Yemeni Intellectual Saeed al-Jamhi Ideologically Attacks al-Qaida

Yemeni Intellectual Saeed al-Jamhi Ideologically Attacks al-Qaida:

Exploring Recent Arabic Volumes Deconstructing Militant Islamist

Narratives

by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN & Ms. Dorothy

Corley

Saeed Ali Obaid Al-Jamhi represents the type of research being conducted by Arab

social commentators on al-Qaida.  His 556 page book entitled, "Al-Qaeda:

Establishment, Ideological Background, and Continuity," offers an interesting

deconstruction and critique of al-Qaida's reductionist and pseudo-intellectual interpretation

of fragments of Islam.  The book was published in 2008 by Madbooli Press in

Cairo, Egypt, and it is part of a series by Cairo's Madbooli Press on al-Harakat

al-Islamiya al-Muassira (Modern Islamist Movements).  Al-Jamhi is a Yemeni

expert on terrorism whose commentaries have appeared in the Arab press.  He

represents fresh Arab writers on al-Qaida. Al-Jamhi writes that Imam al-Sherief's

books are a cornerstone in al-Qaida (hereafter AQ) ideology, which is confirmed

by a Bin Laden audio tape entitled, "Jihad is the Path."  The challenge

is that Imam al-Sherief (aka Dr. Fadl) is not only a major inspiration to AQ, but

also a mentor to AQ Deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Today, Imam al-Sherief has ideologically

turned against AQ, calling the organization the cult of Bin Laden and Zawahiri. 

Al-Qaida Takes Muslim Brotherhood Reductionism and Further Simplifies It

Al-Jamhi highlights insecurities inherent in AQ ideology within the pantheon

of Islamist groups, from political advocates, to radical, militant and violent individuals. 

His book discusses the problem of AQ, other militant Islamists, and Islamist groups,

which is of AQ's placement of jihad as the supreme and perhaps only obligation in

Islam save for the belief of the oneness of God, Tawhid.  This reduction

of Islam is becoming more and more acceptable to Islamists and the wider Muslims

around the globe.  In the militant Islamist obsession of jihad as only

fighting, they deny other forms of jihad, such as that of education, individual

morals, conduct, politics, art, or a jihad that is constructive and includes dialog. 

Al-Jamhi traces the origins of this obsession with jihad to Hassan al-Banna (d.

1949), the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.  Jihad reduced to fighting

was a cornerstone of his recruitment effort and was finally put into practice when

the Muslim Brotherhood sent thousands of fedayeen (irregular guerilla fighters)

with the Egyptian army in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.  Al-Jamhi highlights Hassan

al-Banna's reductionism using the Muslim Brotherhood founder's book "Muzakiraat

al-Dawa wal Daeeah," or Memoirs of Proselytizing and the Proselytizer.  

He blends the act of peaceful proselytizing inherent in all three Abrahamic faiths

with a call to violence, and reduces centuries of Islamic traditions into these

bipolar slogans:

• Ebaada wa Qiyada (Obedience and Command)
• Deen wa Dawla (Religion and State)
• Rawhaniya wa Amaal (Spirituality and Action)
• Salaat wa Jihad (Prayer and Fighting)
• Taah wa Hukm (Submission and Governance)
• Mushaf wa Saif (Quran and Sword)

One cannot separate one from another in this list, according to al-Banna. 

These Islamic slogans were stripped of context and history, and applied to a modernist

interpretation to incite anti-colonial direct violent action. This was done in an

effort to evict the British from Egypt, as the British had been in control of Egyptian

affairs since 1882.  Al-Banna takes these sound bites and gives them a gradualist

plan of action writing:

• Al-Deen taqoom bil Jihad (Religion can only be established by Jihad)
• Al-Jihad taqoom illa bil Dawaa (Jihad can only be established by

  proselytizing)

• Jamma la takun illa bil Dawaa (A group cannot form except through

  proselytizing)

We cannot substitute the concerns of God with that of man, al-Banna continues,

concluding by writing that a military coup is only one means of armed resistance. 

