Syria

In perhaps the strongest push that the Free Syrian Army has made against Bashar al-Assad’s regime over the past 17 months of conflict, rebel fighters have descended on Damascus this week in an effort to pressure the government inside a city that has long been viewed as Assad’s main power base.  As is understandable, finding out exactly what is happening on inside of the capital city is extremely difficult, given the scale of the constant violence and the regime’s efforts to silence international reporting.  But if first-hand accounts provided by anti-government activists are anything to go by, the rebel’s offensive into the capital has proved to be a remarkable success.  The Free Syrian Army is certainly nowhere near driving the Syrian army and intelligence services out, but what they have managed to do is provoke the Assad regime in an area that many people had previously described as a loyalist stronghold.

What began as a series of small-scale ambushes on government targets in the Damascus suburbs has quickly evolved into the first major case of pitched battles between opposition forces and the Syrian regime.  Far from being a man in full control over his future, Bashar al-Assad is now confronted with his most significant setback yet.  The deaths of three men who have intimately involved in carrying out the government’s brutal security strategy will undoubtedly strike fear into a man who only a month ago publicly claimed that he continued to hold the support of his people. 

Having the determination and specific information that is required to track down and eventually assassinate three members of Assad’s security cabinet (the Syrian Defense Minister, Deputy Defense Minister, and a high-ranking general) is a big enough boost for the rebels.  The circumstances surrounding the attack, however, are just as impressive.  This was no juvenile assassination attempt on a convoy of vehicles, but rather a detailed feat of logistics that needed to be performed perfectly in order to successfully infiltrate what should have been the most heavily-guarded meeting room in the entire country.  The debate of whether the explosion was detonated by a suicide bomber or by a remote-controlled device does matter.  The point is that someone was able to sneak an explosive into the same room where the president’s most trusted defense advisers were meeting.  This could not have been possible without at least some cooperation between rebel forces on the outside and those within the regime who have become disillusioned, but well-placed to know the detailed movements of the Syrian Government’s most important loyalists.

Fighting between the rebels and government forces are still ongoing, but the probability that the FSA will be capable enough to, as one spokesman boasted, “liberate Damascus,” remains inconceivable at the moment.  Yet even if Syria’s army pushes rebel fighters from the city-limits, the operation is nonetheless a stunning success for a resistance movement that only five months ago was considered to be dead in the water.  Who would have thought that after a month-long bombardment of their Baba Amr stronghold and subsequent withdrawal last March that the FSA would bounce back to the extent that it has today?

When taken in isolation, the presence of FSA fighters striking at government targets in Damascus is not at all surprising.  Indeed, rebel units have encroached on the capital’s outskirts several times beforehand; the Syrian regime itself has suffered casualties from suicide bombings, standard RPG attacks, and ambushes on army vehicles during patrols.  But the FSA operation in Damascus this week is far bolder and more sophisticated from a tactical standpoint than any of those previous attempts:

-The offensive on the southern districts of Damascus is serious enough to compel a significant change in Syrian military behavior.  For the first time since the insurgency erupted, Bashar al-Assad and his supporters took the concerted decision to divert manpower from other conflict theatres in the country to strengthen its defense in the capital.  Israel’s military intelligence director, Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, testified in front of an Israeli parliamentary committee that Syrian army units have been redeployed to Damascus from the Golan Heights.  This move would not be a big deal if it were not for the fact that Assad has largely viewed the people trying to oust him as a minor irritant.  The sending of reinforcements from the Golan and reports that Syria is using helicopter gunships to stave off the FSA ambush suggests a far different tune that what the regime has been saying in public.  Assad is deeply worried about the an insurgent movement that has matured over the past year.

-In a demonstrable shift in their own tactics, the FSA has purportedly sent its own reinforcements into the capital region.  Col. Qassem Saadeddine, a spokesman for the FSA, has confirmed this information himself during an interview with Reuters: “This has been planned for some time now. We sent many groups and fighters to Damascus and its suburbs 10 days ago. We have sent at least 50 groups, each with around 50 fighters.”  If in fact this statement is true, then the FSA has grown to the point of coordinating a relatively complex operation among fighters from a number of different regions.  A central criticism of the Free Syrian Army is that they were an army only in name, unable to unite a collection of hundreds of neighborhood and city-wide militias with differing ideological and religious outlooks.  This logistical feat is a repudiation of that criticism, and one that the United States may take into consideration as diplomacy at the UN Security Council continues to lag.

-Assad may not show it, but it is almost unfathomable that he is comfortable with the status-quo.  There was a time when the major cities of Damascus and Aleppo were still regarded as primary bases of regime support.  Residents in both of these cities have been able to live more of a normal life than those in Homs, Hama, and Dara’a, where entire districts are wiped out by regime counterattacks.  But with rising discontent in Aleppo and the quick, but steady, gains made by the FSA in Damascus over the past four days, that assumption is starting to fall apart.  Without the support of those two cities, Assad’s tenure is far more vulnerable.  The deaths of three of his most trusted security advisers only adds to the fear that Assad must be feeling right now, for if the president’s brother-in-law can be targeted successfully, there is a real prospect of the president himself could meet the same fate.

