The Way Petraeus Saw Counterinsurgency Operations by RallyPoint.
General (Ret) David Petraeus is one of the most highly acclaimed leaders from this most recent era of conflict. He is perhaps best known for his counterinsurgency approach while commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Iraq.
Here, we've compiled 5 quotes from Petraeus that we believe best encapsulate his perspectives on counterinsurgency doctrine and the challenges of maintaining a lasting balance in a nation that has its own fundamental problems to begin with…
Comments
(Edited)
Should we consider these matters within the context of a difference between certain insurgency types? For example:
a. There is the insurgency in a foreign land which has both a long-standing government and significant security forces and for which the United States needs only to provide a relatively few soldiers to help the government with its present problems. And then
b. There is the insurgency which results from the United States being an occupying power in a foreign land and having to, therefore, provide the bulk of both the government and the security forces; this, as it (the United States) works to transition to a new host government lead.
In both of these instances, the reason for the insurgency is that the governments ("theirs" in "a" above and "ours" in "b") have, for national security reasons, determined that they absolutely must introduce modernization programs and policies which are designed to:
1. Eliminate the traditional way of life and traditional way of governance of the more "backward" population groups in these countries and to
2. Cause these "backward" population groups to adopt more-modern ways of life and ways of thinking.
In both instances, the "backward" population groups have determined that they will fight and die rather than give up their traditional way of life and traditional way of governance and, likewise, fight and die rather than adopt ways of life and ways of thinking which they consider to be (1) not in their best interests and (2) profane.
Should we say that Locke and Madison lived in times like these?
What counsel might Madison have provided here to help the subject governments (theirs in "a" above and ours in "b") accomplish their essential national security tasks?
Thanks COL Jones, in advance, for considering these questions.
The instinct of human nature is for governments to see themselves as victims when faced with revolutionary challenge; Likewise the instinct of human nature is for foreign "liberators" to see themselves as victims when faced with resistance challenge.
Gen. Petreaus did not see things so far different than those who simply thought we should kill them all and let Allah sort them out. He only differed in his belief as to what tactics would be most effective, not in his understanding of the nature of the problem.
He would have been better served if instead of taking counsel from newly anointed or self-appointed SMEs on Counterinsurgency, if instead he would have turned to classic and proven experts on preventing insurgency. #1 on that read list, IMO, is James Madison. Madison's thoughts were shaped by the thinking of men like John Locke. Both men's thinking were shaped by the dynamic nature of the times they lived in. Locke in the aftermath of the Reformation and the English Civil War, and Madison in a generation who grew up oppressed, became revolutionaries, and (almost immediately upon "winning") became counterinsurgents.
A great quote from Madison that would have served us well in Iraq and Afghanistan both:
"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
JAMES MADISON, Federalist No. 51, Feb. 6, 1788
Another keen insight is this one from a man who both fought with the revolution in France, and then (like so many) was ultimately a victim of what that revolution brought, Nicolas Chamfort:
“Some things are easier to legalize than to legitimate.”
Ultimately these are political problems, rooted in human nature and demanding political solutions. All the military can do is buy time and space, and must do so in a manner that does not make the drivers of those political problems worse. But when the military is tasked to mindlessly sustain the very status quo of governance driving the insurgency to begin with, it becomes a thankless and impossible task. Military action can suppress, but not resolve, insurgency.
After so many comments on how great the surge worked maybe the following is a subtle reminder that just maybe it actually failed.
All the surge did was give the Army cover to get out of Iraq nothing more nothing less and to spin it or rewrite history any other way does an in justice to actual events on the ground.
Notice the comments on the useless numbers of police checkpoints--was this not taught to the Iraq's during the surge by the US Army under General P?
“It’s clear that Al Qaeda, which represents the Sunnis, and the Shiite militias are again back in the streets,” said Mazin al-Jubori, a military expert and a former officer during the era when Saddam Hussein was in power.
“But now it is more dangerous than before, as now some of them are in the government and they have power and access,” he said. “The government must increase their information service better than keeping hundreds of useless checkpoints, as things might go worse than the dark days of 2006 to 2007.”
In northern Iraq, four soldiers were killed and seven wounded when a roadside bomb was detonated next to their patrol in Mosul, a police official said. A police officer in Tikrit was killed when an improvised bomb fastened to his car blew up.
In Khanakeen, north of Diyala Province, in an area of dispute between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, four Kurdish security force members were killed and 11 wounded when a suicide car bomber sped into their base, the police said.