Russia

Putin’s Strategic Aim is to Fracture the West

Rachel Rizzo and Adam Twardowski

After Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 caught the United States off guard, Western observers have since struggled to understand Russian strategic decision-making. The apparent disconnect between Russia’s strategic gains and economic costs in theaters such as Ukraine and Syria leaves more questions than answers about “what Putin wants,” and how he perceives Russia’s interests. Alarmed by this uncertainty, a growing chorus of influential voices has warned that unless NATO shores up its land and maritime capabilities in Europe, it risks inadvertently inviting Russia to make a land-grab of NATO’s eastern territory. While NATO must prepare for such a scenario and reassure nervous eastern allies, Putin is probably not looking to rebuild Russia’s imperial frontiers or start a war with the United States, nor is he interested in or capable of reestablishing Russia as a global power like the Soviet Union was. Most analyses about “what Putin wants” miss the mark. Putin realizes that in an era when Russia’s internal challenges dramatically limit its ability to project power, Russia’s security depends not on rolling tanks across the borders of the NATO alliance, but instead on fracturing the West and paralyzing decision-making among Western leaders. Russia’s apparent success in exploiting these fissures within the Alliance is thus the greatest threat the United States and its NATO allies face from Moscow.

A more difficult question to answer, however, centers around why exactly Putin has used this strategy and plunged Russia’s relationship with the West into the worst crisis since the Cold War. Part of the consensus seems to be that Putin is resentful of Russia’s fall from global power and that he craves respect from the United States. Others blame the United States for stoking Russian insecurity by expanding NATO eastward to Russia’s western border. Still others focus on the dynamics of Russia’s internal political landscape, stressing that Putin’s ability to sustain his grip on power depends on promoting an intense nationalistic mentality amongst Russians. In reality, Putin is probably motivated by a combination of all these factors. What is clear, however, is that Russia is intent on honing sophisticated capabilities in the cyber and information domains to sew division in the West and fracture the unity of the transatlantic alliance.

How exactly does Russia carry out its policy of fracturing the West? A new report from CSIS on the Kremlin’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe explains that Russia seeks to advance its geostrategic objectives in part by “weakening the internal cohesion of societies and strengthening the perception of the dysfunction” of the West. By shaping the decision-making apparatus of certain countries through the exploitation of weak state institutions and the identification of allies sympathetic to Russian interests, Moscow believes it achieves more than it could through traditional military campaigns, and at much lower cost. Putin has taken this well-known playbook, which includes disinformation campaigns designed to discredit Western institutions and sew doubts about official narratives of Russian behavior, and found new ways to apply it in the West. Recently, footprints of this approach can be seen throughout the United States, Europe, and the Middle East

In the United States, for instance, Russia’s intelligence services hacked the Democratic National Committee’s servers and leaked embarrassing emails between high-level officials to Wikileaks. The Kremlin did not pursue this strategy because it thinks it can help propel Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, but rather thought that by exposing the inner-workings of the American political system that some voters already view as corrupt, it could sew more discontent among Americans, further discredit Western democratic institutions abroad, and politically weaken Clinton. A weakened U.S. administration would find itself distracted during its early days in office and unable to react decisively to Russian aggression in eastern Europe and elsewhere.

Putin’s intervention in the Donbas was also not intended to be a precursor to large-scale military intervention in eastern Europe. Russia solved the perceived problem of Ukraine’s integration into Western institutions not just by fomenting a protracted conflict in its east, but also by exposing deep-seated divisions in the transatlantic community about how to respond to Russian policy. Today, despite outward statements of unity, EU member states still find themselves at odds with one another over new sanctions against Russia. NATO’s capabilities, though improving, have suffered years of underinvestment by many of America’s European allies, and alarming public opinion polls expose deep ambivalence among Europeans for participating in NATO-led campaigns to defend their eastern allies.

The Middle East is another theater where Russian meddling has sewn disunity and division. Since Russia entered the conflict in Syria in September 2015, the Obama administration has been forced to balance its interest in ending the conflict on acceptable terms with the desire to avoid direct military confrontation with Russian military assets and personnel. The collapse of ceasefire talks with Russia in October has forced the United States to confront the uncomfortable reality that although a ceasefire must still involve some form of arrangement with Russia given Moscow’s interests in the conflict, Putin sees no need to hurry the process along. Russian disinformation efforts already blur the full extent of Russia’s crimes in Syria, and as long as Putin continues to prop up the Assad Regime and keep America at bay, he considers Russia’s interests safe.

The bottom line is that by creating cracks in Western unity, Putin believes he can achieve his aim of continued relevance at a time when Russian economic, demographic, and political power is on the decline. Fomenting chaos inhibits the West’s ability to present a united front, and thus provides an artificial boost to Russian power and ability to shape global events. What has also become clear is that relations between Russia and the West are not poised to improve any time soon. Although the United States and Europe must keep diplomatic channels open with the goal of deescalating tensions and avoiding further clashes, the West must understand that the true goal of Russia’s current strategy is to deceive Western interlocutors, deflect attention from its aggression, and undermine the cohesion of Western institutions. Even if Putin does not aim to instigate additional land-grabs or pursue war with NATO, this does not mean that Russia is not dangerous. In fact, through the use of hybrid rather than conventional tactics, Putin has proven that he can create just as much chaos as by sending an armed battalion into NATO territory. By waging underhanded forms of aggression, recent history has shown he can count on a Western response that underestimates Russia’s resolve to assert its interests.

