence on FM 3-24, the COIN Field Manual. David Galula is the best COIN theoretician as Kennan was for containment.
What are the lessons of Lawrence of Arabia for COIN doctrine?
Lawrence is more important for insurgency than counterinsurgency. Lawrence was an insurgent himself. The lesson I drew from him is the extraordinary difficulty of conducting COIN, drawing upon on his own thinking about how hard it was for the Turkish army to confront him. Any good strategist is going to look at the battlefield from the enemy perspective and Lawrence did this. He understood the advantages the insurgents have and the disadvantages, and that is probably the greatest insight he provided to the study of COIN. The other significant understanding is when you are working with a host nation population, either leading them in an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign; it is possible to do too much as the intervening power. Ultimately the host nation has to carry the majority of the weight.
How important is the developing of the local troops for winning a COIN campaign?
Ultimately foreign countries cannot defeat an insurgency. Only the host nation forces can do that. But the intervening powers bring enormous advantages to the fight and if you can properly integrate the host nation forces and the intervening forces you can multiply the effects of both and the natural advantages of both. That is the objective, but we have struggled to do that as effectively as we could, both in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Download the full article: Interview with Dr. John Nagl
Interview with Dr. John Nagl conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).
About the Author(s)
Octavian Manea was a Fulbright Junior Scholar at Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (Syracuse University) where he received an MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies.
Comments
"...it is important for the leaders to take their helmets off, take their protective glasses off, body armor off and demonstrate that they trust people whose support they are trying to earn."
It is surprising how many leaders at all levels (at least here in Iraq) still don't understand this.
While it may be too late to inculcate such lessons with our senior leaders, who are, hopefully, very close to retirement, perhaps our young leaders, who've spent the last several years executing the COIN fight, will take these lessons to heart and ensure they are fully incorporated into our doctrine, professional education systems, training centers, and overall mindset as they move up the ranks.
You certainly don't have to be born Pashtun, or to unravel any mysteries, to observe that Afghanistan has a long history of resistance to foreign occupation, and that intrusive government, whether from abroad or through Kabul-based proxies, is not well received.
Certainly our attempt to define the structure of Afghan governance was poorly executed, and likely a mistake from the start. Whether we can go back and correct that by imposing a new structure is highly debatable. A better constitution would be a good thing but not necessarily a game-changer. Governance is defined as much by culture, habit, and conditions on the ground as it is by documents, and it's very likely that a centralized Afghan government would resort to management through patronage networks, cronyism, and what we call "corruption" no matter what documents were in place.
If you propose reconciliation with the insurgent leadership by addressing their issues... what do you think those issues are, and how do you propose to address them?
Dayuhan,
I believe it is important not to confuse the "insurgent" with the "insurgency"; or either of those with the "conditions of insurgency" that come to exist within a populace under certain circumstances.
Yes, the "insurgent" leaders never went away. Upon defeat of the Taliban government, the leaders of that government immediately became insurgent leaders. But this is like being a conductor without a band. Much as an insurgent organization can be a band without a listenership. Such an organization quickly fades into obscurity, as do such leaders.
But, if one recalls, there was little insurgency in Afghanistan for several years following the fall of the Taliban, and really never began building much headway until LTG Barno started manipuating the nature of the Coalition engagement from UW and CT to something much more intrusive; and until we enabled Karzai to take power under our writ, with a fatally flawed constitution that we blessed.
Once this happened the conditions of insurgency began to grow, and with them significance and impact of these laguishing insurgent leaders and organizations hiding in Pakistan. One has to appreciate that insurgency is not caused by insurgents to see these things clearly. So I would not be so quick to think this is some unique form of insurgency driven by mysterious forces we cannot understand without being born Pashtun.
Generally speaking and, or course, not in every instance:
At certain times in history (say the 20th Century), when the great powers were often at each others throats (World War I, World War II, the Cold War), might one be likely to see insurgencies being supported by one great power against another and, therefore, cause these insurgencies to be have a greater chance of success (Great Britain + Arabs defeat the Turks; China/USSR + N. Viets/Viet Cong defeat the USA/S. Viets; USA + Afgans et. al. defeat the Soviets)? Might we, accordingly, call such great power-supported insurgencies "apple" insurgencies?
