Obama's choice of Petraeus is thus surprising but understandable. Petraeus has not had a command in Afghanistan but is known to Hamid Karzai and other Afghan leaders. Back in Washington, Petraeus should get a quick confirmation by the Senate and likely without a major Senate review of Afghan policy, something the White House staff is eager to avoid.
Assuming that Petraeus retains his very full-time job at Centcom, the de facto replacement for McChrystal is actually Lt Gen David Rodriguez, the corps commander in Afghanistan. As long as Petraeus remains at Centcom, he will have to tend to the many relationships the Centcom boss has with foreign leaders, which extend from Egypt to Pakistan. Since foreign leaders want to deal with the top man, he cannot delegate this critical diplomacy to a deputy. In addition, he is responsible for supervision of the Iraq endgame, deterrence and contingency planning for Iran, and supervising the region's air and naval strategies. All more than a full-time job.
So what can we expect Petraeus to do about Afghanistan? He will have to sort through McChrystal's staff, no doubt replacing several of its members. He will have to re-establish troubled relationships with the White House staff, the embassy, the State Department, USAID, and other agencies. And he will have to reassure Karzai and other Afghan leaders and other members of the coalition. After an initial burst of attention, we should expect Petraeus to hand much of this work over to Rodriguez, assuming of course that Petraeus retains his Centcom position.
Obama chose Petraeus because of Petraeus's great prestige and his polished temperament. Unfortunately for Petraeus, the Afghan mission is just as intractable today as it was yesterday. The Taliban, the biggest winners from this episode, will hardly care about today's change and have no reason to change their successful tactics. General Petraeus will soon face his toughest challenge.
Comments
Gian,
I spent from 2003 to 2008 in Iraq and know for a fact that continuity reigned supreme. The theater strategy in Iraq has always been to create a temporal defense in depth IOT create time for the political process to gain traction and to transfer authority to the Iraqi authorities. The particulars of our temporal defense in depth was to first neutralize the insurgency and concurrently create a viable Iraqi security apparatus all the while developing and establishing local administration in pacified areas so as to transition responsibility of those areas to the Iraqis. We now call it "clear-hold-build-transfer". What other strategy is there? Sound familiar in places like Marjah?
Upon his arrival, General P and his staff tweaked the operational approach. Our approach in the Iraq by requirement was a decentralized fight across the theater. Why? The reason was (is) that the cultural characteristics in Anbar province differed from those found in Mosul,Tikrit, Baqubah or Basrah. Although we started out in a CJTF configuration and only later transitioned to MNF-I (Korea Eighth Army model) the fight always remained a decentralized affair. It was a decentralized fight under the CJTF configuration and remained a decentralized fight under the MNF-I configuration.
The ground commander owned and continues to own the fight to this day as well as the local relationships and the initiative. What Gen P and staff did for the ground commander was to formalize the operational focus on relevant populations by publicly stating that the strategic purpose was to gain influence and support within the relevant population i.e. awakening, SOI and villages. In my opinion, the "surge", restored a sense of operational flexibility but also redirected the main effort (resources) to Baghdad forcing the outlying commanders to rely more on indigenous forces to assist in protecting the relevant population. MNF-I under General P, explicitly and publicly directed the outlying commanders to engage the locals something that had not been the case before. Commanders such as you were already engaging the locals e.g. clear and hold out of necessity and expediency and in line with traditional COIN tenets before Gen P assumed command. I know this to be a fact. I personally witnessed firsthand U.S. commanders engaging and protecting the local population during my trips around the country before it became a formal directive to do so.
Getting the narrative right in Iraq would go a long way to actually learning those "surge" lessons. If David Gergen on CNN is any indication, we are going right back to spouting those bumper sticker slogans of success (the simplified Iraqi COIN/surge narrative) and then attempt to apply the same suck to Afghanistan.
All is well. Trying to get back to Astan... but it looks like I am off to Somalia for a short anti-piracy jaunt.
r/
MAC
Anonymous at 1822,
Do you have any inkling of what you're speaking about? Since that was rhetorical, let me shed some light: none of the first cohort to my knowledge was an SF tab-wearing McChrystal acolyte. Most of us were non-vol'd from across the different Services. As far as I know, CFSOC only got one AFPAK billet and none higher than the ISAF DCoS level. Other than that, we're spread all around the country inside the ANSF, Ministries, PRTs, etc.
None of us claim to be experts - far from it - and that's not the intent. All we have is a 4-month DLI initial crash course (before follow-on training), some immersion with GIRoA, ANSF, or NGOs, and then embedding into the 'fight.' I'm positive its not an empire-building exercise; its a small attempt to take our previously pitiful attempts at partnering with the HN in *their* COIN fight in a new direction. A direction that's in its fledgling state.
But I can tell you this: the program is something that should have been done long, long ago because no amount of BCTs as you say is going to win this war. It's a political fight and only through partnering with GIRoA and ANSF at all their various levels to build capacity and capability is going to change anything. All of us 'Hands' might not have agreed with every direction the Boss took this effort and some of us don't blindly drink the COIN kool-aid but that's almost irrelevant: the program isn't really about COIN or about JSOC models, or cottage industries - its about getting off of the FOBs and out of our stormtrooper gear and actually trying to listen to the Afghans and understand what they know they need to stabilize their country. Then we can help them learn and build to adjust their governance, development, and security efforts to help them realize it. For the past 9 years we've just been refusing to listen and trying our own US-centric way. I suppose because people like you think all this good war needs are some BCTs to go out and kick some Taleb ass.
