Afghanistan

The Taliban launched a set of coordinated attacks across Afghanistan.  The attacks were centered in Kabul where fighting appears to be still on-going, but also included a suicide attack against the Jalalabad airbase, and in Paktika and Logar Provinces.  In Kabul, reports indicate that the Taliban occupied numerous buildings in order to target NATO headquarters, parliament, and multiple western embassies, as well as attacking the presidential palace.  

These attacks will surely spawn narrative and counter-narrative:  the boldest coordinated attack yet in the form of a mini-Tet Offensive, or a pathetic attempt by a few die-hards that reflects the incapacity of the insurgency.  With U.S. public support for the war already at new lows, with only 30% of respondents in support, (a low not seen in polls on Vietnam until May 1972), one wonders if this attack can really shake that last third of die-hard supporters.  More broadly, though, how will this shape the U.S. domestic political narrative during the coming months ramping up to the election and what effect, if any, will it have on perceptions inside Afghanistan?

This provocative essay from Angelo Codevilla at the Claremont Review of Books has enough vitriol in it to get some on everyone's sacred cow.  He discusses everything from a revolutionary social situation, to the farce of TSA screening, to the paucity of ships for an "island nation."  Even if you don't agree with some or all of it, the issues he raises and the way he addresses them are sure to get you thinking.  

September 11's planners could hardly have imagined that their attacks might seriously undermine what Americans had built over two centuries, ... In fact, our decline happened because the War on Terror—albeit microscopic in size and destructiveness as wars go—forced upon us, as wars do, the most important questions that any society ever faces: Who are we, and who are our enemies? What kind of peace do we want? What does it take to get it? Are we able and willing to do what it takes to secure our preferred way of life, to deserve living the way we prefer? Our bipartisan ruling class's dysfunctional responses to such questions inflicted the deepest wounds.

...After 9/11, at home and abroad, our bipartisan ruling class did the characteristic things it had done before—just more of them, and more intensely. ... Ten years later, the results speak for themselves: the terrorists' force mineure proved to be the occasion for our own ruling elites and their ideas to plunge the country into troubles from which they cannot extricate it.

The Atlantic reports that American military bandsmen are supporting an effort to create Afghan military bands.  Seriously.  

The 10th Mountain Division has sent soldiers to play at dining facilities and ceremonies and to tour remote outposts, entertaining troops with Avalanche, its six-piece rock band; Task Force Dixie, a New Orleans jazz-and-blues band; and Bunker Brass, a quintet. They’re a talented crew: U.S. soldiers must audition to be Army musicians. Those who make it include some promising high-school graduates, but a good number have studied music in college. After learning in basic training to shoot rifles and throw grenades, they have 10 weeks of band practice and advanced music theory.

...

 

And with money from a special U.S. fund for outfitting Afghan security forces, Wallace bought the band new instruments. He skipped woodwinds, American favorites that would likely be ruined by Kandahar’s dry, searing heat, and instead added a French horn and a tuba, though no one knows how to play them.

And yet Wallace, like other military mentors across Afghanistan, is learning that many of the stubbornest deficiencies here are not material, but institutional. A vivid illustration of the problem comes midway through practice, when Nejrabi tells me he doesn’t hold high aspirations for his band.

“They don’t really like to be musicians,” he says, nodding toward his men, who sit a few feet away, listening. “It’s an easy job, and they’re not going out on missions. They come out here to pass the time, make some money, and be safe.”

Mohammed Merah, a young radicalized Frenchman, traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2010 and 2011.  Over an eight-day period in March 2012, he killed three military personnel, three Jewish children, and one Jewish teacher in a shooting spree that horrified and shocked the French nation.  On March 11, he shot dead Staff Sergeant Imad Ibn Ziaten in a parking lot in broad daylight. Four days later, on March 15, he killed first class private Mohammed Legouad and Lance Corporal Abel Chenouf and wounds seriously Lance Corporal Loic Lieber in a small strip mall near their barracks amidst a crowd of bystanders. On March 19, he killed three Jewish children and a Jewish teacher as they arrived at the Ozar-Hatorah school in Toulouse.  Another older student was wounded. The R.A.I.D., the French version of a SWAT police unit, killed him after a 32-hour siege.   

A Plot Inspired and Driven by Al-Qaeda?

Merah’s modus operandi was chillingly efficient and savagely barbaric.  The murderer approached his victims on a scooter, clad in black, and wearing a helmet. He opened fire on his victims at point blank range with a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol, aiming precisely at their upper bodies and heads.  There was no escaping his wrath.  “I can still see the flames coming out of the barrel.  He killed the last soldier like an animal,” reported an employee of the newspaper stand nearby the automated teller where Merah shot the three soldiers.