His language is important to both Arabic and English readers, as it immerses one

in the language of militant Islamist ideology and its sound bites.  From a

counter-terrorism perspective these are the clues that will allow for the tactical

detection of militant cells, as how they describe their Islam in reductionist terms

is the first indication of radicalization.  Another example in al-Jamhi's book

is the notion of tarbiah (personal moral salvation). Is it the intent of

spiritual purity, or the more earthly attainment of power through direct violent

action?  Does the Muslim strive to be individually just or is this striving

reduced to a perpetual overturning of an unjust system?  AQ takes the concept

of tarbiah (personal moral salvation) called for by the Muslim Brotherhood

to attain piety and conviction before fighting, and dispenses with tarbiah

(the slow process of cultivating proper Islamic belief and practices) to feed adherents

into killing machines.  AQ has no patience for the Muslim Brotherhood's proselytizing

of the grassroots, the cultivation of leaders to the Islamist philosophy, the setup

of the Islamic state (in the Muslim Brotherhood image), or the restoration of the

caliphate.  

Countering Militant Islamist Narratives:  Why Al-Qaida Represents Bankrupt

Ideas

 According to al-Jamhi, AQ does not possess any political program that is

coherent.  This lack of a political program makes AQ different from other Sunni

Salafi Islamist groups.  However, al-Jamhi deduces an AQ strategy from its

writings, statements, and general principles.  The foundational principle of

AQ revolves around the fealty given to the Emir (Usama Bin Laden) and those he designates

as his representative through audio and video tapes.  Those who are among AQ's

senior leadership know their rights and obligations and are committed to raising

their banner in opposition to various flags they consider to be infidel.  The

key is that it is AQ who decides and judges whom amidst Muslims and non-Muslims

they consider to be apostate (Muslims deemed by AQ as unworthy) or infidel (non-Muslims). 

AQ portrays itself as a global Islamic (not Islamist) group of which any Muslim

can join or contribute to. The key here is their attempt to cloak themselves within

Islam and not designate themselves as Islamist. However, their narrow and pseudo-intellectual

interpretation of what amounts to violent politicized Islam is what characterizes

them not as Islamist but violent Islamist.  They plan to reach wherever Muslims

are, and presume to be defenders of the faith whether desired or not by Muslims

or non-Muslims.  Embedded in the pages of anti-AQ Arabic works are the seeds

for an effective campaign to develop schisms that isolate and portray AQ as a fringe

violent cult within Islamist groups.  They claim to be the victorious party,

unique among Islamist groups; a group that cannot and will not coexist with other

faiths, or even differences inherent in 1.57 billion Muslims.  By AQ's own

statements they say, according to al-Jamhi's book, "Jihad is our goal, the path

to salvation and happiness."  Dying has become the end and has supplanted the

means in the AQ of the 21^st century, and Islamic reasoning is only good

to lead people to AQ's version of jihad.  AQ describes itself as a global organization

in which nations must take into account when deciding the fate of Muslims. 

Al-Jamhi describes AQ funding as coming from unique, committed, and special sources,

and not from any party or government.  While other Islamist groups have been

co-opted by government funds, AQ has not.

AQ considers the killing of apostates and infidels an issue that requires no

proof due to their animosity toward the Muslim people.  AQ sees no difference

between Muslim apostasy and Western infidelity, comparing people to alcohol (forbidden

in Islam) that is manufactured domestically, and that alcohol that is imported from

foreign nations.  It is fascinating that AQ compares ideas to alcoholic beverages

in an attempt to counter critical Islamic thought.  Unlike other Islamist radical

groups, AQ considers knowledge andnd tarbiah as no longer needed to delay

to jihad.  AQ criticizes the ulema (the Islamic clergy) as being immersed

in their texts and divorced from the people.  They add that the ulema have

been bought by the state as a means of usurping religious leadership from the clergy. 

