So-called “ungoverned spaces” present the United States with significant security challenges in an era characterized by “softened sovereignty."
The US must begin a serious dialogue with Mexico to propose long-term solutions to the grave situation in which the police and military forces as well as the people of Mexico find themselves.
The Threat Of Mexico's Massive Underground Economy by Fernando Chávez, Worldcrunch
Informal, underground, black, "hidden." Economists have used a range of terms for economic activities that basically yield no taxes and don't contribute to bankrolling government services. Strictly speaking, the millions toiling this way in Mexico — and they account for more than half the workforce — are operating on the margins of the law and arguably working themselves into a social vacuum.
In fact, there is new data about the scale of Mexico's underground economy, providing insight into its evolution over the past decade. The research, from Mexico's National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), shows that the shadow economy accounted for 25% of GDP in 2012, and employed 60% of the working population, around 31 million people. This is clear evidence of a serious imbalance in the Mexican economy…
Perry: Guard Protecting US, Not Playing Politics by Will Weissert, Associated Press
Gov. Rick Perry said Wednesday that sending National Guard troops to the Texas-Mexico border will defend not just his home state but the entire nation from "narco-terrorists" and that he doesn't know how long they will have to be deployed before the national threat is quelled.
The Republican's possible 2016 White House aspirations got a boost nationally last month when he ordered 1,000 National Guard troops to the Texas-Mexico border. Perry traveled to Camp Swift Army National Guard Training Center 30 miles outside Austin for a firsthand look at the training they are getting for deployment - while perhaps hoping to look presidential…
Inshallah and Ojalá - The lessons of counterinsurgency and nation-building in Colombia can also apply to the Arab world. By James Stavridis, Foreign Policy.
A 50-year ideological struggle, hundreds of thousands killed, millions displaced, mass graves, murder, rape, torture, a virulent insurgency threatening the overthrow of the entire social order, a rebel enclave carved out of the heart of a big nation. It sounds a lot like the Middle East today, but the grim tale of the tape also applies to the beautiful Andean nation of Colombia over the past half-century.
Today, however, there is enormous progress in Colombia. And it's worth pausing, if not to celebrate these accomplishments quite yet, then at least to consider the lessons we might apply as we grapple with seemingly intractable problems across the Arab world…
Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #21: Cartel Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
Robert J. Bunker
Key Information: Camilo Mejia Giraldo, “Mexico’s Cartels Building Custom-Made Narco Drones: DEA.” Insight Crime. 11 July 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexicos-cartels-building-custom-made-narco-drones-dea:
Mexico’s drug cartels are reportedly commissioning custom-made drones to transport narcotics across the US border, illustrating the continual development of innovative new technologies and methods used to traffic drugs.
Cartels have begun hiring local workers from companies in Mexico to develop custom drones, or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), suited to their needs, according to an unnamed Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) source consulted by El Universal.
Since 2012, the DEA has registered around 150 narco drones crossing the border, transporting in total approximately two tons of cocaine and other drugs. This amounts to an average of roughly 13 kilos per load.
US and Mexican authorities have identified Queretaro, Guadalajara, Nuevo Leon and Mexico City as the drone production points, where cartels pay professionals two to three times their normal salary for this custom technology.
While cartels used to use foreign-made drones, the new reliance on home-grown technology and construction is more cost-effective -- the method is cheaper than the construction of cross-border tunnels or the use of semi-submersible vessels, according to El Universal's report.
InSight Crime Analysis
These new developments represent the latest in a long list of technologies and drug transport methods developed by cartels…
Mexican criminal organizations have been using UAVs since at least 2010, but the relatively small amount of drugs transported per trip on the drones registered by the DEA helps explain why the cartels want to develop larger, specially tailored UAVs. As drone technology worldwide becomes increasingly accessible and cost effective, commissioning custom-made drones in Mexico is the next logical step for cartels.
Key Information: Doris Gómora, “Fabrican narcos sus propios drones, alerta la DEA.” El Universal. 9 de Julio de 2014, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/carteles-fabrican-narcodrones-trasiego-eu-1022274.html:
Cárteles del narcotráfico están fabricando en México sus propias aeronaves no tripuladas o drones para traficar droga hacia los Estados Unidos, para lo cual están utilizando a trabajadores de empresas que tienen ensambladoras de drones en territorio mexicano, según información de la Agencia Antidrogas de Estados Unidos (DEA).
Narcodrones han sido utilizados para traficar droga en la frontera con Estados Unidos desde el 2011, parte de los cuales han sido asegurados por miembros de diferentes agencias tras ser derribados al cruzar hacia territorio estadounidense…
Who: Mexican cartels; specific cartels not stated. Key hiring cities for domestic drone production personnel—Mexico City, Querétaro, Guadalajara, and Nuevo León—suggest Sinaloan and Los Zetas cartel involvement at a minimum.
What: Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) utilized to transport illicit narcotics across the border from Mexico to the United States. Initially foreign produced, particularly Israeli, and then domestic drones since 2014. Since 2012, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has documented about 150 of these confirmed UAV intrusions.
When: UAV use since at least 2010 to the present.
Where: Along the Mexican and U.S. border.
Why: For transport of illicit narcotics; profit motive, overcome U.S. border defenses.
