by Tom Clark
If the Army Learning Concept is correct that we must out-think our opponents to win at competitive learning, then we are reframing knowledge as a commodity. This shifts our educational aim from the systematic study of a body of knowledge to the concept of leaps in learning. The actual problem is that our existing professional military education (PME) vocabulary has no word or governing concept for dealing with knowledge as a creative and artful endeavor.
We have been in this place before.
In the 1980s, US Army leaders engaged a similar issue when filling the void between winning battles while failing to achieve strategic goals. TRADOC commanders began a "public debate over what doctrine should be."(1) All sides in the debate came with strong beliefs on the topic of operational art.
The debate was difficult because as Edward Luttwak observed, there is a "peculiarity of Anglo-Saxon military terminology that it includes no term for the operational level of warfare."(2) The same void exists in professional military education.
Over the past decade, various studies, reports, and inquiries set lofty developmental goals. Noteworthy examples include an Army Training and Leader Development Panel's need to develop officers with enduring meta-competencies of self-awareness and adaptability to set conditions for lifelong learning. US Army War College faculty found a need for leaders with refined capabilities to learn "almost anything very quickly," and with mental agility at "recognizing patterns and converting abstract knowledge to appropriate action." A recent House Armed Services Sub Committee report called for military education to produce leaders with greater capacities for critical thinking.(3)
At lofty, strategic levels, the educational system works well in setting worthwhile goals.
While in practice, a highly centralized, task-focused curriculum controls the learning environment. At this tactical level, we have an efficient model to transfer knowledge.
As a result, professional military education often mimics a closed system for students to demonstrate mastery over the theory or principle of current interest. A learning system based on simple facts or "the ancient narratives."(4) An approach that is sometimes necessary at the military science tactical learning level, but never sufficient at the leader development, operational art level of education.
In a competitive learning environment, classroom activities are not an end in themselves rather efforts to set conditions for success in the real world. Neither technology nor lesson content can power education aimed at competitive learning. The most elegant curriculum and comprehensive lesson plan are of little importance in comparison to learning situations that require students to figure things out and then decide what needs to be done.
Accordingly, I offer two proposals. First, that we define the operational level of education as the art of generating and using knowledge to dominate unfamiliar adversaries, events, or situations.
Second, that we employ one independent and two dependent principles to frame the operational level of education.
The independent principle is to recognize education is an open system that responds to influence more than control.(5) Senior leaders provide an educational intent linking goals with necessary learning conditions and program outcomes. Centralized curriculum and instructor centered classrooms give way to collaboration and action learning. For example, a curriculum that presents students a terminal learning objective in a directed course of action is a closed system. Alternatively, presenting students problem sets along the lines of a leader reaction course is curriculum that influences thinking.
Momentum in learning supersedes unity of effort in classroom activities. Time-based schedules give way to purposeful activity that takes learners through goal directed projects to develop refined abilities in adaptive problem solving. For example, a four-hour lesson on an important topic followed by a narrowly scoped exercise is a much different experience than an open-ended question that requires students to create, integrate, and apply knowledge to a particular issue.
Student minds engaging real-world problems trump lessons emphasizing content coverage. The military science focus on mastery of a system of knowledge gives way to the art of transforming innovative ideas into decisive actions. For example, poring over an artificial standardized scenario is considerably less relevant than developing a plan to employ surge forces in an active theater.
The operational level of education emphasizes effectiveness over efficiency. The key measure involves learning seminars where leaders respond to complex real world problems. Concurrently, leaders come to understand what they are learning as well as how their efforts relate to their future in real-life situations. There are activities to develop new knowledge and to broaden reasoning skills in order to use both as a combat multiplier.
The Army Learning Concept makes salient the notion that creating, integrating, and applying new knowledge represent combat power.(6) Educational art aims to establish momentum that helps leaders learn faster and apply learning more quickly than any adversary.
PME needs to more than a series of check-the-block activities. Educational art is the missing link that enables PME to be an ongoing "aha" experience.
Notes
1. Swain, R. (1996). Filling the void: The operational art and the U.S. army. In B.J.C. McKercher & M.A. Hennessy (Eds.) (pp. 147-161). The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War. Westport, CT: Praeger.
