Many Australians revere the military, and it occupies a sacred place in their consciousness. Soldiers put their lives on the line when we ask them to, in the name of keeping us safe. They are doing so now in Afghanistan, where an 11th soldier lost his life last weekend. But has our Defence Force become complacent about its status?
An adviser to the British and US militaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, Dr Daniel Marston, suggests that some Australian officers have questioned, to him, whether Australia's team training and mentoring Afghan soldiers is as educated on counter-insurgency operations as it should be. His comments hint at a disconnection in the political and military establishment over the nature of the mission, and teaching of Australian soldiers who are fighting there.
Are we fighting terrorists in Afghanistan or are we fighting a counter-insurgency to protect the local population? And if we are fighting a counter-insurgency, are our soldiers properly equipped for it? In the past few months there has been a great strategic shift in the way the war is being fought. The US is now fighting a war more focused on protecting civilians, and less on hunting Taliban. Coalition forces are trying to convince Afghans that - this time round - they will not abandon them to the insurgents.
Where possible, coalition troops are being partnered with Afghan soldiers, and are working across provincial boundaries, having learnt that confining troops to certain areas (all the Canadians in Kandahar, all the British in Helmand) is inflexible and that battalions must be able to move across the country. As one Australian historian recently there observed: "Insurgents pay as little heed to the provincial borders as they do to the Pakistani frontier."
While the Americans, in short, are fighting a counter-insurgency campaign, consider what the Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, said about Australia's mission this week. The "underpinning reason" for being there, aside from the US alliance, was "acting against the global threat of terrorism"...
Much more at The Sydney Morning Herald. Join the discussion at Small Wars Council.
Comments
Dear Michael C:
Agree wholeheartedly that the Army has changed to population centric counterinsurgency, as you say, and to add to what you say it has essentially become the army's organizing principle and operational doctrine. Historian Roger Spiller has said that doctrine is how an army thinks out loud about war and conflict. With that understanding of doctrine in mind, the only out loud thinking now being done in the Army is on population centric counterinsurgency. However, I do not think this is a good thing because it perverts the American Way of War which, as another historian and current president of the Society for Military History Brian Linn has most cogently argued, is one of adaptability, flexibility, and utility.
We have come to a one-way only approach nowadays in our conception of war and conflict.
Michael, perhaps you could look at this from a different angle too. You speak almost with a touch of derision of the fact that while you were in ROTC and when you received TRADOC training it was mostly if not all "hic." But perhaps it was that grounding in the core competencies of fighting, of command and control, of discipline, of fire and maneuver, of synchronizing combat functions that allowed you and your outfits to adapt so well to the present challenges of the small wars environment. How well would you have performed, thinking hypothetically here, if you had been trained primarily for irregular war and Coin, but then were told to fight in an action on the level of what the Israelis faced against Hizbollah in south Lebanon in Summer 2006?
Thanks for listening
gentile
When Ms. Banham asks, "Are we fighting terrorists in Afghanistan or are we fighting a counter-insurgency to protect the local population?" it seems like she is asking the exact question that Mr. Kilcullen addresses in The Accidental Guerilla. We are fighting both globalized groups and local insurgents. The difficulty is training soldiers and adapting to a style of fighting so completely different than the Cold War era training I assume the Australians continued training on the way the US did after the USSR crumbled.
@COL Gentile- Sir, I know you clearly believe our Army has moved too far towards population-centric COIN. As a company-grade officer though, I can only applaud this move. For years in ROTC and for months in TRADOC I was trained in High Intensity warfare that was not at all like life on the ground in Afghanistan. The Army needed to change and it adapted to population-centric COIN. Perhaps it adapted too much, but at least we changed in a positive direction.
Hence, now population centric counterinsurgency tactics dictates strategy and perhaps is coming close if it has not already done so, eclipsed policy.
And of course you stubborn minded army, start learning and adapting. But oh be so sure that you accept the normative teleology: that is to say do learn and adapt, but you must learn and adapt your way toward better population centric counterinsurgency tactics and methods, thus you MAY NOT LEARN AND ADAPT YOUR WAY OUT OF IT BECAUSE THAT IS NOT ALLOWED BY THE RULES.