by Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane, U.S. Army
In the past few weeks and months numerous points and counterpoints have been made regarding CSDA...Connecting Soldiers to Digital Applications. Many of these points are valid; many are not. I would like to take a few minutes to clarify some of the concerns or misperceptions regarding this Army initiative.
First of all, there is no denying that the world as a whole and our Army in particular are in the midst of a technology firestorm. The explosion of smart phones in the civilian sector highlights the potential of these technologies and digital applications for the Army. If we do not get on board these evolving technologies, then the rest of the world will leave us standing at the station. The potential returns from these technologies are simply too great, particularly for enhancing training and tactical functions.
That's why the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and the Army's Chief Information Officer have initiated a pilot program under CSDA to explore the value for the individual Soldier. CSDA is not a materiel acquisition program, but a series of pilots and assessments that will evaluate the value added of smart phones and cellular connectivity to support new training approaches of the Army Learning Concept 2015 and the creation of a persistent learning environment. These assessments will also explore smart phone potential for accessing operational and institutional information. The great potential by employing commercially available devices is that it may permit the Army to rapidly update and share information at a fraction of the cost of developing military unique solutions via traditional methods.
CSDA seeks to exploit the digital generation's comfort with off-the-shelf media technology. This allows the Army to supplement, extend, and partially transfer the training content out of the classroom and into the Soldier's hand through smart phone technologies. From an initial pilot program, we found that students achieved improved training proficiency. Metrics, data collection and assessment of on-going pilots will help determine if Soldiers learning from hand-held technologies may be able to pick up course materials much faster and have greater retention when dealing with basic tasks. We will also determine the extent to which delivery of training content in this method may reduce the amount of time spent in class listening to lectures, but rather prepare Soldiers to engage in collaboration, problem solving and practical exercises when they come together in the classroom environment. Initial findings and tactical feedback from Soldiers with combat experience assigned to the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) already show great promise as exemplified by these comments: "Greatly improved my situational awareness...We could see what was going on in real time." "The smart phone provided communication to the lowest levels...It helped us to see the positions of our battle buddies through a live tracker...Better than anything we already have." Additional feedback gave high marks to Blue Force Tracking applications, increased battlefield visualization, and the ability to take pictures of the enemy, their weapons, and materials and send this information to the company TOC. Other battlefield applications under operational concept review that have great potential include: Threat Act Program that enables Soldiers to continuously search and update data sources for enemy activity in their area; Soldier Eyes that uses phone sensors for situational awareness on location and is tied to data sources that provide location, directions, and distances to enable appropriate movement; Media Share that allows Soldiers to submit photos or video helpful in the collection and analysis of intelligence; and an ISR feed providing day or night live video from a vehicle mounted camera. We are only scratching the surface. The Army plans to continue to exercise, evaluate, and search for more tactical applications that will connect the Soldier to the tactical network while protecting the data accessed by the phones, a concern and a challenge for information assurance.
Presently, the mechanism for providing smart phone capability to all Soldiers is still being explored. We are currently working to identify a strategy and business model which would allow the Army to conduct a firm cost benefit analysis for providing each Soldier with a smart phone. However, this decision has not been made since we are still at the concept exploration stage. The bulk of CSDA resides in eight pilot programs being tested and evaluated simultaneously by AETF Soldiers and students at Army training centers and schools. When implemented, CSDA will fundamentally change how Soldiers access information, data, and training content in both garrison and operational environments. The potential is much too great to stop now.
SWJ Note: Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane is the Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command.
Comments
A few devil's-advocate-type comments:
"First of all, there is no denying that the world as a whole and our Army in particular are in the midst of a technology firestorm."
I'd be very surprised if an outside, objective observer studied the Army and came to the conclusion that the "technology firestorm" has been a net positive for us in terms of effectiveness. We seem to have this idea that more technology equals better effects. Many would argue the opposite: that more information and access to information just equals more confusion.
"If we do not get on board these evolving technologies, then the rest of the world will leave us standing at the station."
Not sure what "standing at the station" means- but maybe that would actually be a good thing-? Regardless, this type of "if we don't act, we'll lose" type of argument doesn't stand up well to scrutiny. I would rather guys in the field ask for things than organizations like ARCIC become advocates for some kind of effort. If ARCIC is behind the concept before the results come back- are they really testing the concept??
"The potential returns from these technologies are simply too great, particularly for enhancing training and tactical functions."
So, we MIGHT get great returns, therefore we have to forego traditional controls that keep "good idea fairies" from overloading the average soldier...?? I'm not saying these technologies won't enhance things for us, but not everything has to be put on the same level as Rapid Equipping Force solutions. Prior to 9/11 acquisition and new idea implementation were arguably too slow. Today it seems to have swung too far in the other direction.
"We will also determine the extent to which delivery of training content in this method may reduce the amount of time spent in class listening to lectures, but rather prepare Soldiers to engage in collaboration, problem solving and practical exercises when they come together in the classroom environment."
