Strategic Note

The Document: On 25 July 2011, the National Security Staff released its Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security. The report is available at (http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/transnational-crime) and can be accessed as a pdf or in html by using the links provided (1). The contents are as follows:

i. Definition

ii. Letter from President Barack Obama: Executive Summary;

I. Introduction,

II. Transnational Organized Crime: A Growing Threat to National and International Security,

III. Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Priority Actions;

1. Start at Home: Taking Shared Responsibility for Transnational Organized Crime,

2. Enhance Intelligence and Information Sharing,

3. Protect the Financial System and Strategic Markets against Transnational Organized Crime,

4. Strengthen Interdiction, Investigations, and Prosecutions,

5. Disrupt Drug Trafficking and Its Facilitation of Other Transnational Threats,

6. Build International Capacity, Cooperation, and Partnerships.

Key Statements:

a). The characteristics of transnational organized crime (TOC) may include that— “They attempt to gain influence in government, politics, and commerce through corrupt as well as legitimate means;”

b). “Criminal networks are not only expanding their operations, but they are also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing. These networks also threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments and using the power and influence of those elements to further their criminal activities.”

c). “In January 2010, the United States Government completed a comprehensive review of international organized crime—the first on this topic since 1995. Based on the review and subsequent reporting, the Administration has concluded that, in the intervening years, international—or transnational— organized crime has expanded dramatically in size, scope, and influence and that it poses a significant threat to national and international security.” 

Western Hemisphere Overview: “TOC networks—including transnational gangs—have expanded and matured, threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region, with direct security implications for the United States. Central America is a key area of converging threats where illicit trafficking in drugs, people, and weapons—as well as other revenue streams—fuel increased instability. Transnational crime and its accompanying violence are threatening the prosperity of some Central American states and can cost up to eight percent of their gross domestic product, according to the World Bank. The Government of Mexico is waging an historic campaign against transnational criminal organizations, many of which are expanding beyond drug trafficking into human smuggling and trafficking, weapons smuggling, bulk cash smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. TOC in Mexico makes the U.S. border more vulnerable because it creates and maintains illicit corridors for border crossings that can be employed by other secondary criminal or terrorist actors or organizations. Farther south, Colombia has achieved remarkable success in reducing cocaine production and countering illegal armed groups, such as the FARC, that engage in TOC. Yet, with the decline of these organizations, new groups are emerging such as criminal bands known in Spanish as Bandas Criminales, or Bacrims.”

Analysis: This strategy was released less than three months ago and according to Bob Killebrew “…is in effect a replacement for the now-outdated U.S. strategy to combat terrorism. This is a good first step” (2).  While I agree it is a step in the right direction, the threat perceptions underlying it are overly traditionalist—some would even say woefully obsolete— and representative of static 20^th century thinking. I thus have very great concerns regarding the threat assumptions underlying the strategy since, if the baseline assumptions are faulty, then the rest of the strategy that is derived from those assumptions becomes highly suspect (3). Unfortunately, 21^st century ‘street realities’ of the last eleven years taking place in Mexico, in areas of Central America, and in other locales appear in no way to have influenced the threat perceptions underlying the strategy. At best, transnational organized crime is viewed as gaining ‘influence in governmental politics’, ‘forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments’, and ‘threatening the security of citizens and the stability of governments throughout the region’ (within the context of some Central American states). Such perceptions are indicative of the primacy and immutability of the nation-state as a social and political form of human organization. TOC within this threat context is viewed much like bloated ticks feeding off of host states. They represent parasitical organizations drawing upon illicit, and at times licit, economies to sustain themselves. TOC, such as the Mexican cartels, could thus never criminalize, capture, or kill a host state—or a region or city within it— based on these threat perceptions. The emergence of a ‘criminal-state’ or a ‘new warmaking entity’ or the existence of a ‘criminal insurgency’ taking place within a state simply cannot be accounted for in a strategy derived from these threat perceptions. The governments and citizens of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras should no doubt be comforted by the fact that they are only threatened with issues of stability and no more. While the strategy may serve to perpetuate the legalistic charade of the nation-state’s ‘monopoly on political violence’ and ‘control over its sovereign borders,’ it does a great disservice to the American people and others by not fully recognizing the TOC threat. Criminal-insurgencies are currently raging across Mexico, in areas of Central America, and in other locales (4). Cities and regions have been captured by de facto politicized cartel and gang entities with criminal para-states established by the Zetas, the Sinaloans, and other criminal organizations. This is representative of the blurring of crime and war ‘nightmare scenarios’ which have been debated since the 1990s and have since manifested themselves throughout the globe. Until US governmental threat perceptions mature—especially in strategic documents that outline our national policies— the cartel and gang threats we are now witnessing in the Western Hemisphere will continue to be misunderstood and underestimated.  