At other times in history (say the 19th Century after 1815 and today post-the Cold War), when the great powers are often seen as being in business and in bed together together; during such times as these, when an insurgency might be much less likely to garner rival great power support; could this important distinction significantly lessen an insurgencies chances of success? Might we, therefore, call such insurgencies -- those that lack great power support -- "oranges" insurgencies?
Accordingly, should we, today, be studying and making decisions re: "apples" or "oranges insurgencies;" especially when we consider such things as whether such more-minor problems as lesser-power support, and/or sanctuary, are really such insurmountable difficulties?
(With no great power standing in the way -- and, in stark contrast, with all great powers seeming to be intent on cleaning up the neighborhood -- might great powers (1) make different calculations re: interventions and (2) staying the course?
One distinction that some may gloss over is Nagl's point, "population, either leading them in an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign; it is possible to do too much as the intervening power. Ultimately the host nation has to carry the majority of the weight."
This distinction is critical to understanding that the United States is not conducting a counter insurgency. The U.S. is not countering an insurgency within the boarders of the homeland. The U.S. is helping a host nation conduct counter insurgency, that is, the U.S. is conducting E-COIN, or expeditionary COIN. This distinction has important implications in how the U.S. should conduct this E-COIN. For example according to Galula and other COIN thinkers getting the local populatio to trust you is important, but in E-COIN this may not be nearly as critical. More importantly is getting the local population to trust their government even at the expense of liking the U.S. Since at some point the U.S. will want to reduce forces and begin going home. This can only occur when the local population trusts their government more than they trust the U.S.
The trend might well be the opposite: the reduction in great power rivalry diminishes the incentives to intervene.
Great powers have in the past tended to intervene in insurgencies because they are afraid that other great powers might use those insurgencies to gain leverage against them. During the Cold War both the US and the Soviet Union were constantly trying to forment insurgency in their antagonists sphere of influence and trying to counter insurgencies in their own spheres of influence. Without the fear that a hostile power will use insurgency against you, there's far less incentive to get involved in all the cost, messiness, and bad PR that intervention involves.
During the Cold War governments such as those of Venezuela and Bolivia today would have been seen as major threats, as likely allies of the Soviet Union. We would have devoted considerable effort to preventing them from gaining power, and if they gained power we'd be heavily involved with trying to generate insurgency against them. Today we may not like them, but we can live with them, as there is no hostile great power to bring them into alliance against us. They aren't enough of a threat to be worth the trouble that intervention involves.
Dayuhan:
My question/comment was intended to be taken more generally ("embolden Great Powers LIKE the United States to intervene;" "cause SUCH PROBLEMS AS less powerful foreign assistance ... to be viewed as able to be overcome").
I think that this may be a very important distinction (to wit: when it is perceived that no great power has -- or will -- actively support an insurgency); this determination might help explain (1) why a great power might intervene at a particular time and (2) why this great power might consider such difficulties as (a) lesser power foreign influence/assistance and (b) sanctuary as not being unsurmountable problems.
Could the distinction "foreign Great Power assistance/influence" (or the lack thereof) be more critically important than the less potent "foreign assistance/influence" criteria.
With the thought that, lacking Great Power assistance/influence (all Great Powers seeming to be alligned against or nutral re: the insurgency), these insurgencies would have much less chance of success.
Does this factor (lack of Great Power influence or assitance for the insurgency) (1) embolden Great Powers like the United States to intervene and (2) cause such problems as less powerful foreign assistance/influence (Pakistan ISI assistance and sanctuary) to be viewed as able to be overcome?
What do you think the top tier's issues really are, and how do you propose to reconcile them?
I doubt that those issues have anything to do with legitimacy or quality of governance. I suspect it's a good deal more basic than that. They had power. We took it away. They want it back. That's the issue. A legal venue is pretty meaningless if the "law" isn't accepted as legitimate, and I doubt the Taliban leadership have any interest in any venue for a challenge unless they control the venue and they believe they can win. They have their preferred venue; that's what the insurgency is. They know they can't beat us, but they just might outlast us.
We have to remember that this is not a Maoist/Cold War insurgency that formed in response to bad governance. The Taliban leadership do not exist as a reaction to the Karzai government; they existed before the Karzai government and they intend to exist after it. That's important, because an insurgent leadership that exists as a reaction to bad governance might be mollified by adjustments in the conditions of governance. That's not the case here. While the Taliban might accept a settlement that they see as a vehicle toward attaining their goal, I doubt that anything short of a return to power would reconcile their issues.