2. Luttwak, E.N. (1981). The operational level of war. International Security, 5(3), 61-79.
3. See Department of the Army (2001). Army Training and Leader Development Panel, Officer Study Report to the Army. Reed, G., Bullis, C., Collins, R., and Paparone, C. (2004). Mapping the route of leadership education: Caution ahead. Parameters 34(3), 46-60. U.S. Congress House of Representatives, Report of the Committee on armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations. (2010). Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel. Print 111-4: Washington, DC.
4. Smith, L.T. (2005). On tricky ground: Researching the native in the age of uncertainty. Denzin, N.K. & Lincoln, Y (Eds.) (pp. 85-108). The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research (3rd ed.). (Eds.). Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.
5. See chapter 2 in, Alberts, D.S. & Hayes, R.E. (2005). Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age. CCRP Publication Series: Washington, DC. Also see, Mr. Y. (2011). A National Strategic Narrative. Woodrow Wilson Center: www.wilsoncenter.org.
6. For a discussion of combat power in other forms, see Dempsey, M. (2009). Our Army's Campaign of Learning. LandPower Essay 09-03. Association of the United States Army: Institute of land Warfare Publication.
Tom Clark is an Associate Professor at the US Army Command and General Staff College.
Comments
Appreciate the dialogue that ensues with the courageous posting of one`s concepts and arguments. It provides a sounding board and jump off point for adressing the complexity of related issues.
I`d like to highlight briefly some of my observations (from a Canadian perspective) related to PME.
I am always amazed at the perceived enormity of the training burden faced by the force generation task. The false assumption, I believe, is that we always have to add more to this burden. Why do we need to continue to expand PME? Why can`t we be ruthless in our determinations by creating a balanced system of additions and deletions? I can`t recall how many times I heard something akin to I need to teach you according to the standard, but not what you need to know. Or the lament of Afghanistan veterans describing how different the training they underwent was in comparison to how they were empolyed operationally.
Secondly, there is far too much emphasis on the testing of learning objectives as opposed to self-paced learning and mastery objectives as others have described above. I ran a PME course for the Air Force and in a re-development effort we removed more than 50% of the testing and review components in order to support learing objectives, course content and adding syndicate work and case studies. We also incorporated a mechanism to assess new course material for replacing, not adding to, older material.
Interestingly, I have heard of a scandinavian approach to PME which assigns individual training budgets to personnel. Members then elect to `spend` their budgets on qualifying PME they are interested in versus sent to. This system creates a free market economy for PME which provides the means for improving their PME and quickly reducing poor courses and content. If your course is not valid, beneficial or effective from an individual (and institution in-kind by groups of individuals), students and funding will not flow. Not unlike many for-profit MBA courses, reputation matters and reputable institutions draw staff and students alike.
My final point relates to career progression and posting cycles as they relate to institutional knowledge. Attrition is often cited as the greatest contributor to knowledge loss within our military systems (hence the emphasis on attracting retired personnel into training systems). I advocate that our posting cycles especially those involving training and PME contribute far more to this loss. Many retirees posess knowledge that remains within the institution, is redundant, or is no longer relevant. On the other hand, the posting cycles regenerate subject matter expertise over and over again every 2 to 3 years, and, those that are moved on are effectively no longer considered SMEs. We tend to employ based on military classification (infantry, armored, pilot, maritime engineer, logisitics etc.) which ignores competencies gained through education, experience and PME. We need to be much more effective in leveraging these competencies as an institution, and create a promotion system that accomodates a mix of leadership (educational, technical and operational)skills versus check box PME propotion criteria. Every Officer should have at least two career fields in which to demonstrate exceptional abilities (secondary fields such as PME, procurement, personnel, logistics, IM, IT, etc). We are losing a number of our best and brightest to other employers because their exceptional skills are neither recognised nor effectively engaged.
Training is hard work. Good, hard training is very hard work. Add the fact that not everyone is or can be a good trainer and the Army indeed has a problem.
Both <b>CLC Joe</b> and <b>Charles</b> are correct in the approaches they advocate. Small Group Instruction is in military training pretty much the Gold Standard -- it has been proven to work well and to produce a superior product. Regrettably, it is manpower intensive and the pipeline does not always provide the best persons for the job. The personnel managers hate it for that reason. As do the bean counters for its added costs.