Analysis: The Mexican cartels have engaged in a three phase evolutionary process of aerial narcotics trafficking from conventional aircraft (both converted airliners and light craft) to ultralight aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Along the U.S. Southern border, this process has been prompted by increased U.S. homeland security activities. UAV use is not unique to the Mexican cartels with such criminal activity noted in January 2009, with drones going to Elmley Prison in Sheerness, Kent, United Kingdom (suspected narcotics),1 in February 2011 going in to a prison in the Tula region south of Moscow, Russia (heroin),2 in November 2011 coming across the Straight of Gibraltar into Spain (cannabis resin),3 throughout 2013 in the province of Quebec, Canada going to various prisons (illicit narcotics),4 in November 2013 going to the US prison in Calhoun, Georgia (cigarette smuggling),5 in March 2014 going to a Melbourne, Australia prison (illicit narcotics),6 and in May 2014 entering the Kaliningrad region, Russia (cigarette smuggling).7 Of concern are future Mexican cartel UAV evolutionary potentials related to a) sensor payload use for reconnaissance and surveillance functions and b) weapons payload use for small arms and IED attack capabilities. While there are no reports that either of these two evolutionary potentials have taken place, they would provide the Mexican cartels with additional tactical and operational level capabilities.
Significance: Armed Drone Potentials, Cartel Technology, Narcotics Trafficking, Sensor Drone Potentials
Notes
1. Daily Mail Reporter, “Remote control toy helicopter ‘used to fly drugs into prison’.” Daily Mail. 12 January 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1112673/Remote-control-toy-helicopter-used-fly-drugs-prison.html.
2. Voice of Russia, “Heroin by helicopter.” 1 February 2011, http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/02/01/42369291/.
3. Tom Worden, “Plane smart! Smugglers use remote-controlled aircraft to fly in cannabis.” Daily Mail. 21 November 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2064276/Plane-smart-Smugglers-use-remote-controlled-aircraft-fly-cannabis.html.
4. See Michael Aubry, “Drone sets off security alert at Hull jail.” Ottawa Sun. 26 November 2013, http://www.ottawasun.com/2013/11/26/drone-sets-off-security-alert-at-hull-jail and Brian Anderson, “How Drones Help Smuggle Drugs Into Prison.” Motherboard. 10 March 2014, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/howdrones-help-smuggle-drugs-into-prison.
5. WALB News 10, “Crooks get creative to smuggle contraband.” 22 & 27 November 2013, http://www.walb.com/story/24047984/crooks-get-creative-to-smuggle-contraband.
6. Brian Anderson, “How Drones Help Smuggle Drugs Into Prison.” Motherboard. 10 March 2014, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-drones-help-smuggle-drugs-into-prison and Nick Evershed, “Drone used in attempt to smuggle drugs into Melbourne prison, say police.” The Guardian. 10 March 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/10/drone-used-in-attempt-to-smuggle-drugs-into-melbourne-prison-say-police.
7. ITAR-TASS News Agency, “Lithuanian drone detained in Russia last week was used for cigarette smuggling.” 14 May 2014, http://en.itar-tass.com/world/731634.
Further Reading
Marguerite Cawley, “Drone Use in Latin America: Dangers and Opportunities.” Insight Crime. 18 April 2014, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drone-use-in-latin-america-dangers-and-opportunities.
Persistent Engagement in Colombia - Joint Special Operations University monograph by Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Griego
From the Introduction:
From its inception, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has enshrined capacity building in its doctrine as the central pillar of the “indirect approach,” which is the essential complement to direct action by U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF). USSOCOM Publication 1 calls upon Special Operations Forces (SOF) to train, advise, and assist partner-nation institutions in order to build their capacity, which in turn will reduce U.S. visibility, risk, and cost. It emphasizes “the need for persistence, patience, and continuity of effort” in capacity building.
In recent years, USSOF engagement in Colombia has been hailed widely as an exemplar of effective capacity building activities, and as proof that persistent engagement is critical to success. The duration and continuity of engagement have indeed been critical to successful capacity building, in Colombia and elsewhere. But they are only one part of the story, representing the quantitative side of SOF engagement. Much less attention has been devoted to the qualitative side of USSOF involvement in Colombia, which is no less important, although it is considerably less obvious and cannot be measured numerically. Taking the qualitative side for granted would be a major mistake, for history shows that providing large quantities of assistance over long periods of time has been no guarantor of success.
This monograph demonstrates that a combination of high quantity and high quality USSOF engagement bolstered Colombian capacity, and that it did so primarily by promoting the development of Colombia’s human capital…
The Transnational Gang Threat - Part 1: Joining Forces to Meet the Challenge - FBI
The community activists, social workers, and police officers from six Central American countries and the U.S. who had arrived in the nation’s capital the previous day were now assembled at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next door to the White House. Chatting in Spanish and English, they waited for the official start of a two-week training program with an innovative approach to dealing with the problem of transnational gangs.
The FBI-led initiative known as CACIE—the Central American Community Impact Exchange program—unites civic groups and law enforcement organizations to deter gang violence and criminal activity by helping to keep young people from joining gangs. This deterrence model stresses prevention in addition to police intervention, and the 22 CACIE participants are on the front lines of that effort.
Resources:
- More on the FBI’s anti-gang efforts
- More on the FBI's Transnational Anti-Gang Task Force
Crime Wars and Narco Terrorism in the Americas: A Small Wars Journal-El Centro Anthology - Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Editors, 544 Pages
This work marks the 3rd Small Wars Journal-El Centro anthology. Its analyses, crafted by over thirty contributing authors, forms a compilation of the violence and corruption in Mexico plaguing the first year of Enrique Peña Nieto's presidency. Instances of spillover violence in the United States and the gang and cartel crime wars in other Latin American countries are also chronicled. Spanish language article appendices are additionally incorporated in this important anthology. - Dave Dilegge, SWJ Editor-in-Chief
This is the Spanish language version of John Sullivan’s earlier SWJ article “Explosive Escalation? Reflections on the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez”.