Certainly the "lower tier" of the Afghan insurgency, the rank and file fighters we engage, and the communities they draw from, are a resistance movement that fights primarily because the upper tier (senior leadership primarily taking sanctuary in Pakistan, and largely a revolutionary movement due to the complete exclusion of the segment of the populace they draw from's opportunity to participate legally in government and opportunity by the Karzai regime they see as illegitimate) provides pay and ideological motivation, somewhat for political reasons (but they are largely apolitical and self-governing), and from the presence of the coalition.
That is a lot in one paragraph I know. We focus on the lower tier with 90% of our COIN efforts and bring in more troops to do so. This does indeed make the resistance insurgency worse; and no amount of development or temporal security efforts can over come that fact that we do not belong there and we are the source of legitimacy of the Karzai regime.
Success can come if we shift our focus to addressing the top tier's ISSUES. Not to reconcile people and groups, but rather to reconcile the issues that drive them to lead this illegal challenge. Simply giving them a legal venue to challenge would help tremendously. This is why a new constitution is the critical ingredient. There can be no peace under the current constitution. Ever.
RCJ
In cases where we are intervening in a conflict between a pre-existing government and insurgents, your prescription would be a good one. In Iraq and Afghanistan, though, I don't know that it will be possible to remove the perception that government draws its legitimacy from us. After all, we created these governments; they exist because of our interventions. They are inextricably connected to us. We have to remember that in these cases we did not intervene to address an insurgency, we intervened to remove governments we dislike. The subsequent governments and the insurgencies they face are effects; the cause was our intervention. Like it or not, we are - as a consequence of our choices - central, not peripheral.
How do we address the conditions that the insurgent exploits if the primary condition being exploited by the insurgency is our presence?
I believe the rule of thumb is a sound one. I would add the caveat to address Bill's comments that IF, and I mean IF that intervening power was:
1. Did not define success as preserving the current government in power; and
2. Was incredibly conscious in every act to not do anything to create perceptions that whatever government emerged to lead this populace was not in some way drawing its legitimacy to rule from the foreign power, then yes, I think an intervening power can help "defeat" an insurgency.
This is because it is working not to defeat some insurgent organization, nor to preserve some flawed government in power; but rather to address the conditions of insurgency among the people that the insurgent is exploiting to make his play for leadership.
Most intervening powers don't do that; and certainly current US COIN doctrine that Dr. Nagl helped write don't prescribe such an approach either.
The word "ultimately" should probably be interpreted based on time frames. I do think foreign troops can suppress an insurgency through the use of overpowering force, but is that a temporary tactical victory or a long term strategic victory? I will argue it depends
This ties into a line of thought I had driving home last night. The Afghan insurgents according to some insurgents and scholars were ready to admit defeat by the Soviets. Their brutal tactics were actually working the first few years (they were as effective as we were initially). What changed the tide in favor of the insurgents was foreign support to the insurgents.
If Saudi, Pakistan and the U.S. didn't provide substantial aid to the Afghanistan insurgents (and foreign fighters) during the mid to late 80's would they have prevailed? No one really knows the answer, but I suspect not.
Does this open the door to considering that the center of gravity may not always be the population, but in some cases it may be foreign assistance? Some of us will argue that the insurgency couldn't prevail against us if we cut off foreign aid to the insurgents in Afghanistan (feasibility shouldn't be confused with whether or not the argument is true). If Pakistan was an effective COIN partner the conflict likely could be brought to an acceptable close within a few years.
My question is, is the general assumption that foreign countries can't defeat an insurgency, but that foreign countries (and non-state entities) can enable one and that the insurgency can't be victorious without their support? Why then isn't the opposite side of that coin true that foreign aid and troops are not critical to victory for the counterinsurgents? Ultimate victory is defined by consolidation efforts, and consolidation efforts are largely political. You can't get to consolidation without effective security forces, and in some cases foreign troops provide those forces.
Every conflict is different, so my rough logic isn't meant to be applied to every internal conflict, but IMO foreign influence has and will have a bigger impact on the "ultimate" outcome of the war in Afghanistan than the villagers. Any victory at the village level will be temporary until the foreign threat is neutralized.
Fire away, it will help me further develop or toss this idea all together.