Trump’s Imaginary “Strategy” for Afghanistan
Perhaps after hard-hitting briefings from Mattis and McMaster, Trump finally realized Obama’s decision to remain in Afghanistan was both realistic and necessary.
Perhaps after hard-hitting briefings from Mattis and McMaster, Trump finally realized Obama’s decision to remain in Afghanistan was both realistic and necessary.
A critical component of turning the tide must be economic development.
It is our national tar baby. Most simply, it is a mess. We are there. We would like to get out. What are our options?
As President Trump inherits the war in Afghanistan, the best piece of advice anyone can give him is that this is about as good as it is going to get.
Both of us served in Kunduz from 2011-12, at a time when it seemed as though the province would continue on a trajectory of increasing stability.
SIGAR Inquiry Into DOD Efforts to Address Afghanistan’s Ghost Soldiers
Yesterday, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) published a letter to DOD regarding continued reports of absentee or non-existent Afghan National Defense and Security Force (ANDSF) personnel, or "ghost" soldiers.
The letter notes:
-- Persistent reports indicating discrepancies between the assigned force strength of the ANDSF and the actual number of personnel serving raise questions regarding whether the U.S. government is taking adequate steps to prevent taxpayer funds from being spent on so-called "ghost" soldiers.
-- Concerns have been raised that the U.S. government has relied on inaccurate data when determining how much it will spend on ANDSF salaries.
-- In 2015, SIGAR reported $300 million in annual, U.S.-funded salary payments to the Afghan National Police were based on only partially verified or reconciled data, and that there was no assurance that personnel and payroll data were accurate.
-- There are continuing reports of significant gaps between the assigned force strength of the ANDSF and the actual number of personnel serving.
-- U.S. Forces- Afghanistan reported that in the quarter ending June 2016 "ANDSF assigned force strength was 319,595 (not including civilians)," however, an Afghan official was reported as indicating that "the best internal estimate put the number around 120,000, less than a third of what is needed to secure the country."
-- The new police chief of Helmand province has been quoted as stating that of the approximately 26,000 ANDSF personnel assigned to the province "40 to 50 percent of the force did not exist physically when we asked for help during operations."
-- DOD outlined actions it was taking to improve the systems used for ANDSF personnel management. However, these systems will only be effective if accurate data is captured and maintained on ANDSF attendance and attrition.
-- Given the persistent reports of absentee or non-existent personnel, my office is concerned about whether adequate steps have been taken to address this issue.
Letter: https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-16-50-SP.pdf
Avoid the Charlie Wilson complex: guilt over the cries of ‘abandoning Afghanistan’ and deciding not to spend billions more of taxpayer’s money on a hop-scotch of social development programs.
As Iraq appears to unravel, it is only right to continue the debate about counterinsurgency, the appropriate application of landpower, and the expanding role of Special Operations in the US military.
If there is one thing the United States military has come to value over the last decade of war – perhaps the only thing – it is having interoperable coalition partners.
At present, for every US Soldier there is at least one 20-foot container of equipment in Afghanistan; a quantity that cannot be overemphasized as our military begins to face the challenges of retrograde in earnest.