Notes 

All quotes without notes pertain to the White House strategy document.

1. Also see “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the Announcement of the Transnational Organized Crime Strategy”. Justice News. Monday, 25 July 2011, http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110725.html.

2. Col Robert B. Killebrew, U.S. Army (Retired), “Crime & War.” Proceedings. October 2011: 26. This citation contains a note thanking Killebrew’s CNAS colleague Matt Irvine for his initial perception concerning it replacing the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

3. My concerns are very different than those articulated by the TransBorder Project, a project of the Center for International Policy in Washington, DC. See Tom Barry, “U.S. Drug War Turns to Transnational Combat”. Border Lines. Wednesday, 3 August 2011, http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/us-drug-war-turns-to-transnational.html.

4. The developed construct is attributed to John P. Sullivan in 2008. Many of his writings on this subject first appeared in Small Wars Journal.

Colombian Intelligence (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad - DAS) Compromised by Drug Traffickers¹

Intelligence Pulse: On 18 September 2011, the newspaper Semana obtained records of the identities of all 6,800 DAS (Colombian intelligence) officials, including undercover agents and their missions, and noted that thousands of intelligence documents were also leaked. The current director of the DAS confirmed the leaks, stating that DAS officials who stole information sold it for personal profit. Semana alleges that the intelligence was passed on to various drug kingpins. President Santos has said he plans the closure of DAS by November 2011.¹

Analysis: While this note may not specifically pertain to the Mexican cartels, it has been included in this series to show the need for robust OPSEC (operational security) and counter-intelligence programs for Western Hemispheric nations threatened by cartel and gang threats. The government of Colombia is considered very sophisticated in responding to these threats given its initial experiences with the Medellin and Cali cartels dating back to the 1980s. This incident represents a severe blow to Colombian intelligence gathering and covert operations capabilities.² Further, well known linkages exist between the narcotics traffickers and criminal groups in Mexico and Colombia and their sharing of intelligence gathering tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Similar threat potentials directed at Mexican and American intelligence organizations focused on the Mexican cartels and the criminal insurgencies taking place in their own respective territories must be considered. These potentials exist for all areas of Mexico and increasingly throughout the US with major threat concentrations in Texas and within the border zones of California, Arizona, and New Mexico.

Notes

1. This intelligence pulse— originally titled “Colombia - DAS officials leak intelligence to drug traffickers for profit” — was provided with the permission of Samuel Logan, Director, Southern Post (www.southernpulse.com), and a SWJ El Centro Fellow.

2. Additional reporting suggests that most of this information was leaked in 2009 and that the ongoing breach of security at DAS has continued. See Travis Mannon, “Colombia’s intelligence chief takes responsibility for massive information leak.” Colombia Reports.  Monday, 19 September 2011, http://colombiareports.com/colombia-news/news/19057-colombias-intelligence-chief-assumes-responsibility-over-massive-information-leak.html.

Mexican Cartels (Transnational Criminal Organizations) Now Operating in Over 1,000 US Cities; Up From 195 US Cities

The recent publication of the US Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), National Drug Threat Assessment 2011 (http://www.justice.gov/ndic/topics/ndtas.htm#y2011) (August 2011) provides an important strategic insight into Mexican cartel penetration into the United States. On p. 8 of the document, a single sentence states:

Mexican-based TCOs were operating in more than a thousand U.S. cities during 2009-2010, spanning all nine OCDETF regions.

