Overcoming Afghanistan's Geopolitical Barriers
by James C. Larsen and Scott Kesterson
Download the Full Article: Three Wickets and A Bulldozer
This strategic and operational-level proposal discusses some of the important dynamics at play in Eastern and Southern Afghanistan, as observed by the authors from 2002 - 2009. It identifies key, positive catalysts that have been largely overlooked or under emphasized by the Coalition, its international and interagency partners, and the Afghanistan National Security Forces. The authors believe that these catalysts, if applied in a geographically focused and integrated manner, rapidly expand social networks across tribes, increase the amount and fidelity of human intelligence, and multiply areas of influence to overcome Afghanistan's geopolitical boundaries. This proposal offers an Afghan-centric and network-centric approach to counterinsurgency that ultimately leads to insurgent defeat in Afghanistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, as well as a unified Afghanistan with rule of law and economic prosperity.
Success demands a network-centric strategy that creates integrated and expanded social networks through linked centers of commerce. The coalition needs a unified and inter-dependent strategy with an end game. The strategy must be simple and consistent with Afghan culture and thinking. Furthermore, the strategy should shift from a mirror imaging Western social and cultural paradigms of the 21st century, and chart progress in terms of starting points and relevant progress with the context of Afghan culture. To this end, success is about exploiting that which goes too often unobserved with audacity and creativity to attack and erode the enemies' strengths and minimize ancient tribal structures.
Achieving an end game is ultimately not found in the application of kinetic warfare, but rather in the folds of daily life.
Download the Full Article: Three Wickets and A Bulldozer
Colonel James C. Larsen is an active duty Infantry Officer who served in various command and staff positions during multiple deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Panama, and Bosnia. Currently, he serves as the Commander of the Warrior Transition Brigade, WRAMC.
Scott Kesterson is an Emmy Award winning videographer and documentary filmmaker who's first film At War is due for release in late 2010.
About the Author(s)
Comments
The authors attempt to bridge the gap between the operational and tactical operations currently being conducted in Afghanistan.
SWJ initiated a conversation on tribal engagement in March 2010 found here,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/events/tew/
Additionally, the authors pull heavily from John Arquilla, Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School, and David Rondfelt's book,
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy
http://www.amazon.com/Networks-Netwars-Future-Terror-Militancy/dp/08330…
describing the bigger concepts on the tactical, local level.
This sentence gave me deep pause:
"Afghanistan needs to undergo rapid modernization and ideological reformation."
I think I know what the authors are getting at, but this should raise a number of red flags, starting with its similarity to the Soviet method of fostering social revolution. More importantly, the one and only thing to unite Afghanistan in opposition to something is not military invasion by an outsider, but the imposition of foreign or excessively progressive ideals.
People freaked over the communists not when they first took over, but only after they decided to modernize and reform the national ideology. Similarly, in 1927 the Shinwari in Nangarhar rebelled against Amanullah Khan because of his social policies, which the elders deemed too liberal.
In other words, rebelling against too-rapid modernization and liberalization is one of the only constants in Afghanistan's political life. We should be aware of that when trying to chart a way forward.