The old saw that "there's never enough time (or money or people...) to do it right but there's always enough to re-do a sloppy job" is really applicable here -- except that the cost of inadequate training is unnecessary excessive and costly wounding and death for too many. They won't get that re-do effort...
What's required are selected Instructional persons who perform adequately and are allowed discretion to adapt training to their small group members. That will be expensive and a different approach will be required. One possibility is the hiring of recent retirees or discharged persons with the requisite experience in a system somewhat like that employed for Junior ROTC Instructors...
The fetish for moving people about to justify an extensive 'Personnel Management' bureaucracy must be eliminated. If one is doing a good job and likes the assignment, more harm is generally done by moving him or her than is good obtained by movement on an almost set schedule. Consider also that not everyone can or should be either a Recruiter or a Drill Sergeant. Ponder also assigning only former TOE unit company commanders as Training Company Commanders -- officer and enlisted. Better yet, use Majors and relieve many of them from the purgatory of an overlarge Staff..
Regardless, it is incumbent upon the Army to improve and lengthen initial entry and early career training, Oficer and Enlisted(quite probably at a cost of reducing very expensive and inefficient later career training and 'education' now provided both...) by putting competent trainers to work on effective efforts to improve our far less than perfect state of training. Current Personnel and Training decision makers may be reluctant to do that as the increased costs that may provide future benefit will be seen as a current detriment...
We can pay now or pay more later. Yes, it will certainly cost more in time and resources to fix our training. However, the eventual cost to the Army and the Nation of not doing so will be far greater.
Great comments from CLC Joe.
In regard to this statement, "I agree completely with the frustration in attempting to teach OBT&E within the constraints of predetermined POI or standardized timelines that do not give instructors the ability to assess the growth and development of their students or units. "...I have looked at pre & post tests, something that ALC2015 wants us to do. It's a good thing and would go a long way toward establishing gateways and allowing obt&e to reach greater heights. But, time is of course an issue.
I could be way off, but one of the things I believe the Army will have to do is implement the small group concept into every schoolhouse it wishes to utilize OBT&E. The small group instructors will stay with a small group of students from start to finish within a course. Courses that do not use such a method have "blocked" POIs and it leads to students that are behind on reaching acceptable outcomes to continue struggling, trying to only get their next GO and move on - while those excelling are left running in place when they could continue developing and/or assisting those that are struggling.
Small group concepts demand more instructors. In a time when our ranks will likely shrink, that is probably not going to happen. Additionally, our contractors are likely to start disappearing soon as well. That's another topic, but from my position our contractors (often retirees) are gold mines of information and we should keep them around.
This change in Army education is a good thing - I just hope the Army doesn't get in the way of its own progress.
Outcomes based training should be based off of commander feedback and what he or the Army says they need. I agree completely with the frustration in attempting to teach OBT&E within the constraints of predetermined POI or standardized timelines that do not give instructors the ability to assess the growth and development of their students or units. I agree completely with the difficulty in doing it correctly in the generating force, when I used concepts similar to OBT&E (OJT) throughout my command as a means to coach, teach, mentor and train my LT's. That, however, is the point. As a Commander I never taught my LT's MCOO's nor did I ever find it necessary to spot check their ability to create one. I never taught them how to use a GPS, or how to use their BFT, or how to fill in a 5988E. They were expected to know it, or be able to figure it out, and if they attempted and fell short I helped correct the deficiencies or helped them streamline the process. OBT&E puts the ownership of learning where it should be, on the student, and put the instructor in the role he should be, the role of assessing growth and applying instruction to maximize it within the stated outcomes of the course. I spent a year attempting to apply OBT&E wrong, as a hybrid of the Old and New and it was horrible for me and my students. When I finallly had my eyes openned by watching people do it right the difference was night and day; but it wasn't black magic, it was exactly what I did as a Commander and what received as an LT. OJT with engaged leaders helping me struggle through learning how to solve real-world difficult problems.