The corresponding note (g) is as follows:

Included are traffickers who purchase illicit drugs from TCO associates and distribute them on their own, cells that function as an extension of the TCO to traffic illicit drugs in the United States, and cells that provide warehousing, security, and/or transportation services for the TCO.

Prior publicly released National Drug Intelligence Center data on Mexican TCOs (Transnational Criminal Organizations) operating in the United States dates back to a situation report and a series of maps from April 2008. The Situation Report: Cities in Which Mexican DTOs Operate Within the United States (http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs27/27986/index.htm). This sentence from the Discussion section provides a baseline concerning Mexican cartel penetration into the United States:

Federal, state, and local law enforcement reporting reveals that Mexican DTOs operate in at least 195 cities throughout the United States.

The acronym “DTO” stands for Drug Trafficking Organization which has since been replaced by the acronym “TCO”— Transnational Criminal Organization— used in the 2011 document— to convey that the Mexican cartels are now viewed as more threatening and capable (with transnational reach) entities. This data comes from

“Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Reporting January 1, 2006 through April 8, 2008”. No corresponding note exists concerning the metrics of the data pertaining to this report, though it assumed, that the same data collection methodology was utilized by the US Department of Justice analysts. If this assumption is accurate:

This would mean that Mexican cartel operational penetration into US cities is now thought to be 500% higher than previously estimated in the time frame of roughly three years. The baseline of “at least 195 cities throughout the United States” has increased to “more than a thousand U.S. cities”. 

While the April 2008 document was supported by Map 1. Cities reporting the presence of Mexican drug trafficking organizations showing the locations of the Mexican cartels in the United States, the new August 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment does not provide such a map. A query and public request for information to NDIC public affairs concerning the release of such a map was made. The response was that such a map would now be considered a law enforcement restricted document. While this might be understandable from an operational security (OPSEC) and counter-intelligence perspective, it is in variance with an open public debate on the Mexican cartel (and gang) threat to the United States and the more encompassing threat to Mexico, Central America, and other regions of the Western Hemisphere.

If US Congressional and Senate committees—such as the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee (http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/subcommittees.asp?committee=8)— and those focusing on homeland security are to continue their public hearings on this broadening threat, some consideration should be made as to US strategic requirements and open public debate. Ten years after the 9/11 attack by Al Qaeda, the United States has reached a pivotal strategic decision point in our national policies. Are we to continue with our national security policy of focusing on that terrorist entity (and its group of networks) as the dominant threat to the US and the homeland or will the Mexican cartels (and their supporting gang networks) now be recognized as replacing Al Qaeda as the number one threat to our government and safety of our citizens? While the violence potentials of Al Qaeda are universally recognized— we will never forget the thousands of our dead mourned after 9/11— the violence associated with the criminal insurgent potentials of the Mexican cartels and their ability to corrupt and undermine governments in the Western Hemisphere must now be considered far more threatening to our nation.¹

Notes

1. Two issues should be further clarified. First, any type of Al Qaeda inspired attack taking place domestically— even a botched suicide bombing attempt against the DC metro system— would result in heightened media sensationalism and a continued US Governmental focus on Al Qaeda as the primary threat to this nation. The fallout from such an incident would likely serve to downgrade our perceptions related to the greater threat stemming from the more corruptive and subtle insurgent activities of the Mexican cartels combined with their use of symbolic violence.  Second, I want to reiterate that the cause of global jihad promoted by Al Qaeda and other elements of radical Islam are still a significant threat to US interests and our global security posture. In the case of our allies in Europe, for example, Al Qaeda and radical Islam continue to be the number one external and internal strategic threat to many of these nations. When our own domestic security scales weigh the threats, however, Al Qaeda and radical Islam, has to now be considered less of a threat to the security of the United States than the Mexican cartels and their associates. Ultimately, while we can live with governmental failure and internal strife in Afghanistan and/or Iraq—we cannot say the same concerning Mexico, given the cross border cartel infiltration we have now identified per the National Drug Threat Assessment 2011.