Understanding the correlation between an insurgency’s goals and their IED design is crucial to defending against the devices and forecasting IED threats.
Guerilla warfare is not an “Eastern Way of War,” it is the universal war of the weak.
One consistently wrong—but always convenient—prediction has been the improbability of ground wars and the declining utility of ground forces.
The “U.S. in the Lead” COIN approach usually fails where security force assistance could succeed.
Despite success at degrading Philippine terrorist networks, much of the security gains have been transitory, while the underlying socio-economic problems in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago remain.
The Civilian Irregular Defense Group was one of Special Forces’ greatest success stories and by far the greatest example of how to fight unconventional warfare with an economy of force approach.
While COIN remains the convention, to varying degrees, in post-conflict and steady-state operations, rule of law will be an essential part of the US security mission.
The explosive effects of rumors in Syria and insurgenceis around the world.
When Afghanistan failed, then COIN was seen as having failed too, having proved itself too risky, too time-consuming to justify its extraordinary investment in lives and treasure.
If the coalition consolidates on major bases along the ring road and attempts a Soviet-style hub and spoke concept, the result will be the same: defeat.