The more of the basics we do for our students, the less ownership they feel towards solving their own problems and the more helpless they act when presented with complex problems; blaming everyone but themselves for their inability to perform. It's not the instructors job to solve problems for the student, nor is it the job of the commander to solve them for his subordinate. If we want better performance from our subordinates in the operating force we need to expect more from our students in the generating force.
CLC Joe,
I hope my comments don't come across as being rude...I am very familiar with what a MCOO is. What you described previously was terrain analysis. Building a MCOO is putting the right stuff, right colors, right information, at the right location. Terrain analysis allows you to do it skillfully. We are probably playing with semantics here, so I'll continue.
Every time I and other instructors bring up these topics, we get replies such as yours which are not addressing what is being brought up: OBT&E or similar methods do not work for foundational skills and competencies. You are spot on regarding skill development in terms of analytical and critical thinking - and the OBT&E stuff is very good. As was mentioned by Ken White above, that stuff has been done by good instructors for a long time. I was taught in that manner long before ALC 2015 was first conceptualized. It works and I'm glad that you utilize it.
But, to the point here: we can't continue to try and force instructors to ram the square shaped OBT&E/ALC2015 into the round hole of foundational skill/competency training. The next time you go over MCOOs in your schoolhouse, do it with OBT&E and use a learner-centric, student-lead approach, with people that have not done a MCOO before. Then when you get overlays with key terrain in red, no admin data, no classification, no registration marks, etc (as I see every day when forced to use this approach), you will see what I'm talking about. We can discuss skill development etc, but wrong is wrong and when someone hands you an overlay that is wrong, then it's wrong and their credibility disappears. By the book, ALC2015 does not give instructors the flexibility to deviate. This is a huge problem and typical with Army initiatives.
Point is...we need a mixture. Some things will do well to be taught via the OBT&E modality. Many basic competencies will need an "old school" approach.
My aim here is not to argue with you. Here is my biggest complaint with ALC 2015: it is being used as a panacea with a virtually no follow-through. ALC 2015 says to maximize time on the fundamentals, but my particular schoolhouse does not allow for that. And, I don't believe the Army as a whole allows for that. The Army subscribes to the theory that there is always time to do it over but never time to do it right. We complain about disappearing competency in tactics and technical expertise, but we don't want to provide the time to work on these fundamentals. Instead we jam stuff like blocks of MRT training into the POI. When we as instructors try to make the fundamental training occur as well as possible, it's viewed poorly. Why? Because too many people in the chain of command are not willing to tell students that training should be hard, and that fundamentals must be practiced heavily. We hear field grades and commanders at all levels asking students what they like. We have decided the outcomes to be measured are not related to performance but related to like and dislike.
There are some basic tasks that have to be taught by the numbers. It's not a big deal and it's not going to jeopardize our training. But the Army has decided to write a one-stop document, and in typical Army fashion it will get force-fed with no room for flexibility.
Rant over.
The Army and Marines both used an amalgam of old and 'new' methodology in training and eduction prior to 1977. They were in, essence, using what is today called OBT&E -- and it worked. Worked very well, in fact. Back in the day, the individual troops were not as well trained -- but units at all levels were generally better trained and more capable simply because everyone knew how to integrate tasks.
In the mid-`970s, the Army bought into a training method used in industry to train assembly line workers to perform rote work. That occurred at the behest of a number of civilian Educational Technology hires as GS 1710 Education (or vocational training ) Specialists that TRADOC foolishly took on to deal with the then current level of Recruit competence. These folks proceeded to tell an Army -- most of whom knew better -- that this process using Tasks, Conditions and Standards would enable the Army to better train.
So the Army traded macro and mission focus for micro and task focus -- they lost the bubble. The BTMS process worked moderately well initially because it dealt with the aftermath of Viet Nam and Robert McNamara's Project 100,000. After Shy Meyer and Max Thurman fixed Recruiting, that training system should have been buried -- the new, post 1982 or so intakes were far brighter and more motivated than their predecessors.
However, those predecessors liked the Task, Condition and Standard routine because it was simple, easy to use and did not require a lot of work or thought. The fact that those predecessors became SSG Drill Sergeants and TRADOC school Instructors (As well as PSGs, 1SGs and CSMs...) meant the Army was stuck with the Project 100,000 like intake(effectively the 1970-1980 intakes) until very recently.