Russia, the United States, and the Syrian End-State

Gabriel White

Amid the backdrop of renewed fighting and yet another crumbling ceasefire agreement, Russia, has once again embarked on a concerted effort to fracture the Syrian armed opposition. In a direct challenge to the United States, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov recently accused the U.S. of protecting the Syrian al Qaeda affiliate, and internationally recognized terror group Jabhat al-Nusra, which rebranded in July as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. While the factual basis of Lavrov’s remarks is steeped in absurdity, the accusations perfectly illustrate Russia’s divide et impera strategy. Russia remains committed to severing U.S. ties to the armed opposition, propagating trends of extremist homogenization, and fundamentally recharacterizing the war in northwestern Syria.

A year has passed since Russia’s entry into the Syrian Civil War. It is evident that no side is capable of achieving outright military victory, yet Russia’s sustained air campaign has inflicted a heavy blow to Syria’s beleaguered opposition. To date, Russia has succeeded in both: securing the survival of Bashar al Assad’s statelet and in part, fulfilling the myth of the regime's characterization of the opposition as a terrorist entity. These objectives have come at the price of heavy casualties, accomplished through brute force and an indiscriminate bombing campaign. As such, Russia’s involvement has catalyzed the opposition’s integration and cooperation with Islamist extremist factions. In turn perpetuating the myth that the regime's war is a war on terror.

Of course, the trend of moderate integration into extremist elements existed prior to Russia's entry into the war.  The near collapse and subsequent irrelevance of the Free Syrian Army as the leading opposition faction was the unfortunate consequence of a cocktail of foreign backing (or lack thereof), toxic ideology, and circumstance. In its place, a plethora of well-armed and equipped extremist factions emerged, securing some of the opposition’s most notable victories, including the storming of Idlib (2015) and championing the continued defense of Aleppo.  

Exploiting this reality, Russia began to lay the foundation of its incrementalist divide et Impera strategy during the February 2016 Munich Cessation of Hostilities agreement (CoH). The agreement, as drafted, presented the moderate opposition, and even some extremist factions, with the illusion of choice.  These groups were forced to disavow a mostly trusted long-term partner (Jabhat al-Nusra) or face the possibility of becoming ‘legitimate’ targets of airstrikes.  Despite limited success featured in Jabhat al-Nusra’s modest reorganization of forces, the ultimatum failed to yield the sought after American outcome--extremist isolation. The failed partitioning within the Syrian opposition demonstrated that the Jabhat al-Nusra challenge had already metastasized.

The failure of the February CoH agreement not only legitimized Russian and Syrian sorties over opposition held territories, but also raised questions over the boundaries of legitimate targets under the Jabhat al-Nusra affiliated umbrella.  Most importantly, however, the agreement presented Russia an opportunity to broaden the base of ‘blacklisted’ groups within the armed opposition. This outcome expanded the number of legitimate targets and permanently alienated key opposition groups from participation in any potential peace agreement.

In late April, Russia submitted a request to the United Nations Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee to issue terrorist designations to Syrian Salafi opposition members: Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar al-Sham, Salafi groups that occupy linchpin positions within the armed opposition. Russia’s motivations to designate these groups  are clear— undermine key opposition efforts in Eastern Ghouta and Aleppo while simultaneously coaxing rebel forces to continue their combat operations. This outcome strains and limits whatever influence the U.S. holds within the opposition, while negating what  the Cessation of Hostilities agreement in its entirety

To further illustrate Russia’s disingenuity with the peace process, at the time these requests were issued, the Syrian High Negotiating Committee was chaired by Jaysh al-Islam leader Mohammad Alloush. Such a move, even if it was bound to be rejected demonstrates Russia’s ultimate aims in changing the course of the war, not in terms of who can achieve a military victory, but rather who the international community will be left to work with.

Real doubt persists as to whether Russia ever had any real intention of adhering to the second Cessation of Hostilities negotiated in September 2016. Neither Russia nor the Syrian regime has demonstrated any interest in yielding back momentum on the battlefield. Building off the success of the recent re-encirclement of eastern Aleppo, Russian and Syria forces continue their bombing campaign, while using negotiations to buy time for further advancement.

Russia has in large part succeeded in its objectives — extremist factions are entrenched within the opposition, the United States opposition strategy is in tatters, and whatever window remains for meaningful U.S. action is closing. 

So long as the United States fails to support what remains of moderate partners on the ground, policy makers will be forced to operate within the reality of a predominantly extremist opposition.  Inaction will perpetuate humanitarian disaster and violence that has now raged for five years. Should Aleppo fall, the subsequent options for a military solution will require significantly higher levels of risk and a political solution will rely on terms dictated by Moscow and Tehran. Neither situation is desirable.

