Small Wars Journal

This Week at War, No. 23

Thu, 07/02/2009 - 9:30pm
Here is the latest edition of my column at Foreign Policy:

U.S. soldiers won't be back to Iraq

The government of Iraq declared June 30th a national holiday as it celebrated the planned withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq's cities. The celebration, which included a military parade in Baghdad, was marred by a car bombing in Kirkuk.

In an interview by satellite with the Pentagon press corps, General Ray Odierno, the U.S. commander in Iraq, explained that the removal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq's cities was both more and less than it seemed. He asserted that people familiar with day-to-day life in Iraq's cities would certainly notice the absence of U.S. patrols and combat outposts. On the other hand, Odierno reminded the reporters that the United States's 12 combat brigades continue to execute full spectrum operations" outside Iraq's cities.

Last February, President Barack Obama announced his administration's plan for Iraq. To implement the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) negotiated in 2008, the Obama administration intends to completely withdraw all U.S. combat forces by August 31, 2010, leaving 35,000-50,000 soldiers for training, support, counterterrorism, and force protection duties. By the end of 2011, both the SoFA and the administration's plan call for the final departure of U.S. forces.

Obama's disdain for the decision to invade Iraq is well-known. He campaigned for the presidency promising to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq and has frequently asserted that Iraq's future is the responsibility of Iraqi society and its leaders.

But some analysts are skeptical that Obama's plan will really lead to withdrawal. Writing on his Foreign Policy blog, the Center for a New American Security's Tom Ricks believes that Iraq will unravel, forcing the Obama administration to abandon its over-optimistic plan. On the other side, Duke Professor and former National Security Council staffer Peter Feaver wonders, in a post on FP's Shadow Government blog, whether the Administration's plan risks squandering the payments the U.S. has made in Iraq Misguided or not, the president seems highly committed to his plan. What possible change in circumstances would it take to force him to scrap it?

Only Obama can answer this question, but I believe it is safe to assume that Iraq's unraveling would have to be very severe indeed to compel him to reinsert U.S. combat brigades back into urban combat. At a practical level, the growing U.S. combat commitment in Afghanistan removes much of the capacity to significantly reinforce Iraq. Politically, President Obama would wish to avoid disappointing some of his most passionate supporters. And at a personal level, President Obama has none of the commitment to Iraq that President Bush had.

What are the metrics of failure" that could compel a turnaround in Obama's Iraq policy? Domestic Iraqi political difficulties would not likely suffice to change existing U.S. plans. Car bombs in Sadr City, Sunni versus Shiite fighting in west Baghdad, or Arab versus Kurdish bloodletting over Kirkuk, even if at 2007 levels, likely won't be enough change Obama's mind. He will view these problems as Iraq's, not his. The U.S. media is likely to sympathize with this view, reducing pressure on Obama to change course.

One thing that could change Obama's plan is the growing foreign influence inside Iraq. The top concern here is Iran. Happily, the Shiite religious parties most closely tied to Tehran performed poorly in last January's provincial elections, but they're hoping for a better showing in the January 2010 parliamentary elections. Second, can al Qaeda form a sanctuary inside Iraq from which it could launch global operations? That does not seem like a concern. Finally, an Iraqi government might feel the need to demonstrate its independence from the United States by fashioning an informal alliance with China or Russia that undermines U.S. interests in the region.

But even here, increased large-scale U.S. military action inside Iraq hardly seems the solution for these scenarios. Iraq may or may not fall back into renewed civil warfare. There is a remote chance it may succumb to unfriendly (to the U.S.) foreign influence. But none of these events will bring U.S. infantrymen back to the streets of Baghdad or Basra.

Who in the government is expeditionary" and who is irrelevant?

On June 25th, eight former U.S. secretaries of state (Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice) published an article in Politico calling for more congressional funding for the State Department. The secretaries argued that U.S. foreign policy will not be effective until the diplomacy and development portions of that policy are fully staffed with trained and funded civilian personnel. They noted that the additional funding needed for the Foreign Service and other civilian enablers of foreign policy are a tiny fraction of the Pentagon's annual budget.

Few object to this argument, least of all Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen. The question that remains is how eager the civilian portions of the U.S. government are to become truly expeditionary"? How —are foreign service officers, along with officials from Treasury, Agriculture, Justice, Centers for Disease Control, etc., to spend prolonged stretches of their careers in remote and dangerous outposts in some of the darkest corners of the world?

The era of persistent irregular conflict," if that is what we are in, will not occur in European or Asian capitals, but at forward operating bases and combat outposts. In these cases, the interlocutors of U.S. diplomats and development specialists will in many cases be tribal and non-state groups rather than government officials.

During this decade, the U.S. military has adapted to this reality. As it has done so, its uniformed members and contractors have in many cases taken over diplomatic and development tasks that had been previously performed by civilian portions of the government and drawn funding away from them. The militarization" of U.S. foreign policy is now worrisome, even (or especially) to the top officials in the Pentagon.

There are thousands of foreign service officers and other civilian employees of the U.S. government out in the field doing their work under difficult conditions. But are their agencies back in Washington adapting as well as the Pentagon has? In order to remain relevant, everyone, not just the military, needs to get expeditionary.

Comments

Christopher M… (not verified)

Mon, 07/06/2009 - 11:53am

I'm not sure what the Pentagon has supposedly adapted to. When has its primary mission been something other than expeditionary warfighting? Engaging in combat overseas has long been something that members of the Armed Service have expected as a probable part of serving in uniform for at least the past century. The character of wars currently being fought arguably may have changed, but not the basic purpose of the military.