Thus it is not an accident that OBT&E is now being used. Smarter intakes needed a better method. It is in use at Benning, Jackson, West Point and Knox -- it needs to spread and be employed in units. OBT&E is not a panacea -- nothing is -- and it is hard but it offers much needed improvements. Training must be hard; if it is, then combat becomes relatively easier. We've been doing it backwards for almost 40 years. Tasks, Conditions and Standards should be parked and saved for mobilization training.
The shortfalls of BTMS have long been known (widely varying conditions and not teaching how to integrate tasks among other things) but trying to eliminate it was fought by those who had essentially grown up with it. That our training -- not great but better than many -- is as good as it is is due to those good leaders who did <i>more</i> than was entailed by the BTMS and follow-on processes (those were also likely folks who judged training subjectively rather than by the flawed, even phony 'metrics' and 'objectivity' that BTMS nominally offered). The process works adequately well for a mass Army; it is NOT appropriate for a small professional force and make no mistake, the force will be smaller -- so it had better be more professional than it now is.
Those old guys are gone or going. Time to improve training. The kids can do far more than we let them do...
Charles,
The MCOO (Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay) is a tool used to help visualize the battlefield, describe its effects on the mission, and communicate that information between individuals. It is not a skill, it is a tool used to help the planning process. "We" as an Army spend too much time teaching the use of tools and not enough time teaching skill development. There are multiple tools in our doctrine that can be used to visualize the battlefield, describe its effects, and communicate that information to each other. If we teach skills and introduce the array of tools used to do so we save time and allow students to build ownership of the methods they select and use in their planning.
Adults learn different then children, we all intuitivily know this, but Old School Instruction follows the methods of instruction demonstrated to us in grade school. Fill in the blank, multiple choice, one solution, one answer. Adult learners need to feel engaged in learning and they need to believe that their training has utility. Old methods fail to do this as well as OBT&E does.
For CLCJoe,
What you describe is terrain analysis, not constructing a MCOO. Please tell me how things turn out when you use a learner-centric, student lead, OBT&E approach works to teach the mechanics of producing a MCOO etc.
I do it every day - it doesn't work.
Old school instruction needs to be integrated with OBT&E, which I believe, our better instructors have always done. Way before ALC 2015 was even thought of, my OBC instructors used this approach. It worked. They knew it would, that's why they did it, and they didn't need ALC 2015 to contrive a way to do it. OBT&E is good, but we need to integrate it appropriately and not go the way of blind faith 100% integration. It has a place and will be productive but it's not a panacea.
I have a five page article due to be published in the next ARMOR! Magazine about building Agile and Adaptive Leaders. I can send that to you, but I am not sure about the legal considerations for having you and them post it. I am working on another article about applying this towards BN STAFF training to use as a primer for adjusting the current Cavalry Leader Course POI to model OBT&E more closely. That article, however, may take me another month.
I have a five page article due to be published in the next ARMOR! Magazine about building Agile and Adaptive Leaders. I can send that to you, but I am not sure about the legal considerations for having you and them post it. I am working on another article about applying this towards BN STAFF training to use as a primer for adjusting the current Cavalry Leader Course POI to model OBT&E more closely. That article, however, may take me another month.
CLC Joe,
I just sent an email to MAJ Sweighart, and I wanted to offer the same request to you. Consider writing a 5-10 page essay for SWJ explaining ARC's outcome based traning,education and impact. Additionally, explain the pros and cons of the program.
The submissions link is here
http://smallwarsjournal.com/site/submit/
or you can contact me at [email protected]
Thanks
Mike
Gentlemen,
As stated by Ben the Army has several programs applying ALC 2015 right now. The most developed and comprehensive of these is the Army Reconnaissance Course taught to LT's and Junior NCO's at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The entire course is based off of Outcomes Based Training and Education methods and it has received excellent reviews and feedback from the students in its ability to train and retain a vast amount of tangible tactical skills in a very short time frame. (27 Days).
