COIN

“Afghan Led” is a critical aspect of our counterinsurgency operations that we must grasp to enable ultimate mission success.

Historians often turn wars and battles into linear sequences outlining casual chains for which the mind has a natural bias.

Transition can’t simply be, “We are leaving...good luck.”

The conventional approach taken by most aid programs has been a counterproductive disaster.

Looking to Plan Colombia to create a Plan Yemen.

There is a danger in the empirical mode of reasoning that it will lead us to think of a thousand locals or twenty counterinsurgents as homogenous units of human being. 

An edited volume by Williamson Murray and Peter Mansoor.

Observing how the Afghans develop intelligence and seek creative means to support their operations is vital to Afghans owning the security.

Will we “learn” the same lessons we learned after Vietnam again? (…and, by the way, what were those lessons?)

Critiquing the Critique of British COIN