The killer was a 24 year-old French citizen of Muslim faith.  During conversations with the police negotiator publicized by Prosecutor Michel Molins, Mehra claimed to be affiliated with Al-Qaeda and trained by Al-Qaeda in Waziristan.  He further indicated that he had received guidelines from Al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan to conduct terrorist attacks in France and warned that his actions were part of a larger campaign.  He also said that he had planned to continue his killing spree by killing more police officers and soldiers.  According to Michel Molins, he had already identified the individuals to be killed.  Organizational links to Al-Qaeda have yet to be proven, but intelligence officials are convinced that Merah radicalized himself watching al-Qaeda video propaganda on the Internet.    

In a telephone call to France 24 two hours before the police laid siege to his apartment, Merah claimed responsibility for all three attacks.  He said he carried out the attacks against the soldiers to protest the French law forbidding the wearing of the head-to-toe veil known as burqa and to protest French intervention in Afghanistan.  He chose to target soldiers because they are a symbol of the State, but chose the individuals randomly.  He chose to attack Jewish children supposedly to avenge his “Palestinian brothers and sisters.”  Here again, he chose Jewish targets as a symbol of Israel but targeted the individuals randomly.

New Challenges for French Counter-Terrorism

These attacks and the failure to prevent them pose the series of new unexpected challenges to the French government. 

• The modus operandi is strikingly different from past Salafist-Jihadist attacks in France.  Handgun attacks are more reminiscent of radical Marxist Palestinian factions such as Abu Nidal or Corsican or Basque terrorist attacks.   Up until a few weeks ago, Salafist-Jihadists’ preferred mode of action consisted of planting bombs in the public square.  Merah’s M.O. is consistent with Abu Musab al Suri’s recommendation to engage in small-scale independent acts of anti-Western terror.  Moreover, Salafist-Jihadist attacks have largely been mass attacks geared at killing as many as possible regardless of their individual status in society.  Merah’s attacks are different.  He carefully chose his victims in accordance with Al-Qaeda’s definition of its enmity: French soldiers representing the crusaders who occupy Islamic lands, and Jews who represent the state of Israel.  In the past, mass attacks that killed indiscriminately made it easier for the government to mobilize all forces of society against the terrorism, as everyone could easily identify with the victimized bystander.  Selected targets might complicate the government’s task as ordinary people not belonging to the categories targeted (the vast majority of people) might feel less connected to or concerned with such attacks. 
• According to French authorities, Mohammed Mehra is a loner, the product of an “atypical Salafist self-radicalization,” without connection to any “jihadist organization structure known to the services.”  If accurate, this is a major departure from past attacks where terrorists were part of a logistical cell affiliated to a larger movement, principally the GIA (Algerian Armed Islamic Group) that provided the resources and expertise necessary to successfully conduct the planned attacks.  The absence of a logistical cell threw the surveillance of the DRCI off as they rated Merah at low-risk of carrying out attacks because they saw no cell-related activity.  Whether there were no cells, or the cells went unidentified for too long remains to be seen.   Either way, it indicates that the painstaking work of monitoring and preventing new attacks will need to be adapted. The government is bound to propose new legislation to close what has appeared as loopholes in the current legislation.
• Last, Merah behaved like a ‘serial killer.’  In the past, single terrorists carried out one operation, but Merah successfully conducted three attacks and told the R.A.I.D negotiator that he was planning on attacking more soldiers and police officers on the morning the police laid siege to his apartment.  Criminologists noted that Merah displayed a deeply narcissistic motivation and a pathological desire to eliminate all those whom, he believes, do not deserve to live; traits consistent with serial killers.  He acted with the cold determination and the violent savagery of serial killers.  In Monday’s attack, he pursued the frightened daughter of the school’s principal into the schoolyard as she was seeking refuge into the building, to shoot her to death. Moreover, he expressed no regrets for the deaths he caused.  Prosecutor François Molins said: “He expressed no regrets.  He only regretted not having killed more victims.  On the contrary, he boasted that he brought France down to its knees.” The confluence of terroristic and criminal motivations and tactics present new challenges for both the French government and French society.  Among those challenges: how does the government detect those individuals before they spur into action? How does society cope with an extended terroristic shooting spree? What is the impact on local socio-economic life if a shooting spree causes of local lock-down?  

Political Controversy and Announced Reforms

However unusual the circumstances of the attacks and the profile of Mohammed Merah, the failure to prevent him and the length of time (eight days) it took to identify and neutralize him prompted unusually vocal criticisms of the Intelligence Services and calls for reforms.

