“Army Adaptation from 1898 to the Present: How Army Leaders Balanced Strategic and Institutional Imperatives to Best Serve the Nation” by Robert H. Simpson and Mark C. Smith (Land Warfare Paper 98, September 2013).
AUSA’s Institute of Land Warfare has recently published a Land Warfare Paper titled “Army Adaptation from 1898 to the Present: How Army Leaders Balanced Strategic and Institutional Imperatives to Best Serve the Nation.” This paper, jointly authored by Colonel Robert H. Simpson and Mark C. Smith, should be of great interest to all in your chapter who would like to understand the necessity for Army leaders to focus on internal improvement rather than trying to influence strategic policy.
“Army Adaptation from 1898 to the Present: How Army Leaders Balanced Strategic and Institutional Imperatives to Best Serve the Nation” (Land Warfare Paper 98, September 2013) looks at the patterns of rising and falling support the Army has received, patterns which have accompanied every war that the United States has seen since the Spanish–American War. While it is natural that with the conclusion of each war support for the military should decrease, it is nonetheless vital that both civilian and military leaders provide for the uninterrupted sustainment of resources that will, at a minimum, allow for the optimal organization, training and equipping of Soldiers. When leaders invest excessive time and effort in changing external strategic policies, internal growth and structure will necessarily suffer. This will leave the Army ill-prepared to face inevitable military challenges, resulting in botched maneuvers that are costly not only in equipment but also in Soldiers’ lives. The authors posit that the strategic and institutional lessons learned from every major encounter that the United States has faced in the past 115 years all demonstrate a need for increased focus on internal Army improvement.