AQ talks of Muslims as victims who have been intellectually conquered by the West,

presuming superiority over most Muslims.  AQ considers enjoining the good and

forbidding the evil as the most important principle.  While there is confusion

as to whether jihad (as fighting) or enjoining the good and forbidding the evil

is the most important principle, it is natural for AQ to zero in on this Quranic

injunction.  By stripping away intent, AQ uses this injunction as a means to

exert societal control and to abuse perceived offenders in order to intimidate the

rest of the populace, not as a means to individual moral salvation.

An Attempt to Address the Problems of Salafism: An Arab-Muslim Perspective

Al-Jamhi also discusses the problem of 21^st century Salafism (the

return to the pious founder movements that emerged in different times in different

locations).  His focus is on the evolution of Salafism in current times. 

He writes that Salafism has evolved from a corrective movement dedicated to correcting

orthodoxy, to breaking into factions and being reduced to a simple radical opposition

movement, which even opposes other Salafists who may have a slightly different Islamic

view.  Salafis have expropriated Islam as a means of acting in conceited pride

and superiority and have neglected to submit themselves humbly before God. 

This is the arrogance of possessing what they believe to be the only true form of

Islamic expression.  Al-Jamhi's book outlines that modern Salafism of the late

20^th century onward fell into philosophical trap by rejecting political

parties, democracy and elections.  Salafis shut themselves off from constructive

expressions, means of protest, and the opportunities to peacefully proselytize their

message in society by engaging in social isolation, which then leads to radicalism

and militancy.  Al-Jamhi's ideas are not fully formed, but this is the first

attempt to explain why Sunni militant Islamists who resort to violence tend to be

Salafi. 

Al-Jamhi discusses three types of dawa (proselytizing) among Salafis today. 

(1)  Dawa Salafiyah, which is straight proselytizing to God's book and

the path of Prophet Muhammad; (2) Dawa Ikhwaniyah is more politicized and

a is a call to follow a personality within the Islamist movement; (3) Dawa Tablighiyah

is also a call to follow a personality and is politicized but compromises in attempting

to attain political power through the abuse of constitutional means.  The last

two Dawa Salafiyah and Dawa Tablighiyah are fragments of Salafism, Hasafiyah Sufism,

and Sunni Islam.  A Muslim is loyal to God and Prophet Muhammad, while a member

of the Muslim Brotherhood is loyal to an organization or person.  These nuances

show the schisms within the more radical forms of Salafism that AQ derives followers,

as it reduces obedience from God to an individual, represented by the cult of Bin

Laden and Zawahiri.  It is crucial for counter-terrorism experts to immerse

themselves in these schisms and in the language of radicals, and to disaggregate

Militant (Violent) Islamists, from Islamists, and these two from Islam.  A

more nuanced approach is needed, and this cannot be achieved by considering Islam,

Shariah (Islamic law) or Muslims as monolithic and not subject to the human

condition of disagreement over orthodoxy, orthopraxy, and the big questions over

what Islam will be in the 21^st century.

Conclusion

Reading and discussing Arabic works of significance should be required in America's

war colleges and counter-terrorism training programs.  Al-Jamhi is a Yemeni

scholar with many observations and ideas that could be of use in finding strategic

advantages for the United States and its Muslim friends who wish to undermine AQ

ideologically.  Studying Arabic works on al-Qaida represents the new frontier

in training our men and women attending such institutions as the National Defense

University and who wish to better protect America's national security. 

Commander Aboul-Enein is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer and Middle East

Foreign Area Officer.  He has been involved in Middle East policy and counter-terrorism

since 9-11.  Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant

Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," published in 2010 by Naval

Institute Press.  He teaches one elective on Islam, Islamist Political Theory,

and Militant Islamist Ideology as Adjunct Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces.  Ms. Dorothy Corley is an undergraduate student

of international affairs at Boston University and intern at the Industrial College

of the Armed Forces.  Ms. Corley is the Teaching Assistant to Commander Aboul-Enein's

course.  Finally, the authors' wish to thank the Yale and National Defense

University Libraries for making Al-Jamhi's work available for study and analysis.