I actually wholeheartedly agree with this concept. The more students can prepare outside of class as opposed to getting lectured, and the more they can engage in collaboration and problem solving when they come together- the better in my opinion. The problem, however, is that I haven't seen much proof that the average student will do those things on their own. We seem to realize the value of extracurricular learning- but actually getting people to do that is another subject. I think we have to go beyond simply offering them the opportunity and somehow demand/convince/reward them to do it. Part of that, IMO, is to value their ideas- informed ideas, that is. And, if people continually educate themselves outside of the classroom- I suspect they'll find ways to do so regardless of whatever technology gadgets they do or don't have.
Charles,
I agree with your assessment. Other examples of myopothy abound within the Army's training community. For example, when is the last time one heard the term training management, more specifically, the use of FM 7-0, 7-15, CATS, or FSOMETL based collective training. These terms have, in my opinion been replaced by the current system of check-the-box readiness and mandated edicts to commanders which take the art out of command and also diminishes the commander's influence on training plan development.
For the past 2 years, I have been in a position to see first hand, how our leadership has essentially forced commanders to pile on more and more requirements from afar, limiting training focus for the sake of risk aversion.
Commanders do not have the time nor freedom to manage their own unit training and have been relegated to guidance which mandates a set of tasks which 'must' be completed before deployment. As long as these tasks are complete, the unit is good to go.
Unfortunately, this mindset has relegated most units to having only enough time to become proficient in individual tasks rather than unit FSOMETL driven collective training. Why, I ask, do we talk ARFORGEN, progressive readiness, crawl-walk-run methodology when soldiers are good to deploy with only the 15/4, theater specific individual/leader, and a slew of other requirements comlete and 'ckecked off'? How capable is the unit, what is the unit's T rating on its FSOMETL, and can it accomplish what it is meant to do in theater?
Commanders have thier hands tied and in most cases held throughout the training process. In many cases, we have commanders who only need to show-up for training which is for the most part, planned, executed and documented by others (State Pre-mobilization Assitance Elements, 1A OC/Ts). Documentation has focused on the use of technology which costs millions and only tracks individual tasks as oposed to reporting unit readiness via Digital Training Management System (DTMS)or USR.
I propose that being able to plan for, execute and document training is the commander's job. A great way to exercise unit capabilities and especially PLs and NCOs is to allow them to plan, execute, resource that training and document it by running simple weapons qualification ranges, STX lanes, LFX exercises themselves instead of others doing it for them. All the while, they are simply re-blueing individual tasks and lower level collective tasks in the overall FSOMETL collective events.
Just as you identified that "Technology is a tool, not a solution", it can be further expanded to curent training methodologies as well. Just as I had to learn manual gunnery as a young Marine, even when we had 'technology', so to must commanders and higher leadership recognize and understand that operational art, not science, the basics, not short-cuts and accepting risk,not aversion are key to unit success. We will then have commanders who deploy knowing that they have a unit full of well rounded individuals who know how to plan, resource and execute missions in combat because they did in training. IMHO
I will state at the outset that I am 90% against this widespread adoption of technology in the belief that it's such a marvelous enabler. Technology is a tool, not a solution. The senior leaders in the Army currently speak of technology as a solution, even a panacea. This is foolhardy. I am 100% convinced that if there is a way to implement technology in a manner that is inefficient and serves primarily to increase the workload of leaders in the most effectual paygrades (E-1 thru O-4), then the Army will find a way to make that happen.
I was formerly in the AETF. Comments from AETF exercises are hand picked. In reality the FCS program has been a grand dog & pony show that has tallied billions in expenditures, lost countless weekends for Soldiers putting on demonstrations for VIPs, and demonstrated numerous failures in technology and concepts. Additionally, there are legitimate concerns about the implementation of these concepts, force structure limitations, and the assured micromanagement that will take place from having BN, BCT & Div Cdrs attaining SA on individual squads and being able to contact them via digital or voice comms directly, bypassing subordinate leaders. The system of systems, network of networks is a recipe for disaster as it currently sits. The only metrics our senior leaders are truly concerned with right now, from the FCS and AETF, are those that make their OERs shine.
I am now an instructor at one of the CoEs that drinks the ALC 2015 Koolaid heavily. They are hell bent on the implementation of gaming technology, podcasting, and just about anything else that distracts us from establishing a rigorous, disciplined environment that generates warfighters. Basic skills are neglected for the sake of implementing technology. Discipline is abandoned in order to produce kind comments from trainees on end of course surveys & AARs.
The kinder, gentler Army has been lazily at work for several years now. The commissioning sources have relented on the Soldierization process for the sake of implementing critical thinking classes. Our senior leaders are too busy giving new entrants a pat on the back for joining in a time of war, rather than empowering their subordinate leaders to produce tough, capable, and adaptive leaders.
A survey of the references used to write ALC 2015 makes it quite apparent that foundational and profound statements are cherry-picked, not scrutinized. There is indeed a reason to change our institutional training methods. But ALC 2015 is not the tool for that task. Good leaders understand how to train, how to facilitate discussions, how to create a learner centric environment, and they fully understand the utter uselessness of endless PowerPoint presentations. Yet ALC 2015 seeks the implementation of things like pre & post-tests and education tailored to individuals, which is not feasible. The Army has neither the human nor materiel resources to make such changes.
