Afghanistan

CSIS's Anthony Cordesman argues that the strategy embarked upon by Gen Stanley McChrystal is now dead and that the U.S. and its allies must construct and resource a strategy to transition to an Afghan "muddle through" that doesn't greatly jeopardize U.S. interests.  While I'm not sure that there has ever been a strategy in Afghanistan, or how to state it, Cordesman argues that four threats have been killing any such strategy from the beginning. (h/t Nathan Finney)

The key reasons shaping uncertainty as to whether the mission could be accomplished—whether it would be possible to create an Afghanistan that could largely stand on its own and be free of any major enclaves of terrorists or violent extremists—went far beyond the problems created by the insurgents.

It was clear that there were four roughly equal threats to success, of which the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani, and Hekmatyar were only the first. The second was the corruption and incompetence of the Afghan government. The third was the role of Pakistan and its tolerance and support of insurgent sanctuaries. The fourth was the United States and its allies.

I highly recommend that you also see Jim Sleeper's "How the Debacle in Afghanistan Disgraced its Cheerleaders" at the Huffington Post, h/t anonymous you know who you are.

At Slate, Fred Kaplan argues that the killing of 2 officers in Afghanistan is a classic insurgent tactic... and it's working.

Once again, we find ourselves way in over our heads in Afghanistan, and at the worst possible time ...

We don’t yet know the precise motive of the man who killed two American officers in a highly secure area of the Afghan interior ministry’s headquarters over the weekend. But the incident should not be surprising; it’s a classic case of insurgency tactics ...

Of the 58 NATO soldiers killed in Afghanistan so far this year, 10 have been at the hands of Afghan personnel whom they’d been training. 

...

If the insurgents demonstrate that not even American officers are safe, not even in the most secure corridors of the Afghan interior ministry, it... reinforces the theme that the government and its protectors can’t protect the Afghan people, ... sows distrust between the government and its protectors, ... [and]  severely weakens the government.

Read the whole short, but excellent article at Slate.  Hat tip to @GregJaffe and @smsaideman for the Tweet.

The Washington Post reports:

The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan on Saturday recalled all NATO personnel working in Afghan ministries in the Kabul area — a bold and potentially divisive response to the killing of two American service members by an Afghan security official in the country’s fortified Interior Ministry earlier in the day.

Reuters reported that President Obama and Secretary of Defense Panetta expressed their support for the decision by ISAF commander General John Allen.  The move highlights the growing tension, mistrust, and antipathy between ISAF and some of their Afghan partners that peaked over a Quran burning incident earlier this week.  The coming week will be very telling as the sides chart their way ahead in a relationship that is strained and has a limited future.