As a Christian who will never bow before the altar of the false COIN religion, I nonetheless believe that the replacement with Petraeus will have a significant effect. Leaving aside the larger issue of our strategy or lack thereof, there was crisis of confidence throughout the ranks with McChrystal. He was unable to convince his own Soldiers or many Americans of the prudence of fairly simple issues like ROE. It seemed that everyday I would read or hear a story of Soldiers complaining of their hands being tied and ordinary Americans griping about the same. At least Petraeus has the perceived track record to be able to go in and reaffirm or adjust such policies and it will be accepted due to his reputation. Perceptions count. At least he can bring that to the table.
Mac:
Agree, I personally dont think it is a matter of generalship at all, and believe in these kinds of wars of counterinsurgency which are essentially area security operations that generalship often matters much less than many folks assume. But the story-line is already being built around General Petraeus. Heck I watched David Gergen on CNN last night where he was falling all over himself to point out that General P saved Iraq and now perhaps he might save Afghanistan.
It was the same thing in Vietnam when Abrams took over. His basic operation on the ground was an area security mission, he was not commanding corps as Patton did in World War II, able to turn an army right or left in a matter of hours if not days. And when Abrams took over things really didnt change much at all. The enemy did to be sure, and American and SVN reacted to that change, but the fundamental conduct of operations did not. THE HISTORICAL RECORD SHOWS THIS. However, the better war narrative that has been constructed over the years suggests that Abrams did turn the Army around on a dime and that turn, according to some, actually won the war. Hokum.
One sees the same Hokum with the notion of a radical shift between Casey and Petraeus in Iraq (read Tom Ricks's latest book); and the record as it exists now in terms of plans, orders, and etc suggest that there was much more continuity than discontinuity between the two.
What is interesting about General P and his taking command in Afghanistan, is that the Coin Triumph narrative seems to be at the end of its rope. What can he really change now, either in reality or perception?
gian
(ps, how goes it Mac? long time no hear old friend)
Will GEN Petreaus put an end to the AF-PAK Hands program which was really nothing more than a sham (or scam) and a way to hand pick the people that McChrystal wanted and to allow ISAF to function along the JSOC model for HQ rotations? They were not looking to develop true AFghan or Pakistan experts (because it would take a generation to do that) but as a way to keep their hands on a huge staff as well as have a network back in DC that would advocate for the mission and be able to influence actions that McChrystal wanted (and we see how well that worked out!!). It is time to clean up ISAF and NMT-A and all the associated "cottage" commands and agencies and organizations that become little more than self-licking ice cream cones. We could probably field another BCT's worth of personnel by slmming down all these HQs/
Robert---you are so right.
Unfortunately for Petraeus, the Afghan mission is just as intractable today as it was yesterday. The Taliban, the biggest winners from this episode, will hardly care about todays change and have no reason to change their successful tactics. General Petraeus will soon face his toughest challenge.
What Obama has failed to understand is that this whole episode has handed the Taliban a major IO win---"look we apply a little pressure and the Americans lose a general"---when they talk now to the local Afghans that will be their messaging. We have nothing to counter that.
If I were Karzai I would be definitely starting talks with the Taliban and Chinese as I now know my partner does not know what he is doing after nine years.
Will be interesting to see if Gen. P goes on Afghan TV/radio and appologizes everytime an Afghan gets killed by NATO troops---will Gen. P be forcing Karzai out of his compound and into the countryside as Gen. McC was doing---doubt it. Will Gen. P start explaining the strategic policy to the ground troops or walk on combat patrols with them--doubt it. He was good for walkarounds in Baghdad, but he never did them outside of Baghdad.
The comments on Gen. P's winning on the surge is historically still in question and many seem to think Gen. P was the driving force behind the Awakening---time will tell.
Slap:
The Coin narrative that has been constructed since the Iraq Surge builds on the myth of the Vietnam War that better generalship under Abrams had "won" the war, only to have it lost by the lack of American will to continue. Of course that myth is just that a myth and is not supported by the historical record. That historical myth from Vietnam has been deployed often to construct the narrative surrounding the Surge of Troops in Iraq in early 2007 that the American Army turned around on a dime because it became armed with new Coin doctrine and more importantly a better General, David A. Petraeus.
Then to Afghanistan and last year when General McKiernan was relieved and replaced by General McChrystal as if he, the new and better general, would save the American Army from itself and accomplish its mission through a better population centric coin campaign.
It is the same thing now I think with General Petraeus and the expectation that since he was the key component of success in Iraq, that he now will be the cipher to unlock the secrets to victory in Afghanistan.
One can already see the articles starting to flow from the pens of journalists and pundits. I am waiting for version two of Kevin Buckley's 1969 article "General Abrams Deserves a Better War."
Whether or not General Petraeus gets his better war, time will tell.
gian
Gian,
Is it a matter of "better" generalship?
I disagree. It is not a matter of better generalship (General McChrystal is a good general is he not), but a matter of mindset as to the kind of war we are fighting and the types of social changes we are actually able to impose.
We've come full circle and can't break free of the so-called functionalist school of British anthropology in which our enlightened administrators continue to puzzle over questions of cultural receptivity to change/modernization and requirements of indirect rule to pull these people, kicking and screaming into the 21st century.
With due reference and respect for General Petraeus but he now reminds me of "Boxer" of George Orwell's Animal Farm. He remains the farm's most hard-working and loyal proponent of our current COIN approach.
"I will work harder" but I fear, when all is said and done, his hard work and better generalship won't make much difference.
r/
MAC