Is the Powell Doctrine Dead and Gone? By Mike Jackson, Modern War Institute
When I was a cadet in the mid-to-late 1990s, the Powell Doctrine was essentially gospel at West Point. While WWI never lived up its moniker as the “War to End All Wars,” it seemed like Desert Storm might – not because it exposed the world to horrors that no rational human being would allow to happen again, but because it exposed the world to America’s unquestionable military dominance. It was an exquisite example of matching technological advancement, military innovation, and sound national policy to protect U.S. national security interests through the use of force. At the time, we believed that was how it would always be, that in the words of former President Bush the “new world order had begun.” Now, almost two decades and two wars later, I find myself torn on how to discuss the Powell Doctrine with my cadets – is it still a useful or even relevant way for junior officers to think about the U.S. Army as a global force prepared to win in an increasing complex world?
Don’t get me wrong, I still believe in the wisdom of the Powell Doctrine and think that America would be well advised to reintroduce it concepts into every policy discussion involving the potential commitment of our military forces…
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The Powell Doctrine was considered more appropriate to the Old Cold War, and to our then-strategy of "containment" (of another great power and its alternative way of life, its alternative way of governance, and its alternative values, attitudes and beliefs.).
The Powell Doctrine was not, and still is not, considered appropriate for the post-Cold War (or, if you prefer, to the New/Reverse Cold War) and to our current strategy of "expansion" (of our way of life, our way of governance, and our values, attitudes and beliefs).
In this regard, consider the following from then-National Security Advisor Anthony Lake; wherein, he:
a. In 1993, articulates our post-Cold War expansionist strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement:"
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html
b. And wherein, in 1996 -- and re: this strategy -- he articulates our post-Cold War rules and concepts for the use of military force:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/lake.html
Given that, post-the Cold War, we have been in this offensive/expansionist mode -- this, rather than in the defensive/containment mode we were in the Old Cold War -- then, re: this 180 degree about-face, can we not see how:
a. Certain of the Powell Doctrine's "determining questions," noted by our author above, (for example: "Is a vital national security interest threatened?"), how these might
b. Be considered totally inappropriate -- and/or indeed self-defeating (due to their extreme "limiting" and/or "undermining" nature) -- this, re:
c. The offensive/expansionist mission which, cir. 1993, had become manifest?