Even with the latest clashes in the capital, a dose of realism is in order.  The FSA may be strong enough to challenge the regime in its power base for a few days, or perhaps for a few weeks.  But their efforts are still unlikely to result in anything substantial, at least from a military perspective.  The FSA has had trouble in the past holding large amounts of territory, a capability that has become somewhat of a prerequisite if the rebels hope to stage operations further into the regime’s power base.  For all of the Assad regime’s latest cracks in the armor, the fact remains that it holds a tremendous superiority over rebel forces in terms of military equipment, cash (however dwindling), manpower, and command-and-control.  The Syrian army has relied upon a package of artillery bombardments, mortar strikes, and air power to ruthlessly but effectively kill insurgents while keeping others on the run.  Without heavier weapons for rebel units, the cycle of probe, attack, and counterattack is likely to continue, rendering any territorial gains by the FSA within Syria’s major cities short-lived, if not strategically questionable.

It has taken over a year, but the international community is finally starting to accept that Bashar al-Assad cannot remain the ruler of Syria.  The international community’s hesitation allowed Assad to wage war against his own people, killing thousands and devastating Syria’s infrastructure.  Diplomatic overtures intent on ending the conflict between the two warring factions have failed and will continue to fail so long as Assad’s intransigence continues.  No international party is willing to directly intercede in the conflict, rightfully fearing the unforeseen consequences of military intervention.  If the international community intends on removing Assad, then only two options are currently available: assisting in the overthrow of Assad by members of his ruling coalition, or supporting a victory by the opposition against the regime. 

Neither of these options is optimal.  Yet, other options are neither realistic nor tolerable.  The conflict has passed any threshold in which a negotiated settlement would satisfy either party as they stand today.  Assad’s onslaught against his own people shows he is intent on remaining president at any cost.  The opposition, once composed of moderate activists calling for political reform, has evolved into an armed insurgency intent on making the regime pay for its crimes.  If the international community wants to see a new regime in Syria, then it has no choice but to isolate Assad while empowering the opposition.

A coup would likely be the fastest way to end the conflict.  The elite minority ruling Syria is interconnected by commerce, fear, and sectarian loyalty.  The Syrian elite thus far remain loyal to Assad, a testament to both Assad’s ability to instill fear and the strength of the elite pact.  However, no group’s loyalty is unlimited.  Defections within Syria’s officer corps and the severity of the country’s economic collapse reveal dissension within the ruling coalition.  Signs of weakness could be exploited in an effort to turn elite sentiment against Assad. 

The coup could be presented as the only means by which the elite can save their own hides.   Opposition fighters are gaining ground against Syria’s security forces and they intend on tearing down the whole political order, not just Assad.  If the elite stay loyal and lose to the revolution, then they will be at the mercy of the long-oppressed Syrian majority.  Yet, a successful move against Assad by members of his ruling coalition could soften hostilities.  The opposition’s symbolic enemy, Assad, would be gone and the international community could use the coup as an opportunity to pressure the conflicting parties towards negotiation. 

The second option, supporting a victory by the opposition, means that the conflict will continue unabated.  Continued warfare within Syria means thousands more will lose their lives, hundreds of thousands of refugees will flee conflict zones, and the country’s already devastated infrastructure will be further destroyed.  Being outgunned, the Syrian opposition can only win through attrition – inflicting minor wounds against security forces until the regime collapses.  The Syrian opposition is fragmented, internally competitive, and constituted of a diverse collection of organizations that are often as hostile to each other as they are to the regime.  Yet, the opposition is leading an effective revolution when it should have already been decimated.  They enjoy the support of much of the Syrian population and have been successful in pushing the conflict into Assad’s main areas of control.  As it stands today, the Syrian opposition cannot win militarily, but their capabilities are steadily improving.

The success of either of these options requires a great deal of luck.  Syria is in chaos and likely will remain so for the foreseeable future.  Trying to sow dissension among the elite may fail.  The opposition could prove unable to finish off Assad.  There are thousands of things that can go wrong in pursuing either of these options.  Yet, the ongoing humanitarian disaster in Syria must be stopped and the international community has limited their options.  Too much time has already been wasted on proposed political settlements and while the intent of these diplomatic efforts is good, they have only allowed Assad to continue his war against Syria itself.  If the international community will not directly intercede in the conflict, then it must support the opposition.  Otherwise, we are simply allowing a disaster to continue.      

Author's Note: Some of the ideas in this short essay were born from a conversation I had with Mr. Edward Burke of the Center for European Reform, to whom I owe due thanks.

