A special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies on U.S. counterinsurgency features three free-to-view articles as a promotion for the rest of the issue. The three articles are:
Conceptual Failure, the Taliban's Parallel Hierarchies, and America's Strategic Defeat in Afghanistan by Shivan Mahendrarajah
Naw Bahar District 2010–11: A Case Study of Counterinsurgency Conducted by Naval Special Warfare in Afghanistan by Thomas Briggs
Critics Gone Wild: Counterinsurgency as the Root of All Evil by David H. Ucko
Comments
I cannot thank you enough for posting the Mahendrarajah paper. It should be widely read by everyone interested in the subject of misunderstandings and disinformation present in the Western intellectual community regarding AfPak, especially that presented by a certain type of South Asian analyst.
I knew there was something off about the initial 2001 advice and the supposed Pashtun angle. CENTCOM and the CIA really went back to a Cold War comfort zone.