Will urban terrorism emerge from Iran's Green Movement?

Now, dejected opposition supporters are re-examining their tactics and struggling to find a new catalyst for a movement that emerged with astonishing power just eight months ago, after the disputed presidential election.

"I think a failure has triggered debates and tactical analyses that have been needed for a long time now," said a 26-year-old woman in Tehran, who attended last Thursday's protest and many earlier ones, and who, out of fear for her safety, asked to be identified only as Saina. After the last major protest, around the Ashura holiday in late December, turned violent, she said, "It seemed like a lot of people were tired of being brutalized and continuing to go out into the streets."

If Iran's Green Movement follows the pattern of earlier opposition movements, two scenarios seem likely. The movement will fade away after the government decapitates its leadership and successfully intimidates its foot soldiers. Or a hardened and professional core group will take over a vastly smaller movement and lead it into a violent urban insurgency.

It is one thing for idealistic students and office workers to throw rocks at riot police and put up with tear gas. It is something else for the mass of momentarily enthusiastic but unhardened activist-trainees to watch heads be broken, endure interrogation at Evin Prison, or learn about gruesome threats from Basij militiamen directed at their sisters and mothers.

The Green Movement faces the same day of reckoning that other revolutionary movements squaring off against authoritarian regimes have faced. At this moment, Darwinian logic usually works its power. Those not cut out to be revolutionaries against a ruthless dictatorship simply revert to their former lives. Under this scenario, a small core of grim, determined, and perhaps equally ruthless revolutionaries would survive. This core group would welcome the resulting boost to the movement's internal security -- the regime will find it more difficult to infiltrate the shrunken core group. Will the hardened survivors miss the mass popular enthusiasm they previously enjoyed? Perhaps, but February 11 showed the limits of that model.

Should the Green Movement shrink to small, professional revolutionary elite, what would be its theory of success? What would it do for a living?

The standard answer is urban terrorism. What would be the point of that? From the perspective of a professional revolutionary, bombing attacks against the police, Basij members, the IRGC, and government leaders serve several purposes. First, the revolutionary is attempting to show the public that the regime is vulnerable. Second, the revolutionary is hoping that the government over-reacts against the neutral public. Both of these are attempts to recruit new foot soldiers to the underground army. Finally, for many revolutionaries terror is simply a form of revenge. Such violence is not a problem for many who have made a commitment to a life outside the law.

Will the Green Movement turn into an urban terror campaign? The best bet is that the IRGC and others responsible for Iran's internal security will successfully dominate the Greens. Authoritarian regimes, when they have the will to survive, have an excellent record against internal rebellions. Iran's governing structure suffers from its own internal divisions, which the Greens hope to exploit. But the regime has its own hard core that possesses a ruthless will to survive. It remains to be seen whether the Green Movement contains any of its own ruthless types. And whether last week's failure will now put them in charge.