Hilary Clinton’s June 12 accusation against Russia put forward nothing new. And what is worse, it could not have come at a worse time. Only three days earlier, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the “urgent” need for an international conference to prevent Syria’s further slide into civil war, to force all parties “to sit down at the negotiating table after first halting the violence.” This plan -- markedly similar to Kofi Annan’s proposal -- belies a great sacrifice by the Russian leadership, but one on which the Secretary failed to capitalize.

Russia’s foreign policy is rooted in a Cold War psychology. Lavrov and his Foreign Ministry view international politics as a geopolitical chess game. It would be no stretch to say that Lavrov has acted as Russia’s “new Kissinger,” seeking to maintain Russian influence at any cost: quintessential realpolitik. Moscow’s influence has diminished since 1991, but Russia’s support for the Assad regime is rooted in Moscow’s desire to maintain its ally in Damascus, and appear powerful in the face of western opinion: the last thing Lavrov wants is to cave to Washington’s desires.

So why would he make such a concession? Russian leaders know that Assad’s days are numbered. The only realistic option for Moscow now is to push for a compromise, evinced by their desire for an international conference. Such an entity would provide parts of the Syrian government with an “escape hatch” from the conflict. Without the threat of vengeful massacres or reprisals against Assad loyalists, support for the government would shrink. Indeed, much of the regime’s support comes from those who fear for Syria’s security in a post-Assad region, not pro-government idealists.

It is thus important to see that Lavrov put quite a bit of leverage on the line over the last few days. He could only make his proposal after being given permission from the highest echelons in the Russian government. The fact that he was able to offer Russian support for such a multilateral conference indicates that Russian diplomats are finally realizing that it is in their best interests to maintain some of their influence in Syria lest they lose it all: for Russian leaders to express a willingness to work towards a “post-Assad Syria” is relatively groundbreaking.  An internationally-brokered compromise with the opposition is essential to this envisaged transition.

Secretary Clinton’s accusation derailed these significant steps. Coming hours after Lavrov’s most recent concessions, her words can easily be seen as a rebuke against the Russian government, and will likely be interpreted as such in Moscow. It has been a poorly-kept secret that Russia has been delivering weapons to Syria for a long time, and the intelligence which supported her claims takes a very long time to verify. Clinton’s timing sends the clear message that the United States continues to be unwilling to work with Moscow towards any solution except that which Washington prescribes.

This type of unilateralism is extremely harmful. It is easy to underestimate or forget the anger Russian leaders still feel about American actions in 2002-2003 during the lead-up to the Iraq invasion, against which they were strongly opposed. The ensuing rift in the Security Council between these two powers led some analysts to wonder if the United Nations could survive. This resentment has only been exacerbated by the most recent accusations. Indeed, the way Russia interpreted Clinton’s words becomes painfully clear in Moscow’s most recent refusal on July 5 to attend international talks aimed at halting the bloodshed in Syria, a meeting spearheaded by the United States, France, Britain and Germany. Russia intransigence further inspired China to boycott the meeting as well. If the United States ignores any movement by Russia towards accepting a proposal for slow but steady peace, the comprehensive victory envisaged by Washington will become even more of an impossibility.

A solution to the Syria crisis will require Russian involvement. Such cooperation is not as difficult to achieve as it may seem: Russian diplomats, headed by Lavrov, are ready to negotiate.  Arming the Syrian regime against its own citizens is indefensible. Yet, Washington cannot continue to ignore the goals and motivations of those groups that are backing the regime, especially Russia. It is critical to bring these groups to the negotiating table so that a difficult but necessary compromise can be extruded, albeit painfully.

Syrian government leaders feel right now as if they are faced with a “do or die” reality. The international community must offer a third way out, whereby parts of the regime can realize it is in their best interest to end the conflict. The Russian plan would create such an avenue, but Clinton’s accusations risk killing it.

Recently, Moscow declared that it would stop supplying the Syrian government with weapons, specifically the Yak-130 attack aircraft; however, this declaration is yet shaky, and it is unclear whether Russia will discontinue current shipments, or simply stop supplying new arms. To solidify these important steps forward, and to keep the Syrian war “small,” the US government should learn from the diplomatic mistake it made in June.

A Syrian MiG-21 pilot, reportedly Col Hasan Mirei al-Hamadeh, defected today, landing in Jordan where he requested and was granted asylum.  BBC, among many others, has the story here.  The BBC also has a brief but smart analytical comment.  It notes the historical linkages of the Asad regime to the air force (Hafez al-Asad was an air force officer and pilot), and especially air force intelligence, however cautions against extrapolating this event to be a potential tipping point for the cohesiveness of the military.  Additionally, it avoids trotting out the sectarian simplifications that have become all too common in caricatures of the region (some sources cite that the air force is largely Sunni).  Nonetheless, it is a major event and cannot but heighten cross-border tensions and suspicions within Syria.