My biggest problem with this widespread influx of technology and ALC 2015, and how the two are connected, is the following: The authors of ALC 2015 rightly point out that our entrants are changing, and that most of our entrants are firmly entrenched in social media, living a technology-dominated life. It further points out that physical, emotional, and cognitive characteristics of our entrants are changing, and not for the better. However, these documents and initiatives fail to connect the dots, understanding the correlation between an instant gratification, technology driven lifestyle full of shortcuts, absent of rigor, and the resulting shortcomings many new entrants display. While correlation does not equate to causation, there are certainly ample reasons to be cautious and less than eager when debating the integration of contemporary societal norms and practices into our Army.
Most of our new Privates and 2LTs are not capable of remaining focused during a fifteen minute presentation, cannot write a simple memorandum, and are frankly shocked when informed that the mission is the number one priority regardless of how much time or effort it may take to accomplish it. Many new 2LTs do not know basic customs and courtesies or drill & ceremony. They are getting virtually zero basic knowledge at commissioning sources. Knowledge of doctrinal terms and symbols is practically non-existent. When officers are getting commissioned without the knowledge that we salute while in PT gear, then the training has gone away or the reinforcement of that training has gone away. No amount of gaming technology is going to replace discipline and basic skills, whether they're technical, tactical, or professional.
Many people will point to the accomplishments of our military during a time of persistent conflict. They will attempt to argue that our current pool of entrants, coupled with our institutional training strategies, authored (or at least signed off) by G.O.s, has lead to successes on the battlefield. I certainly have no empirical data to support or refute that. However, from my position, I have seen the best leadership, training, and guidance implemented by those coming from the "old school" ways of doing business. Salty Squad Leaders that teach the basics and train their Soldiers tough are getting results. Old Platoon Sergeants and battle tested senior Captains and Majors are using common sense and initiative to make their time with new 2LTs the most productive it can be. All I can see from ALC 2015 is that more of these demands will be placed on the Force as TRADOC will not provide the time or allow the toughness this training needs. I see no reason we should send an incomplete product out to the Force, for the sake of appearing proactive or in some way ahead of the power curve.
Recently we've seen our Army implement and mandate Master Resiliency Training, the Army Physical Readiness Training program, as well as ALC 2015 and several "technology initiatives". None of these programs has accurately seen the respective problems they wish to solve. I don't claim these leaders have malicious intent. But they certainly seem to have an inability to see or adequately acknowledge how Soldiers on the ground have overcome shortcomings in our current ways of doing business. The APRT is an excellent example. As our woefully scared senior leaders mandate more and more kit for Soldiers to wear, creative and determined Soldiers have come up with ways to attain combat fitness and preparation for the streets of Iraq or the mountains of Afghanistan. The popularity of functional training has expanded dramatically. Soldiers all over the Army are constructing austere environment training protocols, doing "Fran", GymJones, going Paleo, and spending some of their combat pay on Vibram Five Fingers, reading about ChiRunning, Newton Shoes, etc. They have abandoned an antiquated and ineffectual Army Physical Fitness program for devices better suited to assist them in mission accomplishment and survival on the contemporary battlefield.
What's the response of the Army...Implementation of the APRT that neither satisfies current Soldier fitness concerns nor embraces the creativity of current functional training strategies. Mandating that Soldiers and units place themselves in a "building" or some other phase is folly. Expecting the entire Army to adopt one single plan is myopic. Though the APRT is an improvement, and most likely a well-intended program, it will suffer from staleness and ineffectiveness yet it will be crammed down our throats only to be escaped when one gets adequate dispersion from the flagpole. We also now see guidance from higher stating that only "commercially available running shoes" are allowed with the PT uniform. Again, another myopic and brain dead dictum. Soldiers are now expected to do movement drills, shuttle runs, and similar exercises in the most unstable platform available for dynamic physical exercise: the running shoe. Barefoot and minimalist shoes apparently are not good enough for Soldiers to wear, despite the fact that world-class functional sport athletes utilize these. Just as with the APRT, ALC 2015 and recent technology initiatives are myopic and doomed to failure.
I am not in the crowd that believes our G.O.s are evil. But I am in the crowd that believes our G.O.s are, for the most part, not suited for leading our Army to victory in our current conflicts or our future ones. They were reared in a system that screened for and promoted "yes men". They will promote like-minded individuals and endorse programs that sustain the status quo. The only thing they are more opposed to than change, is progress. True progress would mean a reform in the promotion system, a halt to promoting their cronies, and the adoption of battle tested and battle proven methods. Instead we get poorly crafted documents such as ALC 2015, SmartPhones for Soldiers (a truly expensive proposition in a time where our pay, benefits, and manpower are likely to get cut), new PT programs, and other items that one can only assume are created for the sake of moving from BG to MG, from MG to LTG, and so on.