In February, I interviewed Bing West to ask his opinion prior to the release of his new book, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. Bing contended,
The new religion of benevolent counterinsurgency has been defined by the best writers. Especially in Big Army, attracting attention and prominence is helped enormously by an advanced degree and by the publication of theoretical papers on macro topics at the high level of warfare. The new COIN, however, remains an unproven theory, with a distinct downside.
Over at Foreign Policy, Dr. Stephen Walt asks Hearts, minds, and gunships: What are we really doing in Afghanistan? He comments that
It goes without saying that the accidental killing of nine Afghan boys by an American helicopter gunship was yet another public relations setback for the U.S. war effort. But more than that, I think it may also tell us a lot about how we are really waging that war, which is somewhat at odds with the rhetorical emphasis that it tends to get back home. The incident also underscores the inherent contradictions in U.S. strategy and does not augur well for our long-term prospects.
Walt links to BCSIA fellow Jacqueline L. Hazelton's Compellence in Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Uses of Force in Dhofar, Oman, and El Salvador
This paper analyzes the uses of force in two successful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns to delineate under what conditions the use of military force serves the state's strategic ends, and under what conditions it hinders them. The conventional wisdom prescribes the strictly limited use of force in COIN. Historically, however, successful states have used considerable force, including massive force and including the targeting of civilians. I argue that successful counterinsurgency requires using force selectively: to punish and deter, for denial, and to show resolve. Further, I sketch the conditions under which each type of force is likely to achieve state political ends, and under what conditions it is not. The cases are the British-led campaign in Dhofar, Oman, 1965-1976, and the U.S.-backed campaign in El Salvador, 1979-1992.
In my opinion, enemy versus population counterinsurgency disputes are as useless to the study of war and warfare as east verse west coast disputes were to rap and music. While both provide great publicity, they lack rigor and end in senseless tragedy.
In the end, regardless of scope, breadth, or duration, war is still war. Please continue to weigh in on the discussion and send us your experience for possible publication.