I disagree with Charles on the ability of OBT&E to teach fundamental skills. From my experience as an instructor at the Army Reconnaissance Course fundamental tasks are the easiest to teach under OBT&E. MCOO's are an easy illustration as to why OBT&E is preferential to memorization of tedious tasks. If a student is only taught to mark Hills as Key Terrain or Wooded areas and Marshes as Restrictive Terrain without understanding the tactical aspects and values of those pieces of terrain than he will inevitably create a scheme of maneuver that avoids difficult terrain rather than using it achieve a decisive tactical advantage at a time and place of his choosing. This gets to the crux of Mr. Clark's argument; creating learning environments that inspire rapid and retained learning through techniques that use the fundamentals of war to illuminate higher thought by removing institutionally created constraints such as root memorization and the execution of tasks without links to higher desired outcomes. The fundementals of war being taught in our PME are not the source of its current weakness, the method of instruction is. ALC is an institutional attempt to fix it.
I do think some aspects of military education have been transformed for the better. But I think the Army will have to spend the time to parse out the different needs for the various populations it educates. For example, the tenets expressed in ALC 2015 work pretty well for advanced courses. However, they serve as an obstacle if applied to instruction of the basics. If teaching someone how to maintain computer equipment or how to construct a MCOO, then no approach of critical thinking is going to replace the dry ole, "restricted terrain is marked as _____" etc.
So, I think the Army will have to expand on ALC 2015. Additionally, the Army will have to put real effort into this transformation and not just words. Cramming things into POI, for the sake of checking the block to say "look what we're including as common core tasks" is not the answer.
I apologize for the second posting, but I realize that the "good news" paragraph was somehow deleted from the first one. The good news is that there is evidence that senior leaders have identified these very issues with PME and are working to improve it. There are a handful of pilot programs currently underway that offer alternative curriculum opportunities for those who seek them. Small by design, their programs of instruction are academically rigorous and are carefully tailored to inspire and develop critical thought utilizing educational art as described by Dr. Clark. Although the programs are evolving through their neophyte stages, they are evidence that decision makers are willing to experiment to improve PME.
I agree with Dr. Clark's assessment of professional military education and think that the Combined Arms Center should consider his recommendations. Mid-career military professionals engaged in graduate level study should be focused on the art of war and cultivating their own ideas. Simply memorizing and regurgitating other peoples ideas, planning operations within todays doctrine (which is always written about the last war and reflects how it was or should have been fought) and training the science of war is not intellectually rigorous - it does not improve ones ability to think. There is utility in mastering the science of war, but it is not the best use of a year dedicated to education.
Unfortunately, the current design of ILE that supports the Armys all-inclusive policy forces a watering down of the curriculum (and methodology) to focus on raising the whole teams "batting average." Current methods probably work to ensure the Army delivers the highest number of "good" officers into key leader positions. However, it sacrifices quality for quantity as the best and brightest are marginalized and forced to spin their wheels for a frustrating year with few challenging intellectual opportunities. Creative and dedicated faculty members incorporate educational art where they can, but the design creates limitations.
In addition to re-engineering the teaching method to incorporate educational art, there must also be a mechanism to identify those leaders possessing the aptitude and self-motivation to develop intellectually and become great thinkers. Our PME opportunities should not only be a springboard into a lifelong pursuit of intellectual growth, but should also serve as an evaluation tool to discriminate one field grade officer from the next. Of course, the Army should continue to develop all leaders who choose to make a career in the profession of arms. But to ensure that the Army's next batch of senior leaders is the best we can field, they must be given the tools to excel and proper rewards for exceptional performance. We need leaders who possess the mental agility to "use knowledge to dominate unfamiliar adversaries, events or situations" as Dr. Clark suggests. If done correctly PME can not only help to create them, it can identify them for proper utilization.
PS - Although I dont know the figures that "Charles" asks about in his comment concerning the annual number of graduates from the major echelons of PME, the functional answer is virtually all of them. Thats part of the problem.
I'd like to know if there are statistics on how many people graduate from the major echelons of schools within the Army each year. For example, Basic Training, AIT, BOLC, Cpt Career Course, ILE, etc.
ALC2015 is written as some sort of one-stop document but the diversity of populations that attend Army schools certainly can't be considered a suitable target for a one-stop document. So, I'm wondering where the Army actually intends to implement ALC2015.