Imperfect Proxies: The Pros and Perils of Partnering with Non-State Actors for CT by Brian Katz - Center for Strategic & International Studies
The Issue
- The recent history of the United States and Western allies working “by, with, and though” non-state actors for counterterrorism (CT) operations when unable or unwilling to partner with a host-nation government—such as in Mali, Libya, and Syria—has generated mixed results on the ground.
- Militias can provide a ready-made local ground force willing to fight capable terrorists but lack the legitimacy, effectiveness, and staying power to hold and sustain military gains.
- Conducting CT campaigns by empowering non-state proxies poses unique dilemmas and policy trade-offs for Western policymakers, with limited options to secure swift CT wins without stoking local conflict and generating instability resilient terrorists can exploit.
- The proxy approach will likely remain appealing to Western countries as well as great power rivals as low-cost means to reduce exigent terrorist threats and pursue their security and strategic interests vis-à-vis competitors.
- Simultaneous success in the CT and stability realms will remain a hard if insurmountable challenge without a coherent political strategy for operations to serve and enduring military and diplomatic support to local partners.