Topics include:
1) What happens when the U.S. and Pakistan split up?
2) America's Asian allies examine their options.
What happens when the U.S. and Pakistan split up?
How close is the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship to a break-up? Self-interest, not affection, seems to keep the partnership going. That's fine until a better arrangement for one side comes along or emotion overrides logic. An even larger U.S. military expedition in Afghanistan will be at the mercy of this fragile bond.
The reasons for cooperation are well known. The United States could not prosecute its war in Afghanistan without access through Pakistan. Washington hopes the Pakistani government will deliver up more al Qaeda terror suspects to join Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. The U.S. engages Pakistan on a variety of levels to keep Pakistan's nuclear weapons stockpile under control. Indeed, notable U.S. analysts such as Stephen Biddle and Steve Coll believe that stabilizing Pakistan is the best justification for continuing the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.
For its part, Pakistan counts on the United States to moderate its friction with India. More recently Pakistan has exploited its intelligence and military connection to the U.S. to target the Islamists at war with Pakistan's government. But Pakistan's enduring interest in America seems mostly to be about money.
On Nov. 15 the Los Angeles Times reported on the hundreds of millions of dollars the Central Intelligence Agency has paid Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-- Pakistan's powerful internal intelligence agency-- since 2001. The article reported that in addition to "bankrolling the ISI's budget," the CIA paid the agency $10 million for high-ranking al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah and $25 million for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. According to the article, U.S. intelligence officers delivered many more brief cases stuffed with money to ISI officials in exchange for lower-ranking al Qaeda personnel.
These sums are little more than a rounding error for the U.S. intelligence community and most Americans would consider it money well spent. But it makes one wonder what kind of an ally Pakistan really is. Would a CIA officer need to deliver a thick cash-stuffed briefcase to a British, Canadian, Australian, or South Korean intelligence officer in order to gain custody of a terror suspect?
The article also discusses another well-known aspect of the ISI, namely that there are really two such agencies. The first eagerly cooperates with the CIA when the targets are the Pakistani Taliban who are fighting the ISI and the rest of the Pakistani government. Meanwhile the other ISI, off-limits to the CIA, supports the Afghan Taliban in its fight against U.S. troops.
In spite of the mutual dependence, the countries seem one step from a break-up. In her recent visit to Pakistan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly said what most Americans are thinking, that it is "hard to believe that nobody in your government knows where they [al Qaeda's top leaders] are and couldn't get them if they really wanted to." Is Pakistan deliberately keeping the al Qaeda issue unresolved and the Afghan Taliban in the field in order to keep the U.S. aid pipeline open? Whether valid or not, such a perception risks a relationship-ending backlash.
On the other side, the United States is intensely unpopular in Pakistan. President Asif Ali Zardari's popularity has collapsed over concerns about corruption, ineffectiveness, and the view that Zardari cooperates too eagerly with U.S. policies.
Despite the anger and lack of trust on both sides, the relationship struggles on. Neither side wants a break-up. But neither side controls all of the emotions in play. Something to consider as more U.S. soldiers fly over Pakistan into Afghanistan.
America's Asian allies examine their options
This week the world focused on Asia as leaders from the Americas and Asia attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Singapore. President Barack Obama's three-day tour of China, plus a stop in South Korea, followed.
Obama began his trip in Japan, leaving the dispute over where to base U.S. Marine Corps helicopters on Okinawa unresolved. The dispute only worsened after Obama departed when Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared the working group appointed to resolve the dispute "meaningless."
Obama and Hatoyama both described the U.S.-Japan defense alliance as crucial. The arrangement has permitted Japan to spend less than one percent of its economic output on defense and to require a similarly trivial military manpower commitment from its population. A good deal for Japan, requiring only that its leaders occasionally tamp down grumbling from those Japanese who have to endure living next to U.S. military bases.
What would happen to Japanese defense planning if domestic politics no longer permit this arrangement? Japan would need to formulate alternative defense strategies if its relationship with the U.S. were to wither in the years ahead.
Perhaps Japanese defense planners are already thinking ahead. On Nov. 9 India's defense minister arrived in Tokyo for a three-day meeting on defense cooperation. The ministers focused on maritime security and the defense of sea lines of communication. There was no mention of any input from the U.S. Navy.
In May 2009, the Australian government released a defense white paper that described its planning assumptions through the year 2030. Chapter Four of the white paper acknowledged the necessity of the U.S.-Australian defense alliance. Yet the chapter also portrayed a future with the United States diminished and distracted and China becoming "the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin." The white paper recommended a very costly build-up in Australia's military power and much more direct military coordination with other powers in the region.
Finally, just to make sure all of its positions are fully hedged, India just completed a two-day meeting with Iran's foreign minister to arrange joint army training, a naval patrol exercise in the Arabian Gulf, and cooperation on space satellite launches.
In the past, security planning in the Pacific region functioned on a "hub and spoke" system, with the hub being U.S. Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii and the spokes being America's defense relationships throughout the region. The United States has usually encouraged a more Europe-like multilateral security arrangement in Asia. This will very likely happen, but in ways that could leave the U.S. on the outside looking in.
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http://pundita.blogspot.com/2009/11/why-general-stanley-mcchrystal-is-g…
On or about August 30, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates received a detailed assessment of the military situation in Afghanistan that included a request for additional U.S. troops. The report was from General Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, Nato's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. But as noted on the first page the assessment was a joint effort representing input from ISAF staff and the component commands.
On the matter of Pakistan the report noted:
Afghanistan's insurgency is clearly supported from Pakistan. Senior leaders of the major Afghan insurgent groups are based in Pakistan, are linked with al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups, and are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan's lSI.
Robert you asked:
1) What happens when the U.S. and Pakistan split up?
I am sure someone has "gamed" this development, in several capitals and I cannot recall any open source reporting on such a crisis.
Can we, the West and not just the USA, learn anything from other such abrupt changes in the outlook and policy of such a strategic country? US-RoK relations have been problematic when the RoK government changed. A better example is Libya and the coup by the army officers led by Gadafy. The UK and USA had bases, plus a UK armoured brigade protecting the oilfields from Eygpt (hard to visualise now). Iran is a better illustration, now thirty years ago.
What will remain after a split? Commercial relations, hardly; although the ending of US$ funding might strain some parts of the Pakistani economy - leaving aside the military budget having a sudden "hole". Pakistan's credit rating and ability to borrow would be problematic - nukes and cricket aside - she has little to export.
Will Pakistanis emigrate, to the West and the Gulf states? Different social classes too, the middle classes might opt out.
Would some aspects of the "security" relationship survive or evolve in a different format? I can only immediately compare the 'split' to France leaving the military side of NATO and US facilities being withdrawn (airbases and logistic routes). France remained in the political alliance and made certain pledges for emergencies.
What interests would still be shared? Just one now. Primarily for the Pakistani military, given their fear of India, maintaining a "balance" would loom large. They could become very lonely.
Yes, a split could happen, it may happen and behind the "smoke" some things would remain the same.
Of course there are the dilemmas over: logistic supplies to Afghanistan and the Pakistani nukes to name the likely top two.
Something to mull over the weekend, thanks Robert.