Petraeus Puts Protecting People at Strategy's Center - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service
People are at the center of the counterinsurgency guidance the commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan issued yesterday. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus said the guidance will take "learn and adapt" to heart as the mantra for counterinsurgency, and added that he will learn and adapt his guidance in the weeks and months ahead. Petraeus issued the Army's counterinsurgency manual when he was commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He refined that strategy when he served as the commander of Multinational Force Iraq, and later as commander of U.S. Central Command.
The guidance recognizes that the decisive terrain in Afghanistan is what the military calls the the "human terrain" -- the population where counterinsurgency operations are taking place. "The people are the center of gravity," Petraeus wrote in the guidance issued yesterday. Separating the Taliban and other enemy groups from the people and protecting them from threats is the way forward, he said.
Meeting and understanding the people is the main mission for military forces and international civilian organizations in the country, the general said. He wants servicemembers to conduct foot patrols and talk with the people. "Take off your sunglasses," Petraeus wrote. "Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting face to face, not separated by ballistic glass or Oaklys." NATO and Afghan forces have to live among the people to carry out the counterinsurgency strategy, the general's guidance states. "We can't commute to the fight," he wrote. The idea of NATO troops living among the people and with the Afghan units they support is key. For example, a U.S. military police unit partners with Afghan police in the southern city of Kandahar. By living with them, the unit's members understand the people they work with and can adjust as needed, Petraeus explained.
The general also addressed the need for effective government and for countering corruption. "The Taliban are not the only enemy of the people," he wrote. "The people are also threatened by inadequate governance, corruption and abuse of power -- recruiters for the Taliban." The counterinsurgency guidance tells servicemembers and civilians to work with the Afghan government to strengthen the institutions of the state, and make them responsive to the needs of the people. But the guidance is not all velvet glove; it also calls for NATO and Afghan partners to pursue the enemy relentlessly.
"When the extremists fight, make them pay," Petraeus wrote. "Seek out and eliminate those who threaten the population. Don't let them intimidate the innocent." Protecting the population means doing just that, the guidance says, but killing and injuring civilians works to the enemy's advantage. Petraeus called on troops to fight with discipline and to respect Afghan property. "If we kill civilians or damage their property in the course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate," he said.
The guidance also says that taking territory and then leaving it will not win the battle. Coalition and Afghan forces must take and hold an area to allow international and Afghan government organizations to stabilize the area. Jobs and good government will win the battle in the long run, the general wrote, and servicemembers and civilians must think in the long run. Money is ammunition in a counterinsurgency, the guidance notes. And just as aimed fire is more effective than spraying rounds, so too is investing in the right places with the right people, Petraeus said. The general said he wants servicemembers and civilians to show the Afghan people the values the international community holds dear.
"We are engaged in a tough endeavor," he said. "It is often brutal, physically demanding and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we must not give in to dark impulses or tolerate unacceptable actions by others." Finally, Petraeus said he wants people to use their heads, and to use initiative. "In the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what the orders should have been and execute them aggressively," he wrote.
Comments
New COIN Guidance is a non-starter. Commanders do not buy into it. Siege mentality in Kabul rules the day.
I understand the Guidance was not written for HQs in Kabul but, as P4 says, the people are the COG. Kabul is the most visible and effective expression of GIRoA's power and if the people of that COG see US forces in their capital hunkering down and afraid of their own shadows, the war for the minds of the people will be lost.
What the people feel in Kabul, and the socio-economic conditions created by our lack of COIN Guidance follow-through in the capital will be the single most detrimental thing to risk the viability of the Afghan government. Not good-governance in District X or development in Province Y, but our lack of adopting COIN strategies right here within Kabul city limits. As long as a modicum of stability can be returned to the outlying provinces, it will remain to Kabul, just as it always has, to determine the fate of Afghanistan. While that stability is restored and built in the provinces, we are letting Kabul slip away. By the time stability has been restored in the provinces and Transition is underway, Kabul will have been lost because the people, the COG, will have long lost trust in us and their government by what they see every day around them. Or, more correctly, what they <i>don't</i> see around them. They don't see US forces in local Afghan restaurants, they don't see US Forces walking down the streets or in bazaars, they don't see US forces injecting cash directly into the Afghan economy. They don't see US forces building relationships with Afghans. They do see us hiding behind our hescos, jetting around town in uparmored SUVs, and basically refusing to acknowledge that Afghan citizens even exist inside Kabul. And this is because our commanders cannot break out of their risk-averse, Big-Army mentality.
The people's trust of their government will make or break GIRoA right here and that is being scripted right now through the cognitive dissonance of COIN theory among Kabul's installation commanders. The sooner they can begin to see that blind adherence to forcepro policies for nominal tactical safety risks strategic defeat in the COIN fight, the sooner we can adjust our mentality, assume risk, and do what P4 knows will engender the Afghan people and GIRoA to us.
As you would expect, shortly after assuming command of ISAF, General Petraeus rapidly assessed the situation on the ground and imparted his unique insights regarding what it will take to succeed. On 1 August 2010, he issued "COMISAFs Counterinsurgency Guidance" for all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians of NATO ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan. For those who have not recently read Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, this guidance is an excellent primer (obviously focused on Afghanistan). His 24 points reinforce a counterinsurgency approach that proactively engages the insurgency on all fronts - by closely monitoring the impact of CERP expenditures, not tolerating corruption or inadequate governance, winning the information war by being first with the truth, and relentlessly pursuing those militants who must be killed or captured.
General Petraeus COIN Guidance has some parallels with the guidance he issued as Commander of Multinational Forces Iraq in 2007, but clearly takes into account the unique circumstances and context of the operational environment in Afghanistan. It also builds upon some of the previous guidance issued by General McChrystal in November 2009, but adds several interesting points of emphasis such as "Fight hard and fight with discipline" and "Confront the culture of impunity."
As we all understand, success will not be achieved simply by having clear and insightful guidance from which to draw upon, but by operationalizing this guidance on the ground, at the company level and below -- by ISAF Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Civilians - and their Afghan partners. We would welcome your feedback on the utility of this guidance in the training and preparation of our leaders and troops to succeed in this incredibly complex and demanding operational environment.
To comment, go to http://coin.army.mil and click on COIN Center Blog.
Thank you,
Dan Roper
Col Daniel S. Roper, Director, US Army/ USMC Counter Insurgency Center. This statement is my own and does not constitute an endorsement by or opinion of the Department of Defense.
I would argue that the latest guidance softens the language when it comes to corruption in the Afghan Government as compared with the July 27 version rather than place a greater emphasis on it.
At the very least it places that responsibility on the shoulders of our Afghan Partners, and instructs ISAF to help them in that endeavor.