Amidst a tough presidential campaign, opposition leaders openly wondered whether the Intelligence Directorate (DCRI) did all that was necessary in a timely manner.The fact that Merah was identified as a potential suspect after the first attack but left to his own device until after the murderous spree at the Ozar hatorah school eight days later remains a key point of criticism.François Hollande, the candidate for the Socialist Party, suggested that a full review of all counter-terrorism laws and structures might be in order.Subsequently, the socialist group in the Senate requested that the chiefs from the Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (Erard de Corbin de Mangoux) and from the Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (Bernard Squarcini) appear before a Senate panel.Meanwhile, the extreme-right candidate Marine Le Pen lambasted the government for being too soft on radical Islamists.

In response to the political firestorm, the government has adopted a four-prong approach.First, it publicly defended the State’s services, praising the actions of both the DCRI and the police.Second, the government quelled the Socialist request for a hearing of the two Intelligence chief, accusing the Socialist Party of playing politics ahead of the elections.Third, the government announced a new anti-terrorism legislation aimed at criminalizing radical Islamist Internet surfing and as well as traveling to insurrectionary countries.  A government spokesman announced a draft law for the end of April.  Lastly, the government cracked down on presumed radical Islamist groups in two nationwide operations. So far, 13 militants are under arrest.  These operations indicate that the government may be attempting to neutralize not only groups that act violently, but also those who advocate the use of violence. 

It is likely that serious internal reassessment of how to detect radicalized individuals is already underway as the French government does not want a repeat of the Merah episode.More serious legislative initiative and/or organizational reorganization will probably have to wait after the Presidential Elections in May 2012.

The Atlantic asks a number of pundits if the U.S. will win in Afghanistan.  More specifically:

"The Obama administration's stated objectives in Afghanistan are to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven, prevent the Taliban from overthrowing the government, and build up Afghan security forces in order to transition U.S. combat forces out of the country by 2014. Based on the current strategy, do you think that the Obama administration will achieve its goals?" 

Admittedly, I'm cherry-picking some of the statements, but you can read their full context at the original article.:

Andrew Exum

I believe Afghanistan may be a case in which the president's policy will succeed but not the strategic goals associated with that policy. 

Jamie M. Fly

If the war is lost, it will be lost in Washington, not on the battlefield. Our men and women in uniform can succeed, but only if they are given the resources and time to do so.

Gian Gentile

That botched strategy has sought to achieve very limited policy aims--the reduction of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan--with a maximalist operational method of armed nation building. It represents the death of good American strategy and a waste of good American blood and treasure.

Candace Rondeaux

The Taliban are unlikely to overthrow the Afghan government wholesale but they don't have to for the White House strategy to fail--it already has.

Dave Maxwell testified last week before the House Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.  The topic was "Understanding Future Irregular Warfare Challenges."  The prepared testimony transcript can be found here and a video of the testimony here.

In reaction to public criticism that the military was unprepared for what followed after the defeat of the Iraqi military and destruction of its government, the military embarked on a rapid doctrinal development effort that resulted in the famed FM 3-24 as well as new concepts and forces laid out in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. By 2008 the Secretary of Defense issued an instruction (DODI 3000.07) that brought together Unconventional Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Foreign Internal Defense, Counterterrorism, and Stability Operations under the umbrella of Irregular Warfare.

But with this came the proliferation of new terms and concepts that were (and remain) redundant and of little additional value. Examples of such terms include Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partner Capacity (BPC), Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA), Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/build and Advise (OTERA), Stability Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO), Provincial (originally provisional) Reconstruction Teams (PRT), and Military Transition Teams (MiTT), again, just to name a few. In addition, re-establishing Irregular Warfare as one end of the spectrum of conflict has also led to the rise of new terms to describe conflicts other than state on state high intensity maneuver warfare. Although a number of these terms were being put forth prior to 9-11 examples of the names for war and conflict included not only Insurgency but also Asymmetric Warfare, 4th Generation Warfare (and 5th as well), Hybrid Warfare, Network Centric Warfare, and a host of other rather esoteric terms such as “post-heroic warfare,” “matrix warfare,” and “holistic warfare.” And we should not forget the Chinese “Unrestricted Warfare.”

If Clausewitz were alive today he would repeat what he wrote in the 19th Century:

“Again, unfortunately, we are dealing with jargon, which, as usual bears little resemblance to well defined, specific concepts.”

But Clausewitz also wisely remarked that before you embark on war you have to determine the type of war to be fought. Unfortunately this wise counsel has been focused on naming rather than understanding the war.

The NY Times has posted a 5:35 video on Afghanistan through the eyes of LTC John Darin Loftis, a public information officer, Pashto speaker, and victim of the ministry shootings on 25 February 2012.  The video can be found at this link.  Highly recommended.