In light of the allegation that the Boston bombing suspects may be of Chechen origin, you may find the following articles as helpful background in getting some context on recent events in Chechnya.

The Russian Counterinsurgency Operation in Chechnya Part 1: Winning the Battle, Losing the War, 1994 – 1996

The Russian Counterinsurgency Operation in Chechnya Part 2: Success, But at What Cost? 1999 – 2004

The Russian COIN Campaign in North Caucasus

The Process of Islamic Radicalization in Intra-State Conflict: Insurgent Grievance and Leadership in the First Chechen War and the Tajik Civil War

Author's Note: Some of the ideas in this short essay were born from a conversation I had with Mr. Edward Burke of the Center for European Reform, to whom I owe due thanks.

Hilary Clinton’s June 12 accusation against Russia put forward nothing new. And what is worse, it could not have come at a worse time. Only three days earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the “urgent” need for an international conference to prevent Syria’s further slide into civil war, to force all parties “to sit down at the negotiating table after first halting the violence.” This plan -- markedly similar to Kofi Annan’s proposal -- belies a great sacrifice by the Russian leadership, but one on which the Secretary failed to capitalize.

Russia’s foreign policy is rooted in a Cold War psychology. Lavrov and his Foreign Ministry view international politics as a geopolitical chess game. It would be no stretch to say that Lavrov has acted as Russia’s “new Kissinger,” seeking to maintain Russian influence at any cost: quintessential realpolitik. Moscow’s influence has diminished since 1991, but Russia’s support for the Assad regime is rooted in Moscow’s desire to maintain its ally in Damascus, and appear powerful in the face of western opinion: the last thing Lavrov wants is to cave to Washington’s desires.

So why would he make such a concession? Russian leaders know that Assad’s days are numbered. The only realistic option for Moscow now is to push for a compromise, evinced by their desire for an international conference. Such an entity would provide parts of the Syrian government with an “escape hatch” from the conflict. Without the threat of vengeful massacres or reprisals against Assad loyalists, support for the government would shrink. Indeed, much of the regime’s support comes from those who fear for Syria’s security in a post-Assad region, not pro-government idealists.

It is thus important to see that Lavrov put quite a bit of leverage on the line over the last few days. He could only make his proposal after being given permission from the highest echelons in the Russian government. The fact that he was able to offer Russian support for such a multilateral conference indicates that Russian diplomats are finally realizing that it is in their best interests to maintain some of their influence in Syria lest they lose it all: for Russian leaders to express a willingness to work towards a “post-Assad Syria” is relatively groundbreaking.  An internationally-brokered compromise with the opposition is essential to this envisaged transition.

Secretary Clinton’s accusation derailed these significant steps. Coming hours after Lavrov’s most recent concessions, her words can easily be seen as a rebuke against the Russian government, and will likely be interpreted as such in Moscow. It has been a poorly-kept secret that Russia has been delivering weapons to Syria for a long time, and the intelligence which supported her claims takes a very long time to verify. Clinton’s timing sends the clear message that the United States continues to be unwilling to work with Moscow towards any solution except that which Washington prescribes.

This type of unilateralism is extremely harmful. It is easy to underestimate or forget the anger Russian leaders still feel about American actions in 2002-2003 during the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, against which they were strongly opposed. The ensuing rift in the Security Council between these two powers led some analysts to wonder if the United Nations could survive. This resentment has only been exacerbated by the most recent accusations. Indeed, the way Russia interpreted Clinton’s words becomes painfully clear in Moscow’s most recent refusal on July 5 to attend international talks aimed at halting the bloodshed in Syria, a meeting spearheaded by the United States, France, Britain and Germany. Russia intransigence further inspired China to boycott the meeting as well. If the United States ignores any movement by Russia towards accepting a proposal for slow but steady peace, the comprehensive victory envisaged by Washington will become even more of an impossibility.

A solution to the Syria crisis will require Russian involvement. Such cooperation is not as difficult to achieve as it may seem: Russian diplomats, headed by Lavrov, are ready to negotiate.  Arming the Syrian regime against its own citizens is indefensible. Yet, Washington cannot continue to ignore the goals and motivations of those groups that are backing the regime, especially Russia. It is critical to bring these groups to the negotiating table so that a difficult but necessary compromise can be extruded, albeit painfully.

Syrian government leaders feel right now as if they are faced with a “do or die” reality. The international community must offer a third way out, whereby parts of the regime can realize it is in their best interest to end the conflict. The Russian plan would create such an avenue, but Clinton’s accusations risk killing it.

Recently, Moscow declared that it would stop supplying the Syrian government with weapons, specifically the Yak-130 attack aircraft; however, this declaration is yet shaky, and it is unclear whether Russia will discontinue current shipments, or simply stop supplying new arms. To solidify these important steps forward, and to keep the Syrian war “small,” the US government should learn from the diplomatic mistake it made in June.