This is not true for the civilian agencies, which are being asked to make a far more radical transformation than the military.

The frequently raised issue about "expeditionary" civilians typically misses several key points.

The way the question is raised often implies that the civilian departments of government simply arent willing to endure hardship and danger, yet this discounts the reality that individuals who sign-up for the military do so fully expecting the possibility of being deployed to a combat zone as part of the job to fight a war.

If you want to do Army stuff, you join the Army. If you want to do State Department stuff, you join the State Department. To most civilians, living and working in area subject to frequent mortar and rocket attacks, and ambushes on convoys, looks an awful like Army stuff.

Yet many humanitarian aid workers experience more hardship more frequently than most military personnel--particularly considering the amenities on large forward operating bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. (For an excellent profile of civilians who spend years and careers among desolate places in broken countries like Chad, see Jonathan Harr, "Lives of the Saints." The New Yorker, January 5, 2009, pp. 47-59. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/01/05/090105fa_fact_harr.)

More importantly, this line of questioning frequently overlooks the different nature of the basic missions of these agencies.

In the case of the US Department of Agriculture, for example, sending employees to Afghanistan would take them away from their primary mission, which is: "to enhance agricultural trade, improve farm economies and quality of life in rural America, protect the Nations food supply, improve the Nations nutrition, and protect and enhance the Nations natural resource base and environment." Each of these tasks entails activities conducted almost exclusively within the United States.

Conversely, the Department of Defenses stated mission includes "War-fighting, Humanitarian Aid, Peacekeeping, Disaster Relief, Homeland Security." The first three of these tasks explicitly require overseas deployment.

The vast majority of the State Department's employees are presently deployed around the globe compared to only about 25% of the US Army.

The military in some ways is like a fire department--only a relatively small portion of its total number is engaged in operations at any particular time. The remainder is in reserve waiting for a call to action, or in training, or undergoing a "re-set" to prepare for a specific future operation. Civilian agencies such as the Department of State are more like a police department--nearly all of their personnel are engaged in current operations with almost no float for training and virtually none being held in reserve.

There is much more to the problem than the implied solution that the State Department and other US civilian agencies simply need to be more expeditionary like the Army or Marines.

Unfortunately, it appears that this period of persistent conflict or Long War maybe a self-fulfilling prophecy. As long as we provoke or intervene within the internal affairs of others, I suppose we will have to deal with the secondary and tertiary effects.

George Washington cautioned us against prolonged engagement into others' affairs. I find it ironic that we tend to have little ability to manage our own affairs, but we assume that we have the wisdom to determine others.

I'll redeploy back to Iraq in November on a MiTT to try and help their security forces stabilize and the political forces consolidate power in the hopes of reconciliation outside of violence. Hopefully, we'll find success. Until then, we can only ponder.

Hopefully, our plans to change the world will prove correct, and our children can live in peace.

I would only hope that maybe we will use further caution and patience in any further interventions. My limited study of history beckons that we must accept that everyone is not an American in waiting.

v/r

Major Mike Few

Ken White

Thu, 07/02/2009 - 11:13pm

While I broadly agree with your thrust, I do question one point.<blockquote>"The era of "persistent irregular conflict," if that is what we are in, will not occur in European or Asian capitals, but at forward operating bases and combat outposts."</blockquote>That's a common refrain now. I've been questioning that for years. No one has yet answered my oft repeated questions on the topic:

Even if that is true, what indication do we have that it will be in our interest to intrude in much of this "persistent irregular conflict?"

Why should we enter into such conflicts which will invariably be disadvantageous to us?

Why should not additional resources be applied to State and other agencies to allow us to attempt to preempt any need for military action?

I have no doubt we can create a total spectrum force; it's not that difficult. Nor do I question our need to do so. I do question any desire to create a specialized Foreign Internal Defense or Stability Operations Force (other than Special Forces who should be wholly applied to that mission) and I do question why we should not make efforts to avoid commitment of the GPF unless absolutely nescessary to any such operations which they -- and we, the United States -- will never truly do very well; adequately? Yes, we can do that but it should not be <i>sought</i> as a mission; it should be a last resort.

Why do we seek to play to our weaknesses rather than our strengths?

Schmedlap

Thu, 07/02/2009 - 10:24pm

<I>"Obamas disdain for the decision to invade Iraq is well-known. He campaigned for the presidency promising to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq and has frequently asserted that Iraqs future is the responsibility of Iraqi society and its leaders."</I>
The first sentence questionable. The second sentence only speaks to what he has said publicly. The latter is not an indicator of the former. It is only an indicator of what made political sense to say.

<I>... Tom Ricks believes that Iraq will unravel, forcing the Obama administration to abandon its over-optimistic plan... What possible change in circumstances would it take to force him to scrap it? Only Obama can answer this question...</I>
I think that Ricks just answered it and that Obama's political advisors can also answer it (and their answer would mirror that of Ricks). Specifically, Ricks got it right because an unraveling of Iraq would allow Obama to change course while saving face. It could be portrayed as another calamity that he inherited from the previous administration, so he could avoid this concern: <I>"Politically, President Obama would wish to avoid disappointing some of his most passionate supporters."</I> Frankly, that could be a win-win. His most passionate supporters are far-left, Bush-hating activists. I think he would prefer to distance himself from them in 2012 when voters will likely be more level-headed and Bush-bashing is slightly less in vogue.